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PREFACE  
The four authors herewith present to the European Commission DG Justice the final 
report in fulfilment of the contract following the ‘Open call for tender JUST/2014/JCOO/ 
PR/CIVI/0051: Study on the law applicable to companies with the aim of a possible 
harmonisation of conflict of laws rules on the matter’.  
The report has four main parts: (i) a statistical data collection examining how far, in the 
EU, companies operate in some form in Member States different from the Member State 
in which they have been incorporated; (ii) an empirical survey dealing with the practical 
problems created by the legal uncertainty for companies caused by the current situation 
stemming from the potential for conflicts of laws in a context where the substantive laws 
of the Member States have not been fully harmonised; (iii) a comparative analysis of the 
conflicts of laws rules applicable to companies, as well as the related rules of substantive 
law, in the laws of all Member States; and (iv) a normative assessment suggesting 
possible solutions to the problem, including a possible harmonisation of conflict of laws 
rules in the area of company law 
The abstract and the executive summary that follow the table of contents summarise the 
main findings of this study. The Annex of the report includes the 28 country reports that 
form the basis of the comparative part of the study.  
We thank the country experts and our research assistants for their excellent work, the 
members of the steering committee and the survey respondents for their participation, 
and LSE Enterprise and the European Commission for their support. 
We have sought to bring our work up to date to 1 May 2016, but some subsequent 
developments have been included where necessary or appropriate. 
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While the case law of the Court of Justice has been supportive of foreign incorporations 
and cross-border corporate mobility in Europe, many problems still persist in practice. 
This report analyses these practical problems and the relevant domestic rules, followed 
by normative recommendations. First, the statistical analysis revealed that corporate 
mobility is only a partial reality in the EU. Second, an empirical survey of lawyers from all 
Member States found, inter alia, that there is considerable legal uncertainty regarding 
the subject matter of this report in many of the Member States and that respondents 
support a possible harmonisation of conflict of laws rules. Third, the comparative part of 
the report provides a thorough analysis of the conflict of laws rules applicable to 
companies in all 28 Member States, based upon reports drafted by national 
correspondents from each Member State. Fourth, in the normative analysis, we 
recommend harmonisation of the relevant conflict of laws rules in a new ‘Rome V 
Regulation’. This should generally be based on the incorporation theory, but it should 
also provide tools to protect the public interests of host Member States. The study also 
provides suggestions for a possible directive on seat transfers. 
The information and views set out in this report are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Commission. The Commission does not 
guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this study. Neither the Commission nor 
any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may be held responsible for the use which 
may be made of the information contained therein. 
 
Bien que la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice soit favorable à la constitution de sociétés 
à l’étranger et à la mobilité transfrontalière des sociétés en Europe, de nombreux 
problèmes subsistent en pratique. Le présent rapport analyse ces problèmes ainsi que les 
règles nationales pertinentes et propose des recommandations législatives. Tout d’abord, 
l’analyse statistique a révélé que la mobilité des sociétés n’est pas complètement réalisée 
au sein de l’UE. Ensuite, une étude empirique réalisée auprès d’avocats exerçant dans 
tous les États membres a permis de constater, entre autres, qu’une insécurité juridique 
importante affecte le domaine couvert par le présent rapport dans la plupart des États 
membres, et que les personnes interrogées sont favorables à une harmonisation des 
règles de conflit de lois. En troisième lieu, la partie comparative du rapport fournit une 
analyse approfondie des règles de conflit de lois applicables aux sociétés dans l’ensemble 
des 28 États membres, sur la base de rapports rédigés par les correspondants nationaux 
de chaque État membre. Enfin, dans l’analyse normative, nous recommandons 
l’harmonisation des règles de conflit de lois applicables à la matière dans un nouveau 
« règlement Rome V ». Celui-ci devrait en principe reposer sur la théorie de 
l’incorporation, mais il devrait aussi offrir des instruments de protection des intérêts 
publics des États membres d’accueil. L’étude fournit également des suggestions quant à 
une éventuelle directive sur les transferts de siège. 
Les informations et les vues énoncées dans la présente étude sont celles de(s) l'auteur 
(s) et ne reflètent pas nécessairement la position officielle de la Commission. La 
Commission ne garantit pas l'exactitude des données incluses dans cette étude. La 
Commission et aucune personne agissant pour le compte de la Commission ne peuvent 
être tenus responsables de l'usage qui pourrait être fait des informations qui y sont 
présentées. 
 






Starting with the landmark decision in Centros, the case law of the Court of Justice has 
been supportive of foreign incorporations and cross-border corporate mobility in Europe, 
even where little or no economic activity takes place in the Member State of 
incorporation. However, this has not solved the problems of the applicable law of 
companies in the EU. All Member States have of course traditionally accepted a certain 
degree of economic activity by foreign companies in their territory without imposing their 
own company law rules on such entities as part of their private international law. They 
differ, however, in their traditional legal responses to foreign companies establishing 
particular commercial links with their national economies, as based on the following two 
theories: 
The ‘incorporation theory’ assesses the rules applicable to companies by reference to the 
law at the place of incorporation, irrespective of the level of intensity of any commercial 
links between the foreign company and the host state. Conceptually, this acceptance of 
foreign law encompasses all core aspects of company law (as understood by an 
incorporation-theory country). Thus, following this approach, a validly constituted foreign 
corporation moving its headquarters (or any other part of its undertaking) to a 
jurisdiction will retain its capacity and internal organisation rules. The ‘real seat theory’, 
by contrast, aims at determining the jurisdiction the company is most closely connected 
with. There is no universally accepted way of determining what constitutes the ‘closest 
connection’, but corporate headquarters and the place where the most important 
decisions are made are often used by countries following this approach. Once identified, 
the connecting factor then typically again applies to all aspects of company law. 
This basic dichotomy has been reshaped by the case law of the Court of Justice 
interpreting the right of establishment of companies incorporated in the EU Member 
States. In spite of the Court’s case law, various nuances and complications persist, for 
example, about the relationship between the rules of the lex societatis and other areas of 
law (insolvency law, tort law etc) as well as the possibility of companies to transfer their 
seat. The following report addresses these issues in detail. It contains four main parts: a 
statistical data collection, an empirical survey, a comparative analysis, and a normative 
assessment suggesting possible solutions to the problem. 
Statistical data collection 
Companies that have their ‘real seat’ in a Member State different from the state of 
incorporation have, in the past, given rise to controversial legal questions and attempts 
to restrict their activities on the part of the host state. However, previous research on 
this topic is limited in at least two respects: it has been focussed on the analysis of 
foreign-based companies in the UK and it has mainly been concerned with differences in 
the costs of incorporation.  
The statistical data collected and analysed for this report attempts to fill these gaps:  
First, in the descriptive statistics, based on data from all Member States, we identified 
the UK as the most popular target destination. To a lesser extent, foreign incorporations 
also take place in other Member States, in particular in Central and Eastern Europe, with 
Estonia, Romania and Slovakia being popular target destinations. However, the network 
analysis of these data also showed that foreign incorporations typically happen between 
neighbouring countries with further linguistic, social and economic similarities; thus, the 
effect of the freedom of establishment on the mobility of companies across all Member 
States is still rather limited. 




Second, the time series analysis of new incorporations in the UK and Slovakia from 1990 
to 2015 found that the main changes happened after 2000, with many of them in the UK 
in the 2010s and in Slovakia in the mid-2000s, and that most changes are characterised 
by an increase in foreign incorporations. Thus, for the UK, all of those changes occurred a 
number of years after the case law of the Court of Justice liberalised the freedom of 
establishment of companies. The data from Slovakia show strong change points in or 
around the Slovakian accession to the EU in 2004. But here too it is difficult to relate this 
finding to the case law as this positive effect may also be due to other factors that have 
increased cross-border cooperation and business activity with EU enlargement. 
Third, the regression analysis suggests that decisions about domestic or foreign 
incorporations are not merely a result of the differences in substantive company law. 
Rather, we found that private international law may also play some role: countries that 
have a clear-cut version of the ‘incorporation theory’ seem to benefit in this market for 
incorporations, as compared to companies that have retained elements of the ‘real seat 
theory’. We also found that the extent to which private international law differ between a 
given country pair is significantly and negatively related to the foreign incorporations. 
Fourth, it is therefore possible to draw the following policy implications from this analysis: 
the results show that the case law of the Court of Justice has not made all differences in 
the conflicts of laws rules applicable to companies obsolete. The significant negative 
effect of the differences between those rules may speak in favour of harmonisation in this 
area of private international law. The significant relationship between the ‘pureness’ of 
the incorporation theory and the use of a Member State’s companies by foreign 
incorporators can also provide an indication about the possible direction of any 
harmonisation that aims to facilitate corporate mobility in Europe. 
Empirical survey 
The case law of the Court of Justice and recent law reforms in some Member States have 
liberalised the choice of the place of incorporation. Effective corporate mobility is, 
however, not only a matter of the ‘law in the books’ but also the ‘law in practice’. The 
empirical chapter of this report presents the results of a survey of lawyers conducted in 
September 2015. The responses were evaluated with quantitative methods, also 
examining whether there are significant differences between groups of respondents and 
correlations between answers to specific questions. In addition, qualitative responses of 
the free-text comments were used to contextualise the results.  
The main finding is that there are significant practical obstacles to corporate mobility in 
Europe. This shows in many of the survey answers and holds true for both the aggregate 
level of the responses and the analyses of the responses for particular groups of 
respondents. It also correlates with the view that supports European harmonisation in 
this area of law. More specifically, the following observations can be made:  
First, the respondents do not regard the case law of the Court of Justice as a substitute 
for a possible harmonisation of conflict of laws rules. The support for harmonisation of 
conflict of laws rules was stronger than for harmonisation of substantive company law, 
while the latter still received considerable support; at the same time, there was a positive 
correlation between support for the two, showing that these areas of law are not seen as 
alternative choices for European harmonisation. 
Second, it is noticeable that many of the respondents from the countries that have 
retained an element of the ‘real seat theory’ report various practical obstacles. Those 
problems have also been frequently mentioned in the free text comments, for example, 
indicating the problems in identifying the place of the ‘real seat’. 




Third, the analysis of group differences also shows that there is still a divide between the 
respondents from eastern European countries (or the countries with a lower GDP per 
capita, or the post-2004 Member States) and those from other countries. The 
respondents from the former countries are more likely to indicate lack of familiarity with 
the relevant procedures and to report practical problems in their dealings with domestic 
courts and commercial registers. 
Fourth, as regards specific problems, the respondents often mentioned translation costs 
and problems of legal uncertainty. The relationship with related areas of law, notably 
insolvency law, is also seen as crucial; in particular, questions of taxation are a decisive 
factor for effective corporate mobility. 
Fifth, there is also a strong positive correlation between respondents who are sceptical 
about their domestic law and who support harmonisation of conflict of laws rules. 
Interestingly, there is also a positive correlation between support for harmonisation of 
substantive rules and conflict of laws rules: thus, these areas of law are not seen as 
alternative choices for European harmonisation. 
Comparative analysis  
The conflict of laws rules applicable to companies follow certain common patterns across 
Member States, but they are also characterised by a significant degree of legal 
uncertainty and a fragmentary regulation of issues in the boundary region between the 
lex societatis and other legal areas. Member States have traditionally been divided into 
‘real seat states’ and ‘incorporation theory states’, although this distinction has lost much 
of its relevance in light of the case law of the Court of Justice. Nevertheless, we can 
observe that certain elements of the real seat theory persist in a number of Member 
States and that the scope of application of these rules and their conformity with the 
freedom of establishment under the Treaty is often unclear. 
The main results of the comparative analysis are as follows: 
In virtually all Member States, it is now relatively well established that real seat theory-
based private international law rules can no longer be applied to companies incorporated 
in other EU Member States. However, we find significant variation in how the relevant 
connecting factor is formulated and whether the conflict rules contain exceptions to this 
connecting factor where the foreign company has substantial links to the host state. 
Some countries still formally adhere to the real seat doctrine, but effectively disapply it in 
practice because of the use of presumptions. Others apply their domestic law to foreign 
companies at the choice of third parties if the company’s real seat is located within the 
host state. Yet others apply specific provisions of their domestic company law (broadly 
understood) to foreign companies if idiosyncratic links of differing intensity with the host 
state are present, for example the location of assets in the host state or the carrying on 
of business activity. 
Since companies are ‘creatures of national law’, Member States have in principle the 
authority to establish under which conditions domestic companies can be incorporated. 
About half of the Member States, usually those that traditionally followed the 
incorporation theory, provide for substantive company law rules that enable the 
incorporation of companies irrespective of the location of the company’s headquarters, 
decision-making centre, or business activities, provided the company satisfies the 
minimal requirement of maintaining a postal address in the Member State of 
incorporation. The remaining Member States, on the other hand, currently require, or at 
least may require, companies formed under their company laws to establish and maintain 
some form of physical presence in that Member States, although the situation is 
sometimes unclear under national law. 




Member States agree on a core area of company law issues that are considered to fall 
within the scope of the lex societatis. These comprise typically the formation and 
dissolution of the company, the corporate name, legal capacity, capital structure, rights 
and obligations of members, and internal management matters. Other relevant issues, 
however, are characterised differently in the Member States. In particular, it is unclear 
whether corporate group law – if it exists as a separate body of law in the Member States 
– should be governed by the lex societatis of the subsidiary or the parent, whether 
financial reporting requirements are part of the lex societatis or of public law, and how 
the liability of directors and members of the company directly to third parties should be 
classified. In addition, the comparative analysis has addressed the classification of 
obligations entered into before a company is registered in a commercial register. Most 
jurisdictions treat these matters as part of the lex societatis and, therefore, apply the law 
of the country in which the company seeks registration. Rules on corporate names are 
also regarded as falling within the scope of the lex societatis, but most Member States 
seek to apply either their own rules on business names or unfair competition laws to 
foreign-incorporated companies insofar as this is necessary to avoid the use of names 
that would be misleading or prohibited in the domestic jurisdiction. These requirements 
of the host state law are then qualified as overriding mandatory provisions. 
The boundaries between the lex societatis and other areas of law (lex concursus, lex 
contractus and lex delicti) are generally not well defined in the Member States. Notably, 
we observe significant variation in how the Member States classify legal strategies that 
are designed to address risk-shifting in the vicinity of insolvency, for example the 
responsibility of directors for payments made after insolvency. Likewise, it is unclear 
whether the liability of shareholders for the company’s debts (commonly labelled ‘veil 
piercing’) is to be characterised as an action in tort or as company law. A particularly 
contentious issue is the classification of the liability of directors for tortious acts that 
constitute simultaneously a breach of directors’ duties or other provisions of company law 
or that cause a loss directly to shareholders, creditors, or other third parties. We can 
observe a tendency in the Member States to apply their own liability rules to the directors 
and managers of foreign companies, either in situations where the company has 
established a branch in the host state or the directors caused the insolvency of the 
company and the company carried on business in the host state. 
Regarding cross-border reincorporations, several Member States do not provide for any 
legislative framework or make such transactions effectively impossible, despite the fact 
that the most recent case law of the Court of Justice interprets the freedom of 
establishment as granting companies incorporated in one Member State the right to 
convert into company types of another Member State if that Member State allows 
conversions for domestic companies. In this regard, the lack of uniformity among 
Member States also reveals that the case law is, at least in this respect, not sufficiently 
precise to facilitate the exercise of freedom of establishment in practice. 
It can generally be observed that in most countries there is very little case law 
interpreting the relevant conflict of laws rules and addressing problematic boundary 
issues identified in the reports, thus creating a significant degree of legal uncertainty for 
companies operating in more than one Member State. For instance, several reports state 
that no judicial decision has been taken regarding the definition of ‘seat’ under the 
Brussels I Regulation, the jurisdictional criterion for ‘core’ company law cases. Significant 
differences also exist in relation to the application of overriding mandatory provisions of 
domestic law to foreign-incorporated companies. In summary, the laws of the Member 
States seem to reveal a striking lack of uniformity or legal certainty as to several crucial 
aspects. It can be assumed that both the lack of uniformity and legal uncertainty are 
obstacles to market integration and corporate mobility in the EU, limiting the possibility 
of companies to make effective use of their freedom of establishment. Furthermore, lack 




of clarity and uniformity may give rise to opportunistic behaviours of shareholders at the 
expenses of creditors and other stakeholders. 
Normative analysis 
The last section of this report suggests a possible harmonisation of conflict-of-laws rules 
in the area of company law at the EU level in response to the significant legal variation 
and uncertainty identified in the Member States. 
Given the persistent diversity of substantive company laws, conflict of laws rules will 
continue to play a crucial role. This study supports the idea of common EU conflict of 
laws rules applicable to companies. In the context of harmonisation of those rules, we do 
not, however, recommend harmonisation of substantive company law rules requiring 
companies to establish and maintain a physical presence in the Member State of 
incorporation. 
In the medium/long term, it is suggested that a new regulation on conflict of laws rules 
applicable to companies and all existing (and forthcoming) ‘Rome regulations’ should be 
merged into one regulation. Such a consolidated regulation (‘European Code of Private 
International Law’) can best clarify ambiguities about the relationship between the lex 
societatis, the lex contractus, the lex delicti etc. and may therefore foster the ‘unity of 
the legal order’. It can also provide for a consistent regulation of the common themes 
(ordre public, renvoi etc) that have been addressed in the existing Rome regulations and 
that are discussed in this report. 
It is proposed that, as a general rule, a company shall be governed by the law according 
to which it has been incorporated, and an unincorporated entity by the law according to 
which it has been formed. It is useful to include in the definition of ‘incorporated 
companies’ all companies that acquire (full) legal personality upon entry in the 
commercial or companies register of the jurisdiction of formation. This provision should 
be supplemented by a ‘residual clause’ to the effect that the law of the closest connection 
shall apply if the law cannot be determined pursuant to the general rule. 
The regulation should provide for a non-exhaustive enumeration of the matters governed 
by the applicable law in order to give guidance as to the future (autonomous) 
interpretation of the regulation. The enumeration should include the following matters: 
formation of the company and legal nature/personality; corporate name; capacity of the 
company and authority of its organs; capital structure; rights and obligations of the 
members; internal management matters (board structure, the composition of corporate 
boards, and the involvement of employees, if any); duties of directors and liability for a 
breach of duty and generally for breaches of company law; voluntary winding up; 
enforcement of the company’s claims by its shareholders; the right of shareholders to 
challenge resolutions of the corporate organs; and financial reporting requirements. 
The scope of the lex societatis should extend to the regulation of the consequences of a 
lack of capacity or power by the company or its organs. However, in order to protect 
third parties acting in good faith, the regulation should provide that, where the 
application of the lex societatis would lead to the invalidity of an act, this fact cannot be 
invoked against third parties if (i) a company organ purporting to act on behalf of the 
company enters into a legal relationship with the third party in a country other than the 
Member State of incorporation, (ii) the company has an establishment or acts through a 
personally present representative in the country where the legal relationship is entered 
into, (iii) according to the law of that country the relevant restriction would not exist, and 
(iv) the third party did not know and should not have known of the existence of the 
restrictions pursuant to the lex societatis 




On the other hand, legal mechanisms designed to address problems arising specifically in 
insolvency or in the vicinity of insolvency shall not be included in the scope of the lex 
societatis, irrespective of the internal classification of the provision in the Member State’s 
company or insolvency law. Such mechanisms are in particular legal provisions that 
derogate from common rules of civil and commercial law to protect the interests of the 
general body of creditors and mitigate risk-shifting in the vicinity of insolvency. However, 
in contrast to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice interpreting the scope of the 
Insolvency Regulation, it would be irrelevant for the functional determination of the 
boundary region between company law and insolvency law suggested here whether the 
action in question was in fact brought by the liquidator in the context of insolvency 
proceedings. 
The recitals of the regulation may emphasise that company law mechanisms designed to 
protect the position of controlled undertakings in a corporate group should be governed 
by the lex societatis of the controlled undertaking (rather than the controlling 
undertaking) and that other legal mechanisms governing the rights and obligations of 
group companies follow general principles of private international law. In addition, the 
recitals may clarify that the general criteria developed for the demarcation of the lex 
societatis, lex concursus and lex loci delicti determine how different types of legal 
mechanism imposing liability on the shareholders for the debts of the company shall be 
classified for purposes of private international law. 
The regulation should further stipulate that formal requirements of both acts performed 
in the establishment of a company and the acts of corporate organs and shareholders 
shall be governed by the lex societatis, provided that the acts as such fall within the 
scope of the lex societatis. Alternatively, compliance with the formal requirements of the 
law of the Member State where the act was performed shall suffice, provided that the 
formal requirements in that Member State are functionally equivalent. If the rationale for 
the required involvement of a notary public includes the expectation that the parties 
involved receive some form of legal advice regarding the relevant act, the regulation 
should clarify that acts performed according to the laws of a Member State other than 
the Member State of incorporation shall only be regarded as equivalent where advice on 
the applicable law can also be given in the context of the compliance with formalities 
under the law of the Member State where the act was performed.  
Notwithstanding a foreign lex societatis, Member States should be allowed to apply the 
overriding mandatory provisions of the forum or of a state where the company carries 
out relevant activities. Such mandatory provisions may be, in particular, provisions 
regulating the use of corporate names to avoid the creation of a misleading impression 
and rules on the eligibility and disqualification of directors. 
Finally, due to persisting significant legal uncertainty as regards cross-border 
reincorporations, the report suggests that a directive of substantive company law should 
be adopted to provide for harmonised rules and procedures allowing companies created 
under the law of a Member State to convert into a company governed by the law of 
another Member State. Such reincorporations shall not result in the winding up of the 
company or in the creation of a new legal person. The Directive should also harmonise 
procedures for implementing cross-border reincorporations and provide minimum 
harmonisation of the rules on creditor protection, with the aim of avoiding opportunistic 
reincorporations at the expenses of creditors and other stakeholders. 
The information and views set out in this report are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Commission. The Commission does not 
guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this study. Neither the Commission nor 
any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may be held responsible for the use which 
may be made of the information contained therein. 






Depuis l’arrêt de principe rendu dans l’affaire Centros, la jurisprudence de la Cour de jus-
tice a été favorable aux constitutions de sociétés étrangères et à la mobilité transfronta-
lière des entreprises en Europe, même lorsque l’activité économique exercée dans l’État 
membre de constitution était faible ou nulle. Cependant, les problèmes relatifs à la loi 
applicable aux sociétés dans l’UE n’ont pas été résolus. Tous les États membres ont bien 
sûr généralement accepté que des sociétés étrangères exercent une activité économique 
sur leur territoire, sans imposer leurs propres règles de droit des sociétés à ces entités 
au titre de leur droit international privé. Toutefois, ils apportent des réponses juridiques 
différentes aux questions soulevées par des sociétés de droit étranger qui établissent des 
liens commerciaux spécifiques avec leur économie nationale, sur la base des deux théo-
ries suivantes. 
D’une part, la « théorie de l’incorporation » rattache les règles applicables aux à la loi du 
lieu de constitution, indépendamment de l’intensité des liens commerciaux existants 
entre la société étrangère et l’État d’accueil. En théorie, cette reconnaissance de la loi 
étrangère englobe tous les aspects fondamentaux du droit des sociétés (tel qu’entendu 
par le pays ayant adopté la théorie de l’incorporation). Ainsi, suivant cette approche, une 
société étrangère valablement constituée transférant son siège (ou toute autre partie de 
son entreprise) dans un autre pays conservera sa capacité et ses règles d’organisation 
interne. D’autre part, la « théorie du siège réel » vise à identifier le territoire avec lequel 
la société entretient les liens les plus étroits. Il n’existe aucune méthode universellement 
admise permettant de définir le « lien le plus étroit », mais le siège social et le lieu 
d’adoption des décisions les plus importantes sont souvent utilisés par les pays qui re-
tiennent cette approche. Une fois identifié, le critère de rattachement s’applique généra-
lement à nouveau à tous les aspects couverts par le droit des sociétés. 
Cette distinction fondamentale a été affectée par l’interprétation, fournie par la jurispru-
dence de la Cour de justice, de la liberté d’établissement des sociétés constituées dans 
les États membres de l’UE. En dépit de la jurisprudence de la Cour, des nuances et com-
plications subsistent, par exemple, en matière de relation entre les règles de la lex socie-
tatis et d’autres domaines du droit (droit des faillites, droit de la responsabilité civile, 
etc.), ainsi qu’en ce qui concerne la possibilité pour les sociétés de transférer leur siège. 
Le rapport ci-après aborde ces questions de manière détaillée. Il se compose de quatre 
parties principales : collecte de données statistiques, enquête empirique, analyse compa-
rative et évaluation normative suggérant des solutions possibles à ce problème. 
Collecte de données statistiques 
Les sociétés ayant leur « siège réel » dans un État membre autre que l’État de leur siège 
social ont, dans le passé, donné lieu à des questions juridiques controversées et à des 
tentatives de restriction de leurs activités par l’État d’accueil. Cependant, les études an-
térieures portant sur ce sujet sont limitées pour deux raisons au moins : elles sont axées 
sur l’analyse des sociétés étrangères présentes au Royaume-Uni et se sont essentielle-
ment préoccupées des différences constatées dans les frais de constitution. 
Les données statistiques recueillies et analysées dans le présent rapport visent à combler 
ces lacunes. 
En premier lieu, dans les statistiques descriptives, reposant sur des données provenant 
de tous les États membres, nous avons identifié le Royaume-Uni comme la destination 
favorite. Dans une moindre mesure, les constitutions de sociétés à partir de l’étranger 
(ou sociétés étrangères) ont également lieu dans d’autres États membres situés notam-




ment en Europe centrale et orientale, tels que l’Estonie, la Roumanie et la Slovaquie, qui 
sont les destinations cibles les plus recherchées. Cependant, l’analyse en réseau de ces 
données a également montré que les constitutions de sociétés étrangères se produisent 
généralement entre pays voisins présentant des similitudes linguistiques, sociales et éco-
nomiques ; aussi, l’effet de la liberté d’établissement sur la mobilité des entreprises dans 
l’ensemble des États membres est encore assez limité. 
En deuxième lieu, l’analyse chronologique des nouvelles constitutions de sociétés au 
Royaume-Uni et en Slovaquie entre 1990 et 2015 a révélé que les principaux change-
ments sont intervenus après 2000, dont la plupart au Royaume-Uni dans les années 
2010, et en Slovaquie au milieu des années 2000, et que la plupart des changements 
sont caractérisés par une augmentation des constitutions de sociétés étrangères. Ainsi, 
pour le Royaume-Uni, tous ces changements sont intervenus nombre d’années après 
l’assouplissement, par la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice, de la liberté d’établissement 
des entreprises. Les données venant de Slovaquie indiquent des évolutions fortes vers 
2004, date d’adhésion de ce pays à l’UE. Dans ce cas également, il est difficile de ratta-
cher cette constatation à la jurisprudence, dans la mesure où cet effet positif peut éga-
lement découler d’autres facteurs qui ont conduit à une augmentation de la coopération 
transfrontalière et de l’activité commerciale du fait de l’élargissement de l’UE. 
En troisième lieu, l’analyse des régressions suggère que les décisions concernant les 
constitutions de sociétés nationales ou étrangères ne résultent pas simplement des diffé-
rences existant dans le droit matériel des sociétés. Au contraire, nous avons constaté que 
le droit international privé peut également jouer un rôle : les pays qui ont une version 
claire de la « théorie de l’incorporation » semblent tirer bénéfice de ce marché des cons-
titutions de sociétés, par rapport aux Etats membres qui ont conservé des éléments de la 
« théorie du siège réel ». Nous avons également constaté que les constitutions de socié-
tés étrangères a des répercussions importantes et négatives sur variation du droit inter-
national privé entre deux pays donnés. 
En quatrième lieu, il est donc possible de tirer de cette analyse les conséquences sui-
vantes en termes de politique législative : les résultats montrent que la jurisprudence de 
la Cour de justice n’a pas rendu obsolètes toutes les différences existant dans les règles 
de conflit de lois applicables aux sociétés. L’effet négatif significatif des différences entre 
ces règles pourrait militer en faveur de l’harmonisation, dans ce domaine, du droit inter-
national privé. Le lien significatif existant entre la « pureté » de la théorie de 
l’incorporation et l’utilisation des sociétés d’un État membre par des fondateurs étrangers 
peut également fournir une indication quant à l’orientation possible d’une harmonisation 
visant à faciliter la mobilité des sociétés en Europe. 
Enquête empirique 
La jurisprudence de la Cour de justice et les réformes législatives récentes intervenues 
dans certains États membres ont libéralisé le choix du lieu de constitution. Cependant, la 
mise en œuvre concrète de la mobilité des sociétés constitue une question juridique qui 
ne peut pas être abordée d’une manière uniquement théorique. La partie empirique du 
rapport présente les résultats d’une étude réalisée auprès d’avocats en septembre 2015. 
Les réponses ont été évaluées selon des méthodes quantitatives, en se cherchant égale-
ment s’il existe des différences significatives entre les groupes de personnes interrogées, 
ainsi que des corrélations entre les réponses à des questions spécifiques. En outre, les 
réponses figurant dans les commentaires en texte libre ont été utilisées pour replacer les 
résultats dans leur contexte. 
La principale conclusion est qu’il existe des obstacles concrets considérables à la mobilité 
des sociétés en Europe. Cela apparaît dans la plupart des réponses au sondage et est 
confirmé à la fois par les réponses de manière globale et par les analyses des réponses 




fournies par des groupes particuliers de personnes interrogées. Cela milite également en 
faveur de l’harmonisation européenne dans ce domaine du droit. Plus précisément, les 
observations suivantes peuvent être faites : 
En premier lieu, les personnes interrogées ne considèrent pas que la jurisprudence de la 
Cour de justice puisse se substituer à une éventuelle harmonisation des règles de conflit 
de lois. Le soutien était plus fort pour l’harmonisation des règles de conflit de lois que 
pour l’harmonisation du droit matériel des sociétés, alors que la dernière a néanmoins 
reçu un soutien considerable; en meme temps, il y a une correlation positive entre le 
soutien pour les deux qui montre que ces deux aspects de droit ne sont pas considerés 
comme des choix alternatifs pour l’harmonisation en Europe. 
En deuxième lieu, il convient de remarquer que la plupart des personnes interrogées 
exercent dans des pays qui ont conservé un élément de la « théorie du siège réel » ont 
signalé différents obstacles pratiques. Ces problèmes ont également été fréquemment 
mentionnés dans les commentaires en texte libre, en faisant référence par exemple aux 
problèmes d’identification du lieu du « siège réel ». 
En troisième lieu, l’analyse des différences entre les groupes montre également qu’il 
existe encore une distinction entre les personnes interrogées exerçant dans les pays 
d’Europe orientale (ou dans les pays dont le PIB par habitant est le plus faible, ou dans 
les États devenus membres après 2004) et celles se trouvant dans les autres pays. Les 
personnes interrogées présentes dans les premiers pays sont davantage susceptibles 
d’invoquer un manque de familiarité avec les procédures pertinentes et de rendre compte 
de problèmes pratiques dans leurs relations avec les tribunaux nationaux et les registres 
du commerce. 
En quatrième lieu, en ce qui concerne les problèmes spécifiques, les personnes interro-
gées ont souvent mentionné les coûts de traduction et les problèmes d’insécurité juri-
dique. La relation avec des domaines connexes du droit, notamment le droit des faillites, 
est également considérée comme essentielle ; en particulier, les questions de fiscalité 
sont un facteur décisif afin de permettre une mobilité réelle des sociétés. 
En quatrième lieu, il existe une forte corrélation entre les personnes interrogées qui sont 
perplexes à l’égard de leur droit national et celles qui sont favorables à l’harmonisation 
des règles de conflit de lois. Fait intéressant, il existe également une corrélation entre le 
soutien en faveur de l’harmonisation des règles matérielles de droit des sociétés et le 
soutien à des règles harmonisées de conflit de lois : ainsi, ces branches du droit ne sont 
pas considérées comme des choix alternatifs dans le cadre d’une harmonisation euro-
péenne. 
Analyse comparative 
Les règles de conflit de lois applicables aux sociétés suivent certaines tendances com-
munes dans les différents États membres, mais sont également caractérisées par un de-
gré élevé d’insécurité juridique et une réglementation fragmentaire des questions juri-
diques situées à la frontière entre la lex societatis et d’autres domaines du droit. Les 
États membres ont traditionnellement été divisés en « Etats du siège réel » et les « Etats 
de la théorie de l’incorporation », bien que cette distinction ait perdu beaucoup de son 
intérêt en raison de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice. Néanmoins, nous pouvons ob-
server que certains éléments de la théorie du siège réel subsistent dans un certain 
nombre d’États membres et que le champ d’application de ces règles et de leur conformi-
té au regard de la liberté d’établissement au sens du Traité est souvent imprécis. 
Les principaux résultats de l’analyse comparative sont les suivants. 




Dans quasiment tous les États membres, il est maintenant relativement bien établi que 
les règles de droit international privé reposant sur la théorie du siège réel ne peuvent 
plus être appliquées aux sociétés constituées dans d’autres États membres de l’UE. Ce-
pendant, nous constatons des variations significatives dans la façon dont ce facteur de 
rattachement pertinent est formulé et sur la présence d’exceptions à ce facteur de ratta-
chement dans les règles de conflit, lorsque la société étrangère justifie de liens impor-
tants avec l’État d’accueil. Certains pays adhèrent encore formellement à la doctrine du 
siège réel, mais l’écartent en réalité dans la pratique en recourant à des présomptions. 
D’autres appliquent leur droit national à des sociétés étrangères en fonction du choix des 
tiers, si le siège réel de la société est situé dans l’État d’accueil. D’autres États membres 
appliquent des dispositions spécifiques de leur droit interne des sociétés (entendu au 
sens large) à des sociétés étrangères si des liens spécifiques d’intensité variable avec 
l’Etat d’accueil existent, tels que la localisation des biens dans l’État d’accueil ou 
l’exercice d’une activité commerciale. 
Puisque les sociétés sont des « créatures du droit national », les États membres ont, en 
principe, le pouvoir de fixer les conditions dans lesquelles les sociétés de droit national 
peuvent être constituées. Environ la moitié des États membres, généralement ceux qui 
ont suivi traditionnellement la théorie de l’incorporation, prévoient des règles de droit 
matériel des sociétés qui permettent la constitution de la société, indépendamment de 
l’emplacement du siège, du centre de décision, ou des activités commerciales de la socié-
té, à condition que la société satisfasse l’exigence minimale de disposer d’une adresse 
postale dans l’État membre de constitution. Les États membres restants, d’autre part, 
exigent actuellement, ou tout au moins peuvent exiger, que les sociétés constituées en 
vertu des dispositions correspondantes du droit des sociétés, établissent et conservent 
une certaine forme de présence physique dans ces États membres, bien que la situation 
soit parfois incertaine en vertu du droit national. 
Les États membres sont en accord sur les points essentiels qui relèvent du champ 
d’application de la lex societatis. Celles-ci comprennent généralement la formation et la 
dissolution de la société, la dénomination sociale, la capacité juridique, la structure du 
capital, les droits et obligations des associés et les questions de gestion interne. Cepen-
dant, d’autres points pertinents sont traités différemment selon les États membres. En 
particulier, il n’est pas clairement établi si le droit des groupes de sociétés – s’il existe en 
tant que corps de règles juridiques distinct dans les États membres - doit être régi par la 
lex societatis de la filiale ou celui de la société mère, si les exigences en matière 
d’information financière relèvent de la lex societatis ou du droit public, et de quelle façon 
la responsabilité des administrateurs et des associés à l’égard des tiers doit être classifiée. 
En outre, l’analyse comparative a abordé la question de la qualification des obligations 
contractées avant l’immatriculation de la société au registre du commerce. La plupart des 
pays considèrent que cette question relève de la lex societatis et, par conséquent, appli-
quent la loi du pays dans lequel l’immatriculation de la société est demandée. Les règles 
en matière de dénomination sociale sont également réputées rentrer dans le champ 
d’application de la lex societatis, mais la plupart des États membres cherchent à appli-
quer aux sociétés constituées à l’étranger soit leurs propres règles en matière de déno-
mination sociale, soit celles relatives à la concurrence déloyale, dans la mesure où cela 
permet d’éviter l’utilisation de dénominations qui seraient trompeuses ou interdites dans 
l’ordre juridique national. Ces exigences légales de l’État d’accueil sont alors qualifiées de 
lois de police. 
La frontière entre la lex societatis et d’autres domaines du droit (lex concursus, lex con-
tractus et lex delicti) est généralement mal définie dans les États membres. Nous obser-
vons notamment des divergences significatives dans la façon dont les États membres 
classifient les stratégies juridiques élaborées afin de gérer le transfert de risque lorsque 
la société se trouve proche de l’état d’insolvabilité, notamment la responsabilité des ad-
ministrateurs au titre des paiements effectués après la déclaration d’insolvabilité. De 




même, il est difficile de déterminer si la responsabilité des actionnaires au titre des 
dettes de la société (généralement appelée « confusion de patrimoines ») doit être con-
sidérée comme une action en responsabilité délictuelle ou comme relevant du droit des 
sociétés. Une question particulièrement complexe porte sur la qualification de la respon-
sabilité des administrateurs au titre des actes fautifs constituant en même temps une 
violation des obligations des administrateurs ou d’autres dispositions du droit des socié-
tés, ou causant directement une perte aux actionnaires, aux créanciers ou à d’autres 
tiers. On constate une tendance des États membres à appliquer leurs propres règles de 
responsabilité aux administrateurs et aux dirigeants de sociétés de droit étranger, soit 
lorsque la société a établi une succursale dans l’État d’accueil, soit lorsque les adminis-
trateurs ont causé la faillite de la société, et que la société exerçait son activité dans 
l’État d’accueil. 
En ce qui concerne les transferts de sièges internationaux, plusieurs États membres ne 
prévoient aucun cadre législatif ou rendent en pratique ces opérations impossibles, en 
dépit du fait que la jurisprudence la plus récente de la Cour de justice interprète la liberté 
d’établissement dans le sens où elle accorde aux sociétés constituées dans un État 
membre le droit de se transformer en types de société d’un autre État membre, si ce 
dernier autorise les transformations des sociétés nationales. À cet égard, le manque 
d’uniformité entre les États membres révèle également que la jurisprudence, du moins à 
cet égard, n’est pas suffisamment précise pour permettre, dans la pratique, l’exercice de 
la liberté d’établissement. 
On peut généralement observer que, dans la plupart des pays, il existe très peu de juris-
prudence interprétant les règles pertinentes de conflit de lois et traitant des problèmes 
de frontière identifiés dans les rapports, créant ainsi une insécurité juridique significative 
pour les sociétés opérant dans plus d’un État membre. Par exemple, plusieurs rapports 
indiquent qu’aucune décision judiciaire n’a été rendue en ce qui concerne la définition du 
« siège » en vertu du règlement Bruxelles I, le critère de compétence fondamental en 
droit des sociétés. Il existe également des différences significatives en ce qui concerne 
l’application des lois de police du droit national aux sociétés constituées à l’étranger. En 
résumé, les droits des États membres semblent révéler un manque flagrant d’uniformité 
ou de sécurité juridique quant à plusieurs aspects fondamentaux. On peut supposer que 
le manque d’uniformité et d’insécurité juridique constitue des obstacles à l’intégration du 
marché et à la mobilité des sociétés dans l’UE, ce qui limite la possibilité pour les sociétés 
de faire un usage effectif de leur liberté d’établissement. En outre, le manque de clarté et 
d’uniformité peut donner lieu à des comportements opportunistes des actionnaires au 
détriment des créanciers et des autres personnes dont les intérêts sont concernés. 
Analyse normative 
La dernière section du rapport suggère une éventuelle harmonisation des règles de conflit 
de lois en matière de droit des sociétés au niveau de l’UE, en réponse aux divergences et 
à l’insécurité juridiques importantes constatées dans les États membres. 
Étant donné le maintien de différences entre les droits matériels des sociétés, les règles 
de conflit de lois continueront de jouer un rôle fondamental. La présente étude est favo-
rable à l’idée de règles communes de conflit de lois de l’UE applicables aux sociétés. Dans 
le contexte de l’harmonisation de ces règles, nous ne recommendons, cependant, pas 
l’harmonisation des règles matérielles du droit des sociétés obligeant les entreprises à 
établir et maintenir une présence physique dans l’État membre de constitution. 
À moyen et long terme, il est suggéré qu’un nouveau règlement relatif aux règles de con-
flit de lois applicables aux sociétés et tous les « règlements Rome » existants (et à venir) 
soient fusionnés en un seul règlement. Un tel règlement consolidé (« code européen de 
droit international privé ») pourrait dissiper les ambiguïtés affectant la relation entre la 




lex societatis, la lex contractus, la lex delicti, etc., et pourrait donc favoriser l’unité de 
l’ordre juridique. Il pourrait également prévoir une réglementation cohérente des ques-
tions communes (ordre public, renvoi, etc.) qui ont été abordés dans les règlements 
Rome existants et qui sont discutés dans le rapport. 
Il est proposé qu’une société soit en règle générale régie par la loi en vertu de laquelle 
elle a été constituée, et une société sans personnalité morale, selon la loi en vertu de la-
quelle elle a été formée. Il est utile d’inclure dans la définition des « sociétés consti-
tuées » toutes les sociétés qui acquièrent une personnalité juridique pleine et entière lors 
de l’immatriculation au registre du commerce ou des sociétés du pays de formation. 
Cette disposition devrait être complétée par une « clause résiduelle » afin que la loi du 
rattachement le plus étroit soit applicable si la loi ne peut être déterminée conformément 
à la règle générale. 
Le règlement devrait prévoir une énumération non exhaustive des questions régies par la 
loi applicable, afin de fournir des orientations pour l’interprétation (autonome) future du 
règlement. L’énumération devrait inclure les éléments suivants : constitution de la socié-
té et nature/personnalité juridique ; dénomination sociale ; capacité de la société et 
autorité de ses organes ; structure du capital ; droits et obligations des associés ; ques-
tions relatives à la gestion interne (structure du conseil, composition des conseils 
d’administration, implication des salariés, le cas échéant) ; devoirs des administrateurs 
et responsabilité en cas de manquement et, plus généralement, en cas de violation du 
droit des sociétés ; liquidation volontaire ; exécution forcée des demandes de la société 
par ses actionnaires ; droit des actionnaires de contester les délibérations des organes de 
la société ; exigences en matière d’information financière. 
La portée de la lex societatis devrait s’étendre à la réglementation des conséquences 
d’un manque de capacité ou de pouvoir de représentation de la société ou de ses organes. 
Toutefois, afin de protéger les tiers agissant de bonne foi, le règlement devrait prévoir 
que, lorsque l’application de la lex societatis entraîne la nullité d’un acte, ce fait n’est pas 
opposable aux tiers si : (i) un organe de la société prétendant agir au nom de la société 
conclut une convention avec un tiers dans un pays autre que l’État membre de constitu-
tion, (ii) la société a un établissement ou agit par l’intermédiaire d’un représentant pré-
sent dans le pays où la convention a été conclue, (iii) en application de la loi de ce pays, 
la restriction concernée n’existerait pas, et (iv) le tiers n’avait pas et n’aurait pas dû avoir 
connaissance de l’existence des restrictions en vertu de la lex societatis. 
D’autre part, les mécanismes juridiques conçus afin de résoudre les problèmes spéci-
fiques survenant en cas d’insolvabilité ou à proximité de celle-ci, ne doivent pas être in-
clus dans le champ d’application de la lex societatis, quelle que soit la qualification in-
terne de la disposition dans le droit des sociétés ou de l’insolvabilité de l’État membre. 
Ces mécanismes consistent notamment en des dispositions légales dérogeant aux règles 
ordinaires du droit civil et commercial et destinés à protéger les intérêts de l’ensemble 
des créanciers et à atténuer le transfert des risques juste avant la déclaration 
d’insolvabilité. Cependant, contrairement à la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice inter-
prétant la portée du règlement insolvabilité, il est sans intérêt aux fins de la détermina-
tion fonctionnelle de la frontière entre le droit des sociétés et le droit de l’insolvabilité ici 
suggérée, que l’action soit engagée ou non par le liquidateur dans le cadre d’une procé-
dure d’insolvabilité. 
Les considérants du règlement pourraient souligner que les mécanismes de droit des so-
ciétés visant à protéger la position des entreprises contrôlées dans un groupe de sociétés, 
devraient être régis par la lex societatis de l’entreprise contrôlée (plutôt que par celle de 
l’entreprise contrôlante) et que les autres mécanismes juridiques régissant les droits et 
obligations des sociétés du groupe respectent les principes généraux du droit internatio-
nal privé. En outre, les considérants pourraient préciser que les critères généraux déve-




loppés pour distinguer la lex societatis, de la lex concursus et de la lex loci delicti déter-
minent la façon dont les différents types de mécanisme juridique faisant peser une res-
ponsabilité sur les actionnaires au titre des dettes de la société, sont qualifiés au regard 
du droit international privé. 
Le règlement devrait en outre prévoir que les exigences de forme applicables aux actes 
accomplis lors de la constitution d'une société et à ceux des organes et des actionnaires 
de la société, soient régies par la lex societatis, à condition que ces actes en tant que tels 
rentrent dans le champ d’application de la lex societatis. Alternativement, la conformité 
aux exigences formelles prescrites par la loi de l'État membre où l'acte a été accompli, 
doit suffire, à condition que les exigences formelles de cet État membre soient équiva-
lentes d’un point de vue fonctionnel. Si la justification de la participation obligatoire d'un 
notaire fait présumer que les parties concernées reçoivent à cette occasion une assis-
tance juridique concernant l'acte en question, le règlement devra préciser que les actes 
accomplis en vertu de la loi d'un État membre autre que l'État membre de constitution ne 
peuvent être considérés comme équivalents qu’uniquement lorsqu’une assistance portant 
sur la loi applicable peut également être fournie dans le cadre du respect des formalités 
prévues par la loi de l'État membre où l'acte a été accompli. 
Nonobstant toute lex societatis étrangère, les États membres devraient être autorisés à 
appliquer les lois de police du for ou d'un État où la société exerce les activités concer-
nées. Ces dispositions impératives peuvent, en particulier, porter sur l'utilisation des dé-
nominations sociales, afin d’éviter l’instauration d'une impression trompeuse, et sur les 
conditions de nominations des administrateurs et les interdictions d’exercer. 
Enfin, en raison de la persistance d’une insécurité juridique importante en matière de 
transformations transfrontalières de sociétés, le rapport suggère qu'une directive du droit 
matériel des sociétés soit adoptée afin de prévoir des règles et des procédures harmoni-
sées permettant aux sociétés créées en vertu de la législation d'un État membre, de se 
transformer en une société régie par le droit d’un autre État membre. Ces transforma-
tions ne doivent pas entraîner la dissolution de la société ni la création d'une personne 
morale nouvelle. La directive devrait également harmoniser les procédures de transfor-
mations transfrontalières de sociétés et assurer une harmonisation minimale des règles 
relatives à la protection des créanciers, dans le but d'éviter des transferts de sièges op-
portunistes réalisés au détriment des créanciers et des autres parties concernées. 
 
Les informations et les vues énoncées dans la présente étude sont celles de(s) l'auteur (s) 
et ne reflètent pas nécessairement la position officielle de la Commission. La Commission 
ne garantit pas l'exactitude des données incluses dans cette étude. La Commission et 
aucune personne agissant pour le compte de la Commission ne peuvent être tenus 
responsables de l'usage qui pourrait être fait des informations qui y sont présentées. 
  




I. INTRODUCTION TO FIELD OF STUDY 
1. Overview and conceptual understanding 
Companies are by far the most important form for organising economic activity in the EU. 
Companies are creature of the legal system, and despite some partial harmonisation on 
the European level, companies in the EU are still mostly1 creatures of national law. In 
particular, Member State law, which is still largely unharmonised, determines their legal 
capacity and governs their internal governance and operation (‘lex societatis’).  
A number of problems arise when companies operate in the context of another legal 
system. The first question for any legal system is whether it recognises the existence of 
a foreign company as a legal person on the basis of the foreign lex societatis, or whether 
(and when) it applies its own rules to determine the foreign company’s status. All 
Member States have traditionally accepted a certain degree of economic activity by 
foreign companies in their territory without imposing their own company law rules on 
them. Member States differ, however, in their (traditional) legal responses to foreign 
companies establishing particular intense links with their territories.  
Since company law rules are typically highly interdependent, it will often be desirable 
that only one company law framework, in its entirety, applies to any company. Doing 
otherwise would often lead to inefficient, unpredictable, and contradictory results.2 The 
notion of the lex societatis largely follows from this problem and, as will be shown below, 
all private international law systems in the EU aim at ensuring that a single company law 
framework governs all aspects of company law, at least in principle.3 
This is complicated, however, by the fact that Member States differ somewhat in their 
views of what they consider to form part of company law. As we will show below, there 
are of course rules that are regarded as forming part of company law in (virtually) all 
jurisdictions, such as a company’s legal capacity or the appointment and authority of 
directors. However, there are also areas of law and types of rules that are close to the 
boundary between company law and other area of law, which are considered to belong 
to company law by some jurisdictions, while others regard them as forming part of 
another legal area.4 Such questions arise particularly often near the boundary between 
company law and insolvency law, but there are also questions considered by some 
Member States to constitute company law, while others consider them to belong to tort, 
contract, or public law. Differences between Member States as to the classification of 
rules as belonging to company law or another area of law raise a number of problems 
that we will address in detail below.5  
Even where a particular rule or type of rule is considered to form part of company law by 
both or all Member States involved, the question which set of rules apply to a given 
situation – i.e. domestic company law rules of the host state or foreign law – may be 
answered differently by different Member States. The answer generally depends on the 
relevant private international law rules and the connecting factors they use for the area 
of company law.  
                                                 
1 With the exceptions of the European Company (‘SE’; see Council Regulation 2157/2001, [2001] OJ L 294/1), 
the European Economic Interest Grouping (‘EEIG’; see Council Regulation 2137/85, [1985] OJ L 199/1) and the 
European Cooperative Society (‘SCE’, Council Regulation 1435/2003, [2003] OJ L 207/1). 
2 See C Gerner-Beuerle and EP Schuster, ‘The Costs of Separation: Conflicts in Company and Insolvency Law in 
Europe’ (2014) 14 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 287. 
3 See below Chapter IV, Section 1.1. 
4 See the discussion in Chapter V, Section 6 below. 
5 See Chapter V, Section 3 below. 




2. Real seat v. Incorporation theory 
There are two main private international law approaches used by the Member States to 
resolve the problems of defining the boundary between domestic and foreign law in the 
area of company law – the incorporation doctrine and the real seat doctrine. As will be 
shown in detail below, however, no Member State applies either of these doctrines in a 
pure or unmodified form. This holds true even in relation to third country companies.  
Under the incorporation doctrine, the rules applicable to companies are determined by 
the law at the place of incorporation, irrespective of the commercial links between the 
foreign company and the host state. Thus, following this approach, a foreign company 
will be recognised and retain its legal capacity and internal organisation, even where its 
headquarters or significant parts (or indeed all) of its operations are located or moved to 
a host state following this approach.  
The real seat doctrine, on the other hand, attempts to determine the jurisdiction the 
company is in fact most closely connected with. While there is no single way of 
determining what constitutes the ‘closest connection’, the central administration or 
headquarters of a company are often used by Member States following this approach, as 
will be shown below. This resembles the approach taken by most jurisdictions in 
corporate taxation, where taxation rights are typically asserted based on similar 
concepts.6 The applicable law determined using this connecting factor then governs all 
aspects of company law.  
The picture is somewhat more complicated as far as it concerns the relation between the 
incorporation state and its own companies (i.e. companies that have been formed under 
its laws). Jurisdictions following the incorporation doctrine tend to also apply their 
company laws to all domestically incorporated companies, irrespective of their 
commercial links to that jurisdiction. But this is not necessarily so: private international 
law rules may distinguish between domestic and foreign companies7 and substantive 
company law rules may impose different types of residence requirements, even where 
private international law is based on the incorporation doctrine.8 For instance, both cases 
decided by the European Court of Justice dealing with the relationship between a 
company and its home state (i.e. Daily Mail9 and Cartesio10) concerned incorporation 
doctrine states,11 but in both cases substantive rules of domestic company law (Cartesio) 
or tax law (Daily Mail) created a barrier to severing the link between the incorporation 
state and the company. 
Similarly, the European Company Statute12 effectively follows the incorporation doctrine 
from a private international law perspective, since European Companies are 
predominantly governed by rules on public companies of the Member State where their 
                                                 
6 See Chapter IV, Section 7.1 and Chapter V, Section 9.2 below; see also CH Panayi, European Union Corpo-
rate Tax Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013) 171-175; P Behrens, ‘General principles of resi-
dence of companies’ in: G Maisto (ed.), Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law (Amsterdam: 
IBFD Publications 2009) 5 et seq. 
7 See below Chapter IV, Section 3. 
8 See below Chapter IV, Section 2. 
9 Case 81/87 The Queen v HM Treasury and Commissioners for Inland Revenue, ex p Daily Mail and General 
Trust plc [1988] ECR 5483. 
10 C- 210/06 Cartesio Oktato es Szolgaltato bt [2008] ECR I-9641. 
11 The Hungarian private international and company law rules dealt with by the ECJ in the Cartesio case clearly 
followed the incorporation doctrine; see e.g. V Korom and P Metzinger, ‘Freedom of Establishment for Compa-
nies: the European Court of Justice confirms and refines its Daily Mail Decision in the Cartesio Case C-210/06’ 
(2009) 6 European Company and Financial Law Review 125. In Daily Mail, the question decided by the Court 
concerned a tax law rule that had little connection to UK private international law. 
12 Council Regulation 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE) [2001] OJ L 294/1 (hereinafter 
the ‘SE Regulation’). 




registered office is situated.13 At the same time, however, the substantive requirement 
of locating the ‘head office’ in the same jurisdiction as the registered office creates a 
result similar to the real seat doctrine.14 
Even Member States following the real seat doctrine may permit companies formed 
under their laws to move their headquarters or central administration abroad without 
this affecting the continued application of that Member States’ company law. This can be 
the result of either (i) different private international law rules applicable to foreign and 
domestic companies or (ii) the applicable renvoi rules, when foreign law refers back to 
domestic law. 
The fact that Member States apply – or at least historically applied – different rules in 
order to determine the law applicable to companies can hinder the operation of the 
internal market, as this divergence may lead to different and often incompatible rules 
governing the same company. The same company could also be regarded as subject to a 
particular legal system by one Member States, while another concludes it is a company 
subject to another legal system, and yet another Member State may consider it not 
existing as a company at all. Attempts were made to address these problems through a 
Convention,15 but these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful.16 The questions have 
now, however, to a large extent been addressed in the case law of the Court of Justice.17 
Problems in this area are linked to the connecting factors used by private international 
law. In order to discuss the solutions adopted by the Member States, particular attention 
has to be paid to terminology, as similar terms often have (subtly) different meanings 
across different jurisdictions. The terms ‘registered office’ and ‘place of incorporation’ are 
often used interchangeably, since all (registered) companies in the EU must have a 
registered office, and all, or virtually all, Member States require the registered office to 
be located in the jurisdiction of incorporation. Jurisdictions that adopt a version of the 
real seat doctrine, on the other hand, tend to use the terms ‘seat’ to describe both the 
registered or official address of the firm and the head office or real seat. 
3. Case law of the Court of Justice 
Of particular significance to the questions addressed by this report is the interpretation 
of the freedom of establishment by the Court of Justice in a number of core cases 
concerning companies: Daily Mail, Centros, 18  Überseering, 19  Inspire Art, 20  SEVIC, 21 
Cartesio, National Grid Indus22 and VALE.23  
In Daily Mail, a UK public limited company wanted to transfer its central management 
and control from the UK to the Netherlands for tax reasons. UK law required Treasury 
consent for such a transfer. Daily Mail applied for the consent, but this was denied unless 
Daily Mail paid taxes on (parts of) its capital gains in the UK. This refusal to permit the 
transfer was subsequently challenged as restriction of the freedom of establishment. In 
                                                 
13 SE Regulation, article 9 (1)(c). On this topic see W-G Ringe, ‘The European Company Statute in the Context 
of Freedom of Establishment’ (2007) 7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 185. 
14 SE Regulation, article 7. 
15 Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate (signed on 29 February 1968), 
Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement No. 2-1969. 
16 See J Rickford, ‘Current Developments in European Law on the Restructuring of Companies: An Introduction’ 
(2004) 15 European Business Law Review 1225, 1236. 
17 See Section 3, below. 
18 C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Ehrvervs- og Selskabstyrelsen, decided 9.3.1999. 
19 C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH, decided 5.11.2002. 
20 C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd., decided 30.9.2003. 
21 C-411/03 SEVIC Sytems AG v Amtsgericht Neuwied, decided 13.12.2005 
22 C-371/10 National Grid Indus BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond/kantoor Rotterdam, decided 
29.11.2011. 
23 C-210/06 VALE Építési kft., decided 12.7.2012. 




addressing the question, the Court treated the relevant UK rule as one of private 
international law, determining whether Daily Mail could transfer its central management 
and control to the Netherlands ‘while maintaining its legal personality and its status as a 
UK company’,24 although UK law did not call into question Daily Mail’s existence as a 
legal entity as a consequence of the (proposed) transfer. The Court held that 
‘articles [49 and 54 TFEU] confer no right on a company incorporated under the 
legislation of a Member State and having its registered office there to transfer its 
central management and control to another Member State.’25 
The Daily Mail decision was, however, not univocal. The Court, in particular, added that 
provisions on freedom of establishment 
‘also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in 
another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under 
its legislation’.26 
This statement seems to imply that restrictions posed by the country of incorporation to 
companies’ ‘emigration’ fall within the scope of freedom of establishment. Furthermore, 
the Court stressed that the Treaty’s provisions on freedom of establishment do not 
confer a right to transfer a company’s central management or central administration 
throughout the EU ‘while retaining their status as companies incorporated under the 
legislation of the first Member State’. 27  This statement seems to leave open the 
possibility that a company transfers its central management or its central administration 
into another Member State while not retaining the status of a company governed by the 
Member State of origin and converting into a company governed by the law of the 
Member State of ‘arrival’ (provided that the latter accepts this outcome).28 
In Centros, a company was formed in the UK and intended to carry on business entirely 
in Denmark. It was clear that the founders’ main motivation was to avoid the minimum 
capital requirements under Danish law.29 The Danish authorities refused to register a 
branch of Centros in the commercial register because Centros did not plan to conduct 
business anywhere except in Denmark. The Court refused this approach, stating that ‘a 
situation in which a company formed in accordance with the law of a Member State in 
which it has its registered office desires to set up a branch in another Member State falls 
within the scope of Community law’.30 It held that Centros was exercising its freedom of 
establishment, and that the refusal to register was an obstacle to this freedom.31  
It affirmed that Denmark was ‘entitled to take measures designed to prevent certain of 
its nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, 
improperly to circumvent their national legislation or to prevent individuals from 
improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of [the freedoms]’.32 However, the mere 
fact that an incorporator ‘chooses to form a company in the Member State whose rules 
seem to him the least restrictive and set up branches in other Member States’ did not ‘in 
                                                 
24 See Daily Mail, para 18. 
25 Centros, para 25 
26 Daily Mail, para 16. 
27 Daily Mail, para 24. 
28 See FM Mucciarelli, ‘Company “Emigration” and EC Freedom of Establishment: Daily Mail Revisited’ (2008) 9 
European Business Organization Law Review 295.  
29 Daily Mail, para 18. 
30 Ibid, para 17. 
31 Ibid, para 22. 
32 Paragraphs 24, 25.  




itself, constitute an abuse of the right of establishment’,33 even if Centros intended to 
operate exclusively in Denmark. 
The decision was subsequently confirmed in Inspire Art, where a UK company was used 
to trade exclusively in the Netherlands, again mainly to avoid application of minimum 
capital requirements. Under Dutch law, such companies were subject to the rules of the 
‘Law on Formally Foreign Companies’,34 imposing a number of substantive company law 
rules on foreign-incorporated companies wholly or mainly operating in the Netherlands. 
The ECJ held that the requirements under Dutch law constituted a restriction of Inspire 
Art’s freedom of establishment, stating that choice of law is ‘a right inherent in the 
exercise of freedom of establishment’.35  
Überseering was the first case in which the Court directly dealt with a rule of private 
international law. Überseering, a Dutch private company with real seat in Germany, 
brought a claim in a German court. The claim was dismissed on the basis that 
Überseering had its real seat in Germany, and was thus subject to German company law 
rules. However, as Überseering, naturally, was not incorporated under German law, the 
German court held that it lacked legal personality and thus capacity to be a claimant. 
The German Supreme Court referred two questions to the ECJ, asking in essence 
whether the German real seat theory-based private international law rule was 
compatible with the Treaty. The Court held that effectively requiring Überseering to 
reincorporate in Germany was an ‘outright denial’ of its freedom of establishment. The 
Court distinguished the case from its earlier decision in Daily Mail. It explained that the 
holding in Daily Mail applied only to the relationship between the company and the 
Member State under whose laws it was formed.36 The Court thus created a ‘reserved 
area’ for the Member State under whose laws a company is formed, allowing that 
Member State to define what can be described as a residence requirement.37 
In SEVIC, a German company applied to a German court to approve a merger with a 
Luxembourg-incorporated company. The German court refused to register the merger on 
the ground that the relevant German statute only applied to companies formed under 
German law. On appeal, the question whether this refusal violated the freedom of 
establishment was referred to the ECJ. The Court clarified that the freedom of 
establishment ‘covers all measures which permit or even merely facilitate access to 
another Member State and pursuit of economic activity in that State […] under the same 
conditions as national operators’. 38  The general exclusion of foreign companies from 
participating in mergers was thus a restriction and could not be justified, given its broad 
application.  
In Cartesio, a Hungarian limited partnership registered in Hungary and with its head 
office located in Hungary, sought to move its central administration to Italy, without 
changing its Hungarian registration and while remaining subject to Hungarian law.39 It 
applied to register its new head office in Italy, which was refused by the Hungarian 
authorities. Hungary is, and was at the time, an incorporation country, 40  but 
nevertheless required its companies to maintain its real seat within Hungary as a matter 
of substantive company law. The Court held that ‘in the absence of a uniform 
                                                 
33 Paragraph 27. 
34 Wet op Formeel Buitenslandse Vennootschappen. 
35 Inspire Art, para 121. 
36 Überseering, para 70. 
37 See also below, Chapter V, Section 4. 
38 Sevic, para 17.  
39 Hungarian law required central administration and technical registered office to be in the same place and 
regarded the two as a single concept: see V Korom and P Metzinger, ‘Freedom of Establishment for Companies: 
the ECJ confirms and refines its Daily Mail decision in the Cartesio Case’ (2009) 6 European Company and Fi-
nancial Law Review 125, 141-144. 
40 See e.g. Korom and Metzinger, ibid. 




Community law definition of […] a single connecting factor determining the national law 
applicable to a company, the question whether article [49 TFEU] applies, like whether a 
natural person is a national […] is a preliminary matter which as Community law now 
stands can only be resolved by applicable national law’. It further held that ‘a Member 
State has the power to define […] the connecting factor required if it is to be regarded as 
incorporated under the law of that Member State and, as such, capable of enjoying the 
right of establishment’. This includes the power ‘not to permit a company governed by 
its law to retain that status if it intends to reorganise itself in another Member State by 
[…] moving its seat’ there, ‘thereby breaking the connecting factor required under the 
national law of the Member State of incorporation’.41  
Importantly, however, the Court also stated, albeit obiter dictum, that this does not 
apply to situations where a company intends to reincorporate – i.e. to convert its status 
and become a company governed by the law of another Member State. Such a 
reincorporation constitutes an exercise of the freedom of establishment. The Member 
State of (original) incorporation may not, therefore, restrict reincorporations ‘by 
requiring the winding-up or liquidation of the company’,42 provided that the destination 
Member State permits this conversion. As far as outbound reincorporations are 
concerned, therefore, Member State laws do not enjoy ‘any form of immunity’ from 
scrutiny under the Treaty principles. In other words, such rules do not fall within the 
‘reserved area’. 
Related to this, National Grid Indus43 addressed the question of exit taxation, holding 
that Member States cannot create tax obstacles for companies moving their tax 
residence abroad unless they can justify this restriction.  
Finally, in VALE, an Italian company intended to ‘transfer its seat and its business to 
Hungary’, reregistering under Hungarian law as VALE Építési kft. After having been 
deregistered by the Italian registrar, the company applied for registration with the 
Hungarian court, stating in its application that VALE Costruzioni Srl was the ‘predecessor 
in law’ of VALE Építési kft. The Hungarian court refused the application, because the 
transaction ‘cannot be regarded as a conversion under Hungarian law since national law 
on conversions applies only to domestic situations’44, and that the entry of a predecessor 
is confined to such conversions.45 
The Court of Justice held that the Member State of incorporation ‘unquestionably has the 
power to define both the connecting factor required of a company if it is to be regarded 
as incorporated under its national law […] and the connecting factor required if the 
company is to be able subsequently to maintain that status.’46 National law, however, 
‘cannot escape all review in the light of articles 49 and 54’,47 and Member States must 
provide ‘the same possibility’ for conversion to foreign EU companies as they provide to 
domestic companies. 48  Member States thus must comply with the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness, and thus the recording of the status of predecessor in law 
could not be denied to VALE Costruzioni if it was granted in domestic conversions.  
                                                 
41 Paragraph 110. 
42 Paragraph 112. 
43 See n 22 above. 
44 Paragraphs 12-15. 
45 Although Hungarian law does in effect provide for a similar mechanism for cross-border mergers. 
46 Paragraph 29, citing both Daily Mail and National Grid. 
47 Paragraph 45, 
48 Paragraph 41. 





A useful way to summarise the case law on the freedom of establishment is to look at 
the two main ways in which a corporate mobility can be exercised – relocation of a 
company’s real seat and reincorporation in another jurisdiction.  
First, a company may simply want to relocate its real seat, however defined, to another 
‘host’ Member State. As the Court made clear in Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art, 
host Member States cannot apply their company law rules to such companies, 
irrespective of the level of activity in the host and home Member States, unless they can 
justify this under the Gebhard test, 49  requiring restrictive national measures to be 
applied in a non-discriminatory manner; justified by imperative requirements in the 
general interest; suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; 
and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. 
Second, a company may intend to reincorporate under a foreign Member State law. As 
the Court made clear in Cartesio and National Grid Indus, the Member State under 
whose laws the company has been formed (the state of origin) cannot adopt legislation 
that would render such a reincorporation less attractive. In particular, that Member State 
cannot require liquidation, nor adopt restrictive exit taxes, unless these pass the 
Gebhard test (because the exit tax is necessary to preserve the allocation of taxing 
powers between the Member States and it is proportionate in doing so). 
As for the Member State of destination, the EU law constraints in this scenario are 
somewhat less clear. The desired ‘new’ incorporation state can certainly require the 
company to fulfil the general incorporation requirements under its law – including 
minimum capital and disclosure requirements, etc. In VALE, the Court applies 
‘equivalence and effectiveness principles’, rather than requiring justification based on 
Gebhard. This means that the destination Member State needs to allow reincorporations, 
at least where it allows comparable domestic conversions.50 We will further address the 
implications of the Court of Justice’s case law in chapter V below. 
                                                 
49 C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-
04165. 
50 All EU company laws must have a mechanism to achieve universal succession as part of their implementation 
of the Third Company Law Directive (now Directive 2011/35/EU). 




II. STATISTICAL DATA COLLECTION 
1. Introduction 
In the EU, companies enjoy the freedom of establishment that, in principle, should 
enable them to operate in some form in Member States different from the Member State 
in which they have been incorporated. But to what extent is this the reality? More 
specifically, how widespread are companies that have their ‘real seat’ in a Member State 
different from the state of incorporation? Such companies have, in the past, given rise to 
controversial legal questions and attempts to restrict their activities on the part of the 
host state.1 However, previous research on this topic is limited in at least two respects: 
following the ECJ case Centros,2 it has been focussed on the analysis of foreign-based 
companies in the UK, and it has been mainly concerned with differences in the costs of 
incorporation, such as the minimum capital requirements. 
This chapter aims to fill these gaps. It presents data on all incorporations of foreign 
businesses in the commercial registers of each Member State today, as well as time 
series of new incorporations from two Member States for 1990-2015. It also examines 
the impact of differences in the conflict of laws rules applicable to companies: based on 
regression analysis, it evaluates whether countries that have a clear-cut version of the 
‘incorporation theory’ benefit in this market for incorporations, as compared to countries 
which have retained some elements of the ‘real seat’ theory. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the previous 
empirical research on corporate mobility in the EU and explains the data collection of the 
present study. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics of foreign-based private 
companies in all Member States today, also employing tools of network analysis. Section 
4 evaluates two Member States (UK and Slovakia) in more detail with time series data 
on new incorporations. The regression analysis in Section 5 turns to the question of 
whether the country differences can be explained by differences in conflict of laws rules 
applicable to companies and/or other factors. The concluding Section 6 reflects on the 
implications of the findings, and the Annex in Section 7 contains further information 
relating to the data collection. 
2. Data collection 
2.1 Previous research 
The European study on the application of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive explained 
the problems with collecting statistical data on questions of cross-border company 
mobility and on cross-border mergers in particular, as follows: 
‘Collecting this data proved extremely challenging, as the information that the 
national registries keep is partial, and the commercial databases were 
inconsistent and scarce. Indeed, previous studies on parallel topics encountered 
the same problems in gathering accurate and quality information’.3 
The task of collecting data on the number of companies that operate in a Member State 
different from the one in which they have been incorporated or have their real seat is 
also a demanding one. To start with, it is therefore helpful to present an overview of the 
existing empirical research. 
                                                 
1 See Chapter I, above. 
2 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen (1999) C-212/97 (where two Danish citizens living in Denmark 
and only doing business in Denmark incorporated a UK ltd). 
3 Study on the Application of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive, prepared by Bech-Bruun and Lexidale for DG 
MARKT, 2013, at p 962. 




Table 1. Overview of empirical research on corporate mobility in the EU4 
Paper Topic / countries 
and time frame  
Methodology of data 
collection 











• Identified companies in 
the Companies House 
database, which had a 
largely German-
language name and the 
name was ending with 
‘Limited’  
• Limitations: data 
merely impressionistic, 
potentially under or 
over-inclusive 
• Surge of ‘German’ 
companies incorporating 
in UK after Überseering 
and Inspire Art in 2002 

















• Data obtained from the 
FAME database (Bureau 
van Dijk) 
• Where FAME data was 
incomplete, correction 
factors were applied 
(based on a comparison 
between FAME and 
Companies House 
databases)  
• Directors’ residence as 
main criterion (with 
50% and 100% 
thresholds) 
• Centros ruling 
associated with large 
international flows of 
companies into the UK 
and from Germany, 
France, the Netherlands 
and Norway 
• Increases in post-
Centros company 
migration rates primarily 
explained by country-
specific incorporation 
costs and minimum 
capital requirements  
• ECJ rulings are leading 
to regulatory 
competition between EU 
Member States to 
provide low-cost 
company law  
                                                 
4 In addition, some empirical studies, not discussed here, have analysed the incorporation of businesses as a 
European Company (SE), see e.g. H Eidenmüller, A Engert and L Hornuf, ‘How Does the Market React to the 
Societas Europaea?’ (2010) 11 European Business Organization Law Review 35; Study by Ernst & Young on the 
operation and the impacts of the Statute for a European Company (2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/societas-europaea/history/index_en.htm. 
5 J Armour, ‘Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition’ (2005) 58 Cur-
rent Legal Problems 369. 
6 M Becht, C Mayer and H Wagner, ‘Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry’ (2008) 
14 Journal of Corporate Finance 241. 






















2006 • Data obtained through 
field experiments with 
assistance from country 
correspondents 
• Country correspondents 
reported on their 
attempts to incorporate 
and branch back a UK 
ltd 
• Information recorded in 
the experiments 
includes the number of 
procedures involved, 
their cost and duration, 
as well as any obstacles 
encountered 
• Despite the ECJ rulings, 





• Total cost differences 
are mainly caused by 
differences in the 
translation and 
certification costs; aside 
from financial hurdles, 
national idiosyncrasies 
may further hinder 
branching 
• Eleventh Directive 
should therefore be 
revised; endorsement of 
Commission’s Proposals 
for administrative 
burden reductions and 


















• Data mainly 
capture larger 
public companies 
• Highest gross flow from 
UK to Switzerland; 
overall most relocations 
in Western and Central 
Europe 
• Tax reasons and export 






















• Most data collected 
from the AMADEUS 
database (Bureau van 
Dijk); for Germany and 
Poland, data collected 
directly from national 
company registers  
• Directors’ residence as 
main criterion  
• Company law reforms, 
including reductions in 
registration costs, not 
only encourage 
incorporations but also 
more generally boost 
the overall 
entrepreneurial activity 
in the countries 
examined, irrespective 
of the legal form chosen 
for a new company 
                                                 
7 M Becht, L Enriques and VE Korom, ‘Centros and the Cost of Branching’ (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 171. Modified version also in M Becht, L Enriques and VE Korom, ‘Centros and the cost of branching’, in 
Perspectives in Company Law and Financial Regulation 91 (M Tisen et al., eds., Cambridge: CUP 2009). 
8 T Laamanen, T Simula and S Torstila, ‘Cross-Border Relocations of Headquarters in Europe’ (2012) 43 Journal 
of International Business Studies 187. 
9 R Braun, H Eidenmüller, A Engert and L Hornuf, ‘Does Charter Competition Foster Entrepreneurship? A Differ-
ence-in-Difference Approach to European Company Law Reforms’ (2013) 51 Journal of Common Market Stud-
ies 399. Also published in L Hornuf, Regulatory Competition in European Corporate and Capital Market Law: An 
Empirical Analysis (Cambridge: Intersentia 2012). 

























• Regarding mobility of 
SEs, the European 
Trade Union Institute’s 
European Company 
database was used 
together with the Orbis 
database (Bureau van 
Dijk) 
• Regarding mobility of 
other companies, 
national business 
registers were directly 
contacted, generally to 
no avail (exception of 
Malta); indirect data 
collection (matching de-
registrations with new 
registrations, Zephyr 
database used to track 
cross-border mergers) 
• Increase of cross-border 
seat transfers of SEs 
(significantly) and 
transfers of companies’ 
seat to Malta (slightly) 
• Cross-border mobility of 
registered offices of 
companies in Europe not 
yet achieved; legislative 
action recommended as 
administrative costs of 
implementation would 
be relatively small, while 















• Timing of 
reincorporation tracked 





• Further information 
collected from various 
reports and the 
European Trade Union 
Institute 
• Increase in cross-border 
mergers but at a 
relatively low level; 
mainly private 
companies 
• Companies from 
Germany and 
Luxembourg frequently 















• Data on German and 
Austrian companies 
collected from the 
Companies House via 
FAME database 
• Centros type companies 
identified through three 
classifications: (i) 
company incorporated 
in the UK (ii) with at 
least one German 
director (iii) where the 
company shares its 
registered office with at 
least 100 other 
companies (proxy for 
• Popular view that the 
2008 reforms of German 
company law have 




unsupported by data as 
Austrian incorporations 
in the UK have also 
decreased 
• Instead, the decline may 
be attributed to closing 
down of loopholes that 
previously made ltd 
attractive to 
                                                 
10 P Muller, S Devnani, R Ladher and P Ramada, ‘European Added Value Assessment on a Directive on the 
cross-border transfer of company seats (14th Company Law Directive), Annex II: Economic and Social Effects 
of the Requested Legislative Instrument - Research paper by London Economics’ (Brussels 2013), available at 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/494460/IPOL-
JOIN_ET%282013%29494460%28ANN02%29_EN.pdf. 
11 See supra note 3. 
12 WG Ringe, ‘Corporate Mobility in the European Union – a Flash in the Pan? An Empirical Study on the Suc-
cess of Lawmaking and Regulatory Competition’ (2013) 10 European Company and Financial Law Review 230.  




the involvement of an 
incorporation agency) 
entrepreneurs; 
underestimation of the 
costs of compliance with 
disclosure obligations; 
















• Combination of primary 





corporate websites and 
other corporate 
databases 
• Steady increase of 
foreign forms used since 
2000 
• As a result, tensions 
with the German 
codetermination system 
as employees are no 
longer able to exercise 
their rights; minimum 



















• Data was derived from 
the German 
Commercial Register by 
the Bundesanzeiger 
Verlag 
• German ‘letterbox’ 
companies doing 
business in Austria 
were identified through 
two classifications: (i) 
in small businesses, 
shareholder is usually 
also the managing 
director (ii) who usually 
lives where the 
company does its main 
business 
• To a certain extent, 
Austrian entrepreneurs 
appeared to have been 
swayed by the new 
German legal form, 
however the 
counterfactual could not 
be established due to 
limited scope of the 
study  
• Incentive to avoid 
minimum capital (i.e. 
move from Austria to 
Germany) rapidly 
decreases in proportion 
to the distance from the 
border between the two 
countries  
 
Methodologically, this literature suggests different proxies to identify the nationality of a 
company. It has been observed that the registration of branches is not strictly enforced 
in some Member States. 15  Therefore, the most promising strategies may proceed 
indirectly by examining the company’s filings in the state of incorporation. One 
possibility is to use the address of the directors as an indication of the company’s real 
seat. The proxy can be further varied by, for example, classifying a company as formally 
foreign if all directors live abroad, or if the majority lives abroad. 16  As far as the 
information is available, it can also be revealing to identify whether the managing 
director is also a shareholder (or even the sole shareholder).17 
                                                 
13 S Sick, ‘Der deutschen Mitbestimmung entzogen: Unternehmen mit ausländischer Rechtsform nehmen zu’ 
Mitbestimmungsförderung, Report February 2015, available at www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_mbf_report_2015_8.pdf. 
14 C Teichmann and R Knaier, ‘Experiences with the Competition of Regulators - a German Perspective’, in AJ 
Viera González and C Teichmann (eds), Private Company Law reform in Europe: The Race for Flexibility 209 
(Cizur Menor: Aranzadi, Thomson Reuters 2015). 
15 Becht et al., supra note 6, at 245. 
16 Both definitions were used by Becht et al., ibid, and Braun et al., supra note 9. 
17 As used by Teichmann and Knaier, supra note 14. 




Alternatively, one may go further and aim to collect information about companies 
without any physical connection of the company to the country of incorporation. In order 
to identify such companies some studies have examined whether the company’s 
registered office was shared with at least 100 other companies – i.e. it having a mere 
‘letterbox’ in the country of incorporation. This is said to work well for the UK where 
registration agents use the same address for a large number of companies without any 
business activity in the state of incorporation,18 while in other countries this strategy is 
less reliable. 
In this respect, a terminological but also substantial clarification has to be made. In the 
literature, the term ‘letterbox companies’ is occasionally used for such companies that do 
business in one country, but are incorporated with only a ‘letterbox’ in another one.19 
However, frequently, the term ‘letterbox companies’ is also equated with companies that 
are mere ‘special purpose entities’ (also called ‘conduit companies’): those too merely 
have a ‘letterbox’ in the country of incorporation, but they only hold financial assets and 
are not involved in any business activity in any country, and their main purpose is to 
benefit from the tax advantages that can be gained by using ‘special purpose entities’ as 
intermediate legal entities.20 This type of letterbox companies is often associated with 
companies established in offshore tax havens, for example in the British Virgin Islands,21 
but such regimes also exist in some EU Member States.22 Those companies are not of 
core interest to the present study; due to their lack of economic activity, they are 
unlikely to raise problems of conflict of laws rules applicable to companies resulting from 
a mismatch between statutory and real seat.  
2.2 Strategic considerations of this study 
EU law requires the registration of companies in the commercial registers of the Member 
States23 and, as of June 2017, those registers will be interconnected at EU level as part 
of the Business Registers Interconnection System (BRIS).24 At present, however, the 
commercial registers do not provide researchers with deep-level access to company data 
from all Member States. While it is possible to identify the websites of the commercial 
registers,25 searching for data about all companies established in the EU presents various 
practical problems: the websites are usually only available in the official language of the 
country in question and its search functions are often very limited. Furthermore, deep-
level access to the information that is of interest to this study, such as the nationality 
and addresses of directors, is not available for free but instead is typically charged per 
access to information on each individual company. It is therefore not feasible to compile 
a comprehensive dataset of European companies through the websites of the commercial 
registers.  
For the purposes of this project, we also sought direct communication with the national 
commercial registers. In most Member States it was straightforward to identify the 
                                                 
18 Ringe, supra note 12, at 247. In addition, Ringe searched whether at least one director was German. 
19 Ringe, ibid; Teichmann and Knaier, supra note 14; KE Sorensen, ‘The Fight Against Letterbox Companies in 
the Internal Market’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 85. 
20 See, e.g., Eurodad, ‘Fifty Shades of Tax Dodging. The EU’s role in supporting an unjust global tax system’ pp. 
18-19 (Brussels: Eurodad 2015), available at http://www.eurodad.org/files/pdf/5630c89596bec.pdf; UNCTAD, 
‘World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance’ pp. 189-190 (New York: UN 
2015), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf. 
21 As discussed recently following the leaked information from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, see 
e.g. ‘Panama Papers: How assets are hidden and taxes dodged’ (BBC News, 3 April 2016), available at 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35943740. 
22 Eurodad, supra note 20, mentions Luxembourg but also Austria, Cyprus, Hungary and Spain. 
23 Directive 2009/101/EC, art. 3. 
24 See Directive 2012/17/EU and the Commission implementing regulation (EU) 2015/884. 
25 List of register are provided at https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_business_registers_in_member_states-
106-en.do and http://www.ebr.org/index.php/member-countries/. 




general contact email address of the commercial register.26 We contacted the registers 
at these email addresses. In addition, in some cases, we used more specific contact 
details provided by the national correspondents of this project. About half of the 
registers responded to our inquiry. However, only two of them were able and willing to 
provide us with relatively comprehensive data about individual companies in their 
Member States. Some of the other registers provided us with general aggregate data, for 
example, about the types of companies established in the Member State, sometimes also 
indicating how many of those have foreign directors, yet, without elaborating on the 
home countries of these directors. Thus, overall, it had become clear that this strategy 
did not provide us with comparable and comprehensive information about all, or even a 
majority, of the Member States. 
The most promising path is to make use of the commercial databases provided by 
Bureau van Dijk (BvD). Some of those databases cover company data for specific 
countries, 27  but, for our purposes, it is helpful that all of the national databases of 
European countries are integrated in the general BvD databases Amadeus and Orbis.  
The company data available in Amadeus are the European data of the Orbis global 
dataset, but there are also some differences between those two datasets. Amadeus 
consists of various subsets of the European company data, for example, Amadeus 
Managers, Amadeus Owners, Amadeus Auditors etc. and it is possible to download the 
data from one of those subsets without restrictions in size. By contrast, Orbis only allows 
the download of a limited amount of firm data (with details depending on the items 
included). However, overall, it seemed to us to be preferable to use Orbis. The search 
functions of Orbis offer more choices, in particular since it is possible to search the entire 
dataset without any restrictions to a particular subset. Moreover, searching for company 
data from 2014 and 2015, we established that Orbis is more frequently updated since 
many of these data are not available through Amadeus. 
Since Orbis is composed of information from various domestic sources, the completeness 
of the information varies between countries. For example, for the UK and Ireland, it is 
based on BvD’s Fame database, which contains comprehensive information on over 9 
million active and inactive companies registered in the UK and Ireland.28 For almost all of 
the other EU Member States, the coverage of the companies included (for the precise 
information available see the next section) is very good, as we confirmed by way of 
comparing the number of companies in Orbis and the data provided by the commercial 
registers as well as previous research. 29  But there are some exceptions. The most 
notable one concerns the Greek data where many companies are missing. A query to 
BvD confirmed that their data only cover about 5% of the active businesses in Greece. 
A further limitation concerns the information about branches. In order to identify 
companies having their real seat, however defined, in a Member State different from the 
state of incorporation, we started our data collection by downloading information on EU-
incorporated companies with linked branch data. Our analysis, based on the records of 
over 1.5 million limited company records, revealed however that the data on registered 
foreign branches is not linked efficiently to the legal entities in question. This holds true 
even for those countries with the best data availability, such as the UK and Ireland. The 
most effective strategy is therefore to focus on the company information available in the 
country of registration, as the following will explain. 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 See http://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/company-information/national (subscription required; we 
accessed BvD via the subscription by the London School of Economics and Political Science). 
28 See https://fame.bvdinfo.com/. 
29 Eg, E Wymeersch, ‘Comparative Study of the Company Types in Selected EU States’ (2009) European Com-
pany and Financial Law Review 71 at 73. 




2.3 Data collection with Orbis  
Private companies are more likely to be interested in foreign incorporations than public 
ones, for example, due to variations in minimum capital requirements.30 Therefore, the 
present analysis focuses on private companies. Orbis has a search function that allows 
for the search of ‘standardised legal forms’, but it is more reliable to manually choose 
the precise types of company for each of the Member States.31 This leads to a list of 14.7 
million private companies incorporated in all Member States today. 
Subsequently, we restricted the search to those companies where at least one director or 
senior manager is from a foreign country. For our purposes it makes sense to exclude 
someone who runs a business in another Member State but establishes a company in his 
or her country of nationality. In the regression analysis32 we are interested in persons 
who want to incorporate companies in another Member State despite having no special 
attachment to that country. The situation is different for nationals of that other country: 
for example, the control variable of a common language speaks against a 
businessperson from Portugal incorporating a Finnish company, but this is an argument 
that would not apply if it were a Finnish national who runs his or her own business in 
Portugal. 
This search operation also reduces the number of private companies available to a 
manageable size of 1.1 million companies. We also had to check to what extent this may 
exclude relevant information. In total, 63% of the private companies from all Member 
States provide information about the nationality of their directors and senior managers. 
For 13 of the 28 Member States, however, less than 50% of the companies include such 
information. But, generally speaking, for those countries any other information that may 
be helpful for the purposes of the present research is even less likely to be available in 
Orbis.33 Thus, the best that can be done is to use means of extrapolation as far as the 
data are incomplete,34 and, in the regression analysis, include control variables for the 
proportion of companies included in the dataset; here, as will be explained, we will also 
check for the robustness of any findings by way of excluding the countries where only 
limited data are available. 
In the Orbis search results, we selected a number of fields relevant for the purposes of 
our research, also considering the proxies suggested by previous research.35 Thus, for 
the main parts of the analysis, we downloaded information about (i) the address and 
contact details of the company, (ii) the number of current directors and managers, their 
nationality, place of residence and job title, and (iii) the nature of the company’s 
shareholders, namely whether they are also the directors or senior managers of the 
company and whether they are natural or legal persons. With respect to the Orbis 
category ‘directors and managers’, it is not entirely clear which positions Orbis classifies 
under this heading. For most private companies, the main persons reported here are the 
executive directors/managers but for some of the bigger private companies it may also 
include other managers with the authority to act on behalf of the company. We suggest 
that it is justifiable to consider all of these positions in order to identify the companies of 
interest in this chapter since they can be indicators of the ‘real seat’ of a company. For 
the companies established in the UK, we also filtered the search results so as to only 
                                                 
30 See the study by Becht et al., supra note 6. 
31 See the list in Section 7, below. 
32 See Section 5, below. 
33 The three exceptions are Belgium, Malta, and the Netherlands where the nationality of directors and manag-
ers is less readily available in Orbis than their place of residence. 
34 See Section 3.1 below. 
35 See Section 2.1 above. 




include the companies’ directors, but the actual findings were very similar – with a 
correlation of close to 0.99.36 
Some of the current empirical literature examines not the total number of incorporated 
companies, but the new incorporations in a particular year.37 This approach can enable 
interesting time series evaluations. For the purposes of the present study, we aimed to 
identify all new foreign incorporations from 1990 to 2015. Using the ‘segmentation by 
year’ function provided by Orbis, this can in principle be achieved without downloading 
all of the data. However, as will be explained in the following, sufficiently long and 
reliable time series data are only available for few of the Member States.38 
3. Descriptive statistics of private companies in all Member States today 
3.1 Variations in data availability 
While Orbis is a valuable resource of international information about companies, any 
search for specific details has to address its variations in data availability: variations 
between countries but also those between the relevant information about directors and 
senior managers (in the following, the term ‘managers’ will be used to refer to both of 
these groups). 


















For companies with at least one foreign manager: 
Information available for at least one 





















Austria  175,152 75.26% 14,097 99.51% 100.00% 83.43% 79.73% 
Belgium 292,802 6.53% 8,640 99.61% 100.00% 22.99% 49.34% 
Bulgaria 500,277 89.39% 12,735 8.18% 100.00% 94.38% 84.49% 
Croatia 111,131 8.07% 2,804 53.14% 100.00% 91.30% 48.86% 
Cyprus 246,802 24.00% 8,069 99.93% 100.00% 81.71% 36.80% 
Czech Rep. 336,325 98.52% 39,200 13.55% 100.00% 93.69% 98.57% 
Denmark 208,472 82.42% 6,054 99.54% 100.00% 64.29% 77.42% 
Estonia 154,608 20.15% 12,712 9.32% 100.00% 94.56% 66.83% 
Finland 261,689 96.84% 21,517 99.11% 100.00% 50.22% 96.56% 
France 1,048,007 5.73% 20,797 37.86% 100.00% 43.70% 69.39% 
Germany 1,315,368 89.98% 61,737 99.18% 99.99% 86.26% 70.09% 
Greece 24,193 65.34% 3,141 86.50% 100.00% 45.65% 65.39% 
Hungary 412,160 66.72% 1,354 85.97% 99.93% 76.51% 62.70% 
Ireland 109,127 72.89% 13,254 99.95% 100.00% 95.72% 54.69% 
Italy 958,941 95.96% 16,029 94.67% 100.00% 87.38% 76.19% 
Latvia 158,468 89.22% 15,295 100.00% 100.00% 99.86% 88.46% 
Lithuania 84,135 24.88% 2,806 35.71% 100.00% 21.53% 91.45% 
Luxembourg 50,243 36.07% 8,406 99.99% 100.00% 97.87% 60.96% 
Malta 50,343 23.68% 8,887 99.76% 100.00% 36.77% 51.27% 
Netherlands 867,632 6.30% 23,448 60.10% 100.00% 71.98% 54.09% 
                                                 
36 Correlation of 0.9889 between (i) the 27 observations that count the number of ltds that have a board of 
directors only consisting of persons from one of the other 27 Member States and (ii) the 27 observations that 
count the number of ltds where all ‘directors and managers’ are from one of the other 27 Member States. 
37 E.g., Becht at al., supra note 6; Braun et al., supra note 9. 
38 See Section 4.1, below. 




Poland 196,818 64.91% 11,926 43.78% 100.00% 87.53% 84.78% 
Portugal 284,659 51.25% 8,634 12.93% 98.99% 99.24% 30.03% 
Romania 887,697 98.93% 77,344 98.74% 100.00% 96.99% 99.83% 
Slovakia 231,935 62.71% 32,473 14.13% 99.68% 97.50% 88.07% 
Slovenia 73,105 19.17% 1,639 84.56% 87.68% 74.56% 55.64% 
Spain 1,756,652 26.87% 19,551 36.55% 99.96% 48.89% 59.22% 
Sweden 505,813 10.86% 20,020 26.36% 94.83% 57.56% 38.19% 
UK 3,464,781 95.42% 622,983 99.99% 100.00% 99.54% 60.47% 
 
The initial columns in Table 2 refer to the information already mentioned in the previous 
section: the first one shows the total number of private companies as available in Orbis, 
the second one shows the availability of information about the nationality of managers 
and the third one indicates the number of companies where at least one manager is a 
foreign national. This third data column has 1,097,199 companies in total, but as the 
final four columns show, with some further variation in the level of detail available. 
It can be seen that in case of ten Member States, less than 50% of the companies with 
at least one foreign manager provide information about the residence of at least one 
manager. In addition, even as far as information is included in the Orbis data of a 
country, it is often not useful since it does not mention the private address of the 
manager but simply restates the company’s address.39 
Thus, instead of the residence of managers, the following will be based on their 
nationality. But, here, as the final column shows, it will also be necessary to consider 
that there is some variation in the availability of nationality data for all managers of a 
company. In addition, the regression analysis will, inter alia, need to control for 
migration patterns between the Member States. 
The categories ‘managers being shareholders’ and ‘shareholders being natural or legal 
persons’ may be relevant since the foreign-incorporated companies that are of interest 
for this study are typically companies where natural persons are the main shareholders 
as well as the managers of the company. 40  From Table 2 it can be noted that the 
information about ‘managers being shareholders’ is particularly well reported in Orbis; 
thus, it will be used in the following. 
3.2 Foreign-incorporated companies 
Table 3 presents an extract of the results. Following on the considerations about possible 
proxies and data availability (see Table 2), it is based on companies with all managers 
being from one of the other Member States and the majority of those managers being 
shareholders. 
                                                 
39 Notably this is the case in the UK. 
40 Such as in Centros, supra note 2. By contrast, special purpose entities (see Section 2.1, above) would often 
be subsidiaries of other companies. 




Table 3: Top target countries of businesses incorporated in other Member 
States 
Companies with all managers 
from one other Member State 
and majority of those being 
shareholders as reported in 
Orbis 
As previous column but 
based on an estimation of 
all companies 
As previous column but 
based on an estimation 
that excludes companies 
established by residents  
UK 156,087 UK 270,487 UK 227,064 
Romania 31,646 Estonia 34,090 Estonia 33,524 
Slovakia 16,072 Romania 32,045 Romania 30,123 
Czech Republic 9,967 France 29,258 France 27,029 








The first column is based on the raw data as available in Orbis and reports the ‘top five’ 
target countries and the total for all Member States. But, as apparent from Table 2, the 
descriptive value of these figures is limited due to the discrepancies in the availability of 
information for each Member State. Thus, for the purposes of the second column, the 
target data have been extrapolated so as to estimate the total number of those 
companies across Member States.  
The third column considers that some of the data about incorporations by foreigners may 
be due to those foreigners living in other Member States. Thus, based on migration 
data,41 it has been estimated how many of the companies have been established by 
foreigners who are resident in the country of the register, a figure then deducted from 
the number in the second column. In order to check the robustness of this operation, 
these figures were also compared with those from the commercial registers that provide 
the most complete coverage of both nationality and residence, and where the latter 
address seems to refer to the private addresses of the directors. 42  Despite some 
variation in detail, the aggregate numbers for the two data lines are then very similar.43 
In substance, it follows from Table 3 that the UK is by far the most popular target 
country, accounting for 60% of the companies in the raw data and 52% in the two 
versions of the adjusted data (columns 2 and 3). In all versions of the ranking, it is then 
followed by three Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as well as 
Germany/France. Comparing the total numbers in the second and third column, it can be 
seen that about 15% of the foreign incorporations are due to foreign EU citizens in the 
country in question. 
The popularity of some CEE countries as target countries for companies is an interesting 
but not implausible finding. After the fall of communism, the business laws of the CEE 
countries have been going through various phases of reform, thereby increasing the 
potential of some of them to attract foreign incorporations. An internet search also 
                                                 
41 See Section 5.2, below. 
42 Assumed where there is a correlation of more than 0.95 between the immigration-adjusted nationality data 
and the residence data.  
43 Based on data for Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Poland and Romania, the total difference drops from 17.73% 
to 2.84% (while the absolute difference for each observation drops from 22.26% to 21.25%). 




confirms that there are a number of web sites that promote incorporation of businesses 
in Estonia, Romania and Slovakia.44 
Moreover, it is likely that the situation in the CEE countries is not only about matters of 
company law, but is also related to other areas of law such as favourable tax and labour 
laws.45 For example, we may think about the situation of a Finnish businesswoman who 
registers a private company in Estonia and rents an office there, but keeps her own 
residence in Finland from where she manages the company. 46  Such a scenario is 
therefore different from the sub-category where the company has no physical connection 
to the country of incorporation.47 However, such companies are also of interest to our 
present purposes since, for example, the Finnish businesswoman could also have 
incorporated the company in Finland while merely renting an office in Estonia. The 
question of how far the place of incorporation is a deliberate choice – and therefore the 
impact of conflict of law rules related to the freedom of incorporation – is therefore also 
a relevant one in this scenario.  
3.3 Network presentation and clusters 
To get a fuller picture of the relationship between origin and target countries, it is 
necessary to consider the information for all countries, namely the matrix of each pair of 
possible countries which leads to 28 x 27 = 756 observations. This information can be 
presented as a network. 
                                                 
44 See, eg, http://www.estoniancompanyregistration.com/, http://www.companyincorporationestonia.com/,  
http://www.romania-company.com/, http://www.theromanianclub.com/,   
http://www.slovenskespolocnosti.sk/en,  http://zugimpex.com/slovakia-company.html  
45 For corporate tax law see also Section 5.2, below. 
46 Another example might be that of an Italian businessman who incorporates a new company in Romania in 
order to relocate part of its production into this latter country. Although the Italian businessman is the sole 
shareholder and director of the Romanian company, he just spends few days a week in Romania, thanks to 
cheap flight connections, and kept his official residence in his hometown, where part of the production is still 
situated. This situation might not be uncommon. 
47 See Section 2.1 above. 




Figure 1. Network of businesses incorporated in other Member States with > 50 
businesses 
 
Figure 1 displays all of the country pairs that have a tie-strength of at least 50: i.e., 
based on the estimated figures, there are at least 50 businesses from the origin country 
that incorporate a company in the target one. The direction of the arrows indicates which 
country is the origin and which is the target country. The network analysis program was 
also instructed to shift the position of countries according to the strength of their 
relationships based on the technique of ‘spring embedding’. 48  Finally, following the 
classification scheme of the United Nations Statistics Division,49 the colours of the nodes 
indicate the geographic classification into Eastern European (blue), Northern European 
(grey), Southern Europe (black) and Western European (red) countries. 
In a figure such as Figure 1 it is clear that the countries with a small population (e.g., 
Slovenia, Malta) are bound to have weaker ties since – regardless of any incoming 
incorporations – they tend to have fewer businesses that can establish a business abroad. 
Thus, it is also helpful to scale all countries in terms of outgoing ties to 100%. This has 
been done in Figure 2, below. It displays all ties that are above 10%, so a link is shown 
if more than 10% of the businesses from the outgoing Member State that incorporate in 
all other Member States do so in the incoming Member State. 
                                                 
48 See http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C4_netdraw.html. 
49 Available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm. 




Figure 2: Network of businesses incorporated in other Member States with > 10% 
 
It can be inferred from both Figures 1 and 2 that the UK is the centre of this mobility 
network. Many of the close connections appear to match geographic and linguistic 
similarities (e.g., Cyprus and Greece; the Czech Republic and Slovakia; Slovenia and 
Croatia; Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).  
The closeness, according to these network data, can also be established more formally. 
Network analysis provides various tools to identify community structures. 50  Some of 
those tools rely on binary data, but for a valued network – such as the current one – it is 
preferable to use tools that consider the full information in the dataset. One such method 
is to calculate ‘optimisation clusters’. This refers to a formal method that ‘optimises a 
cost function which measures the total distance or similarity within classes for a 
proximity matrix’.51  
Optimisation clusters require that the researcher specifies in advance how many clusters 
shall be created. In Table 4 this has been done, based on the absolute number of 
incorporations, for up to ten clusters since, with more clusters, we would often only have 
meaningless clusters of only one or two countries. 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., A Ferligoj, P Doreian and V Batagelj ‘Positions and Roles’, in The SAGE Handbook of Social Net-
work Analysis 434 (J Scott and P.J Carrington eds., London: Sage, 2011). 
51 Definition at http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/2cvtid.htm. 
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The table also indicates how well the respective clusters explain the entire dataset (R2). 
It can be seen that this number is low for the divisions with few clusters, but that it 
gradually increases with more clusters being added. For example, the eight-cluster 
division can then be seen as a plausible one, consisting of the following clusters (in the 
order from the table): a mixed one, an Eastern European one, a Western European one, 
a South-West and a South-East European one, a Central European one, and two mainly 
Nordic-Baltic ones.  
It is also helpful to ‘track’ the position of individual countries throughout the ten clusters. 
It can then be seen that the following groups of countries are always in the same 
respective cluster: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary; Finland, Estonia and 
Latvia; Poland, Romania and Italy; the UK and Ireland; Cyprus and Greece; and Belgium 
and Luxembourg. These groups may be seen as intuitive ones as they are those of 
neighbouring countries with further linguistic, social and economic similarities. 53 
However, in the context of the present study, it may also be noted that it shows the 
rather limited effect of the freedom of establishment on the mobility of companies across 
all Member States.  
4. Time series of new incorporations in the UK and Slovakia, 1990-2015 
4.1 Data availability 
It is interesting to assess how fluctuations in new foreign incorporations have evolved in 
the popular target countries over the last decades. In principle, Orbis enables a search 
for new incorporations each year. However, for many Member States, data are not 
                                                 
52 The abbreviations follow the official EU abbreviations (see http://publications.europa.eu/code/en/en-
370100.htm): Belgium (BE); Greece (EL); Lithuania (LT); Portugal (PT); Bulgaria (BG); Spain (ES); Luxem-
bourg (LU); Romania (RO);; Czech Republic (CZ); France (FR); Hungary (HU); Slovenia (SI); Denmark (DK); 
Croatia (HR); Malta (MT); Slovakia (SK); Germany (DE); Italy (IT); Netherlands (NL); Finland (FI); Estonia 
(EE); Cyprus (CY); Austria (AT); Sweden (SE); Ireland (IE); Latvia (LV); Poland (PL); United Kingdom (UK). 
53 For further evaluation see the regression analysis in Section 5 below. 




available about incorporations of companies that are not active any more – or, as far as 
they are available, information about the managers (their nationality and them also 
being shareholders) is missing. Thus, having checked the data availability for the most 
popular eight target countries (according to the results of the previous section), it was 
found that only the data from the UK and Slovakia are of good enough quality to enable 
an analysis of the evolution in new incorporations over the last two and a half decades. 
The following is based on the ‘segmentations by year’ criterion that is available in the 
Orbis search function. The use of this particular Orbis search option has also influenced 
the way foreign businesses were identified in the analysis in this section (in some 
respects, deviating from the approach of the previous section). The main restriction was 
that we searched for firms where all of the directors (for UK ltds) or senior managers 
(for Slovak SROs) are nationals from another Member State.54 In addition, we imposed 
the search restriction that all of those directors/senior managers had to be shareholders 
of the company (with any participation). 
Similar as with the data reported in the previous section, the focus on foreign nationals 
means that some of them may have actually been resident in the UK or Slovakia. Thus, 
based on migration data published by the UN, 55  we estimated how many of the 
companies were established by foreigners who are resident in the UK or Slovakia at the 
time of incorporation, a figure then deducted from the total number. In order to check 
the validity of this calculation, we compared the resulting data with the residence data in 
the study of UK incorporations by Becht et al.56 for the years 1997 to 2006: those are 
highly correlated (0.986) which gives us confidence in this technique of identifying 
companies established by foreigners who also live in their country of nationality. 
4.2 General results  
The following figures report the time series for incorporations of such foreign-based 
private limited companies in the UK and Slovakia (i.e. with all directors/senior managers 
being shareholders and nationals from another Member State but deducting the 
companies established by foreigners living in the UK or Slovakia). As the scale of 
incorporations differs considerably, the first of those figures reports the eight countries 
with the highest numbers of foreign incorporations in the UK/Slovakia, the second figure 
the next eight countries, and the final figure the remaining Member States. 
                                                 
54 While Orbis only allows the search of companies with at least one director/senior manager from a particular 
country, it is possible to search for all companies with any directors from all countries of the world with the 
exception of this particular country, which can then be deducted from the total number of companies with in-
formation about the nationality of directors/senior managers. 
55 See Section 5.2, below. 
56 Becht at al., supra note 6. 




Figures 3 to 5: Time series of newly incorporated foreign-based UK ltds 
 
 






The UK data show that prior to the 2000s most curves are flat, then followed by a rise of 
ltd incorporations, first, in some of the ‘old’ Member States (notably, Germany, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria), but in the 2010s also across all Member States 
(both ‘old’ and ‘new’ ones). In terms of the countries that are at the top of the curves, it 
is no surprise that more populous countries have more companies incorporated in the 
UK. With respect to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), it needs to be 
noted that it is possible that the residence adjustment underestimates the number of 
citizens from these countries resident in the UK who established ltds.57 
In some Member States, there has been a rise of UK ltds but then also a decline, at least 
for some years. As already noted by Ringe,58 this happened in Germany in particular 
with a reform of the law of private limited companies (MoMiG), but the figures also show 
some reversals of the general trend for Spain, Denmark, Belgium and Austria. However, 
overall, the number of newly incorporated foreign ltds has continued to rise. Thus, we do 
not confirm Ringe’s assessment of mere ‘flash in the pan’. 
 
                                                 
57 Notably, this may be the case for the Romanian and Bulgarian data in the years 2007 to 2013, given the 
restrictions to immigration in the UK for Romanians and Bulgarians but with an exemption for the self-
employed. See http://immigrationmatters.co.uk/uk-border-agency-rules-for-bulgarian-and-romanian-
nationals.html. 
58 Ringe, supra note 12. 




Figures 6 to 8: Time series of newly incorporated foreign-based Slovakian SROs 
 
 






The numbers for foreign-based SROs are, generally speaking, lower than those for 
foreign-based UK ltds. The figures also show that the trend lines are flat and low until 
the EU accession of Slovakia in 2004, with the exception of businesses established from 
the Czech Republic.59 Throughout the time series it is noticeable that incorporations from 
the neighbouring countries, i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary and Austria are at the top of 
the curves.  
The general time trend is that after 2004 foreign incorporations increased for a number 
of years, but then most of the curves peaked in the early 2010s and subsequently 
declined, in particular in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (while the very low 2015 data should be 
treated with caution as Orbis may not yet have fully recorded all companies from that 
year). It is suggested that these changes do not simply reflect the variations in minimum 
capital requirements and the ease of incorporation since most CEE countries have 
followed the same trend in facilitating the incorporation of private companies.60 Rather, it 
may be linked to changes in the investment climate in Slovakia. For example, it can be 
observed that, in Slovakia, inflows in foreign direct investment have declined in the last 
few years, in particular since 2011, 61  which has been attributed to Slovakia’s 
‘malfunctioning judiciary’, ‘excess bureaucracy’, ‘poor infrastructure’, as well as an 
                                                 
59 It may also be noted that, until 1993, both countries were still part of the same country; thus, the data from 
the first years of the time series should be treated with caution. 
60 For example, the minimum capital requirements reported in Becht et al., supra note 6, at 251, for 2006 have 
been reduced in the subsequent years in Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Further comparisons of 
the ease of incorporation across time can be assessed with the Doing Business Reports, see Section 5.2, below. 
61 See data at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=SVK&series=&period and 
www.tradingeconomics.com/slovakia/foreign-direct-investment.  




increase in the corporate tax rate above the rates of the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland.62 
4.3 Structural breaks 
The previous section pointed towards possible changes in the time series after the ECJ 
case of Centros, Überseering etc. and the EU accession of the CEE countries. These 
possible ‘structural breaks’ can also be assessed more formally with tools of change-
point detection.63 The following uses two of those techniques: first, Stata implements a 
test for structural breaks in time series data, using a Wald test.64 This test tries to 
identify exactly one break in the time series. However, in the present time series, it may 
not be unrealistic to assume that there can be more than one break point. Thus, second, 
with the software ‘Change-Point Analyzer’,65 we use a CUSUM change point detection 
test which can identify multiple change points and provide further information about the 
strength and direction of these structural breaks of the time series. 
Table 5: Change point evaluation of foreign-based UK and Slovakian limited 
companies 
 
 UK limited companies (ltds) Slovakian private companies (SROs) 
Test: Wald  CUSUM (with level) Wald  CUSUM (with level) 
Austria 2004 2004(2) 2004 2004(1), 2014(4) 
Belgium 2008 2004(3), 2008(2) 2006 2000(2), 2006(1) 
Bulgaria 2012 2010(5), 2012(3) 2007 2007(1) 
Croatia 2012 no 2010 2004(2), 2010(1) 
Cyprus no no 2010 2010(1) 
Czech Rep. 2012 2006(2), 2013(1) 2004 2004(2), 2014(3) 
Denmark 2001 2002(2), 2004(3) 2004 2004(1) 
Estonia 2012 2008(3), 2012(1) no no  
Finland 2011 2007(2), 2012(1) 2012 no  
France 2012 1998(3), 2012(4) 2004 2004(1) 
Germany 2004 2004(1), 2008(2) 2004 2004(1) 
Greece 2012 
1998(6), 2010(3), 
2012(2) 2006 2006(1) 
Hungary 2012 2012(3) 2006 
1996(6), 2006(3), 2007(2), 
2013(4) 
Ireland 2011 1998(4), 2011(2) 2004 2000(1), 2004(3), 2009(2) 
Italy 2012 2007(5), 2012(2) 2005 1997(3), 2003(2), 2014(1) 
Latvia 2012 no 2009 2003(2), 2009(1) 
Lithuania 2012 no  2006 2006(1) 
                                                 
62  US State Department, ‘2015 Investment Climate Statement – Slovakia’, available at 
www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241740.htm. 
63 For references and an application to legal data see D Katelouzou and M Siems, ‘Disappearing Paradigms in 
Shareholder Protection: Leximetric Evidence for 30 Countries, 1990–2013’ (2015) 15 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 127 at 141-2. 
64 See www.stata.com/new-in-stata/structural-breaks/.  
65 Available at www.variation.com/cpa/index.html. 




Luxembourg 1999 no  2006 2006(1) 
Malta no no  2005 2005(1) 
Netherlands 2005 2005(3), 2012(2) 2004 1998(3), 2005(1), 2008(2) 
Poland 2012 2013(2) 2008 2004(2), 2010(1) 
Portugal 2012 2013(3) 2001 no  
Romania 2012 2013(5) 2006 2004(3), 2007(3), 2013(4) 
Slovakia no no   - 
Slovenia 2012 1996(4), 2015(3) 2005 2005(2), 2014(1) 
Spain 2012 2013(4) 2005 2005(1) 
Sweden 2010 2007(6), 2013(3) 2004 2004(1) 
UK  - 2002 2000(1) 
 
Notes for CUSUM test: (i) Black for positive change; red for negative change   
(ii) lower level indicates more important change point;  
the lowest two levels (i.e. (1) and (2)) are in bold. 
The results in Table 5 confirm some of the interpretations from the previous section, 
namely that the main changes happened after 2000, with many of them in the UK in the 
2010s and in Slovakia in the mid-2000s, and that most changes are characterised by an 
increase in foreign incorporations, though with some exceptions (Denmark and Germany 
for the UK, and a number of countries for Slovakia, mainly for 2013 and 2014).  
Focussing on the results of the CUSUM test, it is worth highlighting the most important 
changes, i.e. those with the levels (1) and (2). In the UK data, all of those changes 
happened a number of years after the ECJ case of Centros; thus, apparently, this 
judgment alone did not give non-UK businesses the confidence to establish a company in 
the UK. It may also be noticeable that we only have such strongly important changes for 
less than half of the post-2004 Member States; thus, this also justifies a cautious 
assessment of the effectiveness of the ECJ case law for corporate mobility in the EU. The 
data from Slovakia show strong change points in or around the Slovakian accession to 
the EU in 2004. But it is difficult to strictly relate this finding to the ECJ decisions of 
Centros etc. as this positive effect may also be due to other factors that have increased 
cross-border cooperation and business activity with the EU enlargement. 
5. Regression analysis: does private international law matter? 
5.1 Methodological considerations 
In order to assess the relevance of differences in conflicts of laws rules applicable to 
companies, the following regression analysis will be based on the cross-sectional data of 
currently incorporated companies.66 While time series data can be helpful to establish 
causal relationships, the aforementioned limitations of data availability mean that only 
the cross-sectional data enable us to conduct a meaningful analysis of the relevance of 
differences in private international law for companies incorporated across all Member 
States. 
The incorporation data are count data. This indicates a Poisson or negative binomial 
distribution with a Generalized Linear Model (GLM). In the present case, negative 
                                                 
66 As reported in Section 3, above. 




binomial is preferred due to overdispersion.67 We use standard errors clustered by the 
countries of the commercial register, thus addressing the possibility that our data are 
correlated within groups of observations sharing the same country.68 
In all of the subsequent models, we use the original data on companies with all 
managers from another Member State and the majority of them being shareholders, 
both criteria as reported in Orbis. We then also control for the availability of the relevant 
data in Orbis and migration to the country of the register (see Table 7 below: 
‘multiplicator’ and ‘migration’). This approach was preferred over the use of the adjusted 
data (see Table 3, above). The adjustment was based on the assumption that migrants 
incorporate a company as frequently as the native population. But it is also possible that 
migrants are more likely to incorporate their own companies since it may be difficult for 
them to find employment in the public sector or local businesses. Thus, the use of 
migration as an explanatory variable is helpful since it would also capture any higher (or 
lower) rate of incorporations per capita of the migrant population. 
In the main regressions we exclude the six countries with the most limited data (below 
5%).69 To check the robustness of the findings, we also ran regressions with all countries 
but the UK, the eleven countries with the most comprehensive data (above 50%)70 and 
all 28 Member States. 
5.2 Explanatory variables 
Starting with Centros, the case law of the ECJ (now CJEU) has facilitated the 
incorporation of companies in other EU Member States.71 The Court of Justice has based 
its reasoning on the Treaty’s freedom of establishment, not arguments of conflict of laws 
rules applicable to companies. However, a strict application of the ‘real seat’ theory for 
incorporations (and re-incorporations) in intra-EU scenarios would not be in compliance 
with the freedom of establishment. Still, there may be ‘remnants’ of the real seat theory 
in some Member States, which might variously refer to the location of the administrative 
office or other fact-based criterions, in order to mitigate certain effects of a ‘pure’ 
incorporation theory.72 We can code the level of ‘pureness’ of the incorporation theory as 
follows: 
A country gets ‘1’ if a connecting factor based upon the incorporation 
theory is clearly formulated in legislation or through judge-made law (i.e. 
in a way that everyone, even non-experts, can grasp it) and no exceptions 
are provided (i.e. no additional connecting factors based upon the location 
of a company’s real seat). The score ‘2/3’ denotes either (i) the situation 
that a connecting factor based upon the incorporation theory is clearly 
formulated but that this criterion is subject to exceptions, or (ii) that legal 
experts can identify that the country follows a connecting factor based 
upon the incorporation theory and no exceptions are provided, but non-
experts are uncertain about this position. The score ‘1/3’ refers to the 
previous scenario (ii) but exceptions to the incorporation theory clearly 
exist. Finally, ‘0’ is about to the scenario where even legal experts cannot 
                                                 
67 In Stata, we use ‘negative binomial parameter estimated via ML’. 
68 For further technical details on regressions using count data see, eg, R Winkelmann, Econometric Analysis of 
Count Data (Berlin, Springer 5th ed 2008); S Coxe et al., ‘The Analysis of Count Data: A Gentle Introduction to 
Poisson Regression and Its Alternatives’ (2009) 91 Journal of Personality Assessment 121. 
69 These are Belgium, Croatia, France, Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden, see Table 2, above. 
70 These were Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, UK. 
71 For details see Chapter I of this report. 
72 It is worth reminding that in this section we are not making any statement on the compatibility of such rem-
nants of real seat theory with the freedom of establishment: we merely describe the reality of Member States’ 
private international law as it emerged from the country reports. 




identify that the country follows a connecting factor based upon the 
incorporation theory. 
In addition, in some Member States, rules of substantive company law contain 
requirements for companies to establish or maintain a specific connection to the territory 
of the Member State. This was coded as follows:  
A country gets ‘1’ if domestically incorporated companies do not have to 
have their headquarters or any other fact-based criteria on the domestic 
territory; a country gets 1/2 if domestic companies should have some 
factors on the domestic territory but this rule is uncertain; it gets ‘0’ 
otherwise.  
Based on these definitions and the comparative analysis, 73  this leads to the 
following classifications: 
Table 6: Country classifications in private international and substantive 
company law 
(1) ‘Pureness’ of incorporation theory under private international law (max. 1) 
(2) Substantive company law free from ‘real seat elements’ (max. 1) 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Austria 2/3 0 Italy 2/3 1 
Belgium 2/3 0 Latvia 1/3 0 
Bulgaria 1 1 Lithuania 1 0 
Croatia 2/3 1 Luxembourg 1/3 0 
Cyprus 1 1 Malta 1 1 
Czech Republic 1 1 Netherlands 1 1 
Denmark 1/3 1 Poland 0 1/2 
Estonia 2/3 0 Portugal 0 1 
Finland 1 1 Romania 2/3 1 
France 2/3 0 Slovakia 1 1 
Germany 2/3 1 Slovenia 2/3 0 
Greece 1/3 0 Spain 2/3 0 
Hungary 1 1 Sweden 1 1 
Ireland 1 1 United Kingdom 1 1 
 
Incorporation in another country can also be driven by a number of other factors. For 
this purpose, we use various control variables, see Table 7. The main aim is to test 
whether other characteristics of the country of incorporation may be more important 
than conflict of laws rules. Further variables account for the closeness of the country 
pairs. 
We also needed to consider that the data on private companies as they exist today are 
likely to be influenced by both the recent past and the present: while the past is of 
importance for the incorporation decision, the present is also relevant since companies 
                                                 
73 See Chapter IV of this report. 




that still exist today make the implicit choice to keep the present legal form.74 For the 
collected data, 74% of the companies were established between 2005 and 2015: thus, 
as far as the control variables have been subject to change, the regressions use the 
average value over this period.75 
Table 7: Description of explanatory variables 
Name Description (for country of 
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Rule of law Rule of Law score based on 
Word Governance Indicators 
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Spoken language  Language spoken by at least 





Distances between the cities 
constituting the economic 
centres between country pairs, 
weighted by share of country’s 
population 
as previous 





                                                 
74 Thus, the present analysis is different from the one by Becht at al., supra note 6, and Braun et al., supra 
note 9, which only analysed the new incorporations in particular years. 
75 This was done for the variables on incorporation costs, corporate tax rates, rule of law and migration. 






Limited companies (as reported 
in Orbis) per capita 




Absolute difference in conflict 
of laws rules as regards 
pureness of incorporation 
theory 
Own calculations based on Table 
6, above  
Multiplicator Factor correcting for variations 
in data availability 
Own calculations, see Table 2, 
above 








Dummy variables for each 




To elaborate, instead of conflict of laws rules, it could rather be low incorporation costs, 
low corporate tax rates and a good rule of law rating of the country of incorporation that 
attract foreign businesses. With respect to the possible relevance of corporate tax law, it 
is worth noting that the concept of tax residence diverges from the mere formal 
registered seat and is normally a fact-intense criterion, which, for instance, considers the 
place of a company’s business or its headquarter.76 Thus, such a variable is unlikely to 
be significant for companies that merely have a ‘letterbox’ in the incorporation country 
while doing business in another Member State.77 However, it is likely to be relevant with 
regard to companies having a physical connection to the country of incorporation, so 
that the tax authorities apply domestic tax law, despite its managers being foreign-
based.78 Those cases are also within the scope of the present analysis.79 
More generally, it can also be speculated that businesses may not choose a legal system 
by way of incorporation that is too unfamiliar to them: the variable on whether countries 
belong to the same ‘legal origin’ (English, French, German or Nordic), based on the 
contentious studies by La Porta and Djankov et al.,80 aims to account for this factor. 
Of course, it is not only the legal similarities that play a role. Language could matter 
since registration of a company typically requires the use of the official language of the 
respective country. It can also be relevant as far as the choice of a place of incorporation 
may mean that the founders may become involved in legal disputes in the target country. 
Geography is likely to matter for businesses that operate in a border region – which can 
also mean that the main place of business could be in the neighbouring country. 
The population of the incorporation country could also be relevant. In the US, the 
popularity of the small state of Delaware is, inter alia, said to be due to the fact that 
Delaware can focus on being attractive to foreign incorporations while more populous 
                                                 
76 For a good overview see G Maisto (ed.), Residence of Companies Under Tax Treaties and EC Law (Amster-
dam: IBFD, 2009) (also on how the definition of these factual terms differs from the corresponding terms in 
the conflict of laws rules applicable to companies). 
77 For the ambiguous phrase ‘letterbox companies’ see also Section 2.1, above. 
78 Or where, in practice, tax authorities are not fully informed as regards the factual connections of the compa-
ny to another country, or are lenient in the way they apply the law as regards this connection. 
79 See Section 3.2, above. 
80 For further discussion, see M Siems, ‘Varieties of legal systems: towards a new global taxonomy’, Journal of 
Institutional Economics, forthcoming (FirstView available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744137415000545).  




states have to balance more diverse interests.81 But the reverse is also possible, namely 
that countries with a larger population are considered as being a more secure choice for 
incorporating a company. This variable also controls for the effect that some of the 
companies in question may do some business in their country of incorporation and may 
therefore benefit from the larger market of this country. 
The control variable of companies per capita may capture a variety of factors. Some of 
those overlap with reasons already mentioned, such as costs of incorporation. But it is 
also worth testing whether, more generally, the form of the private limited company is 
popular in the country of incorporation, thus controlling for other difficult-to-code details 
of company law.82 
The variable about the absolute difference in conflict of laws rules as applicable to 
companies takes the classification according to ‘pureness’ of incorporation theory (see 
Table 6, above) as a starting point. It then establishes the difference between each 
country pair; thus, for example, countries get a ‘0’ in difference if both of them follow 
the pure incorporation theory or if both of them still have many remnants of the real 
seat theory. This variable can potentially be interesting as it may indicate whether any 
harmonisation of conflict of laws rules in this area (i.e. regardless of the substance) may 
be beneficial to corporate mobility. 
It was already mentioned (see 5.1, above) that the control variables ‘multiplicator’ and 
‘migration’ are necessary since the regressions use the original data of companies as 
reported in Orbis. Finally, the dummy variables for the country of the managers consider 
that there are many unobservable reasons that may determine why people from a 
particular country want to incorporate a private company in the first place. For example, 
this variable may capture differences in innovation or in labour and social laws. 
5.3 Regression results 
The first three regression outputs report the results excluding the six countries with the 
most limited data for the place of incorporation (see 5.1, above). They are therefore 
based on 22 (place of incorporation) x 27 (place of business) = 594 observations. 
                                                 
81 See, e.g., R Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (1993). For a US/EU comparison see, e.g., 
F Mucciarelli, ‘The Function of Corporate Law and the effects of Reincorporations in the U.S. and the E.U.’ 
(2012) 20 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 421. 
82 Also considering that the existing quantifications of company law focus on the law of public companies. See, 
e.g., http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/research-projects/completed-projects/law-finance-development/. 




Table 8: Negative binomial regressions (1) – dependent variable: number of 
companies with all managers being citizens of another Member State and more 
than half of those also being the shareholders of the company   
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) 
Incorporation score 2.080279 ** 1.469544 *   




0.7902481  -0.81764  
Costs of incorporation 0.1040623 ** 0.0834384 * 0.104062 ** 




 -0.07587  






 -0.60188  
Legal origin 0.7639068 ** 0.7502287 ** 0.763907 ** 





0.0014363 ** -0.00135 ** 
Population 6.20E-08 ** 6.26E-08 ** 6.20E-08 ** 
Companies per capita   13.93519 *   
Difference conflict rules     -4.16056 ** 
Multiplicator -0.143194 * -0.31475 ** -0.14319 * 
Migrants 3.40E-06  3.63E-06  3.40E-06  
Country dummies # ** # ** # ** 
Constant -0.44684  0.630225  1.633443  
Log pseudolikelihood 
-








 n=594  n=594  n=594  
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level; # highest degree 
The results show that, as far as the legal variables are concerned, the incorporation 
score, the costs of incorporation and legal origin are consistently statistically significant, 
but not the variables on ‘real seat’ elements in substantive company law, corporate tax 
law and the rule of law. The lack of significance of the substantive law ‘real seat’ coding 
is not implausible as it may be doubtful how important this difference is in practice: for 
example, in Estonia, which we coded as having such a requirement, the country report 
suggest that ‘there is no effective mechanism that would restrict the foreign-
administrated companies to be registered in Estonia’.83 
The variables about official language and geography are significant with the expected 
signs. In further regressions (not reported here), we also examined the role of the 
spoken language, but it was found to be less significant than the official language. The 
variable on population shows that in the EU, larger countries have an advantage in 
attracting foreign incorporations. 
Model (2) includes the variable on ‘companies per capita’ and confirms that other factors 
may play a role for the incorporation decision. However, the incorporating score also 
retains its significance in this specification; thus, it can be seen that it is not simply a 
proxy for other differences. 
Model (3) shows that it is not only the substance of the conflict of laws rules that 
matters but also the absolute difference between them. This regression also includes 
other variables that deal with differences between countries (legal origin, language etc.) 
and those also retain their statistical significance. Thus, here too, we can be confident 
                                                 
83 See country report Estonia, Section 2. 




that this result is not simply due to a possible correlation between conflict of laws rules 
applicable to companies and other similarities between countries. 
Table 9: Negative binomial regressions (2) – dependent variable: as Table 8 
Independent variables: (4) (5) (6) 
Incorporation score 3.382553 ** 2.104793 ** 1.578953 ** 
Substantive company law -0.95515  -0.65626  -0.69515  
Costs of incorporation 0.10797 ** 0.101664 ** 0.063953 * 
Corporate tax rate -0.29792 ** -0.0836  -0.07589 * 
Rule of law 0.139134  -0.44879  -0.73922 * 
Legal origin 0.706026 * 0.749897 ** 0.762654 ** 
Official language 0.400527  1.388102 ** 1.171581 ** 
Geographic distance -0.00158 ** -0.00138 ** -0.0015 ** 
Population 8.04E-08 ** 5.75E-08 ** 3.60E-08 ** 
Companies per capita       
Difference conflict rules       
Multiplicator 0.685718  -0.16251 ** -0.13767 ** 
Migrants 7.79E-07  3.37E-06 * 3.22E-06 * 
Country dummies # ** # ** # ** 
Constant 0.833491  -0.133796  3.916033  





 n=297  n=756  n=729  
** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level; # highest degree 
To check the robustness of the findings, models (4) to (6) report the regression results 
for the specification of model (1) for modified country groups. Model (4) examines the 
eleven countries with the most comprehensive data, and model (5) does so for all 28 
Member States (even the six with the very limited data). Model (6) excludes the UK as a 
possible outlier given that more than 50% of the foreign incorporations are registered in 
the UK.84 It should be noted that this is a hypothetical scenario since in an EU without 
the UK, it may well have been the case that a Member State with a similar law (perhaps 
Ireland) would have taken the position of the UK as a popular target destination. 
The main results are unchanged in all of the three models. In model (4) the lower 
significance level for some of the variables is likely to be due to the lower number of 
observations. In models (4) and (6) it is however also interesting that the variable on 
corporate tax rate is now statistically significant, with the expected negative sign. In 
addition, in model (6) the negative significance of the rule of law variable is likely to be 
due to the popularity of some of the Central and Eastern European countries as popular 
target destinations (see Table 3, above). It can also be speculated that the lower rule of 
law score may not always be against the interest of companies since it may go hand in 
hand with lighter requirements in terms of doing business. In this respect, model (6) 
may indicate a possible ‘market segmentation’:85 businesses which only aim at reducing 
the initial incorporation costs do so in the UK, while those which also aim at reducing 
taxation (and have a more general preference for laxer laws) incorporate in other 
countries.  
                                                 
84 See Section 3.2, above. 
85 See Section 3.2, above. 




Table 10: Interpretation of coefficients in model (1) 
Independent variables: Coefficient and 
significance 






Incorporation score 2.080279 ** 700.67% 213.79% 





Costs of incorporation 0.1040623 ** 10.97% 68.23% 









Legal origin 0.7639068 ** 114.66% 52.92% 
Official language 1.607175 ** 398.87% 75.38% 
Geographic distance 
-
0.0013462 ** -0.13% -97.55% 
Population 6.20E-08 ** 0.00% 143.22% 
Multiplicator -0.143194 * -13.34% -127.28% 
Migrants 3.40E-06  0.00% 31.68% 
 
Count data regressions do not lend themselves to intuitive interpretation as easily as 
OLS models; however, it is possible to say that a coefficient of x means that a change in 
the respective independent variable of 1 will result in a multiplication of the predicted 
count by ex.86 In Table 10, we present the interpretation of the coefficients of the most 
convincing model (1). The column ‘change per 1 unit increase’ enables the calculation of 
an effect of changes to this variable, holding the other variables constant. 
The next column follows the same approach but examines the percentage impact of a 
one standard deviation increase. This is the best way to compare the effects of the 
individual variables. It can be seen that the incorporation score plays the largest role, 
followed by the population, geographic distance, official language, costs of incorporation 
and legal origin.  
6. Conclusion 
The empirical research about corporate mobility in the EU has so far been limited in two 
respects: it has been focussed on the analysis of foreign-based companies in the UK and 
it has mainly been concerned with differences in the costs of incorporation.  
This chapter had the aim to fill these gaps. First, in the descriptive statistics, based on 
data from all EU Member States, we identified the UK as the most popular target 
destination. To a lesser extent, foreign incorporations also take place in other Member 
States, in particular in Central and Eastern Europe, with Estonia, Romania and Slovakia 
being popular target destinations. However, the network analysis of these data also 
showed that the foreign incorporations typically happen between neighbouring countries 
with further linguistic, social and economic similarities; thus, the effect of the freedom of 
establishment on the mobility of companies across all Member States is still rather 
limited. 
Second, the time series of new incorporations in the UK and Slovakia found that the 
main changes happened after 2000, with many of them in the UK in the 2010s and in 
                                                 
86 Similar to the discussion in the US, see, eg, M Barzuza, ‘Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Lia-
bility-Free Jurisdiction’, (2012) 98 Virginia Law Review 935. For Europe see A Zorzi, ‘A European Nevada? Bad 
Enforcement as an Edge in State Competition for Incorporations’, University Ca’ Foscari of Venice, Dept. of 
Economics Research Paper Series No. 12 (2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2766174. 




Slovakia in the mid-2000s, and that most changes are characterised by an increase in 
foreign incorporations. Thus, for the UK, all of those changes happened a number of 
years after the case law of the ECJ liberalised the freedom of establishment of companies. 
The data from Slovakia show strong change points in or around the Slovakian accession 
to the EU in 2004. But here too it is difficult to relate this finding to the ECJ case law as 
this positive effect may also be due to other factors that have increased cross-border 
cooperation and business activity with EU enlargement. 
Third, the regression analysis established that decisions about domestic or foreign 
incorporations are not merely a result of the differences in substantive company law, in 
particular the costs of incorporation.87 Rather, we found that private international law 
plays a key role. Countries that have a clear-cut version of the ‘incorporation theory’ 
benefit in this market for incorporations, as compared to companies that have retained 
elements of the ‘real seat theory’. We also found that the extent to which private 
international law differ between a given country pair is significantly and negatively 
related to the use of pseudo-foreign companies.  
These findings have important policy implications. They show that the case law of the 
ECJ (now CJEU) has not made all differences in the conflicts of laws rules applicable to 
companies obsolete. The significant negative effect of the differences between those 
rules may speak in favour of harmonisation in this area of private international law. The 
significant relationship between the ‘pureness’ of the incorporation theory and the use of 
a Member State’s companies by foreign incorporators can also provide an indication 
about the possible direction of any harmonisation that aims to facilitate corporate 
mobility in Europe. 
 
 
7. Annex: Forms of companies from EU Member States in Orbis 
Country Forms of private companies  
 
Forms of public companies 
 
Austria Private limited company – GmbH Public limited company – AG 
Belgium Private limited liability company – 
SPRL/BVBA 
Limited company by shares – 
SA/NV 
Bulgaria One-person private limited 
company - EOOD, Private limited 
company – OOD 
One-person public limited 
company - EAD, Public limited 
company – AD 
Croatia Limited liability company – d.o.o., 
Limited liability company, 
simplified – j.d.o.o. 
 Joint stock company - d.d. 
Cyprus Private limited company Public limited company  
Czech Republic Limited liability company - S.R.O. Joint stock company - A.S. 
Denmark Private limited company – ApS Limited company – A/S  
Estonia Limited liability company – OÜ  Joint stock company - AS  
Finland Private limited company – OY Public limited company – OYJ 
France Limited company, simplified – 
SAS, Limited liability company – 
SARL 
Limited company – SA 
Germany Limited liability company – GmbH 
[includes data for UG] 
Public limited company – AG 
                                                 
87 See also the previous research summarised in Table 1.  




Greece Limited liability company - E.P.E, 
Limited liability company - sole 
shareholder, Private capital 
company - I.K.E. 
Limited company - S.A.  
Hungary Limited liability company – KFT Public limited company - ZRT 
and NYRT 
Ireland (Private) limited liability company  Public company 
Italy Limited liability company - SRL Joint stock company – SPA  
Latvia Limited liability company – SIA Joint stock company – AS 
Lithuania Limited liability company – uab  Joint stock company – ab 
Luxembourg One-person company with limited 
liability, Private limited liability 
company – SARL 
Limited company by shares – SA 
Malta Limited liability company, Limited 
liability company - private exempt, 
Limited liability company - private 
non-exempt 
Limited liability company – public 
non-exempt 
Netherlands Private limited liability company – 
BV 
Public limited liability company – 
NV 
Poland  Limited liability company - 
Sp. z.o.o. 
Joint stock company – SA 
Portugal Limited liability company - LDA Public limited company – SA 
Romania Limited liability company – SRL Joint stock company – SA 
Slovakia Limited liability company - S.R.O. Joint stock company - A.S. 
Slovenia Limited liability company - d.o.o. Joint stock company - d.d. 
Spain Limited liability company – SL, 
One-person company with limited 
liability 
Public limited company – SA 
Sweden Limited liability company – AB Public limited liability company - 
AB publikt 








III. EMPIRICAL SURVEY 
1. Introduction 
Starting with the landmark decision in Centros, the case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union has been supportive of cross-border mobility of companies in 
Europe.1 In some Member States, legal reforms of the conflicts of laws rules have also 
liberalised the choice of the place of incorporation. 2  However, despite these 
developments, there may be significant problems in practice. 
In this chapter, we report the results of an empirical survey conducted in September 
2015. The content of the survey closely follows the call for tender,3 which asked to 
conduct an empirical analysis of the practical problems created by the legal uncertainty 
for companies caused by the current situation stemming from the potential for conflicts 
of laws in a context where the substantive laws of the Member States have not been 
fully harmonised. This should also consider the case law of the Court of Justice relating 
to the freedom of establishment and the existing European company law framework. 
The main finding is that the respondents do not regard the European case law as a 
substitute for a possible future harmonisation of conflict of laws rules. In particular, it is 
notable that many of the respondents of the countries that have retained an element of 
the ‘real seat theory’ report various practical obstacles. There is also a strong positive 
correlation between respondents who are sceptical about their domestic law and who 
support EU harmonisation of conflict of laws rules. Furthermore, the analysis of group 
differences shows that there is still a divide between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States 
as respondents from latter former countries are more likely to indicate lack of familiarity 
with the relevant procedures and to report practical problems in their dealings with 
domestic courts and commercial registers. 
The subsequent text is structured as follows: Section 2 will outline the design of the 
survey, Section 3 will present and discuss the main findings followed by a conclusion in 
Section 4. Section 5 contains the Annex of this chapter with the cover email and the text 
of the survey. 
2. Survey design: scope, procedure and respondents 
2.1 Form and scope of survey 
The survey design aimed to reflect the benefits of a multi-method approach:4 the survey 
therefore asked both multiple-choice and open-ended questions 5  in order to collect 
information that, on the one hand, can easily be compared across the 28 Member States 
and that, on the other hand, captures factors unique to each jurisdiction. 
The aim of the survey was to collect empirical information on the practical problems due 
to the lack of harmonisation of conflict of laws rules. This means that the survey had to 
consider that it is possible that some legal problems existing in theory do not materialise 
in practice and vice versa. For example, on the one hand, there can be the situation that 
the law of a particular country is unclear or unsupportive of cross-border operations of 
                                                 
1 Though with some variation in details. See Chapter I, above. 
2 See Chapter IV, below. 
3 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/contracts/files/2014s149-267126/invitation_en.pdf at p 13. 
4 See, e.g., LB Nielsen, ‘The Need for Multi-Method Approaches in Empirical Legal Research’, in P Cane and HM 
Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), pp. 
951-975. 
5 For types of questions in empirical legal analysis, see, e.g., RM Lawless, JK Robennolt and TS Ulen, Empirical 
Methods in Law (Austin: Wolters Kluwer 2010), pp. 71-4; L Epstein and AD Martin, An Introduction to Empirical 
Legal Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 74-80. 




companies, but that this may not be a problem in practice, say, because lawyers have 
found a way around these rules (or even because there is no demand for such 
operations in this particular country). On the other hand, it may be the case that the law 
is relatively supportive of cross-border operations, but that in practice these may be 
problematic due to other hurdles, such as language differences, finding appropriate legal 
advice, and local judges and commercial registrars being unfamiliar with the case law of 
the Court of Justice. 
A related point is that there may be differences between the actual law and perceptions 
about the law. In particular, this may concern perceived differences between the laws of 
the Member States. For example, in related empirical research, the Oxford Civil Justice 
Survey asked in-house lawyers whether they thought that there was considerable 
variation in the contract laws and civil justice systems of the EU Member States, with the 
result that, with respect to contract laws, 71% answered in the affirmative, and, with 
respect to civil justice systems, 84% gave an affirmative answer.6 Correspondingly, the 
present survey aimed to evaluate to what extent in the field of this study such views 
about a high degree of divergence are widespread. 
The specific survey questions also provided brief scenarios asking the respondents to 
assess whether and how in practice particular situations can be implemented in their 
Member States. Here the questionnaire also explained that the survey was specifically 
interested in the practicalities of these situations, for example, which tools may be used 
in order to transfer a company’s seat to another jurisdiction and about the experience of 
lawyers in their dealings with the national commercial register. 
2.2 Survey procedure 
The survey was drafted by members of the core group of the project. It was 
subsequently presented to and pre-tested by members of the project’s steering 
committee.7 It was then modified and some of the questions were streamlined in order 
to improve the response rate to the survey.  
The survey was aimed at lawyers and other legal practitioners who have expertise in 
situations where companies operate, or plan to operate, across borders for each of the 
Member States. In order to identify possible respondents, we asked each of the national 
correspondents of the project8 to provide us with the contact details of at least 30 names, 
with the aim to have 50 or more names for the larger economies.9 We confirmed with 
the national correspondents that, given the international dimension of the topic, all of 
the respondents were able to answer a questionnaire in English. For a minority of 
countries, it was necessary to supplement these names, provided by the national 
correspondents, with our own research in order to identify 30 (or 50) names of such 
legal practitioners per country.10 
This approach of a relatively small sample per country was chosen due to the highly 
specialised nature of the survey questions. For example, if we had included just any 
lawyer with a public email address, it would certainly have increased the number of 
responses. However, the external validity of the responses would have been inferior to 
                                                 
6 S Vogenauer, Civil Justice Survey 2008, available at http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/iecl/ocjsurvey.shtml. See 
also S Vogenauer, ‘Regulatory Competition through Choice of Contract Law and Choice of Forum in Europe: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence’, (2013) 21 European Review of Private Law 13. 
7 For the need to pre-test surveys, see Lawless et al., supra note 5, at 79. 
8 I.e. the persons responsible for the country reports of this study.  
9 This can be regarded as a form of ‘snowball sampling’ that, for the entire group of respondents, approximates 
a random sample, as described in Lawless et al, supra note 5, at 149. 
10 Based on independent databases such as http://www.chambersandpartners.com/; http://whoswhole-
gal.com/; http://www.legal500.com/. 




the present survey which deliberately targeted the main legal practitioners of each 
country with expertise on questions of cross-mobility of companies.     
The survey was distributed via Surveymonkey on the 7th of September 2015. Reminders 
were sent on the 14th and the 22nd of September. The survey was closed at midnight 
on the 30th of September 2015. 
2.3 Survey respondents 
The survey was sent to 992 lawyers and other practitioners. The survey ‘bounced’ for 14 
respondents as they seemed to have opted out of Surveymonkey emails, which means 
that 978 persons have received the survey. 177 of those responded to it. This leads to a 
response rate of 18.1% which is a good rate of response for an online survey.11 
The initial questions of the survey asked respondents to provide some personal 
information. The first two questions concerned their expertise in the legal systems of one 
or more countries, as summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: Legal expertise of respondents (n: 177) 
Question 1: The legal system of which country is most familiar to you? 
Question 2: Have you also studied or worked in other jurisdictions for a 
substantial period (at least six months)? [multiple answers possible] 
Country Q. 1 Q. 2 Country Q. 1 Q. 2 
Austria 9 4 Luxembourg 3 6 
Belgium 8 7 Malta 3 - 
Bulgaria 7 - Netherlands 5 5 
Croatia 5 2 Poland 6 - 
Cyprus 1 1 Portugal 8 - 
Czech Rep. 10 1 Romania 8 - 
Denmark 3 - Slovakia 3 3 
Estonia 2 1 Slovenia 9 1 
Finland 6 1 Spain 8 3 
France 7 10 Sweden 9 1 
Germany 13 14 UK 5 28 
Greece 7 - Angola - 1 
Hungary 2 3 Belarus - 1 
Ireland 3 1 Hong Kong - 1 
Italy 18 1 Serbia - 1 
Latvia 5 2 US - 28 
Lithuania 4 1    
 
It can be seen that the survey was answered by respondents from a good mix of 
countries. Some of the larger Member States – notably the UK but also Germany and 
France – are also well represented by respondents who have additional educational and 
professional experience in those jurisdictions. With respect to Question 2, it can also be 
noted that the majority of respondents (94 out of 177, i.e. 53.1%) indicated that they 
had studied or worked in at least one other jurisdiction. Given the topic of this survey, it 
does not come as a surprise that the increasingly influential group of lawyers with 
transnational experience12 is prominently reflected in our responses. 
                                                 
11 Cf. MP Couper and M Bosnjak, ‘Internet surveys’, in PV Marsden and JD Wright (eds.), Handbook of Survey 
Research (Bingley: Emerald, 2nd ed. 2010), pp. 536-8. 
12 See, e.g., Y Dezalay and B Garth (eds.), Lawyers and the Construction of Transnational Justice (London: 
Routledge 2013). 




Table 2: Further personal characteristics of respondents 






Q3. What is your 
current employment? 
[multiple answers 
possible] (n: 174) 
Lawyer in law firm 147  84.5% 
In-house lawyer 11  6.3% 
Notary 7 4% 
Legal scholar/academic 39 22.4% 
Other (please specify) 1013 5.7% 
Q4. Who are your main 
clients? (n: 176 with 14 
responses ‘N/A’; thus 
162 substantive 
responses) 
small firms (up to 49 
employees) 
21 12.96% 
medium-sized firms (50 to 249 
employees) 
52 32.1% 
larger firms (250 or more 
employees) 
89 54.94% 
Q5. Have you been 
involved in work that 
concerned corporate 
mobility and/or 
problems of the conflict 
of laws rules applicable 
to companies? (n: 175) 
more than 10 times 79 45.14% 
5 to 9 times 33 18.86% 
1 to 4 times 49 49 28% 
not yet 14 8% 
 
The subsequent three questions asked about the current employment, the main clients 
and the relevant expertise of the respondents. Table 2 shows that the main respondents 
of the survey were lawyers in law firms and that many of those were from large firms 
with extensive experience in matters of corporate mobility and problems of the conflict 
of laws rules applicable to companies.  
2.4 Evaluation based on all respondents and groups of respondents 
The following sections will, to start with, always report the quantitative results based on 
the data for all respondents. Those general results will also be presented in bar or pie 
charts and, if relevant, the text will report further quantitative findings, such as 
correlations between variables, as well as qualitative responses from free-text comments. 
In addition, the findings differentiate between groups of respondents as far as there are 
statistically significant differences between those groups. 14  The group classifications 
follow from the personal characteristics identified in questions 1 to 5 (see Tables 1 and 2, 
above). However, group divisions based on the answers to questions 2, 3 and 5 were not 
statistically significant in any of the specifications. The division according to the main 
client (Question 4) was significant in only one response. 15  Most fruitful were 
classifications based on the main location of the respondents. Here we used the following 
classification schemes: 
First, we examined a geographic classification into countries from eastern, northern, 
southern and western Europe since the survey responses may reflect different economic 
and business structures in those geographic regions. 16  Based on the classification 
                                                 
13 The answers were: ‘lawyer in consulting firm’, ‘investment banking’, ‘insolvency administrator’, ‘solicitor 
(England and Wales)’; ‘legal consultant (international law)’, ‘tax lawyer’, ‘judge’, ‘official of counsel of law firm’, 
‘legal adviser in insurance company’, ‘insolvency practitioner’. 
14 Based on a significance level of 5%. 
15 See Question 6 in Section 3.1, below. 
16 As has become apparent in the context of the Eurozone crisis. See, eg, PA Hall, ‘Varieties of Capitalism and 
the Euro Crisis’ (2014) 37 West European Politics 1223. 




scheme of the United Nations Statistics Division,17 this leads to the following division: (i) 
eastern Europe (n = 6): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia; 
(ii) northern Europe (n = 8): Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Sweden, the UK; (iii) southern Europe (n = 8): Cyprus, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain; (iv) western Europe (n = 6): Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands. 
Second, we divided the countries into Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries since it is 
possible that there may be more cross-border mobility of companies within the Eurozone, 
as well as the view that any remaining obstacles should be removed by EU 
harmonisation. Based on the time when the survey was conducted in September 2015, 
the resulting division is: (i) Eurozone countries (n = 19): Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain; (ii) non-Eurozone 
countries (n = 9): Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Sweden, the UK. 
Third, it is interesting to classify according to pre-2004 and post-2004 EU Members 
States since respondents from the former countries may have more experience in 
matters of corporate mobility and law makers and judges from the latter countries may 
have only recently started considering the case law of the Court of Justice on corporate 
mobility. The division is as follows: (i) pre-2004 EU Member States (n = 16): Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK; (ii) post-2004 EU Members States (n 
= 12): Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Fourth, a division of Member States into strong and weak economy countries may be 
relevant since in the former group there may be more experience in and desire for cross-
border mobility of companies. The division is based on the differences in GDP (PPS) per 
capita,18 as compared against the EU average, normalised to ‘100’: (i) GDP (PPS) per 
capita > 100 (n = 11): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK; (ii) GDP (PPS) per capita < 100 (n = 
17): Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain. 
Fifth, despite the case law of the Court of Justice, some Member States have remnants 
of the real seat theory in their conflict of laws rules in their relationship to other EU 
Member States. It is therefore possible to distinguish between (i) such countries with 
elements of the ‘real seat theory’ (n = 16): Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark Estonia, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Spain; and (ii) other countries, i.e. more ‘pure’ incorporation theory countries 
(n = 12): Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, UK.19 
                                                 
17 Available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm. 
18  Available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/TEC00114 (data from 1 December 
2015). 
19 This is based on the comparative analysis, Chapter IV, below. 




3. Quantitative and qualitative findings  
3.1 General perceptions about EU company law and conflict of laws 
Question 6 asked respondents to express their opinion on six controversial statements 
about EU company law and conflict of laws relevant to this study. This uniform design 


























(1) 33 99 16 23 3 3 177 
(2) 36 73 24 32 11 1 177 
(3) 57 58 28 16 14 3 176 
(4) 89 56 21 3 5 3 177 
(5) 30 36 31 40 25 15 177 
(6) 11 53 56 29 5 21 175 
 
The responses show that, first, the majority of respondents hold the view that there is 
much variation in the substantive rules of company law across the EU and that this 
variation plays an important role in choosing the place of incorporation. Second, the 





































0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Ques on 6. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
strongly agree moderately agree neutral moderately disagree strongly disagree I don't know 
'There should be EU 
harmonisa on of the rules of 
conlict of laws as they apply to 
companies in the EU.' 
'There is much varia on in the 
substan ve rules of company 
law across the EU.' 
'Varia on in those substan ve 
rules plays an important role in 
determining the preferred place 
of incorpora on for companies.' 
'There should be further EU 
harmonisa on of substan ve 
company law in the EU.' 
'Legal prac oners of my 
country are familiar with the 
case law of the CJEU in Daily 
Mail, Centros, Überseering, 
Inspire Art, Cartesio, VALE.' 
'The line of cases is sufficiently 
suppor ve of cross-border 
mobility of companies.' 




conflict of law rules, with stronger support for conflict-of-laws harmonisation (above 
80%). Third, the responses to the final two questions show that the case law of the 
Court of Justice in Daily Mail, Centros, Überseering, Inspire Art, Cartesio, VALE is no 
substitute since it is only partially known by legal practitioners in the Member States and 
is only partially supportive of cross-border mobility of companies. Thus, overall, these 
responses seem to support the harmonisation of conflict of laws rules applicable to 
companies. 
Interestingly, there are also strong correlations between many of the individual 
responses (based on a coding of 1-4 from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’; the 
‘don’t know’ answers were disregarded20): 
Table 4: Correlations of answers in Question 6 
Answers 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1 .406** 0.065 0.119 0.035 -0.074 
2 .406** 1 .385** .384** 0.038 -.205* 
3 0.065 .385** 1 .574** -0.145 -.210** 
4 0.119 .384** .574** 1 -0.08525 -0.138 
5 0.035 0.038 -0.145 -0.085 1 .264** 
 
 
**: correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*: correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
It can be seen that there is a strong positive correlation between answers 1 and 2: thus, 
those who say that there is much variation also claim that this variation plays a 
significant role. Similarly, noting the strong positive correlation between answers 2 and 3, 
those who claim that variation plays a significant role in determining the place of 
incorporation also often argue that there should be further harmonisation of substantive 
EU company law. 
Next, there is a strong correlation between answers 3 and 4: thus, those respondents 
who endorse further harmonisation of EU company law also often endorse harmonisation 
of conflict of laws rules as they apply to EU companies. Apparently, therefore, for many 
respondents, harmonisation of substantive law or conflict of laws rules is not seen as an 
alternative. 
The strong positive correlation between answers 5 and 6 means that those who indicate 
that their legal practitioners are familiar with the EU case law also say that this case law 
is sufficiently supportive of cross-border mobility. Interestingly, there is also a significant 
negative correlation between answers 3 and 6: thus, those who advocate further 
harmonisation of EU company law disagree that the line of cases is sufficiently 
supportive of cross mobility, i.e. this line of cases is not seen as a substitute to formal 
harmonisation. 
                                                 
20 Corresponding correlations were observed using binary coding of 0-1 for ‘disagree’ and ‘agree’ respectively. 




Table 5: Statistically significant group differences for Question 6 
Sub-question Respondents who 




disagree more than 
other respondents  
(significance levels) 
‘There is much variation in the 
substantive rules of company law 




strong economy countries 
(0.011) 
‘Variation in those substantive 
rules plays an important role in 
determining the preferred place of 









‘There should be further EU 
harmonisation of substantive 





post-2004 EU countries 
(0.021) 
‘Legal practitioners of my country 
are familiar with the case law of 
the CJEU in Daily Mail, Centros, 
Überseering, Inspire Art, Cartesio, 
VALE.’ 





pre-2004 EU countries 
(0.037) 





Table 5 reports the categories of Question 6 where there are statistically significant 
group differences.21 Those differences can be interpreted as follows: respondents from 
western European and strong economy countries have more experience in cross-border 
activities and are therefore more likely to be aware of the variation in substantive rules 
of company law. In the next two categories it is noticeable that respondents from strong 
economy countries (and in one instance, the northern European ones) are less likely to 
perceive differences as problematic and to support harmonisation of substantive law 
rules. In addition, according to the final category, respondents from strong economy 
countries (as well as some other groups and respondents working for larger clients) are 
more likely to say that lawyers in their respective countries are familiar with the 
European case law. Thus, a plausible explanation of all of those responses is that, for the 
groups mentioned above, there are more cross-border activities and respondents are 
more aware of the European case law and perceive the need for EU harmonisation as 
less urgent. 
By contrast, respondents from southern Europe – as well as, for some categories, 
Eurozone and post-2004 Member States – are more concerned about variations of 
substantive rules and even more likely to support their harmonisation. This may reflect 
deficiencies in their domestic laws.22 It can also be related to the fact that, at least in 
some of those groups, cross-border corporate mobility may be less developed: thus, 
having EU laws on this topic is considered particularly helpful. 
                                                 
21 Here, and in the following, Levene’s test has been applied in order to determine whether or not to assume 
equal variances. 
22 See also Section 3.3, below. 




3.2 Specific scenarios for mobility of companies in Member States 
Questions 7 to 11 asked about the practical problems of companies that intend to move 
or reorganise within the internal market, with the scenarios drafted keeping the 
corresponding case law of the Court of Justice in mind. Question 12 then asked whether 
the situation would be different for the relationship to non-EU countries. In all questions 
respondents were encouraged to provide free text comments – which many of them 
did.23 
The first of those questions asked about the scenario of an initial split between the 



















(1) 40 47 29 51 9 176 
(2) 46 62 33 30 4 175 
(3) 29 47 43 49 5 173 
(4) 29 53 39 49 6 176 
 
                                                 
23 The following number of free text comments were provided: 47 in Q7; 32 in Q8; 36 in Q9; 33 in Q10; 17 in 





















0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Ques on 7. Please consider the situa on that someone wants to incorporate a 
company in your Member State but with the company’s headquarters are in another 
EU Member State. Will this raise any of the following problems in your country? 
highly relevant relevant li le relevance not relevant don't know 
'Transla on of documents 
about the affairs of the 
headquarters for 
authori es of your country.' 
'Commercial register of 
your country objects.' 
'Lawyers and notaries of 
your country unfamiliar 
with situa on and reluctant 
to support your plans.' 
'Legal uncertainty which 
company law courts of your 
country may apply.' 




Excluding the ‘don’t know’ answers, it can be seen that the majority of respondents 
indicate that it could be a problem that the commercial register of the country of 
incorporation objects and that the translation of documents about the affairs of the 
headquarters for authorities of this country may be needed. A strong minority of more 
than 40% also indicates that there may be problems due to the legal uncertainty 
concerning which company law will the courts of the country of incorporation decide to 
apply and due to lawyers and notaries of this country being unfamiliar with the situation 
and reluctant to support the plans. 
Table 8: Correlations of answers in Question 7 
Answers 1 2 3 4 
1 1 .506** .466** .615** 
2 .506** 1 .363** .451** 
3 .466** .363** 1 .617** 
4 .615** .451** .617** 1 
**: Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
As in the previous part, it is interesting to identify correlations between the individual 
responses.24 It can be seen from Table 8 that the responses to the four answer options 
presented in Question 7 are all strongly correlated: in other words, whenever one 
potential problem is mentioned, the others are as well. 
Many of the free-text comments to this question refer to the ‘real-seat theory’, in parts 
still applied by some of the Member States.25 For example, one of the respondents wrote 
that ‘Belgium is a real seat state. If the company is transparent about its intentions, this 
will cause a lot of confusion and problems’. Others were even more definitive, for 
example, saying that ‘it is not possible to incorporate a company in Latvia with a 
registered address in another EU Member State’ and that ‘the competent judges / clerks 
will not register an Austrian NewCo with headquarters in another Member State’. 
In the context of the answer option about translations, many respondents referred to the 
fact that judges and employees at the local registers lack foreign language knowledge. 
For example, according to one respondent the (Italian) ‘commercial register doesn't 
accept documents written in non-Italian language’ and according to another one: ‘Polish 
is the official language in the Republic of Poland. Many people in Poland still do not know 
foreign languages; especially the ones that work in the public administration.’  
Other responses also referred to more general legal and institutional problems. For 
example, for Spain a respondent bemoaned the ‘lack of conflict of laws’ rules’ and a 
respondent from Italy expressed the view that ‘the formalism of the Italian company law 
as applied by notaries is frequently an obstacle to this kind of transactions and increases 
the costs of the transaction’. As elsewhere in the survey, many also referred to issues of 
taxation, here specifically referring to income revenues of the company and the 
corresponding place of establishment under tax law. 
                                                 
24 Here and in the following, this is based on a coding of 1-4 from ‘highly relevant’ to ‘not relevant’; the ‘don’t 
know’ answers were disregarded. 
25 See the country reports and the comparative analysis (Chapter IV) for details. 




Table 9: Statistically significant group differences for Question 7 
Sub-question Respondents who 
perceive factors more 




perceive factors more 










real seat countries 
(<0.001) 
weak economy countries 
(0.019) 
translation of documents 
about the affairs of the 
headquarters for authorities 
of your country 
 northern European 
countries (0.024) 
legal uncertainty which 
company law courts of your 





real seat countries (0.012) 
lawyers and notaries of your 
country unfamiliar with 
situation and reluctant to 





weak economy countries 
(0.003) 
real seat countries (0.013) 
 
The group differences also show that there is a high correlation between the answers to 
the sub-questions. In substance, it is revealing that respondents from northern Europe 
are more content with the situation in their countries. By contrast, respondents from 
southern Europe, weak economy and real seat countries point towards more problems – 
which may be due to less effective domestic institutions, less familiarity of local registers, 
lawyers and notaries with the case law of the Court of Justice,26 and the remnants of the 
real seat theory leading to objections by the commercial register, problems of legal 
uncertainty and the lack of support from local lawyers and notaries. 
The next question asked about the scenario of a subsequent split between the country of 
incorporation and the headquarters, again taking the perspective of the former country: 
 
                                                 
26 See also the responses to Question 6 in 3.1, above. 






Table 10: Response count of Question 8  
Answer Options (as chart) Response Count (n: 172) 
no … 76 
presumably not … 27 
yes … 69 
 
The general picture of the answers to Question 8 corresponds to those to Question 7 
since, here too, many respondents regard the split between registered seat and 
headquarters as at least potentially problematic. This question also made it explicit that 
there may be a mismatch between the ‘law in the books’ and the ‘law in practice’ since 
the headquarters of a company may not be easily identifiable to the authorities, a 
position shared by at least some of the respondents.  
Correspondingly, in the free text comments, a respondent from Belgium indicated that ‘a 
lot will depend on how transparent the company is, but if transparent, this will create 
problems’. By contrast, two other respondents from Belgium phrased the problem in 
different ways: the first one wrote that ‘in theory this situation would pose legal risks, 
but in practice the Belgian real seat doctrine is applied in a unilateral way (i.e. only to 
“inbound” cases)’, while the second one expressed the view that ‘it is not even a 
question of “unlikely to find out”. I do not think anyone in Belgium wants to disqualify 
Inbev as a Belgian company because it is de facto being run out of New York 
(hypothetically)’. 
 'No, since the 
authori es of my 
country only refer to 
the place of the 
registered office.' 
 'Presumably not, 
since they are 
unlikely to find out 
about the transfer of 
the headquarters.' 
 'Yes, it would pose 
legal risks.' 
Ques on 8. Please consider the situa on that a company registered in your 
Member State transfers its headquarters to another EU Member State. Could this 
create problems for the company in your country? 
40.12% 44.19% 
15.70% 




In the comments many of the respondents also referred to other problems, for example, 
‘issues with suppliers, debt collection and place of legal disputes’ and ‘questions as to 
outstanding liabilities to employees and suppliers/third party contractors’. A particular 
concern involved taxation as can be seen in a response from Sweden: ‘The biggest risk is 
the tax risk. Swedish tax authorities would consider this as moving the operations 
outside of Sweden and impose a considerable (prohibitive) exit tax’; similar statements 
have been received from respondents from Belgium, Luxembourg, Latvia, France, 
Slovenia, Spain, and the Netherlands. Returning to the quantitative data, it is therefore 
possible that some responses in the answer option ‘pose legal risks’ also reflect such 
risks related to questions of tax law. 
Table 11: Statistically significant group differences for Question 8 
Respondents who more often perceive 
problems than other respondents 
(significance levels) 
Respondents who less often 
perceive problems than other 
respondents (significance levels) 
real seat countries (0.003) northern European countries (<0.001) 
Eurozone countries (0.020) 
 
With respect to group differences,27 it is again the case that respondents from northern 
Europe report fewer problems than other regions. Respondents from real-seat (and 
Eurozone) countries are generally more sceptical of the situation where a company 
registered in a Member State transfers its headquarters to another country. This shows 
again the problems with the remnants of the real seat theory in some Member States.  
Question 9 asked about the reverse situation from Questions 7 and 8, namely that a 
company from another Member State only has its headquarters in the Member State of 
the respondent, i.e. from the perspective of the latter Member State this company may 
be regarded as a ‘pseudo-foreign company’.  
 
                                                 
27 The information was coded as follows: yes =2; presumably =1; no =0. 





















(1) 46 54 21 42 10 173 
(2) 21 50 38 55 9 173 
(3) 53 60 36 19 4 172 
(4) 18 54 50 46 5 173 
(5) 6 32 50 81 4 173 
 
The responses to answer options 1, 2 and 4 – with between 41% and 58% approval 
(‘highly relevant’ or ‘relevant’) – indicate that some Member States regard this situation 
as problematic. For example, two respondents from Belgium and Spain expressed the 
view that, based on the place of the company’s headquarters, Spanish and Belgian 
company law would be applicable. Respondents from Italy, Greece and the Netherlands 
also indicated that at least parts of their countries’ company law may apply. These are 
interesting statements given the fact that the case law of the Court of Justice is most 
likely to be understood as requiring Member States to accept validly incorporated 
companies from other Member States.28 
The answer option 3 was also mentioned in some of the free-text comments. In 
particular, many respondents referred to the registration of a branch in their respective 
                                                 


























0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Ques on 9. Please consider the situa on that a company incorporated in another 
EU Member State wants to base its headquarters in your Member State. Will this 
raise any of the following problems in your country? 
highly relevant relevant li le relevance not relevant don't know 
'Lawyers and notaries of your 
country unfamiliar with 
situa on and reluctant to 
support your plans.' 
'Legal uncertainty which 
company law courts of your 
country may apply.' 
'Court of your country make 
company subject to the 
company law of your 
jurisdic on.' 
'Transla on of documents (eg, 
for registra on of a branch in 
your country).' 
'Reputa onal problems for 
company in ques on (eg, due 
to the label as a foreign 
company).' 




Member States and the corresponding costs.29 For example, a respondent from Slovakia 
explained that ‘all incorporation documents of the founder of the branch must be 
provided in original/certified copies and translated into Slovak; annually, the financial 
accounts of the founder must be (at least pursuant to law, though this duty is widely 
avoided) officially translated into Slovak and filed with the Slovak Commercial Register.’ 
The same respondent also provided an explanation to answer option 5 referring to 
reputational problems of companies ‘incorporated in non-EU tax havens such as Belize, 
or to a lesser degree Cyprus’. 
Concerning further issues, a respondent from the Republic of Ireland indicated that the 
assets of the foreign company in Ireland are subject to Irish insolvency law (and some of 
the other respondents also referred to the COMI in a number of questions in this survey). 
Taxation was again frequently mentioned, in particular if – in the words of a respondent 
from Portugal – the place of establishment of the company can be shown to be in the 
Member State of the headquarters. 
Table 13: Correlations of answers in Question 9 
Answer 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1 .585** .398** .469** .319** 
2 .585** 1 .366** .532** .422** 
3 .398** .366** 1 .410** .268** 
4 .469** .532** .410** 1 .492** 
5 .319** .422** .268** .492** 1 
**: Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Applying the same method as in Question 7 (see above), it can be that all answers are 
strongly positively correlated with each other; thus, whenever one potential problem is 
mentioned, the others are as well. 
 
                                                 
29 For previous empirical research on this topic see M Becht, L Enriques, and V Korom, ‘Centros and the Cost of 
Branching’ (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 171. 




Table 14: Statistically significant group differences for Question 9 
Sub-question Respondents who 
perceive factors 
more often as 






more often as 
irrelevant than 
other respondents  
(significance 
levels) 
courts of your country make company 
subject to the company law of your 
jurisdiction 




legal uncertainty which company law 
courts of your country may apply 




lawyers and notaries of your country 
unfamiliar with situation and reluctant 
to support your plans 
 northern European 
countries (0.006) 
reputational problems for company in 









Distinguishing between groups of responses, as previously, those from northern Europe 
report fewer problems in a number of categories. Respondents from real-seat countries 
were more likely to mention problems with their own courts and legal uncertainty as 
relevant problems – which is consistent with the expectation that remnants of the real 
seat theory can hinder cross-border corporate mobility. In terms of reputational 
problems, respondents from Western Europe and strong economy countries are more 
likely to mention problems than other groups, while those from post-2004 Member 
States are less likely to report problems. This difference is likely to reflect the fact that 
the domestic legal forms of the countries from the former groups are better known (thus, 
foreign forms are potentially seen in a more sceptical light), while in the latter group 
there may be the perception that foreign legal forms may actually be advantageous to 
domestic ones. 




Questions 10 and 11 deal with the ways a company’s registered seat may be transferred. 
 
 
Table 15: Response count of Question 10  
Answer Options (as chart) Response Count (n: 162) 
to dissolve the company and to incorporate a new 
company … 
30 
to merge the old company with a newly established 
company … 
78 
to change the registered seat of the company 54 
other procedures (please specify) 34 
 
It follows that the use of a cross-border merger for corporate re-incorporation is the 
most popular option, but there is also some support for the possibility to change the 
registered seat of the company or to simply dissolve the company and to incorporate a 
new company. As far as the choice of ‘other procedures’ in Question 10 was explained in 
the comments, respondents from France, Greece, Latvia and Sweden made reference to 
the possibility of converting the company into an SE and transferring its seat. A 
respondent from Sweden indicated that, as an alternative, one could ‘incorporate a 
subsidiary or the like in the new jurisdiction and have the company make a public 
takeover bid for its own parent’. 
 
 'To dissolve the 
company and 
to incorporate a new 
company in the other 
country.' 
 'To merge the old 
company with a 
newly established 
company in the other 
country.' 
 'To change the 
registered seat of the 
company.' 




Ques on 10. Please consider the situa on that a company incorporated under the 
laws of your Member State wants to become a company registered under the 
company law of another Member State. It shall be assumed that the law of the 
other country supports such plans. What procedure would you recommend to the 
company in ques on (mul ple answers possible)? 






Table 16: Response count of Question 11 
Answer Options 
Response Count (n: 
169) 
willingness of the commercial register … 57 
costs and fees 67 
Speed 74 
experience with procedure in question 61 
legal certainty 107 
tax considerations 93 
other reasons (please specify) 18 
 
For Question 11 about the determinant factors for the choice of procedure, problems of 
legal certainty have most frequently been mentioned (thus, possibly, confirming the 
need to harmonise seat transfers despite the case law of the Court of Justice); tax 
considerations were also regarded as very important.  
The free text comments also referred to other reasons, such as the possibility of 
universal succession in rights and obligations (respondents from Bulgaria and Slovakia), 
the automatic transfer of IP rights (respondents from Slovakia and Sweden), the need to 
consult employees (respondents from Sweden and the UK) and an unanimity 
requirement for changing the registered seat (respondent from Luxembourg). 
Interestingly, a respondent from Slovakia observed that ‘in Slovakia we have noted [a] 
couple of successful changes of registered seat (mainly between Slovakia and Hungary 
and all concerning very small companies) although, in my opinion this was only [a] 
result of the fact that Slovak Commercial Register does not materially review the 









 'Willingness of 
the commercial 





 'Costs and 
fees.' 
 'Speed.'  'Experience 
with procedure 





 'Other reasons 
(please 
specify).' 
Ques on 11. In the scenario of the previous ques on (Q10), what would be the 
main considera ons for this choice [mul ple answers possible]? 




Table 17: Relationship of answers to Questions 10 and 11 
 Options of Q11 (in absolute numbers, in %, significance 
level) 





















9 12 18 9 22 14 1 
30.00% 40.00% 60.00% 30.00% 73.33% 46.67% 3.33% 
  *    * 
to merge the old 
with a newly 
established 
company (78) 
35 21 23 35 58 38 7 
44.87% 26.92% 29.49% 44.87% 74.36% 48.72% 8.97% 
** ** ** ** **   
to change the 
registered seat 
of the company 
(54) 
12 29 32 13 23 32 8 
22.22% 53.70% 59.26% 24.07% 42.59% 59.26% 14.81% 
** ** ** * **   
other procedures 
(34) 
8 12 12 13 17 25 4 
23.53% 35.29% 35.29% 38.24% 50.00% 73.53% 11.76% 
     **  
**: statistically significant difference from all other respondents at 0.05 level 
*: statistically significant difference from all other respondents at 0.1 level 
It is also revealing to scrutinise the relationship between the forms chosen and the 
relevant considerations. The simple but rather crude solution to dissolve the old and 
incorporate a new company is mainly preferred by respondents who regard it as quicker 
and as more certain than the, in the view of those respondents, more complex other 
options. Merging the old with a new company is also seen as a certain procedure by the 
respondents who would choose it; however, it requires more experience and may be less 
quick. The most straight-forward solution, to change the registered seat of the company, 
is – in the views of the respondents who indicate that such a procedure is feasible – 
inexpensive and speedy; in addition, it can have tax advantages since the existing 
company will not be dissolved.  
Since these reasons only report the answers of respondents in support of their own 
option, further considerations can account for the lack of choice of the other options. For 
example, in the comparative part of this study we show that the case law of the Court of 
Justice on seat transfers (VALE etc.) has not been applied consistently throughout the 
EU.30 Thus, in some countries, it may not be feasible (or too uncertain) to pursue this 
strategy in order to change the registered seat of the company. This relevance of the 
local context can also be seen in the statistically significant group differences: 
 
                                                 
30 See also Chapter IV, Section 6, below. 




Table 18: Statistically significant group differences for Questions 10 and 11 
Options Respondents more likely 
to suggest than other 
respondents (significance 
levels) 
Respondents less likely 
to suggest than other 
respondents  
(significance levels) 
to dissolve the company 
and to incorporate a 
new company in the 
other country 
Eastern European countries 
(0.003) 
Western European countries 
(<0.001) 
pre-2004 EU countries 
(<0.001) 
Eurozone countries (0.004) 
strong economy countries 
(0.002) 
to merge the old 
company with a newly 
established company in 
the other country 
Western European countries 
(0.001) 
Eastern European countries 
(0.004) 




Eurozone countries (<0.001) 
strong economy countries 
(0.001) 
to change the registered 
seat of the company 




relevance of speed Southern European countries 
(0.005) 
 
weak economy countries 
(0.031) 
relevance of experience 
with procedure in 
question 
Western European countries 
(0.014) 
 
relevance of legal 
certainty 




For the answers to Questions 10 and 11, differences between three main groups can be 
identified. First, there is the group of respondents from Eastern Europe and the post-
2004 Member States. They are more likely to suggest that the company should dissolve 
itself and create a new company in the other country, less likely to suggest that the 
company merges the old company with a newly established company in the other 
country and more likely to refer to legal certainty as a relevant consideration. All of this 
can be interpreted as showing that in those countries practicing lawyers, as well as 
registers and courts, have less experience with seat transfers than elsewhere in Europe. 
Second, respondents from western Europe (as well as pre-2004 Member States, 
Eurozone countries and strong economy countries) are very unlikely to propose the 
‘dissolve and create a new company in other country’ procedure but are likely to suggest 
that the company merges the old company with a newly established one in the target 
Member State. This is the more sophisticated procedure (and it has also been the 
traditional model for reincorporations in the US31), and therefore it also makes sense 
that respondents from western Europe are more likely to consider experience with the 
procedure in question as a relevant consideration. 
Third, respondents from southern Europe have a relative preference for the direct 
change of the registered seat. This may be due to the implementation of such a strategy 
                                                 
31 For a comparison see, eg, F Mucciarelli, ‘The Function of Corporate Law and the effects of Reincorporations in 
the U.S. and the E.U.’ (2012) 20 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 421. 




in the laws of those countries.32 In addition, the survey responses indicate that those 
respondents put more emphasis on the importance of speed, as, indeed, as far as this 
option is available, it can be quicker than other forms of seat transfers. 
In contrast to the intra-EU scenarios found in Questions 7 to 11, Question 12 asks 
respondents to assess the situation as regards third countries: 
 
 
Table 19: Response count of Question 12  
Answer Options Response Count (n: 174) 
for non-EU companies mobility is considerably more 
restrictive 117 
minor or technical differences 34 
no difference 12 
don’t know 11 
 
Thus, a clear majority answered that corporate mobility is considerably more restrictive 
for non-EU companies than in the intra-EU settings. This may be partly a result of the 
case law of the Court of Justice. The free text comments, however, mainly referred to 
legislative measures having led to improvements of mobility within the EU (or, to be 
precise, within the EEA) – more specifically, the Cross-Border Merger Directive (noted by 
respondents from Sweden and Portugal), the Statute of the European Company (noted 
by a respondent from Latvia) and the Directive 2009/133/EC of 19 October 2009 on the 
common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions etc (noted by a respondent 
from Greece). 
Other comments provide further reasons why the involvement of non-EU companies can 
be problematic. Respondents from Spain and Greece mentioned that the ‘real seat 
                                                 
32 See also comparative analysis Chapter IV, Section 6, below. 
 'For non-EU 
companies mobility is 
considerably more 
restric ve.' 
 'Minor or technical 
differences.' 
 'No difference.' 
 'Don’t know.' 
Ques on 12. For the previous scenarios (Q7 to Q11), does it make a difference 









doctrine’ will be strictly applicable here, thus making corporate mobility more difficult 
than in intra-EU settings. Respondents from France and Luxembourg referred to the risk 
that in the relationship with non-EU countries companies may be seen as dissolved, thus 
losing their legal personality. Finally, many respondents noted that further details would 
depend on the rules of the non-EU country in question and any available international 
agreements between the countries concerned. 
3.3 Further questions about situation in Member States 
While Questions 7 to 12 asked the respondents to assess specific scenarios, the following 
three questions deal with more general topics relevant to the issues of conflict of laws in 
the Member States. 
Table 20: Question 13: Are there any law firms or other advisory firms in your 
country that actively promote legal mobility? [multiple answers possible]. In 
case there are such firms, please specify - if possible - in or from which 
jurisdictions and provide names or websites of these firms. 
Answer Options 
Response 
Count (n: 174) 
Response 
Percent 
yes, there are firms that promote the incorporation 
of domestic businesses in other countries 
38 21.8% 
yes, there are firms that promote the incorporation 
of foreign businesses in my country 
43 24.7% 
no, I don’t think so 71 40.8% 
I don’t know 48 27.6% 
 
An article from 2008 emphasised, amongst others, the role of incorporation agents for 
the incorporation of companies in other Member States (notably continental European 
businesses in the UK).33 The responses to Question 13 show, however, that about 2/3 of 
the respondents (categories ‘no, I don’t think so’ and ‘I don’t know’) could not confirm 
their activity. 
As far as respondents choose one or both of the first two answer options, some of the 
free text comments made general references to major law and audit firms, as well as 
consulting firms that promote incorporation in overseas tax havens. Specifically for 
Slovakia, a respondent from a major law firm mentioned that they promoted the 
‘founding of UK start-ups’, but that they also used to promote Slovakian companies ‘vis a 
vis Austria, Germany and other jurisdictions’ due to low corporate tax rates in Slovakia 
(though those have now been increased).34 A respondent from Greece explained that 
here incorporation goes ‘from Greece to the UK, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Bulgaria, 
Romania etc.’ 
Only two of the free-text comments indicate specialised companies that promote 
corporate mobility in Europe: an Italian respondent referred us to two Italian websites 
that promote inward and outward incorporations35 and a Belgian respondent mentioned 
a Belgian firm that promotes incorporation of UK limiteds.36 
                                                 
33 M Becht, C Mayer and H Wagner, ‘Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry’ (2008) 
14 Journal of Corporate Finance 241 at 254-5. 
34 See also the statistical analysis, Chapter II, Section 4.2 above. 
35  See www.italianlimited.it (aimed at Italian firms incorporating in the UK, Malta, Ireland, or Cyprus) 
www.italiancompanyformations.com (aimed to promote incorporation in Italy). 
36 See www.coventis.be/bvba/ltd-oprichten-voor-en-nadelen.html. 




Table 21: Statistically significant group differences for Question 13 
Options Respondents more likely to 








yes, there are firms that 
promote the incorporation 
of domestic businesses in 
other countries 




pre-2004 EU countries (0.003) 
Eurozone countries (0.002) 
strong economy countries 
(0.006) 
yes, there are firms that 
promote the incorporation 
of foreign businesses in 
my country 
Eurozone countries (0.009)  
 
Analysing group differences, it is noticeable that respondents from western European, 
Eurozone, pre-2004 and strong economy Member States are more likely to report that 
firms exist that promote the incorporation of domestic businesses in other countries. This 
is likely to be due to the fact that in these countries there is more experience with cross-
border mobility than elsewhere in Europe. With respect to firms that promote the 
incorporation of foreign businesses in their own country, the only significant difference is 
that the respondents from Eurozone countries were more likely than non-Eurozone 
respondents to state that there are those firms, with the plausible explanation that 
European integration – and thus prevalence of those firms – is more advanced within the 
Eurozone.37 
Table 22: Question 14 - Do you think there is considerable legal uncertainty in 
the application of the conflict of laws rules of your Member State on the 








the main connecting factor (‘real seat’, ‘statutory seat’ 
etc) 67 41.1% 
the boundary between the applicable company law 
and other areas (eg, insolvency, tort, contract law) 97 59.5% 
the scope of overriding rules of domestic law that may 
interfere with foreign company law 
94 57.7% 
other topics 16 9.8% 
I don’t know 23 14.1% 
 
The responses to Question 14 confirm the finding of the comparative part of this 
project38, namely that the boundary between the applicable company law and other 
areas (e.g., insolvency, tort, contract law) and the scope of the overriding rules of 
domestic law (e.g., questions of ordre public) are often difficult to determine. The overall 
picture of the responses also shows considerable uncertainty about the applicable law: 
                                                 
37 However, for all of the results in Table 21 it needs to be noted that (even) in the ‘more likely’ categories, it is 
always less than 50% of respondents who state that there are such firms. 
38 See Chapter IV, below. 




excluding the ‘don’t knows’, only 9.8% of the respondents say that there is no 
uncertainty, while more than 55% indicate two or more issues.39 
With respect to the first answer option, it needs to be considered that for countries that 
clearly follow the ‘incorporation theory’, the main connecting factor may not pose major 
problems. By contrast, the responses from ‘real seat’ countries and from countries with 
unclear or mixed legal positions tend to express more uncertainty as regards the main 
connecting factor. For example, according to a respondent from Belgium, ‘the 
determination of the principal establishment (real seat) requires a factual assessment, 
and this will almost automatically result in legal uncertainty’. 
Regarding other topics of legal uncertainty, only some responses have been provided. 
For example, a respondent from Luxembourg refers to the topics of ‘business license, 
filing of annual account and the competent body for decisions’ and a Greek respondent 
to the law applicable to the piercing of the corporate veil, problems with transactions 
made by company representatives abroad and transactions involving foreign subsidiaries. 
In the more general free text comments, an Estonian respondent expresses the view 
that ‘it is exceedingly rare for such issues to come up before Estonian courts and I would 
be inclined to think they have never arisen.’ By contrast, a respondent from the Republic 
of Ireland indicates that ‘all of these issues are pretty well settled’, and one from the UK 
suggests that ‘the law on seat is fairly clear in the UK but confused by poor guidance 
derived from ECJ determinations’. 
Table 23: Statistically significant group differences for Question 14 
Sub-question Respondents who perceive 
factors more often as relevant 
than other respondents  
(significance levels) 
the boundary between the applicable company 
law and other areas (eg, insolvency, tort, 
contract law) 
real seat countries (0.010) 
Southern European countries 
(0.019) 
Eurozone countries (0.004) 
the scope of overriding rules of domestic law 
that may interfere with foreign company law 
Southern European countries 
(0.002) 
 
The analysis of group differences also shows that real seat country respondents are more 
likely to report problems, specifically for the boundary question.40 Respondents from 
southern Europe are also more likely to report uncertainty about the contentious 
boundary issues as well as the scope of mandatory laws than other respondents. A 
cautious interpretation can be that the court proceedings in these countries are slower 
and less efficient than elsewhere in Europe, thus, accounting for this increased 
uncertainty. 
 
                                                 
39 The precise numbers are: 4 issues mentioned by 4 respondents = 2.45% of the respondents; 3 issues by 30 
= 18.4%; 2 issues by 55 = 33.74%; 1 issue by 58 = 35.58%; and none by 16 = 9.8%. 
40 As regards uncertainty about the ‘main connecting factor’, the corresponding difference between respond-
ents from real seat and incorporation theory countries is significant at the 10% level. 






Table 24: Response count of Question 15  














15 78 68 12 3 176 
 
Despite the complexity of the foregoing topics, Question 15 asked respondents to make 
an overall assessment of whether their domestic law sufficiently supports cross-border 
mobility. A slight majority answered in a positive way (‘strongly yes’ and ‘moderately 
yes’). But it is also interesting to compare these figures with those in Question 6 where 
more than 80% expressed a positive view about a possible EU harmonisation of the rules 
of conflict of laws as they apply to companies. 
Relatedly, it is revealing to examine how the precise responses to Question 15 correlate 
to the six statements in Question 6. For three of those, the relationship is statistically 
significant. It shows that those who think that the domestic law is sufficiently supportive 
of cross-border mobility answered in Question 6 that (i) there is not much variation of 
substantive rules of company law across the EU (correlation: -0.18, significant at 5% 
level), that (ii) the EU should not harmonise rules of conflict of laws as they apply to 
companies (correlation: -0.202, significant at 1% level), and (iii) that the case law of the 
Court of Justice is sufficiently supportive of cross-border mobility (correlation: 0.228, 
significant at 1% level). By implication, those respondents who are more sceptical about 
their own domestic laws tend to be more supportive of harmonising conflict of laws rules 
as they apply to companies. 
 'Strongly yes.' 
 'Moderately yes.'  'Moderately no.' 
 'Strongly no.' 
 'Don’t know.' 
Ques on 15. Overall, do you think that the situa on in your country is sufficiently 










3.4 Other comments provided 
The final part of the survey asked respondents the open-ended Question 16: ‘Do you 
have any further comments on the themes of this questionnaire?’. Respondents took this 
as an opportunity to reflect on the main problems and the way forward.  
As regards some of the major problems, the following views can be seen as 
representative. According to an Italian respondent ‘there are big issues instead with 
reference to insolvency law and directors’ duties in insolvent international groups.’ A 
respondent from Slovakia mentions the issue that: ‘despite being a lawyer, from 
practical point of view, and I do not like to admit it, the most important factors 
concerning mobility relate to taxes … not to regulation of corporate affairs.’  
On the role of the European case law, a respondent from Luxembourg assesses that: 
‘CJEU case law together with the statute of the European Company (SE) are in theory 
sufficiently supportive of cross-border mobility of companies within the EU. In practice, 
CJEU case law is known and familiar to only few practitioners and there are frequently 
problems in the performance of the mobility in Member States where the law remains 
silent on this matter.’ 
The question is therefore how the EU should move forward. According to a respondent 
from the UK, there is a ‘significant need for harmonisation on the question of corporate 
seat and jurisdiction as applied across EU Member States’, and according to a 
respondent from Luxembourg ‘further harmonisation of substantive corporate law adds 
no value, but the conflict-of-law rules need further harmonisation.’ This latter scepticism 
as regards the harmonisation of substantive company law is not in line with the general 
responses that we have received from Question 6, above. However, the strong support 
of harmonisation of conflict of laws rules confirms the responses to Question 6. 
4. Conclusion 
Effective corporate mobility is not only a matter of the ‘law in the books’ but also the 
‘law in practice’. This chapter reported the results of a survey of lawyers conducted in 
September 2015. The responses were evaluated with quantitative methods, also 
examining whether there are significant differences between groups of respondents and 
correlations between answers to specific questions. In addition, qualitative responses of 
the free-text comments were used to contextualise the results.  
The main finding is that there are significant practical obstacles to corporate mobility in 
Europe. This shows in many of the survey answers and holds true for both the aggregate 
level of the responses and the analyses of the responses for particular groups of 
respondents. It also correlates with the view that supports European harmonisation in 
this area of law.  
More specifically, the following key findings can be identified:  
• First, the respondents do not regard the European case law as a substitute for a 
possible harmonisation of conflict of laws rules, neither at the general level nor as 
regards specific questions (e.g., for seat transfers). The support for 
harmonisation of conflict of laws rules was stronger than for harmonisation of 
substantive company law, while the latter still received considerable support. 
• Second, it is noticeable that many of the respondents from the countries that 
have retained an element of the ‘real seat theory’ report various practical 
obstacles. Those problems have also been frequently mentioned in the free text 




comments, for example, indicating the problems in identifying the place of the 
‘real seat’. 
• Third, the analysis of group differences also shows that there is still a divide 
between the respondents from eastern European countries (or the countries with 
a lower GDP per capita, or the post-2004 Member States) and those from other 
countries. The respondents from the former countries are more likely to indicate 
lack of familiarity with the relevant procedures and to report practical problems in 
their dealings with domestic courts and commercial registers. 
• Fourth, as regards specific problems, the respondents often mentioned translation 
costs and problems of legal uncertainty. The relationship to related areas of law, 
notably insolvency law, is also seen as crucial; in particular, questions of taxation 
are a decisive factor for effective corporate mobility. 
• Fifth, there is also a strong positive correlation between respondents who are 
sceptical about their domestic law and who support harmonisation of conflict of 
laws rules. Interestingly, there is also a positive correlation between support for 
harmonisation of substantive rules and conflict of laws rules: thus, these areas of 
law are not seen as alternative choices for European harmonisation. 
  




5. Annex to Survey41 
5.1 Cover email sent to respondents 




On behalf of the European Commission, we are conducting a study on problems caused 
by the lack of harmonisation of the conflict-of-law rules concerning companies in the EU.  
It would be great if you could help us by responding to a few survey questions: it should 
not take more than ten minutes!  
Here is a link to the survey: [SurveyLink] 
If you are interested in our final report, please enter your email address at 
[SurveyLink2]; we will then send you a copy of the report, based on this survey as well 




Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, London School of Economics  
Federico Mucciarelli, SOAS, University of London and University of Modena & Reggio 
Emilia  
Edmund Schuster, London School of Economics  
Mathias Siems, Durham University’ 
 
5.2 Survey text (as made available on Surveymonkey) 
Survey on Corporate Mobility (European Commission study) 
This study, funded by the European Commission, aims to evaluate the problems caused 
by the lack of harmonisation of the conflict-of-law rules concerning companies. Specific 
attention is paid to the practical problems of companies that intend to move or 
reorganise within the European Union. 
                                                 
41 We thank the respondents to our survey, in particular Dr. Lukas Fantur, Attorney at Law, Austria - Nikolaus 
Adensamer, KPRA attorneys at law, Austria - Vedran Obradovic, KWR Rechtsanwälte, Austria - Dr. Florian 
Linder, Viehböck Breiter Schenk & Nau Rechtsanwälte, Austria - Carl Clottens, Eubelius, Belgium - Stela Ivano-
va, bnt Neupert Ivanova, Bulgaria - Pavel Hristov, Hristov & Partners, Bulgaria - Danijel Pribanić, attorney-at-
law in cooperation with Karanović & Nikolić, Croatia - JUDr. Radka Chlebcová, Ph.D., attorney, Czech Republic - 
Michal Pivarči, Clifford Chance, Czech Republic - Martin Chr. Kruhl, Lett Law Firm, Denmark - Catherine Cathi-
ard, FIDAL, France - Dieter Leuering, Flick Gocke Schaumburg, Germany - Pavlos Masouros, Masouros Law 
Firm, Greece - Andreas Pantelakis , Pantelakis-Skaltsas , Greece - Sotiris Dempegiotis, Dryllerakis & Associates, 
Greece - Giuseppe A. Rescio, Notary, Catholic University of Milano, Italy - Giampaolo Salsi, K&L Gates, Italy - 
Giorgio Corno, Studio Corno Avvocati, Italy - Francesco Dagnino, Criscuoli Dagnino e Associati Studio Legale, 
Italy - Giovanni Gazzaniga, Allen & Overy partner, Italy - Marco Lamandini, Italy - Luca Masotti, Masotti & Ber-
ger, Italy - Prof. Alberto Saravalle, Bonelli Erede, Italy - Studio Legale Scarante & Partners, Lawyers, Italy and 
Spain - Maris Brizgo, Klavins Ellex, Latvia - Dovile Burgiene, Valiunas Ellex, Lithuania - Odeta Trucinskaite-
Siusiene, Tark Grunte Sutkiene, Lithuania - Michael Psaila, Simon Tortell & Associates, Malta - Jean C Farrugia, 
DF Advocates, Malta - Raquel Montes Fernandes, CMS, Portugal - Catarina Belim, Vieira de Almeida & Associa-
dos, Portugal - Vasile Godinca-Herlea, Managing partner CITR, Romania - Lucian Bojin, Universitatea de Vest 
Timisoara, Romania - Radovan Pala, Taylor Wessing, Slovakia - Petra Ferk, PhD, Institute for Public-Private 
Partnership, Slovenia - Gorazd Šifrer, Notary public, Slovenia - Nana Šumrada Slavnič, LL.M., PhD, Slovenia - 
Mihai Carabas, Carabas, Lungu - Attorneys at Law, Romania - Angel M. Ballesteros Barros, University Pablo de 
Olavide, Spain - Pedro Tent, J&A Garrigues, S.L.P., Spain - Ericsson (law firm), Sweden - Jesper Schoenbeck, 
Vinge, Sweden - M Meiselles, solicitor, England and Wales, and law lecturer, UK - Steven Conybeare, Cony-
beare Solicitors, England, UK. 




We would be very grateful if you could answer the subsequent questions of this survey. 
They concern (1) basic personal information, (2) general perceptions about company law 
and conflict of laws in the EU, and (3) specific practical questions about the mobility of 
companies (please note that we are interested in both private and public companies, but 
not partnerships, cooperatives and associations).  
It should not take more than ten minutes to complete the survey (and it is also possible 
to skip questions). Of course, all responses will be treated strictly confidential and 
anonymous. This project is being carried out in accordance with the LSE Research Ethics 
Policy and Procedures. If you have any questions, please email us at pil-
project@europeancompanylaw.net  
 
Part 1: Basic personal information 
1. The legal system of which country is most familiar to you? [note: this will be ‘your 
Member State’ in Parts 2 and 3 of this questionnaire]  
 
2. Have you also studied or worked in other jurisdictions for a substantial period (at least 
six months)? Please specify [otherwise leave blank]  
 
3. What is your current employment? [multiple answers possible]  
lawyer in law firm  
in-house lawyer  
notary  
legal scholar/academic  
Other (please specify)  
 
4. Who are your main clients?  
small firms (up to 49 
employees)  
medium-sized firms 
(50 to 249 
employees)  
larger firms (250 or 
more employees)  
N/A  
    
5. Have you been involved in work that concerned corporate mobility and/or problems of 
the conflict of laws rules applicable to companies?  
more than 10 times 5 to 9 times  1 to 4 times  not yet  
    
 





Part 2: General perceptions about company law and conflict of laws in the EU 
6. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  












‘There is much variation 
in the substantive rules 
of company law across 
the EU.’  
      
‘Variation in those 
substantive rules plays 
an important role in 
determining the 
preferred place of 
incorporation for 
companies.’  
      
‘There should be further 
EU harmonisation of 
substantive company law 
in the EU.’  
      
‘There should be EU 
harmonisation of the 
rules of conflict of laws 
as they apply to 
companies in the EU.’  
      
‘Legal practitioners of my 
country are familiar the 
case law of the CJEU in 
Daily Mail, Centros, 
Überseering, Inspire Art, 
Cartesio, VALE.’  
      
‘This line of cases is 
sufficiently supportive of 
cross-border mobility of 
companies.’  
      
 
 




Part 3: Specific practical questions about the mobility of companies with a view 
to conflict of laws rules 
7. Please consider the situation that someone wants to incorporate a company in your 
Member State but with the company’s headquarters in another EU Member State. Will 
this raise any of the following problems in your country?  






not relevant  don’t know  
commercial 
register of your 
country objects  
     
translation 
of documents 




your country  




courts of your 
country may 
apply  
     
lawyers and 







     
Comments (optional):  
- please provide explanations for problems classified as ‘highly relevant’ or ‘relevant’ 
- please specify any other problems 
 




8. Please consider the situation that a company registered in your Member State 
transfers its headquarters to another EU Member State. Could this create problems for 
the company in your country?  
no, since the authorities of 
my country only refer to the 
place of the registered office  
presumably not, since they 
are unlikely to find out about 
the transfer of the 
headquarters  
yes, it would pose legal risks  
   
Comments (optional) 
 
9. Please consider the situation that a company incorporated in another EU Member 
State wants to base its headquarters in your Member State. Will this raise any of the 
following problems in your country?  






not relevant  don’t know  
courts of your 
country make 
company 
subject to the 
company law of 
your jurisdiction 





courts of your 
country may 
apply  




registration of a 
branch in your 
country)  
     
lawyers and 






     
















(eg, due to the 
label as a 
foreign 
company)  
     
Comments (optional):  
- please provide explanations for problems classified as ‘highly relevant’ or ‘relevant’ 
- please specify any other problems 
 
10. Please consider the situation that a company incorporated under the laws of your 
Member State wants to become a company registered under the company law of another 
Member State. It shall be assumed that the law of the other country supports such 
plans. What procedure would you recommend to the company in question?  
to dissolve the company and 
to incorporate a new 
company in the other 
country  
to merge the old company 
with a newly established 
company in the other 
country  
to change the registered seat 
of the company  
   
Other procedures (please specify) 
 
11. In the scenario of the previous question (Q10), what would be the main 
considerations for this choice [multiple answers possible]?  
willingness of the commercial register of your country to implement procedure in 
question  
costs and fees  
speed  
experience with procedure in question  
legal certainty  
tax considerations  
Other reasons (please specify)  





12. For the previous scenarios (Q7 to 11), does it make a difference whether the other 
country is another EU Member State or a third country?  




minor or technical 
differences  
no difference  don’t know  
    
Comments (optional) 
 
13. Are there any law firms or other advisory firms in your country that actively promote 
legal mobility? [multiple answers possible]:  
yes, there are firms that promote the incorporation of domestic businesses in other 
countries  
yes, there are firms that promote the incorporation of foreign businesses in my 
country  
no, I don’t think so  
I don’t know  
In case there are such firms, please specify - if possible - in or from which jurisdictions 
and provide names or websites of these firms: 
 
14. Do you think there is considerable legal uncertainty in the application of the conflict 
of laws rules of your Member State on the following topics? [multiple answers possible]  
the main connecting factor (‘real seat’, ‘statutory seat’ etc)  
the boundary between the applicable company law and other areas (eg, insolvency, 
tort, contract law)  
the scope of overriding rules of domestic law that may interfere with foreign 
company law  
I don’t know  




Other topics (please specify) and/or further explanations (in particular, if there is legal 
uncertainty as to any of the points above, please specify where this is the case) 
 
15. Overall, do you think that the situation in your country is sufficiently supportive of 
cross-border mobility of companies?  
strongly yes  moderately yes moderately no  strongly no  don’t know  
     
 
Part 4: Others 
16. Do you have any further comments on the themes of this questionnaire?  
 
 
Many thanks for your time! 
 
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, London School of Economics  
Federico Mucciarelli, SOAS, University of London, and University of Modena & Reggio 
Emilia  
Edmund Schuster, London School of Economics  
Mathias Siems, Durham University 
 




IV.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. Sources of law 
Before comparing in detail the relevant substantive company law and private 
international law rules in the Member States, this section will start by providing an 
overview of the national sources of these rules. As we show below, the substantive rules 
of company law are largely codified in all Member States, with case law-based principles 
also playing an important role in most Member States, albeit to a varying degree. 
Company law may be codified in the following ways: (1) as a separate statutory 
instrument applicable to all kinds of companies (a ‘Companies Act’); (2) several different 
statutes for individual company types; (3) a specific chapter of a more ‘general’ statute, 
such as a civil or a commercial code. Similarly, private international law rules may be 
codified either in a specific private international law statute or as part of the general 
domestic civil law statute or code. Table 1 below details the sources of company law and 
private international law in all Member States. Where available, we include references to 
statutes accessible online in the original language. 
1.1 Overview of national laws 




If yes, statutory sources Sources of substantive 
company law (English 
where available) 
Austria Yes Austrian Private International 
Law Act of 1978, as amended 
(Bundesgesetz vom 15. Juni 
1978 über das internationale 
Privatrecht – IPR-Gesetz), 
Federal Gazette Nr. 
304/1978, consolidated 





Stock Corporation Act (AktG) 





Limited Liability Companies 






Belgium Yes Private International Law 
Code of 16 July 2004 (PIL 
Code), Wet van 16 juli 2004 
houdende het Wetboek van 
internationaal privaatrecht / 
Loi de 16 juillet 2004 portant 
le Code de droit international 
privé, Belgian Official Gazette 
27 july 2004, see 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.




Belgian Corporate Code of 7 
May 1999 (BCC), further 
executed in the Royal Decree 
of 30 January 2001 
BCC: Wet van 7 mei 1999 
houdende het Wetboek van 
vennootschappen / Code des 
sociétés de 7 may 1999, 
Belgian Official Gazette 6 
August 1999,  
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.
be/wet/wet.htm  
Royal Decree: Koninklijk 
Besluit van 20 januari 2001 
tot uitvoering van het 
wetboek van 
vennootschappen / Arrêté 
royal de 20 janvier 2001 
portant exécution du code 
sociétés, Belgian Official 
Gazette 6 February 2001, 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.




                                                 
1 The Cypriot legal system is based on English law. In general, common law rules and principles only apply in 
the absence of domestic statutes. Private International law, however, is not codified and is based on common 
law rules and principles. 
be/wet/wet.htm 
Bulgaria Yes Private International Law 
Code (PILC), DV, No42 of 17 




Bulgarian Commercial Act 
(CA), DV, No 48 of 18 June 
1991 
Law on Public Offering of 
Securities (LPOS), DV, No 114 
of 30 December 1999 
Croatia Yes Private International Law Act 
of 1991 (PILA).  
It was originally the private 
international law act of 
Yugoslavia, enacted in 1982.  
English translation by prof. 
Željko Matić, The Yugoslav 
Act Concerning Private 
International Law, 30 
Netherlands International Law 
Review (1983), pp 220-239. 
Company act 1993.  




Cyprus No.1  - Law of Companies, Cap.113 
Consistently with Cyprus 
being a mixed legal system, 
Cap.113 is complemented by 
Cypriot case law interpreting 
its provisions and also citing 
English common law. 
Czech 
Republic 
Yes Private International Law Act 







stanoviska/preklady/english   










Estonia Yes Private International Law Act, 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/e
n/eli/513112013009/consolid
e (English translation) 




Finland No - Companies Act 2006 (Fi. 











Civil Code Article 1837: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle
Civil Code and Commercial 
Code (see links in previous 
column) 




                                                 
2 The basic provisions of conflict of law are found in the part of ‘General Principles of Civil Law’ of the Greek 
Civil Code. Apart from these provisions of the Civil Code, there are numerous other conflict of law provisions 
spread on national legislation, secondary EU law (mainly Regulations) and various international conventions 




















General conflict rules codified 
in the Introductory Law to the 
Civil Code (EGBGB), 
http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgbeg/in
dex.html (English translation) 
Stock Corporation Act (AktG) 
for public companies, 
http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/aktg/ (English 
translation not available; but 





Limited Liability Companies 




ndex.html (English translation 
of the GmbHG) 




Arts 4-33 of the Civil Code 
(part of ‘General Principles of 
Civil Law’). Numerous other 
conflict of law provisions 
spread on national laws. 
Law No. 2190/1920 on 
Limited Companies 
Law No. 3190/1955 on 
Limited Liability Companies 
Law 4072/2012 on new 
private company 
Hungary Yes Decree-law no. 13 of 1979 on 





Civil Code, Third Book  
Act on conversions, mergers 





Ireland No - Companies Act 2014: 
http://www.irishstatutebook.i
e/2014/en/act/pub/0038/  
Italy Yes Private International law Act 

















Italian Consolidated Financial 
Act 1998: Legislative Decree 




























Lithuania Yes Lithuanian Civil Code 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/
dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=
404614 (English translation) 




Luxembourg Yes Commercial Companies Act of 
1915, Arts 2, 159 





Malta No - Companies Act 1995 
Netherlands Yes Book 10, Title 8, Articles 117-
124 Civil Code (CC), 
https://zoek.officielebekendm
akingen.nl/stb-2011-
272.html; English translation: 
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com
/civilcodebook01010.htm   
Book 2 Civil Code 
Law on Works Councils, Wet 
van 28 januari 1971, 
houdende nieuwe regelen 
omtrent de medezeggenschap 
van de werknemers in de 
onderneming door middel van 
ondernemingsraden (Wet op 
de Ondernemingsraden/Law 
on Work Councils, available at 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BW
BR0002747/geldigheidsdatum
_18-12-2014#  (for a 










Commercial Companies Code 
of 15 September 2000 
Civil Code of 23 April 1964, 
Act on National Court Register 
of 20 August 1997,  
Bankruptcy Law of 28 
February 2003  
Act on Freedom of Economic 
Activity of 2 July 2004  




Article 3 Companies Act 1986 
(see next column) 






Romania Yes 7th Book of the New Civil Code 
(NCC 2011) 
Law no. 31/1990 (LS) 







1. As can be seen above, in a majority of EU Member States, private international law 
rules are contained in statutory instruments. In several countries, a private 
international law act codifies in a single legislative instrument all relevant conflict of 
law rules and principles (this is the case in Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Italy, and Poland). Other countries regulate private international law issues 
within the general domestic civil code (France, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain).  
2. ‘Common law’ jurisdictions (Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and the UK) do not provide for 
any legislative codification of private international law. Instead, conflicts of law rules 
are mainly based on the common law rules developed by the judiciary. 
Slovakia Yes Act 97/1963 on International 
Private and Procedural Law 
 
Act 513/1991 ‘Commercial 
Code’ 
Act 40/1964 ‘Civil Code’ 
Slovenia Yes ‘Private International Law and 
Procedure Act’ Zakon o 
mednarodnem zasebnem 
pravu in postopku (Official 
Journal of the Republic of 
Slovenia, Nos. 56/99 and 
45/08) (abbreviated as 
ZMZPP), available at 
http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/p
regledPredpisa?id=ZAKO1258
#   







‘Companies Act’ Zakon o 
gospodarskih družbah (Official 
Journal of the Republic of 
Slovenia, Nos. 56/09 et seq.) 










Spain Yes Civil Code; 
Commercial Code;  
Capital Companies Act 2010 
(Ley de sociedades de 
capital); 
Structural modifications of 
coampanies Act 2009 (Ley 
3/2009);  
Regulation of commercial 
registry (Reglamento del 
registro mercantil) 
 
Text of laws (see previous 
column) available at 
www.boe.es  
 
Sweden No - Aktiebolagslagen, Swedish 
Companies Act 2005 
The Swedish Foreign Branch 
Offices Act 1992 (Sw. lagen 
om utländska filialer m.m.) 
United 
Kingdom 
No - Companies Act 2006, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/2006/46/contents  




3. The rules of private international law are also not currently codified in the 
Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden). 
4. Germany is in an intermediate case. The general private international law framework 
is codified in an act of parliament (the introductory act to the civil code), which 
however does not include conflict of law rules related to companies and other legal 
entities. In relation to company law, therefore, the applicable rules of private 
international law are based on the principles developed by the courts. 
2. Preliminary questions about substantive company law 
2.1 Overview 
Before turning to the national rules on conflicts of laws in the area of company law, it is 
necessary to discuss the relevant substantive company law rules in which these conflicts 
rules are embedded.  
Since companies are ‘creatures of national law’, each jurisdiction establishes under which 
conditions domestic companies can be incorporated. Such requirements are part of 
substantive company law, not of conflict of laws. By their nature, such company law 
requirements do not directly affect the legal position of foreign-incorporated companies, 
but they may effectively add to, or qualify, the conflicts of law approach a jurisdiction 
takes in relation to its own companies. For instance, while conflict of laws rules may 
generally use a company’s registered office as the main connecting factor for both 
domestic and foreign companies,3 the substantive company law of that jurisdiction may 
require that domestic companies establish (or maintain) their headquarters or principal 
place of business in the territory of the Member State in question.  
All Member States currently require, for the types of companies of interest for the 
purposes of this Report, that companies maintain at a minimum, a ‘registered office’ (or 
similarly the ‘statutory seat’ or ‘registered address’) in the Member States of 
incorporation. Differences exist, however, as to the nature and quality of the registered 
office.  
In 14 Member States, the registered office can in effect be a mere postal address at 
which the company receives mail. In the remaining Member States, there either is an 
explicit requirement for some level of business activity (beyond the ability to receive 
mail) at the registered office, or legal uncertainty exists in this regard. The additional 
requirements range from having actual business premises at the registered office to the 
requirement that the centre of effective management or principal place of business is 
located at the registered office, or at least elsewhere in the territory of the Member State 
in question.  
Whether such legal requirements should be qualified as private international law or 
substantive company law may not always be self-evident and depends on the 
interpretation of the provision.  A rule of law may be of a purely substantive nature but 
contain an international element, i.e. it may stipulate that it applies if a certain element 
is satisfied abroad or within the territory of the lex causae. 4 On the other hand, a 
                                                 
3 See Section 3.1, below. 
4 The latter type of rule has been described as a ‘self-contained’ or ‘self-satisfied’ provision of substantive law 
(G. Kegel, ‘Die sebstgerechte Sachnorm’, in E. Jayme et al. (eds), Gedächtnisschrift für Albert A. Ehrenzweig 
(Karlsruhe: C.F. Müller, 1976)). An example for the former type is the Hungarian law at issue in Cartesio, 
which stipulated that the Hungarian Company Act should only govern companies ‘which have their seat in Hun-
gary’ (Article 1(1) of Law No CXLIV of 1997 on Commercial Companies, see Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató 
Szoláltató bt [2008] ECR I-9641, para. 11), and defined ‘seat’ as ‘the place where [the company’s] central ad-
ministration is situated’ (Article 16(1) of Law No CXLV of 1997 on the Commercial Register, Company Advertis-
ing and Legal Procedures in Commercial Registration Matters, translated in Case C-210/06, ibid., para. 17). 




provision may contain a hidden conflict of laws rule that determines its international 
scope of application notwithstanding the lex causae. For the purposes of this part, we 
focus on rules that, where not complied with, do not (or at least not in itself) lead to the 
company ceasing to be subject to the law under which the company has originally been 
formed. In these cases, it may be said that the provision in question forms part of a 
country’s internal company law.5 
Any requirement going beyond a mere postal address, whether referred to nationally as 
‘registered office’, ‘statutory seat’, or otherwise, can be regarded as a form of an 
‘effective residence requirement’. Effective residence requirements are generally 
permissible from the perspective of EU law, and they form what we refer to as the 
‘reserved area’ of company law for Member States from the viewpoint of the Treaty. It is 
worth noting that effective residence requirements for domestic companies fall within the 
reserved area irrespective of their legal nature. Both, private international law rules and 
internal company law rules, resulting in such residence requirements fall outside the 
scope of Art 49TFEU, at least where they relate to the criteria in Art 54 TFEU.6 They are 
‘preliminary matters’ that determine whether a company is entitled to rely on the Treaty 
freedom and hence belong to the ‘reserved area’ where the Member States’ legislative 
activity is not subjected to scrutiny under the Treaty.7 
As the Court of Justice has made clear in Daily Mail and Cartesio, Member States have 
‘the power to define both the connecting factor required of a company if it is to be 
regarded as incorporated under the law of that Member State […] and that required if 
the company is to be able subsequently to maintain that status.’8 Although the Court’s 
language in Cartesio and Daily Mail may suggest that it is primarily concerned with 
residence requirements resulting from private international law, the Court of Justice has 
also held more broadly that Member States are ‘able, in the case of a company 
incorporated under its law, to make the company’s right to retain its legal personality 
under the law of that State subject to restrictions on the transfer of the company’s actual 
centre of administration to a foreign country’.9 Moreover, the rules at issue in both Daily 
Mail and Cartesio were both apparently substantive, not private international law, rules. 
It seems clear therefore that effective residence requirements grounded in substantive 
company law are compatible with EU law. 10  
A certain tension, of course, exists between, on the one hand, the permissibility of 
effective residence requirements under national law, and, on the other hand, the fact 
that the Court of Justice considers the ability of entrepreneurs to exercise choice of law 
in the area of company law as an ‘inherent’ feature of the freedom of establishment.11 If 
all Member States decided to impose strict residence requirements for companies 
established under their laws, this would effectively rule out (pure) choice of law 
                                                 
5 See e.g. the discussion in V Korom and P Metzinger, ‘Freedom of Establishment for Companies: the European 
Court of Justice confirms and refines its Daily Mail Decision in the Cartesio Case C-210/06’ (2009) 6 European 
Company & Financial Law Review 125, 136-139. A jurisdiction may require companies to maintain the head-
quarters in its territory even where it follows an incorporation theory approach as a matter of private interna-
tional law. See W-G Ringe, ‘The European Company Statute in the Context of Freedom of Establishment’ (2007) 
7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 185, 188-190. 
6 Note that Art 54 TFEU does not itself constitute a private international law rule. However, use of the criteria 
mentioned in that provision in the context of a national private international law rule seems to provide a ‘safe 
harbour’ for such a rule under the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. Whether this can be extended to other 
unilateral private international law rule criteria (i.e. ones that are used only in relation to domestic companies) 
is somewhat unclear.  
7 The Court in Cartesio explains that ‘the question whether the company is faced with a restriction on the free-
dom of establishment, within the meaning of Article [49 TFEU], can arise only if it has been established, in the 
light of the conditions laid down in Article [54 TFEU], that the company actually has a right to that freedom’, 
Case C-210/06 Cartesio [2008] ECR I-9641, para. 109. 
8 Ibid. para. 110. 
9 Case C-208/00 Überseering [2002] ECR I-9919, para 70; Case C-210/06 Cartesio para 107. 
10 For a discussion see also e.g. G Eckert, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht (Vienna: Manz 2010) 110. 
11 See Centros and Inspire Art. 




throughout the Union. For the present purposes, however, this question seems to be of 
limited relevance, given that Member States currently tend to abolish, rather than to 
impose, such residence requirements. 
It should also be highlighted that the exact limitations of the reserved area are far from 
clear. The Court seems to attach importance to the fact that Art 54 places the registered 
office, central administration and principal place of business on equal footing.12 This may 
suggest that only effective residence requirements that are connected to the criteria in 
Art 54 firmly fall outside the scope of the right of establishment.  
2.2 Overview of national laws 
Based on the above, it thus seems useful to assess the requirements of internal 
company law defining the necessary connection with the state of incorporation before 
turning to the private international law rules determining the international scope of 
application of the Member States’ company laws. Below, we therefore provide an 
overview of the substantive law requirements in all Member States based on the reports 
by our company experts.  
Table 2 summarises, first, the effective residence requirements (if any) in all Member 
States, understood as any requirement ranging from a mere business address to the 
principal place of business of the company (columns (2) and (3)). Second, we analyse 
the consequences in case these requirements are not (or no longer) fulfilled (column (4)). 
These may consist in rendering the incorporation void or voidable, triggering 
administrative fines or other sanctions, or allowing third parties to rely on certain laws at 
the place of the real seat in addition to the incorporation law. Finally, we inquire whether 
commercial registers scrutinise in practice upon incorporation or on an ongoing basis 
that the company is in compliance with the substantive requirements of the state of 
incorporation (column (5)). 
 
                                                 
12 See Cartesio, para 107. 




Table 2. Substantive company law 
Country Residence/real seat requirement 
for national companies 
If yes, details of substantive 
requirements 
Consequences if requirements 
no longer met 
Regularly scrutinised (on 
incorporation/ongoing) 
Austria Both private and public companies 
are required to specify a 
registered office (‘Sitz’) in their 
articles of association. The 
registered office has to be located 
in Austria. 
It does not have to coincide with 
the real seat (‘Verwaltungssitz’) of 
the company, but some link to the 
actual operations of the company 
is required. 
The registered office must, at 
least initially, be at a place 
where the company has (i) a 
permanent establishment or 
operations (‘Betrieb’); (ii) its 
headquarter 
(‘Geschäftsleitung’); or (iii) its 
central administration 
(‘Verwaltungssitz’).  
According to the prevailing view 
among legal scholars, 
subsequent changes do not lead 
to a dissolution of the company 
on substantive company law 
grounds.191  
General obligation on the 
part of the competent court 
to scrutinise the legality of 
the incorporation 
documents.  
The actual fulfilment of one 
of the three criteria 
mentioned is at least 
occasionally scrutinised by 
the competent courts. 
Belgium Companies established according 
to Belgian company law must have 
their statutory seat and principal 
establishment in Belgium.  
It is generally accepted that the 
statutory seat must be the 
place of the company’s 
principal establishment;192 
there is no statutory law in this 
respect, but it is argued that 
the application of the real seat 
theory in Belgium implies that 
the company’s statutory seat is 
its principal establishment 
In addition, companies must 
disclose each unit of 
establishment (a place that can 
be geographically identified 
through an address and where 
business activity takes place or 
is organised and/or monitored) 
If the location of the real seat of 
the company is not at the same 
place of the (fictitious) statutory 
seat, third parties have the 
choice to address the company 
at the real seat or at the 
statutory seat 
The identification of an incorrect 
seat is not a ground for the 
annulment of the company 
If an incorrect seat is 
deliberately stated in the articles 
of association, the court can rule 
that the company as well as the 
directors and/or the founders 
have committed the offence of 
‘forgery’, which is civilly and 
criminally sanctioned193 
The coincidence of statutory 
seat and real seat is not 
regularly scrutinised. 
                                                 
191 See Eckert, n 10 above, 111. 
192 See eg Antwerpen 13 March 2000, TRV 2000, (236) 240; Luik 27 maart 2001, TBH 2003, 144, note N. WATTE en V. MARQUETTE; Kh. Hasselt 10 November 2004, TRV 
2005, 172, note S. CALLENS en H. MATTHYSEN. 
193 Article 196 of the Criminal Code; Antwerpen 14 March 2006, RABG 2008/8, 503. 




Country Residence/real seat requirement 
for national companies 
If yes, details of substantive 
requirements 
Consequences if requirements 
no longer met 
Regularly scrutinised (on 
incorporation/ongoing) 
- If the real seat of a Belgium 
company is transferred abroad, 
the company will generally ‘lose 
its Belgian nationality’ and be 
subject to the company law of 
the country where its real seat is 
found194 
Bulgaria Generally, there is no residence 
requirement under Bulgarian law, 
although some legal uncertainty 
exists on this point. 
No explicit rule that requires the 
headquarters to be situated at the 
same place or in the same country 
as the registered office. 
N/A Bulgarian substantive law does 
not require the coincidence 
between statutory seat and 
actual place of management, 
but it requires shareholder 
meetings to take place at the 
‘statutory seat’ which must be 
located in Bulgaria. 
In any event, lack of ‘residence’ 
cannot lead to a forced 
dissolution of the company. 
The Commercial Register 
does not scrutinise in 
practice whether the place of 
the registered office has any 
physical connection to the 
company. 
Croatia No connection required between 
the registered office and the 
company’s operations under 
Croatian law, although a 
coincidence of real seat and 
registered office may formally be 
required upon formation of the 
company (but not thereafter). 
N/A N/A The court register is neither 
obliged nor authorised to 
check whether the registered 
business address 
corresponds to the 
company’s real seat. 
Cyprus No. Other than the registered 
office, there are no additional 
requirements of a physical 
connection between the company’s 
operations and Cyprus. 
N/A N/A N/A 
                                                 
194 Kh. Hasselt 10 November 2004, TRV 2005, 172. 




Country Residence/real seat requirement 
for national companies 
If yes, details of substantive 
requirements 
Consequences if requirements 
no longer met 






The Civil Code does not place any 
restrictions on the situation of the 
real seat, and it can also be 
situated outside the Czech 







Denmark The application for registration 
must specify the registered office, 
which is defined in s. 5(13) CA as 
the address in Denmark at which 
the company may be contacted. 
There is no requirement of a link 
between the company’s activities 
and its registered office. 
- It was the understanding of 
the Danish Business Authority 
(DBA) that the registered office 
should identify the ‘seat’ of the 
company, i.e. the place from 
which the company was 
actually managed 
- This interpretation was 
changed in 2008; no longer 
necessary that any actual 
business takes place at the 
premises, provided that the 
management can be contacted 
at the address, e.g. through a 
representative such as a lawyer 
N/A N/A 
Estonia Details are unclear, but some link 
between the company’s activities 
and its registered office may be 
necessary, depending on the 
interpretation of the relevant 
Estonian rules. 
A company is resident at the 
‘place where the permanent 
and continuous economic 
activity of the legal person or 
other activities specified in the 
articles of association of the 
legal person are carried out’, 
but it is unclear whether this 
results in a mandatory link 
between the company’s 
activities and its registered 
office 
The companies register may 
impose a fine on the company. 
In practice, this requirement 
(to the extent it applies) is 
not enforced by the register. 




Country Residence/real seat requirement 
for national companies 
If yes, details of substantive 
requirements 
Consequences if requirements 
no longer met 
Regularly scrutinised (on 
incorporation/ongoing) 
Finland No requirements regarding 
territorial connection to Finland 
except that the registered office 
must be in a Finnish municipality.  
No need to carry out any business 
activities in Finland or have 
business premises in the country. 
At least one board member and 
the managing director must have 
their residence within the EEA, 
unless the registration authority 
grants an exemption (in general 
granted for residence in 
Switzerland or the USA). 
N/A N/A N/A 
France It is not entirely clear whether a 
link between the company’s 
activities and its registered office 
are required.  
French law does not explicitly 
impose restrictions as to the 
choice of the registered office. 
According to some commentators, 
choosing a registered seat that 
does not coincide with the real 
seat/is unconnected to the 
company’s activities may be 
treated by the courts as abuse of 
law.195 
No formal requirements, but 
where the registered office 
does not coincide with the real 
seat this may have 
consequences in private 
international law.196 
Only private international law 
consequences for the protection 
of third parties, but unclear in 
practice.197 
No scrutiny by the 
registration court 
Germany Since 2008, the registered office 
no longer has to be the place 
where the central administration 
of the company is located 
Parts of the literature argue that it 
- - No scrutiny by the 
registration court 
                                                 
195 See e.g. P Merle, Droit commercial: Sociétés commerciales (Dalloz, 18th ed. 2015), para 105. 
196 See Merle, ibid; see also Table 3.1. below. 
197 See in more detail Table 3.1. below. 




Country Residence/real seat requirement 
for national companies 
If yes, details of substantive 
requirements 
Consequences if requirements 
no longer met 
Regularly scrutinised (on 
incorporation/ongoing) 
constitutes an abuse of law if no 
connection at all exists to the 
place of the registered office 
Greece Real seat relevant for most 
companies (i.e. the traditional 
private and public company 
forms).  
Registered office for the newly 
introduced company form of 
company (IKE-PC), introduced 
with Law 4072/2012   
For the ‘traditional’ companies: 
real seat, defined as the place 
of meetings of the board of 
directors and/or the 
shareholders. Some exceptions 
apply. 
Not entirely clear, but no 
automatic nullity/dissolution of 
company 
No scrutiny 
Hungary The registered office does not 
have to coincide with the 
company’s real seat.  
Where the seat of the company 
does not coincide with the place of 
its central management, the place 
of the central management has to 
be indicated in the deed of 
foundation and mentioned in the 
trade register. 
A special provision addresses 
intra-EU situations.198 
If the articles of association do 
not explicitly indicate that the 
place of a company’s central 
management is located in a 
place different than the 
registered office, the latter is 
presumed to its central 
management.  
A legal supervision procedure is 
possible against the company 
before the Court of Registration, 
compelling it to comply with the 
provisions of the law. As a result 
of this procedure, either the 
company complies with the law, 
or the Court of Registration fines 
the company and, as a last 
resort, will start a special 
winding up procedure for the 
termination of the company  
The legal supervision may be 
opened by the Court of 
Registration either ex officio 
or on demand. 
Ireland No link between registered office 
and the company’s central 
administration is required but the 
company must carry on an activity 
in Ireland.  
The registered office must be a 
physical location in Ireland. 
At least one director must be 
N/A N/A N/A 
                                                 
198 The law states in s. 7(B) of the Hungarian Act on the Registration of Firms that a company ‘registered in the trade register is entitled to carry out its activity on a prima-
ry basis in another Member State of the European Union, as well as it is entitled to transfer the primary place of its activity to another Member State of the European Union. 
Such a decision of the firm does not require the amendment of the registration of the registered seat, unless a different provision of a specific norm provides for it.’ This 
provision entered into force on September 1st 2007, i.e. after the Court of Justice decision in the Cartesio case. 




Country Residence/real seat requirement 
for national companies 
If yes, details of substantive 
requirements 
Consequences if requirements 
no longer met 
Regularly scrutinised (on 
incorporation/ongoing) 
resident in an EU/EEA Member 
State unless the company is 
bonded or is certified as having a 
‘real and continuous link’ with 
economic activity in Ireland. 
Italy No restrictions on the locations of 
the real seat (which can also be 
abroad), but a ‘premise’ should 
normally be in the place of the 
statutory seat.   
General meetings should be 
normally held at the place of 
statutory seat (unless the 
articles of association provide 
for a different location). 
N/A N/A 
Latvia The legal definition of the filed 
‘company address’ refers to the 
real seat (headquarters) and the  
registered office. 
Nevertheless, it seems to be 
possible for the registered office to 
be a mere postal address, 
although the exact position is 
somewhat unclear. 
Apparently, no actual business 
premises are required, but 
details not entirely clear. 
N/A The register only checks 
whether consent for use as 
registered office has been 
given by the legal owner of 
the building in which the 
registered office is located. 
Lithuania Lithuanian company law seems to 
be based on the presumption that 
the registered office, the real seat, 
and the main business place 
coincide. In practice, however, this 
is not treated as a legal 
requirement. 
Although the coincidence of the 
registered office and the real 
seat is not required in practice, 
a registered office that is 
completely unrelated to the 
companies activities (post-box) 
may be incompatible with 
Lithuanian law. The exact 
requirements are not entirely 
clear. 
Depending on the interpretation 
of the residence requirement, 
the consequence may in 
principle be the liquidation of 
the company. 
The Register of Legal Entities 
does not in practice check 
whether the actual business 
place or location of the 
permanent managing body 
of the company coincide with 
the registered office. 
Luxembourg Location of real seat in 
Luxembourg is required.  
The requirement is in practice 
considered to be fulfilled where 
board meetings take place in 
Luxembourg, even if day-to-
day management is conducted 
from abroad.  
Moreover, board meetings held 
A Luxembourg company that 
does not maintain its real seat in 
Luxembourg may in principle be 
dissolved. However, the lack of 
reported cases suggests that 
this sanction has no practical 
relevance. 
Not in practice. 




Country Residence/real seat requirement 
for national companies 
If yes, details of substantive 
requirements 
Consequences if requirements 
no longer met 
Regularly scrutinised (on 
incorporation/ongoing) 
via the Internet are deemed to 
have taken place at the 
registered office of the 
company, thus significantly 
diluting the real seat 
requirement. 
Malta No. 
There is no requirement of a link 
between the company’s activities 
and its registered office. 
N/A N/A N/A 
Netherlands No. 
There is no requirement of a link 
between the company’s activities 
and its registered office. The 
registered office must be in the 
Netherlands, but does not have to 
coincide with the company’s real 
seat. 
N/A N/A N/A 
Poland It is unclear whether a link 
between the company’s activities 
and its registered office is required 
by Polish law. 
The majority view among legal 
commentators is that some link is 
required, although not necessarily 
the location of the real seat. 
The majority of legal scholars 
implies that the registered seat 
shall be a place associated with 
the company’s activity but not 
necessarily the real seat 
Correction of filing can be 
required by the court. In 
principle, the company may 
ultimately be dissolved if it does 
not comply. The relevance of the 
rule depends on the 
interpretation of the residence 
requirement (if any), which is 
disputed in Poland. 
Commercial registers do not 
scrutinise upon registration 
whether the company in fact 
conducts any of its business 
activity in a place of its 
registered seat or under the 
registered address.  
Since December 2014: 
founding members do not 
have to submit to the 
registry court documents 
showing the title to premises 
where the registered address 
is located. 
Portugal No specific connection of 
Portuguese companies with the 
domestic territory as a matter of 
Portuguese substantive company 
N/A N/A N/A 




Country Residence/real seat requirement 
for national companies 
If yes, details of substantive 
requirements 
Consequences if requirements 
no longer met 
Regularly scrutinised (on 
incorporation/ongoing) 
law.  
Portuguese private international 
law, however, results, in principle, 
in an effective residence 
requirement.199 
 
Romania There seems to be no requirement 
of a link between the company’s 
activities and its registered office. 
N/A N/A N/A 
Slovakia No. 
There is no requirement of a link 
between the company’s activities 
and its registered office.  
The company must prove that it 
has some control over the 
premises, but this does not in 
effect preclude the use of mere 
letter-boxes as registered office. 
The only requirement, as far as 
the registered office is 
concerned, is for it to be under 
an ownership right or right to 
use the property attributed to 
the company, so as to avoid 
completely fictitious addresses.  
The company does not need to 
have actual business premises 
at the registered office address. 
If the company loses the control 
over the premises (e.g. 
termination of the lease 
contract), the company might 
be terminated under s. 68 of the 
Commercial Code by the court in 
a special procedure.  
The required control 
over/access to the registered 
office address is not 
regularly scrutinised by the 
register. 
Slovenia Unclear. 
Some commentators argue that 
private and public companies, 
companies need to have both their 
registered office (statutarni 
sedež)200 and the real seat or head 
office (dejanski sedež) in Slovenia. 
According to other commentators, 
the real seat of the company may 
also be located outside of Slovenia 
as a matter of substantive 
company law. 
 
Unclear, but according to some 
commentators, the 
headquarters have to be 
situated in Slovenia (although 
probably not necessarily at the 
registered office). 
Unclear, as it depends on the 
interpretation of the substantive 
law requirement. 
It cannot be excluded possible 
that a company is subject to 
compulsory liquidation in case of 
a divergence between registered 
office and real seat. Most 
scholars, however, argue that 
companies should be given 
appropriate time to re-establish 
their operations in Slovenia (or 
transfer their registered office). 
Not in practice. 
                                                 
199 See Table 3.1. below. 
200 The Companies Act uses simply the term ‘sedež’, i.e. ‘seat’, similarly as German GmbHG ‘Sitz’, however, it derives from Article 29 of the Companies Act that this term is 
used to describe the registered office. 




Country Residence/real seat requirement 
for national companies 
If yes, details of substantive 
requirements 
Consequences if requirements 
no longer met 
Regularly scrutinised (on 
incorporation/ongoing) 
Spain A company’s registered office 
must be either at its real seat or at 
the place of its principal 
establishment. 
These have to be located in Spain. 
The articles of association must 
specify whether the registered 
office is at the real seat or at 
the place of its principal 
establishment. 
Courts can order an amendment 
of the articles. 
If neither the management nor 
the main establishment are in 
Spain, rules on involuntary seat 
transfers apply. 
Third parties are protected by 
the relevant private 
international law rules in case 
the registered office does not 
coincide with either the real seat 
or the place of principal 
establishment. 
Regular scrutiny only at the 
time of incorporation. 
Sweden No requirement of a link between 
the company’s activities and its 
registered office.  
Neither real seat nor headquarters 
have to be located in Sweden 
N/A N/A N/A 
United 
Kingdom 
No link between registered office 
and the company’s business is 
required.  
The registered office may be a 
mere postal address in the UK. 
N/A N/A N/A 
 




3. Determining the law applicable to companies  
Most national approaches to private international company law are categorised as 
belonging to one of two basic doctrines, the so-called real seat theory and the 
incorporation theory. While legal systems will generally not adopt either approach 
in their ‘pure form’, but in many variations, their main features can be 
summarised easily. The incorporation theory refers to the place of incorporation, 
the country under whose laws the corporation is created. That legal system will 
determine the capacity of the corporation and all matters commonly regarded as 
falling within the ambit of corporate law, in particular issues relating to the 
corporation’s internal management. 201  Likewise, a state applying the 
incorporation theory in its pure form will recognise a corporation validly formed in 
another country as a legal entity that is vested with corporate capacity and has 
standing to sue and be sued, 202  and such a state will not normally seek to 
intervene in issues falling within the scope of the incorporation law,203 except in 
cases involving public policy considerations or where the state of incorporation 
applies a renvoi.204 
The connecting factor under the real seat theory is inherently more ambivalent. 
First, there is no common understanding of the precise contours of the term, 
notably whether the real seat refers to the place of the company’s central 
administration and management or to the location of other aspects of the 
company’s business, such as its main operations. Furthermore, even under a 
well-established definition, the determination of the company’s place of central 
decision-making may be difficult in practice, in particular in corporate groups or 
companies with a decentralised decision-making structure. An additional 
complication derives from the fact that countries may not apply the incorporation 
theory in its pure form, but provide for intermediate solutions that combine the 
place of incorporation as the primary connecting factor with other rules (to be 
classified either as conflict of laws rules or, as explained above,205 as rules of 
internal corporate law, but in their effects similar) that are designed to prevent 
companies from making use of foreign law if most or all of their business 
operations are located within the country’s territory. If such rules are not 
restricted in their scope of application to companies incorporated in third 
countries, the question arises whether they are in line with the right of 
establishment, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in Centros and Überseering. 
Table 3.1 collects information on the Member State’s general approach to 
determining the lex societatis: the definition of the main connection factor used 
by them, both as applicable to companies with connections to other EU Member 
States and companies that operate in, or are incorporated under the laws of, third 
countries (column (2)), and any exceptions to this primary connecting factor 
(which we also term ‘additional connecting factors’, see column (3)). The latter 
are typically triggered by an actual connection with the Member State’s territory 
in cases where the registered seat of the company is located abroad. Finally, in 
column (4), we discuss whether the private international law rules of the Member 
States refer only to the substantive (internal) company law of the lex causae (so-
                                                 
201 The scope of the lex societatis and the problem of classification will be discussed below in Section 4. 
On the classification problem, see also C Gerner-Beuerle and EP Schuster, ‘The Costs of Separation: 
Conflicts in Company and Insolvency Law in Europe’ (2014) 14 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 287, 
320-323. 
202 See, for example, L Collins et al, Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2012), 30–011 (on UK law). 
203 Ibid. at 30-028. 
204 See C Gerner-Beuerle and M Schillig, ‘The Mysteries of Freedom of Establishment after Cartesio’ 
(2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 303. 
205 Section 2. 




called internal law theory) or both to the substantive law and the private 
international law of that country, thus allowing for the further referral to the law 
of another country or the referral back to the lex fori, if different from the lex 
causae (renvoi).  
An additional issue to be examined in this context is the potential existence and 
impact of what can be called ‘outreach statutes’. Outreach statutes, making 
special provision for intervention in the internal affairs of certain foreign 
companies (without, however, leading to a change in the lex societatis), are well 
known internationally and can be found, for instance, in several US states. A 
leading example is California. If a foreign company is substantially connected with 
California,206 a number of Californian mandatory company laws on internal affairs 
of the corporation apply, including rules on the election and removal of directors; 
directors’ standard of care and indemnity; distribution rules and liability for their 
breach; shareholder majorities and cumulative voting; merger and reconstruction 
procedures; records and reports and state enforcement and inspection.207 Such 
outreach provisions have been upheld as constitutional for many years, 208 
although more recently the Delaware Supreme Court decided that Delaware law 
prevails over a (contrary) provision of the California statute for corporations 
formed under Delaware law.209 
We distinguish between outreach statutes in a narrow sense, which we define as 
laws making special provision for intervention in the internal affairs of foreign-
incorporated companies, without, however, leading to a change in the lex 
societatis, and outreach statutes in a wider sense, referring to laws not designed 
to apply specifically to foreign companies, but having an equivalent effect 
because they (i) regulate matters generally considered to form part of company 
law and (ii) apply on the basis of criteria separate from the general determination 
of the lex societatis, which typically capture not only domestic companies, but 
also companies incorporated abroad that have a significant link with the territory 
of the forum state. Outreach statutes in the narrow sense are often directed at 
so-called ‘pseudo foreign’ companies, i.e. companies with all or most of their 
business operations in a country other than the state of incorporation. An 
example is the Dutch law that was at issue in Inspire Art, imposing disclosure and 
minimum capital requirements on companies operating exclusively or 
predominantly in the Netherlands and lacking a ‘real connection’ with their 
country of establishment.210 Outreach statutes in the wider sense often apply to 
foreign companies because the legal mechanism they promulgate is formally part 
of another legal area, for example administrative law in cases where enforcement 
is through a government agency (and the mechanism’s international scope of 
application is, accordingly, defined by the territoriality principle) or capital 
markets regulation where the company’s securities are listed on a domestic stock 
exchange.211 
                                                 
206 The test is complex but essentially requires a majority of California resident shareholders plus an 
average majority of sales, assets, and employees located within the state – Cal. CC Section 2113. 
207 See C Kersting, ‘Corporate Choice of Law-A Comparison of the United States and European Sys-
tems and a Proposal for a European Directive’ (2002) 28 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1, 20. 
208 Western Airlines Inc v Sobieski 12 Cal Rep. 719 (Fed. CA 2nd D 1961). See also Kersting, n 207 
above, 31. 
209 See VantagePoint v. Examen, Inc., 871 A. 2d 1108 (Delaware Supreme Court 2005). For a discus-
sion of the problem of outreach statutes from the US perspective see JB Jacobs, ‘The Reach of State 
Corporate Law beyond State Borders: Reflections upon Federalism’ (2009) 84 NYU Law Review 1149. 
210 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd., [2003] 
ECR I-10155 (holding that the Dutch law constituted a violation of the Treaty). 
211 Outreach statutes in a narrow sense, but not so much those in a wider sense, will often rely on 
overriding mandatory provisions to protect public interests of general importance. They may accord-
ingly be part of a country’s ordre public, as we will discuss in more detail in Section 5 below. It is nev-




Table 3.2 summarises whether the Member States require all or some foreign (or 
‘pseudo-foreign’) companies operating within their territory to comply with 
specific registration and disclosure requirements, which can be expected to be the 
most likely type of outreach statute (column (2)), and list the most important 
provisions that otherwise affect the legal position of foreign companies in the host 
state (column (3)). 
3.1 Overview of national laws 
Table 3.1. Connecting Factor 
Country Main connecting factor 









Austria Real seat (place of 
central administration), 
but by the courts 
interpreted to apply only 
non-EU/EEA companies; 
for EU/EEA companies 
registered seat 
- Referrals comprise the PIL 
of the lex causae 
Belgium Real seat, Art. 110 PIL 
Code 
Defined as the location of 
the principal 
establishment (‘plaats 
van de voornaamste 
vestiging’) of a legal 
entity 
Criteria: the entity’s 
centre of governance, the 
centre of its business and 
activities and, 
subordinately, its 
statutory seat, Art. 4, § 3 
PIL Code212 
As long as third parties 
do not protest, it is 
assumed that the 
principal establishment is 
at the statutory seat, and 
courts will not investigate 
where the company’s 
centre of governance, 
business etc. are located 
The literature argues that 
if the real seat theory 
leads to the application of 
Belgian law to a EU-
foreign company, the 
respective rules 
constitute a restriction 
- In general, the law at the 
place of the real seat 
applies  
Exceptions: 
- If the real seat of a 
company is in a country 
that applies the 
incorporation theory, 
Belgian courts respect this 
choice and apply the 
incorporation law, Art. 110 
PIL Code 
- If the company is 
established in Belgium and 
the real seat is transferred 
to an incorporation state, 
Belgian courts will 
(continue to) apply Belgian 
company law 
                                                                                                                                            
ertheless useful to mention these mechanisms already at this point in order to give a comprehensive 
description of the Member States’ approaches to defining the lex societatis and possible interferences 
with a foreign company law. 
212 Antwerpen 13 March 2000, V&F 2000, 220, TRV 2000, 236 (Super Club), holding that the principal 
establishment of a holding company is where the general meetings and the meetings of the board of 
directors of the holding company take place, not where the subsidiary operates. 




that needs to be justified 
Bulgaria Place of registration (lex 
loci registrationis), Art. 
56(1) PILC 
According to article 
56(2) PILC, where no 
registration is 
required for the 
incorporation of the 
legal person, or where 
the legal person is 
registered in several 
states, the applicable 
law shall be the law of 
the state in which the 
statutory seat is 
situated (siege social) 
(unless one of the 
states where the 
company is registered 
is Bulgaria, in which 
case Bulgarian law 
applies). 
According to article 
56(3) PILC if, in the 
cases under (2), the 
situs of the statutory 
seat is different from 
the situs of the actual 
place of management 
of the legal person, 
the law of the state 
where the actual place 
of management is 
situated shall apply. 
With regard to renvoi, 
article 40(2) PILC provides 
that remission to Bulgarian 
law and referral to the law 
of a third State shall be 
inadmissible regarding the 
legal status of legal 
persons. 
Croatia Registered office; Croatia 
supports the 
incorporation doctrine 
(Art. 17(1) PILA) 
By way of exception 
to the general rule, 
Art. 17(2) PILA 
provides that if a legal 
entity has its real seat 
in a state other than 
the one in which it 
was established, and 
according to the law 
of that other state is 
seen as a company 
established under the 
law of the real seat 
state, it shall be 
considered to be a 
legal person of that 
state. For example, if 
a company is 
registered in the UK 
but has its real seat in 
Belgium, Art. 17(2) 
PILA would require 
the court to apply 
Belgian law, thus 
possibly resulting in 
an infringement of the 
freedom of 
establishment. 
Third parties (e.g. 
creditors and tax 
When Croatian conflict of 
laws rules lead to the 
application of foreign law 
this reference is 
understood, as a general 
rule, as a reference to the 
foreign law as a whole, 
including its conflict of laws 
rules (Art. 6 PILA). 
Croatian PILA therefore 
allows for a renvoi to 
domestic law or to another 
foreign law. 
In the opinion of the 
authors the general 
provision of Article 6 on 
renvoi does not apply in 
company law. 
 





choose whether to 
invoke legal 
consequences 
dependant on the law 
at the real seat or the 
registered seat of the 
company. 
Cyprus Place of incorporation  A relevant exception 
relates to the law 
applicable to the legal 
capacity of a company 
to enter into a legal 
transaction. According 
to Cyprus literature, 
this is governed by 
the Memorandum and 
Articles of Association 
of the company and 
by the law of the 
country that governs 
the transaction 
entered into by the 
company. 
There is no relative 
statutory provision or 
relevant case law. It could 
be suggested that Cypriot 
courts would apply double 
renvoi as is the position in 
common law, an approach 
that finds support in case 
law, specifically in 
Christopoulou. However, 
this is the only Cyprus 




Law of the state under 
which the company was 
incorporated (Art. 30(1) 
PIL act) 
In order for 
companies to be 
bound by agreements, 
it is sufficient for them 
to have been reached 
in accordance with the 
laws valid at the place 
where such an 
agreement was 
concluded (Art. 30(2) 
PIL act) 
 
Both substantive law and 
private international law of 
a country apply (renvoi).  
If the provision of that 
country refers back to the 
Czech law: substantive 
Czech law applies (renvoi 
back) 
Where the provisions of 
foreign law refer to the law 
of another foreign state, 
the substantive-law 
provisions of that law shall 
apply if that third state 
‘accepts’ the renvoi; 
otherwise Czech law 
applies. 
Denmark Recently prevailing view: 
registered office 
Other view: incorporation 
itself 
Older literature: actual 
centre of administration 
No case law dealing 
directly with this 
question213 
- If foreign law is applicable 
according to the Danish 
international private law, 
the referral comprises 
pursuant to general Danish 
conflict of laws principles 
only a referral to 
substantive law, and not to 
the private international 
law of that country; 
generally, renvoi has not 
become an issue of concern 
in Denmark for any 
questions that deal with the 
private international law of 
                                                 
213 An older case, UfR1918.39H, has been seen as an acceptance of the real seat theory. However, the 
case concerned tax law, and the question was whether or not the company should be taxed as a Dan-
ish company or a foreign company. Thus, it is not clear from the case that the court would have taken 
the same approach to determine the lex societatis. 





Estonia Registered seat Companies which are 
being managed or 
have their main 
activities in Estonia 
are governed by 
Estonian law; 
compatibility with EU 
law not discussed by 
the courts 
Reference to the law means 
‘referral to both substantive 
law and private 
international law of that 
country’ 
Finland Registration in Finland - - 
France Siège social, Art. 1837 
Code Civil and L210-3 
C.Com. 
Interpreted as registered 
office by the literature 
No case law, but criminal 
offence of abus de biens 
sociaux applied to 
directors of foreign 
incorporated companies 
with some activity (not 
necessarily their real 
seat) in France214 
1) In case of fraud, 
case law allows 
interested persons to 
invoke the law at the 
real seat, if the real 
seat is in France215 
2) Art. 1837 Code 
Civil and L210-3 
C.Com.: ‘Third parties 
may rely for legal 
purposes on the 
registered office …. 
However, the 
company shall not be 
entitled to raise this 
against them if its 
actual office is located 
elsewhere.’  
Thus, third parties 
may rely on the law at 
the real seat if 
different from the 
incorporation law 
Conformity with 
Inspire Art questioned 
by the literature, but 
no case law 
No decision applying renvoi 
to companies during the 
last thirty years 
Germany EU/EEA: registered office 
Non-EU/EEA: centre of 
administration, defined 
as ‘the place where the 
fundamental corporate 





- Referrals comprise the PIL 
of the lex causae, but no 
double renvoi, Art. 4(1) 
EGBGB 
Greece Real seat relevant (based 
on case law); exception 
for maritime companies, 
but not for EU-
incorporated companies 
Adjustments are 
discussed in the literature 
to make Greek law 
- Art. 32 of the Greek Civil 
Code prohibits renvoi and 
states that the ‘applicable 
foreign law does not 
include the private 
international rules of the 
foreign State’. 
                                                 
214 Cass. crim., 25 June 2014, n° 13-84445, Revue des sociétés 2015, p. 50, note M. Menjucq. 
215 Cass. crim., 21 nov. 1889, S. 1890, 1, 94; Clunet 1889. CA Paris, 31 oct. 1957, p. 850, RTD com. 
1958, 345. 
216 BGHZ [Court Reporter of the German Federal Court of Justice] 97, 269, 272. 




compatible with the 
rulings of the Court of 
Justice 
Hungary The State in whose 
territory the company 
was registered (s. 18(2) 
Decree on private 
international law). 
 
Subordinated criteria:  
(a) Statutory seat if a 
legal person has been 
lawfully registered in 
accordance with the 
laws of several states 
or registration is not 
required under the 
rules applicable where 
the seat designated in 
the articles of 
association is actually 
situated (s. 18(3)) 
(b) Real seat when a 
company has no 
‘statutory seat’ or has 
seats in more than 
one state (s. 18(4)) 
Hungarian private 
international law accepts 
the renvoi doctrine. Hence, 
Hungarian company law 
should apply if the private 
international law of the 
state of incorporation of a 
foreign company refers 
back to Hungary. The 
consequence would be that 
the company did not exist. 
No case law exists that 
deals with this problem. 
Ireland Place of incorporation - Likely that English 
approach would be 
persuasive if the issue were 
considered; obiter 
comments of Irisih courts 
indicate that they take dim 
view of renvoi. 
Italy Law of the State where 
the formation procedure 
was fulfilled (article 25 
PIL Act) 
Literature divided on how 
to interpret this criterion, 
but for registered entities 
there are only minimal 
differences. 
Italian law applies 
when the company 
has the administrative 
seat in Italy or when 
the ‘principal object’ 
of the company (that 
is to say its main 
activity or main 
operation) is situated 
in Italy (article 25 PIL 
Act). This rule only 
applies to non-EU 
companies only. 
Italian private international 
law refers to both 
substantive law and private 
international law of the 
competent jurisdiction 
(renvoi).  
If the foreign private 
international law refers 
back to Italy, Italian 
substantive law applies. 
Latvia Real seat; but, de facto, 
focus on registered seat; 
also some bilateral 
treaties codifying 
relevance of registered 
seat 
 ‘If pursuant to the 
provisions of this [law] the 
law of a foreign state must 
be applied, but such law in 
turn stipulates that Latvian 
law is applicable, then 
Latvian law shall be 
applied’. But Latvian law 
accepts renvoi back to the 
Latvian law only (and not 
to any possible lex fori) 
Lithuania Registered seat - If violation of foreign 
incorporation rules: 
state of main activity  
- If ‘subdivisions’ of 
foreign companies 
with ‘head office, 
principal place of 
business or other 
[main] activity of the 
Renvoi accepted in matters 
determining the civil legal 
status of a person; but 
rules do not apply where 
the applicable law has been 
chosen ‘by the parties to a 
transaction, likewise in 
determining the applicable 
law to the form of a 






law determined the 
civil capacity of the 
subdivision 
transaction and to non-
contractual obligations.’ 
Luxembourg Real seat (place of 
central decision-making, 
i.e. where the board of 
directors meets), but 
presumption that the real 
seat is at the place of the 
statutory seat 
- No case law, but most 
likely courts would follow 
French case law; hence, 
renvoi would be allowed 
Malta Place of incorporation - - 
Netherlands Registered office, Art. 
10:118 CC 
If no registered seat, 
the centre of activity 
at the moment of 
establishment of the 
company, Art. 10:118 
CC 
If a company has its 
statutory seat in a 
different country form 
the country according 
to the law of which it 
was established, 
Dutch courts will 
consider all elements 
in determining the 
applicable law;217 
most likely, this 
means that courts will 
apply the law 
according to which the 
company has been 
established 
No renvoi; the application 
of the law of a country is 
understood to be the 
application of the laws and 
rules of that country with 
the exception of private 
international law, Art. 10:5 
CC 
Poland The ‘seat’ of a company. 
No specification whether 
‘real seat’ or ‘statutory 
seat’. Legal scholars 
divided between 
followers of the ‘real seat 
theory’ and ‘incorporation 
theory’, but the latter 
theory has become 
dominant. However, the 
Polish Supreme Court 
(12.3.2015) has 
maintained that a 
company’s seat ‘shall be 
construed as the place of 
actual activity’ (company 
from Lvov, now in 
Ukraine: it is uncertain 
whether this decision is 
applicable to other 
situations). 
But Polish courts 
generally take the 
statutory seat as an 
- If the Private International 
Law of the country in which 
the company has its seat 
refers to the law of another 
country in which the 
company is actually 
incorporated, the law of the 
country of incorporation 
applies.  
 
                                                 
217 As stated in parliamentary materials, see Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 137, nr. 3, p. 68. 




indication for determining 
the applicable lex 
societatis without 
analysing in detail the 
actual management 
centre of the company. 
Portugal On paper, Portuguese PIL 
follows the ‘real seat 
theory’ (the place where 
the principal and 
effective office of 
administration is located: 
Art. 33(1) Civil Code, Art. 
3(1) Companies Act). 
However, this rule is held 
as not applicable to EEA 
companies and several 
exceptions exist (see 
reincorporations and duty 
to re-incorporate) 
Portuguese companies 
with their ‘real seat’ in 
a foreign country 
cannot invoke the law 
of such foreign 
country against third 
parties (Art. 3 
Companies Act).  
Renvoi doctrine applies: if 
foreign law is applicable, its 
private international law 
rules also apply. If foreign 
law refers back to 
Portuguese law, their 
substantive rules apply 
(Arts. 17-18 Civil Code). 
Therefore: if a company is 
incorporated in Portugal 
with its real seat abroad 
and the state of the real 
seat follows the 
incorporation theory, 
Portuguese law applies 
(and the company is validly 
incorporated).  
Romania Complex dual criterion: 
Statutory seat, but if the 
company has multiple 
establishments in 
different countries, what 
must be taken primarily 
into account is the real 
seat of that company 
(interpreted as the place 
where the main centre of 
decision-making is 
located), Art. 2571 al. 2 
NCC  
This can support the 
conclusion that Romanian 
law follows, in fact, the 
real seat theory. 
In light of the rulings of 
the Court of Justice, the 
real seat criterion should 
be disapplied for EU-
incorporated companies. 
Additional problems 
are created by the 
incoherence produced 
by legislation as well 
as administrative 
practice: 
Art. 2582 NCC 
guarantees the 
automatic recognition 
of foreign companies. 
The Trade Registry, 
based on a text from 
the Trade Registry 
Law, reviews the 
company’s existence 
by studying the law 
under which it was 
created (the law of 
the registered office), 
thus ignoring the 
current lex societatis. 
Thus, Art. 2571(2) 
NCC should be seen 
as exceptional, 
applied restrictively, 
only to pseudo-foreign 
companies. 
Renvoi is admitted as a 
general solution. 
 
Slovakia Registered seat, s. 22 of 
the Commercial Code  
- There is a wide margin of 
appreciation on behalf of 
the judicial authority in 
relation to the application 
of renvoi. 
Section 35 of the Act on 
International Private and 
Procedural Law stipulates 
that, if based on the 
application of this Act, the 
legal system to be applied 




refers back to the national 
legal system or refers to 
the legal system of another 
state, such reference shall 
be used only if it reflects a 
reasonable and equitable 
arrangement of the 
relationship in question. 
Slovenia Registered seat; Art. 17 
of the Private 
International Law and 
Procedure Act (PILPA). 
The country of 
incorporation is the main 
connecting factor for 
determining the 
applicable company law. 
The Slovene courts 
simply refer to the place 
of entry into the 
commercial register as 
the relevant factor to 
interpret the registered 
seat. 
Art. 2 PILPA stipulates 
that the primary 
connecting factor is 
exceptionally not to 
be used, if it is clear 
that the relation with 
the lex causae is not 
the most important 
one and there is an 
essentially closer link 
to some other law. 
Art. 17(3) PILPA 
provides that ‘if the 
actual head office of a 
legal entity is in a 
country other than the 
country in which it 
was founded, and 
under the law of this 
other country also 
belongs to it, it shall 
be considered that the 
company belongs to 
this other country’. 
However, this 
provision has been 
dismissed as not 
applicable. 
Art. 6(1) PILPA accepts a 
referral to the law of a third 
country, as well as a renvoi 
back to Slovene law. In the 
latter case, only 
substantive (internal) 
Slovene law applies, the 
Private International Law 
and Procedure Act 
therefore does not allow for 
a double renvoi. 
Spain Companies that are 
domiciled in Spain 
(registered office in 
Spain) are governed by 
Spanish law, regardless 
of their State of 
incorporation (Art. 8 
Capital Companies Act) 
[unilateral conflict rule, 
but case law applies this 
rule also to foreign 
companies] 
Companies whose 
principal establishment or 
business activity are 
located in Spain, will 
have to place their 
domicile in Spain (Art. 
9(2)). 
Case law and scholars 
are divided on the 
interpretation of these 
rules; however, the 
dominant view (accepted 
by the courts) is that 
these rules are to be 
Foreign companies 
with their principal 
establishment or main 
business activity in 
Spain are governed by 
Spanish law (Art. 
9(2)); they have to 
convert into Spanish 
companies, otherwise 
they are treated as 
Spanish partnerships 
or civil companies 
Narrow interpretation 
of Art. 9(2): only 
applicable in limited 
cases and probably 
not to EU companies, 
but not yet confirmed 
by case law 
Only renvoi back to 
Spanish law. No general 
Renvoi doctrine (Art. 12(2) 
Civil Code). No case law. 




considered as a version 
of the incorporation 
theory. 
Sweden Registration in Sweden. - In general, Swedish private 
international law does not 
support the doctrine of 
renvoi. The principal rule is 
that the application of 
foreign law means a 
referral only to the 




1) Place of incorporation 
2) No distinction between 
EU and non-EU 
- In general referral to 
internal law, no renvoi 
(internal law theory); by 
way of exception, total 
renvoi is used in some 
other areas, but probably 
not in company law.  
  
Table 3.2. Outreach statutes 
Country Registration and disclosure 
requirements; compatibility with EU 
law 
Others (e.g. directors’ disqualification) 
 
Austria Registration requirements for 
branches of foreign companies. Non-
EU/EEA companies are required to 
appoint a special representative for 
branches in Austria. All foreign 
companies are required to prove 
their legal existence and must file a 
translation of their articles of 
association.  
- 
Belgium A foreign-incorporated company that 
opens a branch in Belgium must 
deposit its memorandum of 
association and the articles of 
association with the commercial 
court; before these documents are 
deposited, an action in law of the 
foreign company will be null and void 
Persons who are responsible for the 
governance of the branch of a foreign 
company are liable to third parties in the 
same way as board members of a 
Belgian company (thus, the breach must 
be related to the operation of the 
branch, e.g. negligence in the disclosure 
requirements of branches or non-
compliance with Belgian general 
principles of corporate governance), Art. 
59 BCC 
The Belgian law on the employees’ 
council is applicable regardless of the 
nationality of the company; branches of 
companies that employ on average more 
than 100 employees must establish an 
employees’ council 
Both natural persons and legal entities 
can be disqualified from acting as 
director, supervisor or agent of a Belgian 




company and a Belgian branch of a 
foreign company;218 it is irrelevant 
whether the criminal conviction or 
insolvency sentence on which the 
disqualification order is based was issued 
by a Belgian or a foreign court 
Bulgaria The publicity of the data provided for 
in article 17a CA regarding the 
branch of a foreign person aims at 
protecting creditors and third 
parties. Pursuant to article 17a in 
connection with article 17(2) CA the 
branch of a foreign person shall be 
registered in the Commercial register 
on the basis of a written application 
which discloses the seat and subject 
matter of activity of the branch, 
information about the foreign 
company and the person who 
manages the branch etc. 
- 
Croatia Art. 612 Companies Act provides 
that foreign companies are not 
permitted to undertake business 
activities on a continuous basis 
before they establish a subsidiary in 
the territory of the Republic of 
Croatia. Business activity will be 
considered continuous if it is 
considered as such by established 
trade practice 
In order to establish a subsidiary 
foreign companies are also required 
to provide: evidence that the 
company is registered in another 
country (e.g. provide a certified 
court register excerpt), a valid 
decision on the establishment of a 
subsidiary in Croatia, a copy of the 
foreign company’s articles of 
association and officially 
authenticated and abbreviated last 
annual financial statement of the 
foreign company. 
In 2011 the Croatian Constitutional 
Court held that such registration 
requirements are not contrary to the 
freedom of establishment. 
- 
Cyprus Art. 347-353 Cap.113 are specific 
provisions of Cyprus Companies Law 
that are applicable to foreign 
companies. They concern the power 
to hold immovable property, service 
to such companies, information that 
needs to be stated on company 
documents and more.  
Section 351 establishes similar 
disclosure requirements to those 
Article 101 specifically renders Part III of 
Cap.113 that contains provisions relating 
to the obligation of companies to register 
charges and record mortgages as well as 
to maintain relevant registers, applicable 
to overseas companies to the extent that 
the charges and mortgages concern 
immovable property in Cyprus and the 
overseas company has an established 
place of business in Cyprus. 
                                                 
218  Royal Decree nr. 22 of 24 October 1934 betreffende het rechterlijk verbod aan bepaalde 
veroordeelden en gefailleerden om bepaalde ambten, beroepen of werkzaamheden uit te oefenen, OJ 
27 October 1934 (KB nr. 22). 




imposed by Dutch law in Inspire Art. 
Yet, the issue of their compatibility 
with EU law does not seem to have 
arisen as yet. 
The aforementioned rules apply both 
to non-EU and EU-incorporated 
companies, though companies 
registered in an EU Member State 
are exempted from the obligations 
laid down in Article 350, amongst 
others, to file financial accounts, 
director's and auditor's report if the 
conditions provided in specific EU 
Directives are met (see Article 350, 
Cap.113). 
By virtue of Article 362, Cap.113, Cyprus 
courts can wind up an overseas company 
if it conducts or has conducted business 
in Cyprus. Article 362, could, in this 
respect, be considered an outreach 
statute.   
Czech 
Republic 
See Table 5 below Insolvency law (ss. 63, 64 Business 
Corporations Act): The insolvency court 
shall, even ex officio, decide that a 
director may not hold the office as a 
member of a governing body for a period 
of 3 years, if the way in which this 
person exercised his office resulted in 
the company’s bankruptcy 
Denmark An EU/EEA-incorporated company 
doing business in Denmark must 
register a branch with the DBA if the 
company’s activities in Denmark 
have a certain extent, s. 349 CA 
Other foreign companies: must 
obtain authorisation by the DBA to 
operate in Denmark via a branch 
The branch must be managed by one 
or more branch managers 
(filialbestyrere), s. 346(1) CA 
Branches must have an independent 
name, consisting of the name of the 
branch; name of the main company; 
its nationality; and the word ’filial’ 
(branch); the compatibility of these 
requirements with EU law has been 
questioned219 
Branches: the CA provides that ‘[t]he 
provisions of this Act regarding members 
of management generally apply, with 
such changes as are necessary, to 
branch managers,’ s. 346(2) CA. This 
suggests that a broad range of 
provisions could be applicable. If that is 
the case, such requirements will 
potentially impose double burdens.220 
Other rules addressing the activities of 
foreign companies are contained in 
sector-specific legislation, e.g. the 
Financial Business Act, Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers etc. Act, 
Securities Trading Act 
New rules on bankruptcy quarantine 
entered into force in 2014, but difficult 
to enforce: directors of Danish company 
who are given bankruptcy quarantine 
can register as directors in another 
country and even operate in Denmark 
through a secondary establishment 
Estonia Foreign branches: name must 
include the words ‘Eesti filiaal’ 
[‘Estonian branch’]; if permanent 
activity, name of branch must be 
entered into commercial register. 
If a foreign company operating in 
Estonia has a web page directed to 
the public, it shall include at least a 
summary in Estonian about its field 
of activity or the goods and services 
- 
                                                 
219 E Werlauff, ‘Can National Company Law Require a Branch of a Foreign Company to Have an Inde-
pendent Name?’ (2014) 11 European Company Law 165. 
220 For a discussion, see KE Sørensen, ‘Branches of Companies in the EU: Balancing the Eleventh 
Company Law Directive, National Company Law and the Right of Establishment’ (2014) 11 European 
Company and Financial Law Review 83. 





Finland Registration requirements for 
branches of foreign companies 
Finnish company law not applied to 
foreign companies 
France Special registration requirements for 
branches of foreign companies apply, 
distinguishing between EU and non-
EU companies (Arts. R. 123-54, R. 
123-57 et R. 123-58 C.Com.) 
Financial markets regulations: 
considered as ‘lois de police’, which 
apply to both French and foreign listed 
companies221 
Abuse of corporate assets (abus de biens 
sociaux) applied to foreign companies 
having their real seat in France222 and to 
foreign companies not having their real 
seat in France, but most of their 
activities there223 (the court applies 
French company law, which is held to be 
the applicable lex societatis because of 
the company’s actual real seat in France 
or because the real seat is deemed to be 
in France given the company’s activities 
there) 
Germany The law on the registration of 
branches provides since 2008 that 
the eligibility requirements of the 
companies acts apply to ‘the legal 
representatives of the company with 
regard to the branch’ (ss. 13e(3)), 
13f(5), 13g(5) HGB); the 
compatibility of this law with the 11th 
Directive (i.e. Directive 89/666) is 
questioned by some in the 
literature224 
Eligibility of persons to serve as directors 
of public or private companies (ss. 76(3) 
AktG, 6(2) GmbHG): explicitly refer only 
to the German stock corporation and 
limited liability company, but were also 
applied to persons to be appointed as 
directors of a foreign company operating 
in Germany225 (since 2008, this question 
is also addressed by the law on branch 
registration, see the column left) 
Greece Rules for foreign companies: special 
disclosure requirements for branches 
and agencies; non-EU companies 
have to register a branch.  
Regarding the liability of signatories of 
the application for the ministerial 
decision authorising the establishment of 
a branch or agency in Greece of foreign 
(EU and non-EU) companies with limited 
liability, Art. 59 of Law 3190/1955 states 
that ‘(u)ntil the completion of the 
formalities mentioned in the above 
article, signatories who have contracted 
in the name of the company have 
unlimited and several liability’. 
Hungary No explicit outreach statutes in 
Hungarian law, no case law and no 
discussion in the legal literature; 
non-EU companies have to register a 
See left 
 
                                                 
221 CA, Paris, 13 January 1998, Bull. Joly Bourse 1998, p. 256; Rev. soc. 1998, p. 572: ‘the provisions 
of the Act of July 2, 1996 are economic ‘ordre public’ provisions and the general regulation of the COB 
(“Commission des operation de bourse”) applies to any operator who acts on a French regulated mar-
ket’. 
222 Cour de cassation (crim.) 31 January 2007, Nadhmi Auchi, Patrick Chamarre, André Guelfi, Jean 
Hamon et autres; 10 March 2010, F-D, n°09-82.453, Rev. Soc. 2007.369, comment B. Bouloc. 
223 Cass. crim., 25 June 2014, n° 13-84445, Revue des sociétés 2015, p. 50, note M. Menjucq. 
224 But see Explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal for a Law for the Modernisation of 
the German Limited Liability Company Law and the Prevention of Misuse (MoMiG), Bundestags-
Drucksache 16/6140, p. 50 (stating that the Eleventh Company Law Directive is not affected because 
it is not concerned with the eligibility of directors and restrictions of the right of establishment are 
justified). 
225 BGH NZG 2007, 592 (arguing that in cases such as the one at issue, where a German national 
formed a pseudo-foreign company to circumvent domestic eligibility requirements, the conduct of the 
director should be qualified as abuse, and restrictions of the right of establishment were therefore 
justified). 





Ireland Rules on ‘external’ companies in Part 
21 of the 2014 Act for foreign 
branches: filing obligations to Irish 
register 
 
Chapter 5 of Part 14 (Compliance and 
Enforcement) of the 2014 Act for 
disqualification of company directors use 
a broad definition of company which 
includes ‘every company and every 
body, whether corporate or 
unincorporated, that may be wound up 
under [the 2014 Act]’; thus this includes 
foreign companies. 
Italy Transparency requirements for 
foreign companies active in Italy 
(Articles 2507 to 2510 Civil Code). 
Not significantly applied and 
enforced.  
- 
Latvia All foreign companies (both EU and 
non-EU) are required to file a proof 
on their registration in the country of 
incorporation (if there is a 
registration requirement in particular 
country) and a copy of their articles 
of association as well as to appoint 
an official representative of the 
branch (see Table 4.3 below for 
name of a branch) 
In practice: administrative authorities in 
Latvia have difficulties in respecting 
incorporation country’s laws as well as in 
ensuring that EU-based companies may 
enjoy their freedoms without hidden 
restrictions. 
Lithuania Branches of foreign companies must 
be registered in the Register of Legal 
Entities; name of the branch or the 
representative office must contain 
word filialas (branch) or atstovybė 
(representative office); at least one 
person acting on behalf of 
branch/office needs to reside in 
Lithuania (but does not apply to EU 
companies) 
- 
Luxembourg No requirements going beyond the 
11th Directive 
No case law from Luxembourg courts, 
but note that French courts apply the 
criminal offence of abus de biens sociaux 
to directors of foreign companies with 
their real seat or most of their activity in 
France226; Luxembourg company law 
contains a similar provision on abuse of 
corporate assets (Art. 171-1) 
Malta The law does not contain provisions 
that can be properly described as 
outreach statutes and that would 
displace the law of the state of 
incorporation 
Special regulations for overseas 
companies with a branch or place of 
business in Malta, dealing principally 
with the delivery of documentation 
and records and financial reporting 
requirements; for EU companies the 
registrar waives the requirement 
that the accounts be presented in 
precisely the same form as would be 
required of a Maltese company 
- 
                                                 
226 See notes 222 and 223 above. 




Netherlands For non-EEA companies operating 
exclusively or predominantly in the 
Netherlands and lacking a ‘real 
connection’ with their country of 
establishment, the Act on foreign 
business corporations applies in its 
entirety (applying inter alia certain 
Dutch liability rules of board 
members, Arts. 2:9, 2:248, 2:216(3) 
CC, and requiring the drawing up of 
financial accounts and reports as 
Dutch companies, Arts. 2:360 et 
seq. CC) 
For EEA companies: parts of the Act 
on foreign business corporations 
continue to apply (directors are 
personally liable for damage caused 
to third parties due to misleading 
financial accounts, and ‘de facto’ 
directors are qualified as directors if 
they perform ‘acts of administration’, 
Arts. 2:249, 260, 261 CC) 
If a foreign company that is subject to 
corporate tax in the NL becomes 
insolvent, Dutch rules on liability of 
directors (Arts. 2:138, 149 CC227) apply, 
Art. 10:121 CC 
Poland Requirements for ‘foreign 
entrepreneurs’: certain registration 
formalities; scope of the business 
activity of a branch and the use of a 
particular business name with the 
additional words: ‘branch in Poland’ 
(Act on Freedom of Economic 
Activity). Scholars argue that the 
above approach should be applied 
only in relation to foreign companies 
from outside EU/EEA. 
- 
Portugal Foreign companies performing 
business activities in Portugal for 
more than one year must establish a 
permanent representation in 
Portugal and comply with the 
Portuguese commercial registry 
regime (Article 4(1) of the 
Companies Act). According to Article 
4(2), if it does not do so, the 
company is bound by the acts 
carried out on its behalf in Portugal 
and is jointly liable with the persons 
carrying out the acts and with the 
company’s managers or directors. 
These rules, however, do not apply 
to EEA companies that operate in 
Portugal under the freedom to 
provide services as provided for in 
Council Directive 2006/123 / EC (art. 
4(4) Companies Act as amended by 
DL n.º 49/2010, of May, 19th). 
Directors of foreign companies do not 
have to disclose whether they are 
eligible to act as directors.  
Eligibility constraints or limitations under 
Portuguese law are probably applicable 
to foreign companies that intend to 
register a branch in Portugal, based 
upon general principles of fraud against 
the law. No case law however. 
Romania If the local activities of a foreign 
company will be conducted through a 
branch, a specific registration in the 
See 4.7 for the disqualification of 
directors in the case of their non-
compliance with the typical requirements 
                                                 
227 Joint and several liability for deficiencies in the company’s assets if the directors manifestly per-
formed their duties improperly and it is likely that this conduct was an important cause of the compa-
ny’s insolvency. 




Trade Registry is required. For the 
registration in the Trade Registry, 
the authorities require an affidavit 
signed by the would-be director by 
which he/she states that he/she 
fulfils the legal conditions for 
appointment in the capacity of 
Director. 
during the registration process. 
Romania’s Capital Market Law applies to 
all companies whose shares/securities 
are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market in Romania, irrespective of their 
national law. 
Slovakia The Commercial Code fully respects 
the incorporation theory 
The court may decide that a director 
shall not hold office as a member of the 
governing body for a period of three 
years based on s. 13a of the Commercial 
Code. 
Slovenia A foreign company may carry out a 
gainful activity in Slovenia only by 
setting up a branch. There is 
disagreement regarding the proper 
interpretation of the relevant 
requirements and potential 
sanctions. The literature argues that 
financial penalties should apply, 
rather than disregarding the legal 
capacity of the foreign entity. 
It is ambivalent whether the Slovene 
Employment Relationship Act applies to 
foreign companies. According to the Act, 
Slovene law shall apply to employment 
relationships when the employer is 
established or residing in Slovenia. 
However, the Act does not specify 
whether the statutory seat or the real 
seat should be taken into account. 
Spain Art. 9(2) Capital Companies Act (see 
above): not applicable to EU 
companies.  
- 
Sweden Formally no ‘outreach statutes’. 
In order for a foreign company to 
carry out business in Sweden, 
Section 2 of the Swedish Foreign 
Branch Office Act provides that such 
activities must be conducted 
through: i) a divisional office with 
independent management ii) a 
Swedish subsidiary iii) or an agency 
with operations in Sweden. 
For certain types of business activities, 
considered important for the undisturbed 
operation of the economy, specific rules 
exist that address the activities of 
foreign companies.  
Examples include: i) credit institutions ii) 
securities companies iii) foreign insurers 
iv) central securities depositories v) 
foreign insurance brokers etc. 
Also, the managing director of a foreign 
branch office established in Sweden may 
be the subject of a prohibition on trading 
under the Swedish Trading Prohibition 
Act 2014 (Sw. lagen om näringsförbud). 
United 
Kingdom 
1) Registration as an overseas 
company and disclosures in the 
course of trading required if the 
company is incorporated outside the 
UK and opens an establishment (a 
branch or other place of business) in 
the UK, Part 34 (ss 1044-1059) CA 
2006 and Overseas Companies 
Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/1801) 
2) Name: an EEA company can 
always register its corporate name, 
unless this infringes the UK rules on 
permitted characters: a non-EEA 
company is subject to the same 
restrictions as UK companies 
(prohibition of offensive or 
misleading names) 
Disqualification of directors under UK law 
is possible even if the company is 
incorporated abroad, e.g. where 
insolvency proceedings have been 
opened in the UK (Re Seagull 
Manufacturing (No 2) [1994] Ch 91) 
 




3.2 Connecting factor 
1. In virtually all Member States, it is now relatively well established that the 
real seat theory is no longer applicable to foreign companies incorporated in 
other EU Member States, at least not without modifications. However, we find 
significant variation in how the relevant connecting factor is formulated, 
whether the conflict rules contain exceptions or subsidiary connecting factors, 
and whether the operation and reach of the rules are well established or legal 
uncertainty persists. In order to describe the existing variation, we analyse 
first the main connecting factor that the Member States employ and then 
discuss whether, and if yes, under what circumstances they allow deviations 
from this connecting factor. 
2. A number of Member States still formally retain the real seat as connecting 
factor.  
• In Austria, the codified law stipulates that the law applicable to companies 
is determined by the location of the company’s central administration, but 
the courts have acknowledged that this provision cannot be applied to EU-
incorporated companies. Instead, the applicable legal rules are exclusively 
determined by reference to the registered office as specified in the articles 
of association.228  
• Belgian and Luxembourg provide for a solution that formally adheres to 
the real seat doctrine but is in practice largely in line with the 
incorporation theory because of the use of presumptions. The real seat is 
defined as ‘the location of the principal establishment’, which in turn is 
determined by considering the location of the company’s centre of 
governance or business activities (Belgium), or the place where the most 
important decisions of the company are taken, which will generally be the 
place where the directors and shareholders meet (Luxembourg). 229 
However, both legal systems establish the presumption that the central 
administration of the company is located where the statutory seat is. This 
presumption can be rebutted if parties provide evidence that the organs of 
the company meet elsewhere.  
• In Greece, the relevant connecting factor continues to be the company’s 
real seat. The lack of compatibility of this provision with the right of 
establishment of EU-incorporated companies has been discussed in the 
literature, but there is not yet any case law having changed the 
established doctrine or interpreted it restrictively.  
• Finally, Portuguese law also contains a connecting factor based on the real 
seat theory, but this provision does not seem to be applied in practice, 
since registrars and notaries tend not to verify whether the real seat of the 
company is located at the place of the statutory seat. Furthermore, the 
Portuguese Commercial Companies Act provides that a company with its 
statutory seat in Portugal cannot invoke the law of the country where it 
has its real seat against third parties. 230  The combination of these 
provisions and practices seems to ensure that the issue of the 
compatibility of the Portuguese rules with the case law of the Court of 
                                                 
228 OGH, judgment of 29 April 2004, 6 Ob 43/04y. 
229 The Commercial Companies Act 1915, Art. 64bis, allows companies to provide in the articles of 
association that directors may participate in meetings of the board by videoconference. A meeting 
conducted by videoconference is deemed to be held at the ‘seat of the company’. 
230 Portuguese Commercial Companies Act, Art. 3(1). 




Justice has not yet arisen. Nevertheless, there is some uncertainty how 
cases should be treated that do not fall directly within the ambit of the 
Portuguese rules, for example where a company’s real seat is located in 
Portugal, but not its statutory seat.231 
3. Second, a number of Member States follow the incorporation theory in 
principle, but provide for subsidiary connecting factors that incorporate certain 
elements of the real seat theory. Often, the reach of these exceptions and 
their compatibility with the requirements of EU law are not well established.  
• A first group of exceptions provide for the alternative reliance on the 
statutory seat or the real seat if registration is not a precondition for the 
incorporation of the company or the registered seat cannot be identified 
for other reasons (Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Netherlands).  
• A second group of Member States stipulate that if the company’s place of 
central decision-making or centre of business operations is located within 
the territory of the forum, the forum’s company law will apply (Estonia,232 
Italy,233 and Spain234).  
• Finally, a third group of countries allow parties to rely on the law at the 
place of the real seat for particular purposes (Croatia, France, and 
Portugal). Pursuant to Croatian law, third parties can choose whether to 
invoke legal consequences dependant on the law at the real seat or the 
registered seat of the company.235 French law provides that the law at the 
real seat may be invoked in cases of fraud; and more generally, third 
parties are able to choose between the incorporation law and the real seat 
                                                 
231 It is argued that Art. 3(1) Portuguese Commercial Companies Act should operate in a bilateral way, 
since it aims at protecting third party expectations, Luís de Lima Pinheiro, ‘O Direito aplicável às 
Sociedades, Contributo para o Direito Internacional Privado das Pessoas Colectivas’ in Estudos de 
Direito Internacional Privado, Direito de Conflitos, Competência Internacional e Reconhecimento de 
Sentenças Estrangeiras (Almedina, 2006) 87. This premusably means that companies have to be rec-
ognised as validly incorporated entities governed by the law of the state where the statutory seat is 
located, even if the real seat is in Portugal. However, it would not prevent third parties from relying on 
the law of the real seat state if these rules are more advantageous. See Portuguese country report, p. 
4, for an overview of the discussion in the Portuguese literature. 
232 Estonian law applies to foreign-incorporated companies ‘if a legal person is actually managed in 
Estonia or the main activities of the person are carried out in Estonia’, § 14(2) PILA. 
233 Italian law applies when (i) the company has its administrative seat in Italy or (ii) the ‘principal 
object’ of the company (that is to say its main activities or main operations) is situated in Italy, Art. 
25(1), sentence 2 Italian Private International Law Act. However, this provision does not lead to the 
denial of the legal existence of foreign companies or the ‘re-qualification’ of such companies as Italian 
companies. Art. 25(1), sentence 2 only states that certain Italian rules should be applied to these for-
eign companies and should supplement the law of incorporation. It is controversial to what extent 
specific Italian rules can be applied to EU or EEA companies pursuant to this provision, MV Bendettelli, 
‘«Mercato» comunitario delle regole e riforma del diritto societario italiano’ (2003) 48 Rivista delle 
Società 710. Case law does not exist. 
234 Spanish Corporate Enterprises Act, Art. 9(2): ‘Corporate enterprises whose main business estab-
lishment or operation is within the Spanish territory shall be required to have a registered office in 
Spain.’ This provision, read together with Art. 8 (‘All corporate enterprises with registered offices in 
Spain, irrespective of the place of formation, shall be Spanish and subject to this act.’) would in prin-
ciple require all companies with their real seat in Spain to convert into Spanish companies, and other-
wise they would be treated as Spanish partnerships or civil companies. In the academic literature, it is 
suggested to interpret this provision narrowly, capturing only cases ‘intimately linked to the Spanish 
market’, i.e. pseudo foreign corporations (Spanish country report, pp. 14-15). In addition, it is argued 
that the provision is not applicable to EU companies (F Garcirmartín Alférez, Derecho Internacional 
privado (Madrid: Civitas/ Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed 2014) 361-362), but this has not yet been con-
firmed by case law. 
235 Croatian country report, Section 2. 




law. 236  The Portuguese Commercial Companies Act stipulates that 
companies with their statutory seat in Portugal cannot invoke the law of 
the real seat state against third parties. 237  It is controversial in the 
Portuguese academic literature how this provision should be interpreted. A 
minority view argues that third parties can choose between Portuguese 
law and the law of the foreign country where the centre of administration 
and control (real seat) is located.238 Others argue that Portuguese law as 
lex societatis is applicable in relation to third parties, with the exception of 
situations where such third parties are entitled to expect the application of 
the law of the real seat; for instance, if the company has its centre of 
administration in a state that follows the real seat theory and the company 
contracts with third parties who are aware of this.239  
• In most of the above-mentioned countries, there is some discussion of the 
conformity of the relevant provisions with EU law in the academic 
literature. In some cases, it has been argued that the rules should not 
apply to EU-incorporated companies, 240  but case law that could give 
guidance is generally rare or non-existent.  
4. An unusual subsidiary connecting factor not found in other Member States 
(with the exception of Slovenia) is the Croatian Private International Law Act 
of 1991 (PILA), which stipulates that if a legal entity has its real seat in a 
state other than the one in which it was established, and according to the law 
of that other state it is seen as a company established under the law of the 
real seat state, it shall be considered to be a legal person of that state.241 For 
example, if a company is registered in the UK but has its real seat in Belgium, 
the PILA would require the court to apply Belgian law. The operation and 
purpose of this provision is unclear; it is not comparable to a renvoi, since 
Croatian law would declare UK law as applicable in the example, and it is 
unclear whether the provision results in the application of Belgian substantive 
company law, with the consequence that the company is not validly 
incorporated, or also Belgian private international law rules. Case law applying 
the provision does not exist. A similar provision is contained in the Slovenian 
Private International Law and Procedure Act, which provides that ‘if the actual 
head office of a legal entity is in a country other than the country in which it 
was founded, and under the law of this other country also belongs to it, it 
shall be considered that it belongs to this other country’.242 
5. Another unusual exception has been established by the Appellate Court of 
Ljubljana. Relying on general principles of Slovenian private international 
law,243 the court held that the primary connecting factor shall exceptionally 
not be used if it is clear that the relation with the incorporation law is not the 
most important one and there is an essentially closer link to some other 
law.244 The significance of this exception is unclear, in particular whether it 
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would generally lead to the application of the law of the real seat state to 
pseudo foreign companies. 
6. In at least two countries, Belgium and Luxembourg, the continued application 
of the real seat theory seems to have the effect that companies obtain ‘dual 
nationality’ if they were established in a country following the incorporation 
theory, say the UK, and then move their real seat to Belgium or Luxembourg. 
From the perspective of the UK, the company would continue to be validly 
incorporated in the UK and governed by UK law. From the perspective of 
Belgium or Luxembourg, the company would be subject to Belgian or 
Luxembourg law. It has been argued that the company is in such a case 
governed by both legal systems and its articles of association should comply 
with the requirements of both company laws.245 However, this view goes back 
to a relatively old decision of the Belgian Supreme Court.246 Newer case law 
does not seem to exist, and it is questionable whether courts would uphold 
the ruling in light of the right of establishment jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice. While the ‘dual nationality’ solution does not lead to a denial of legal 
personality in the sense of Überseering, it is difficult to see how the 
cumulative application of legal requirements from two company law systems 
could be justified. 
7. To summarise, in the clear majority of Member States, it is now relatively well 
established that the incorporation theory shall determine the law applicable to 
companies in intra-EU cases (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK), even though some of these countries have formally 
retained the real seat theory (Austria, Germany, Portugal, Spain). In the 
remaining countries (Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, and 
Romania), the implications of the continued adherence to the real seat theory 
have not been discussed widely. Some uncertainty seems to exist whether the 
legal situation is in line with the Treaty and how the connecting factor should 
be interpreted in order to ensure that the application of domestic company 
law to companies incorporated in another EU Member State does not infringe 
the right of establishment. Where there is a discussion of the problem, 
commentators in the academic literature suggest a restrictive interpretation of 
the existing rules or certain modifications. However, it is also not always clear 
whether the suggested solutions are fully compliant with the Treaty 
requirements, 247  and the legal situation is generally unsettled due to the 
scarcity of relevant case law. 
8. In many Member States, third parties are protected if they rely in good faith 
on the capacity of the company according to the law where the transaction 
with the company is entered into or where the contracting party resides or 
where its place of business is located. Such rules are sometimes explicitly 
codified248 and sometimes derived from an analogy to the existing good faith 
provisions that exist in other European legislation, notably the Rome I 
Regulation.249 In the latter case, if the analogy mirrors the Rome I Regulation 
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247 See, for example, the discussion of opinions expressed by the Greek literature, Greek country re-
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closely, it is necessary for the person acting on behalf of the company and the 
third party to enter into the transaction in the same country.250 Commonly, 
the good faith protection covers both the capacity of the company to enter 
into the transaction (which will generally only be problematic in countries still 
adhering to some form of the ultra vires doctrine251) and the power of the 
corporate organs (authority) to bind the company. In Poland, we find an 
extended version of the above good faith rule. In determining the capacity of 
the company, third parties acting in good faith may rely on the law at the 
place where the transaction with the company is entered into or where the 
company’s enterprise (meaning a set of organized tangible and intangible 
assets designed to conduct business activity) is located.252 
3.3 Outreach statutes 
1. All Member States provide for registration and disclosure requirements if a 
foreign company operates a branch within the territory of the forum, as well 
as in some cases for additional obligations, such as authorisation or residence 
requirements. In several Member States, these requirements go beyond the 
disclosure obligations set out in Directive 89/666, so-called Eleventh Company 
Law Directive, (for example, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain). In these cases, it is generally (but not 
always253) well established that the additional obligations shall only apply to 
non-EU/EEA incorporated companies. For example, the Netherlands continue 
to impose additional disclosure obligations and certain rules concerning the 
liability of directors on so-called pseudo-foreign companies, defined as 
companies that have most or all of their business operations in the 
Netherlands and lack a ‘real connection’ with the country of incorporation. 
This law, the Act on Foreign Law Business Corporations, was challenged 
before the Court of Justice in Inspire Art and has since been amended to limit 
the scope of application of several parts of the act to non-EU/EEA 
companies.254 A similar law can be found in Poland.255 
2. Another outreach mechanism in the narrow sense that can be found in some 
Member States is the extension of liability provisions of the forum to branch 
managers of foreign companies. For example, according to Belgian law, 
negligence in the administration of the branch can lead to liability of those 
who are responsible for the management of the branch under Belgian 
company law. 256  Other countries extending responsibilities under domestic 
                                                                                                                                            
with the company could rely on the domestic law in claiming that the corporate organ acted with au-
thority. 
250 See the text of Art. 13 Rome I Regulation, stipulating that incapacity cannot be invoked in dealings 
with a third party acting in good faith if the contract is ‘concluded between persons who are in the 
same country’. 
251 Directive 2009/101/EC (formerly the First Company Law Directive), Art. 10(1), does not require 
the Member States to abolish the ultra vires doctrine, but it restricts the doctrine to bad faith; acts are 
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252 Polish Act on Private International Law, Art. 18. For a discussion see the Polish country report, Sec-
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company law to branch managers include Cyprus, Denmark, Lithuania and the 
Netherlands.257 
3. As far as outreach statutes in the wider sense are concerned, a commonly 
observed example is the directors’ disqualification regime. For example, the 
UK rules on directors’ disqualification258 apply to the directors of ‘any company 
which may be wound up under […] the Insolvency Act’.259 Because of the wide 
interpretation of the English courts’ jurisdiction to wind up a foreign company, 
which essentially only requires a ‘sufficient connection’ with the UK,260 the 
connecting factor is considerably broader than that of private international 
company law, and the law consequently also captures non-UK companies, 
including those from other EU Member States. 261  Several Member States 
contain comparable rules that have been interpreted to have some 
extraterritorial effect (e.g., Belgium, Germany, and Ireland).262 
4. From a conflicts-of-law point of view, this result is consistent. Directors’ 
disqualification is a mechanism of administrative law. Its international reach is 
not determined pursuant to private international company law rules, but the 
principle of territoriality. 263  The safeguarding of public interests lies at its 
heart, rather than the legitimate expectations of parties to a private 
transaction.264 Nevertheless, the question arises whether the application of 
such laws to foreign-incorporated companies is compatible with the right of 
establishment. Some German courts have addressed this question.265 They 
argue that it constitutes abuse if a German national who is prohibited from 
serving as director of limited companies under national law forms an English 
company and is validly appointed as director pursuant to English law. 
Consequently, in such a situation the director is not entitled to invoke the 
Treaty freedoms. Even if the situation was considered to fall within the scope 
of the Treaty, German courts consider the application of the German rules on 
the eligibility of company directors to foreign companies to be justified 
because of overriding reasons in the public interest, notably fairness and trust 
in commercial transactions.266 
5. It may be useful to systematise the various approaches found in the Member 
States along three dimensions: the type of laws that are declared immediately 
applicable (paragraph 6), the required connecting factor (paragraph 6), and 
the conceptualisation of the host state’s intervening measure (paragraph 6). 
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6. The most likely issues that have been identified as having immediate 
applicability in spite of a foreign lex societatis are the following (roughly in 
order from the more specific to the more general): 
• Rules regarding corporate names267 
• Disqualification of directors and eligibility requirements for being a 
company director268 
• Disclosure obligations imposed on branches of foreign companies that 
go beyond the Eleventh Company Law Directive269 
• Liability of branch managers pursuant to the directors’ duties of the 
host state270 
• Liability of directors of foreign companies pursuant to the directors’ 
duties of the host state, irrespective of their function as manager of a 
branch in the host state271 
• General application of the company law of the host state272 
7. The required intensity of connection with the host state’s territory is 
characterised by a similarly large variation across Member States. We can 
distinguish between the following connecting factors (roughly in order from 
the more tenuous to the less tenuous connection): 
• Assets in the host state273 
• Business activity of some significance/subject to corporate tax in the 
host state274 
• Branch in the host state275 
• Real seat in the host state276 
8. Finally, while some uncertainty exists as to how the application of the host 
state’s law can be conceptualised, the following rationales can be identified in 
the Member States: 
• Use of the host state’s (negative) ordre public277 
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• Use of overriding mandatory provisions (‘laws of immediate application’, 
‘lois d’application immédiate’, ‘lois de police’ or ‘Eingriffsnormen’),278 
which are held not to constitute a restriction of the Treaty279 or to be 
justified under the Gebhard-conditions280 
• Classification of the question not as company law, but as another legal 
area for purposes of private international law281 
• Deviation from the general connecting factor (incorporation theory) in 
favour of the real seat282 
4. Scope of the lex societatis 
The discussion in Section 3 above has shown that in spite of a move towards the 
incorporation theory in the EU, largely precipitated by the right of establishment 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, considerable differences remain between 
Member States as regards the formulation of the relevant connecting factor(s) 
and possible interventions by the lex fori in a foreign lex societatis by means of 
outreach statutes. An additional source of potential legal uncertainty stems from 
the fact that even where it is possible to determine the connecting factor in an 
unambiguous way, the boundaries of the lex societatis may not be well defined. 
This question is known as the problem of classification or characterisation in 
private international law. 283  Regulatory strategies and the underlying conflicts 
that they address need to be classified for purposes of private international law in 
order to identify the law that is applicable to the conflict. In our area, the 
question turns primarily on which issues are to be classified as ‘company law’ – a 
term currently not autonomously interpreted in the EU and, hence, not 
necessarily understood in the same way in all Member States (this would, of 
course, change with the adoption of a harmonising measure in this area)284 – and 
which issues fall within the scope of ‘neighbouring’ legal areas, notably insolvency 
law, tort law, contract law, and securities regulation, including takeover law.  
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According to well-established private international law doctrine, classification does 
not necessarily follow the categories of a country’s internal law, but develops 
along functional lines. While rules of private international law often use 
terminology stemming from the substantive (domestic) law, and the internal legal 
categories may therefore be a useful starting point, the interpretation of both 
types of law does not necessarily run in parallel. 285  This gives rise to two 
problems with potentially detrimental effects on corporate mobility. First, Member 
States may classify regulatory strategies that are functionally substitutable 
differently because the strategies draw on different legal concepts in the two 
states. If the relevant connecting factors are not identical (and do not happen to 
lead to the application of the same legal system in the case at issue), the lack of 
a uniform classification has the consequence that market actors may be subject 
to overlapping regulatory requirements or the applicable legal regime exhibits 
gaps. Two areas that are functionally particularly closely intertwined and yet 
generally do not use the same connecting factors are company law and 
insolvency law. For most purposes, intra-EU situations will be governed by the 
incorporation state’s company law and by the insolvency law of the state where 
the company’s centre of main interest is located. At the same time, it is plausible 
to assume that some Member States focus predominantly on legal strategies 
commonly classified as insolvency law, and others on strategies to be classified as 
company law in order to protect creditors.286 Thus, the combination of diverging 
connecting factors and diverging strategies of substantive law to address the 
same underlying problem will lead to overregulation if the company’s registered 
office is located in the state that focuses on company law mechanisms and the 
COMI in the state focussing on insolvency law mechanisms, and to regulatory 
gaps in the reverse case.287 
Second, even if conflict rules are harmonised and connecting factors aligned, 
Member States may disagree about the interpretation of the connecting factors 
and, consequently, attribute a different international scope of application to the 
respective legal areas. For example, pursuant to the Insolvency Regulation as 
interpreted by the Court of Justice, insolvency law also governs ‘actions which 
derive directly from [insolvency] proceedings and which are closely connected to 
them.’ 288 The understanding of what qualifies as a closely connected action is 
important in determining the reach of the Insolvency Regulation and, thus, 
indirectly also the scope of the lex societatis. If Member States disagree about 
the interpretation, functionally comparable legal mechanisms may again be 
classified differently for purposes of private international law, at least until the 
Court of Justice has settled all controversial questions. 
In this section, we will analyse these issues as follows. We first give an overview 
of the scope of the lex societatis as defined by the private international law 
statutes or case law in the Member States (section 4.1) and then examine in 
more detail to what extent questions of formation (section 4.2) and corporate 
governance (section 4.3) are covered by the lex societatis. Several boundary 
questions exist where the classification as company law is not self-evident and 
Member States may rationally pursue different approaches, for example the 
consequences of the promoters acting on behalf of the company before 
registration is completed or the position of directors who exceed their authority. 
Sections 4.5 and 4.6 are concerned with the most important adjacent legal areas: 
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insolvency law and rules governing non-contractual (or quasi-contractual) 
obligations. 
Finally, it could be argued that the right of establishment case law of the Court of 
Justice, by giving companies broad discretion as to the law under which they 
decide to incorporate, has created incentives for Member States to define the lex 
societatis more narrowly. This is due to the fact that conflict rules governing 
different areas of law relevant to companies are subject to varying connecting 
factors, not all of which can be chosen with as little cost as the lex societatis. Any 
connecting factor that is based on a broad assessment of economic facts, for 
example the centre of main interest under the Insolvency Regulation, is 
comparatively difficult to manipulate (although manipulation is, of course, not 
impossible), while being conceptually closer to the real seat theory than the 
incorporation theory. Thus, Member States that were forced to alter their 
traditional approaches to determining the lex societatis in light of the Court’s 
jurisprudence might feel inclined to reformulate or recodify regulatory strategies 
so as to bring them within the ambit of a connecting factor that reflects their 
initial policy choices better than the incorporation doctrine. We term this strategy 
‘re-classification’ of substantive company law and explore in section 4.7 whether 
such re-classification has taken place in the Member States in reaction to the 
Court’s decisions in Centros and Überseering. 
4.1 General approach 
Given that EU law has harmonised company law only in a fragmentary way, it is 
not surprising that there is no common understanding of the reach of the lex 
societatis at the European level. Several harmonising EU law measures use the 
registered office as the connecting factor and thus effectively bring the relevant 
measure within the scope of the lex societatis, 289  but vast areas of what is 
traditionally referred to as company law remain regulated exclusively by the 
Member States. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the lex societatis will 
commonly comprise at least (1) issues regarding the company’s formation; (2) 
internal management matters, especially the relationship between the 
shareholders, management, and the company; and (3) voluntary dissolution. 
Table 4.1.1 describes the scope of the lex societatis in the Member States in 
general terms and assesses whether the lex societatis also governs issues going 
beyond the relationship between the shareholders, management, and the 
company. Two important questions in this context, the involvement of other 
stakeholders in the governance of the company, notably employees, and the 
protection of creditors, will be addressed in more detail in other sections.290 Here, 
we give an overview of the topics covered by the lex societatis and highlight 
problematic boundary issues. 
Two questions that give rise to classification problems deserve particular 
attention. First, while it is uncontroversial that the duties owed by directors and 
shareholders (if any) to the company or other shareholders are part of company 
law, both as far as their internal legal characterisation and their classification for 
purposes of private international law is concerned, the enforcement of breaches 
of these duties or actions for annulment of resolutions of the general meeting 
involve matters of procedural and possibly administrative law. 291  Thus, the 
distinction between the lex societatis and the lex fori is likely to be an issue when 
rules on burden of proof, reimbursement and costs, power of attorney, and others 
are discussed. 
                                                 
289 See, e.g., Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids, Arts 4(2), 5(3), 12(2). 
290 See Section 4.3, Table 4.3, column (5), and Section 4.4. 
291 See, for example, the classification of the Dutch inquiry procedure, text to note 297 below. 




Second, some legal systems provide for a separate body of rules on groups of 
companies (such as the German Konzernrecht), whereas others determine on a 
case-by-case basis whether particular legal concepts apply to the group context 
and how they should be modified in order to take account of the interests and 
incentives at play in corporate groups (for example, concepts of piercing the 
corporate veil to establish responsibility of the parent for the debts of a thinly 
capitalised subsidiary). Where the constituent companies of a corporate group are 
incorporated under different jurisdictions, legal systems have essentially three 
possibilities: They may apply their group law (or functionally equivalent legal 
mechanisms) to groups if the parent is subject to their law, or if the operating 
companies are sufficiently closely connected with their territory, or they pursue 
an intermediate solution that treats the group companies as separate entities and 
assesses for each relevant legal mechanism independently whether and to which 
members of the group the mechanism applies. These questions are addressed in 
Table 4.1.2. 
 
4.1.1 Overview of national laws 
Table 4.1.1. Scope of the lex societatis 
Country General description of the scope Issues going beyond the relationship 
between the shareholders, 
management, and the company 
governed by the lex societatis 
Austria No explicit legal rule; prevailing 
view in the literature suggests 
that formation, legal capacity, 
capital requirements and 
maintenance rules, internal 
governance structure, and the 
rights, duties, and liability of 
members and directors are all 
part of the lex societatis. 
Applicability of labour law 
principles to contracts with board 
members also governed by the lex 
societatis, but substantive labour 
law governed by the jurisdiction in 
which tasks are carried out. 
- According to some commentators, a 
bona fide third party contracting with 
the company may rely on Austrian law 
regarding the scope of the authority of 
directors where the lex societatis is 
more restrictive than Austrian law for 
comparable business associations. 
- Claims of third parties against board 
members arising from a violation of 
disclosure rules are governed by the lex 
societatis. 
Belgium The lex societatis governs: (i) the 
existence and legal nature of the 
legal entity; (ii) the firm or the 
company name; (iii) the 
establishment, the dissolution and 
the liquidation; (iv) the legal 
capacity of the legal person; (v) 
the composition, powers and 
functioning of its organs; (vi) the 
internal relationship among 
partners or members, as well as 
the relationships between the 
corporation and its shareholders 
or members; (vii) the acquisition 
and loss of the status of 
shareholder or member; (viii) the 
rights and obligations attached to 
the profit-sharing certificates or 
Certain relationships between the 
company and third parties are governed 
by the lex societatis, see the column left 




shares and the exercise thereof, 
(ix) the liability for breach of the 
company law or the statutes; and 
(x) the extent to which the 
corporation is liable towards third 
parties for payment of debts 
incurred by the company’s organs, 
Art. 111 PIL Code 
Bulgaria The PILC (article 58) provides for 
a non-exhaustive list of topics that 
are governed by the lex 
societatis: a) the establishment, 
the legal nature, and the form of 
legal organisation; b) the name or 
the corporate designation; c) the 
legal personality and the system 
of management; d) the 
composition, competence and 
functioning of the bodies; e) the 
representation; f) the acquisition 
and loss of membership, as well 
as the rights and duties thereto 
incidental; g) the liability for 
obligations; h) the consequences 
of violations of the law or of the 
basic instrument; i) the 
transformation and dissolution. 
Creditor protection measures and 
procedures: 
Rules on capital formation (such as 
minimum capital requirements or rules 
on pay-out of dividends and interest) 
and the protection of creditors in specific 
corporate operations (such as capital 
reductions, mergers or demergers). 
Bulgarian company law provides for 
special rules on corporate bonds and on 
bondholders’ powers (articles 205-214 
CA). The bondholders’ meeting is a 
corporate body and Bulgarian rules 
governing this body and its powers fall 
within the lex societatis, at least with 
regard to Bulgarian companies, 
regardless of the bondholders’ 
nationality. Lex societatis determines 
the rights of bondholders and their 
relation to the rights of the members. 
Croatia According to academic 
commentary, the scope of the 
applicable law includes: (a) 
formation of the company, (b) 
capacity of the legal entity, (c) 
rights and duties of the organs of 
the company, (d) organisation 
and internal relationships within 
the company and (e) dissolution 
of the company, including the 
effects of its liquidation. 
Croatian company law also provides that 
a shareholder of the company is 
personally liable for the company’s debts 
if he reduces assets of the company, to 
his own benefit or the benefit of another 
person, although he knew or had to 
know that the company is in no position 
to settle its debts (piercing the 
corporate veil doctrine, which is 
considered to be part of company law 
for purposes of determining the 
applicable law) 
Cyprus Though there is not a list of topics 
covered by the lex societatis, the 
scope is very broad; case law 
refers to a company’s ‘formation, 
status (as a legally-recognised 
entity), its operation and a broad 
range of actions and activities’ as 
being governed by the lex 
societatis. 
The Supreme Court of Cyprus also 
refers to English textbooks 
referring to lex societatis as 
covering the capacity of 
companies to sue and be sued, 
dissolution and liquidation. 
It follows from case law (National Bank 
of Greece v. Metlis, Adams v. National 
Bank of Greece S.A) that apart from 
issues regarding formation, internal 
management and voluntary dissolution, 
lex societatis potentially covers all issues 
regulated by Cap.113, since all such 
issues naturally ‘concern companies’. 
Thus, mergers, the registration of 
charges and mortgages over immovable 
property and liquidation by creditors or 
the court may also be covered. 
Also, the Cyprus Supreme Court ruled 
that the concept of the derivative action 
falls within the ambit of substantive 
company law and hence a power of 
attorney is not needed (as required 
under civil procedure rules). 
Czech 
Republic 
Scope of the lex societatis under 
s. 30(1) PIL Act: (i) Legal 
personality and legal capacity of 
- 




an entity other than a natural 
person; (ii) a trading name or a 
name; (iii) internal relations of 
such an entity; (iv) the relations 
between such an entity and its 
partners or members; (v) mutual 
relations of its partners or 
members; (vi) a responsibility of 
its partners or members for 
liabilities of such an entity; (vii) a 
person responsible for acting on 
behalf of such an entity; (viii) 
winding up. 
Denmark - Not clearly defined by statute or 
case law 
- Literature: all areas of the 
companies act, including 
questions regarding the formation 
of the company, legal capacity, 
capital requirements and 
maintenance rules, internal 
governance structure, and the 
rights, duties, liability of members 
and directors and voluntary 
dissolution.  
Employee representation is regulated by 
the Danish Companies Act and is thus 
likely to fall within the scope of the lex 
societatis. 
Estonia § 15 PILA: in particular: the legal 
nature of the company; 
foundation and winding up; legal 
capacity; name or business name; 
corproate bodies; internal 
relations; liability for the debts of 
the company; legal representation 
- 
Finland Broadly the same areas that are 
covered by the CA, including rules 
on the company’s accounts 
- 
France Formation, internal management 
matters, and voluntary dissolution 
(no statutory regulation, 
addressed by case law and in the 
literature) 
Any aspect relating to the company’s 
functioning is part of the lex societatis, 
including the relationship between the 
company and third parties, i.e. the 
power of the directors to contract in the 
name of the company 
Germany No legal definition; the literature 
suggests that formation, legal 
capacity, capital requirements and 
maintenance rules, internal 
governance structure, and the 
rights, duties, and liability of 
members and directors are part of 
the lex societatis, financial 
reporting requirements, most 
likely also procedural rules on the 
annulment of decisions of the GM 
and derivative actions 
The protection of third parties that rely 
on the validity of acts of corporate 
organs follows general principles of 
conflict of laws. Thus, it has been 
argued that the party contracting with 
the company may generally rely on the 
local law in claiming that the corporate 
organ acted with authority, at least if 
the persons are located in the same 
country.292 
Greece Case law and theory specify which 
topics fall within the scope of lex 
societatis; these are at least (i) 
issues regarding the company’s 
incorporation, (ii) internal 
- 
                                                 
292 BGH NJW 1965, 487 (analogy to Art. 12 EGBGB [Introductory Act to the Civil Code]). 




management matters, and (iii) 
voluntary dissolution.  
Hungary Scope of the lex societatis 
according to ss. 18(1), 26(2) and 
64(1) Decree on private 
international law as interpreted by 
case law: (i) formation; (ii) legal 
capacity,  capacity to sue and be 
sued; (iii)  company law operation 
(internal organisation, meetings, 
duties, liabilities and powers of 
company bodies etc.); (iv) 
mergers, de-mergers, national 
conversions; (v) winding-up; (vi) 
rights and duties of shareholders; 
(vii) liability of members 
(shareholders) towards third 
parties; (viii) liability of directors 
towards the company and 
shareholders; (ix) liability of 
directors towards third parties; 
(x) rights and obligations based 
on bonds issued by the company 
to the public; (xi) rights and 
obligations based on shares issued 
by the company. 
- Liability of members (shareholders) 
towards third parties 
- Liability of directors towards third 
parties 
Ireland Formation, dissolution, and 
internal management (related to 
previous concept of domicile) 
- 
Italy Non-exhaustive list of topics that 
are governed by the lex 
societatis: a) legal nature of the 
entity; b) name of the company; 
c) formation of the company, 
liquidation and conversion into 
another type of company; d) legal 
capacity; e) powers and internal 
rules of companies’ bodies; f) 
rules on attribution; g) 
mechanisms to sell and purchase 
shares in the company, rights and 
duties of shareholders; h) liability 
for the company’s debts; i) 
violations of law or of the 
company’s constitution (Art. 25(2) 
PIL Act) 
Italian company law also governs the 
following topics: 
- Rules on capital formation (such as 
minimum capital requirements or 
concealed distributions) 
- Rules protecting creditors against 
specific risky transactions (capital 
reductions, mergers or demergers) 
- Directors’ liability towards creditors 
(Art. 2394 Civil Code) 
- Rules on corporate bonds and on 
bondholders’ powers (including approval 
of debt restructuring) 
Latvia The lex societatis applies at least 
to the legal nature, capacity of a 
company to act, internal relations, 
including those among founders, 
foundation and winding-up, 
mergers, etc. 
- 
Lithuania Art. 1.20(1) of the Civil Code: 
- legal nature of the company, i.e. 
its legal form and status; 
- foundation, reorganisation, 
liquidation; 
- the name of the company; 
- the system and competence of 
the bodies of the company; 
- the company’s civil liability; 
- 




- the power to represent the 
company; 
- the legal effects of the violation 
of laws or incorporation 
documents 
Luxembourg No codified rules, but some case 
law holding that the following 
issues are part of the lex 
societatis: 
- The functioning of the company, 
including the definition of the 
powers of its directors; 293 
- The power of a director to enter 
into a security agreement on a 
behalf of the company;294 
- The power of a director to act on 
behalf of the company in judicial 
proceedings295  
For other issues, it can be 
assumed that French case law 
would be followed 
See left 
Malta Maltese courts generally classify a 
claim in accordance with the 
private international law of 
England and Wales, i.e. covering 
formation, capacity, internal 
affairs, derivative action 
Stakeholder-regarding duties of 
directors arise in circumstances where 
insolvency appears imminent, but not 
clear whether these would be classified 
as company law for purposes of private 
international law 
Netherlands - The lex societatis governs: (i) 
consequences of the legal 
personality of the company; (ii) 
internal organisation; (iii) 
competence of the organs; (iv) 
liability of directors and officers to 
the company; (v) liability of 
founders, partners, shareholders, 
directors, and officers for acts 
binding the company; and (vi) 
dissolution, Art. 10:119 CC 
- The list is not exhaustive; it has 
been argued that it can be 
extended to the validity of a 
voting agreement, dispute 
resolution (Arts. 2:336-343 CC), 
squeeze out of shareholders, and 
rules on annual accounts (duty to 
prepare, applicable accounting 
standards, whether the accounts 
need to be audited296) 
- Inquiry procedure (Arts. 2:344-359 
CC): lex societatis; foreign companies, 
including pseudo-foreign companies, are 
not subject to the regime297 (but see 
Table 4.2 on groups) 
- Proxy voting: controversial whether all 
aspects, including the relationship 
between the shareholder and the proxy 
holder, are part of the lex societatis, or 
the latter is contractual (hence, Rome I 
applies) 
- Enforcement of contractual or tortious 
claims of the company: Rome I/II 
apply298 
- Unclear which conflict rules apply if 
misrepresentations in the annual 
accounts and reports cause damage to 
third parties 
Poland List of items governed by the lex 
societatis: (a) formation, merger, 
division, transformation or 
dissolution of the company; (b) 
It is unclear whether shareholder 
agreements are governed by the lex 
societatis or the lex contractus. 
                                                 
293 Court of appeal of Luxembourg, 22 November 1995, case no 16944; Court of appeal of Luxem-
bourg, 26 May 2004, case no 27478. 
294 Court of appeal of Luxembourg, 22 November 1995, case no 16944. 
295 Court of appeal of Luxembourg, 26 May 2004, case no 27478. 
296 Rb Rotterdam 21 May 2008, JOR 2008/285 (Plaid Enterprises Inc.). 
297 Hoge Raad 26 June 2010, NJ 2010, 370, JOR 2010/226 (note G. Van Solinge), LJN BM0710 (e-
Traction). 
298 See Poot vs. ABP, Hoge Raad 2 December 1994, NJ 1995/288 (holding that shareholders of Poot 
could not bring a derivative action to enforce a claim of Poot against ABP). 




business name; (c) legal capacity; 
(d) competence and rules of 
functioning of corporate organs as 
well as appointment and dismissal 
of their members; (e) rules of 
representation; (f) acquisition and 
loss of the status as shareholder 
as well the rights and obligations 
connected therewith; (h) 
shareholder’s liability for the 
company’s obligations (veil 
piercing); (i) consequences of the 
breach by a person representing 
the company of the law or the 
articles 
Portugal - Non-exhaustive list of items 
governed by the lex societatis: 
capacity of the legal person; the 
creation, functioning and 
competence of its bodies; the 
manners in which the position of 
member is gained and lost; 
liability of the company, its organs 
and officeholders towards third 
parties; transformation and 
dissolution (Art. 33(2) Civil Code) 
- Representation of a company by 
their statutory bodies is also 
governed by the lex societatis 
(Art. 38 Civil Code) 
- 
Romania Lex societatis governs a non-
exhaustive set of matters relating 
to the creation, functioning and 
dissolution/winding-up of a 
company. More specifically, it 
includes a) the capacity; b) the 
acquisition and loss of the position 
of shareholder; c) the rights and 
duties deriving from the 
shareholder status; d) the 
designation, powers and 
functioning of the management of 
the company; e) representation of 
the company through her organs; 
f) the liability of the legal person 
and of her organs toward third 
parties; g) the modification of 
constitutive acts; h) the 
dissolution and winding up of the 
legal person 
- 
Slovakia Formation, pre-corporation, 
internal structure, voluntary 
dissolution based on s. 56 of the 
Commercial Code and following 
- 
Slovenia The lex societatis governs: i) the 
formation of the company ii) 
internal management matters and 
iii) voluntary dissolution. 
- 
Spain - Lex societatis applies to (not 
exhaustive): the legal capacity, 
incorporation, representation, 
- 





dissolution and closure of the 
company (Art. 9(11) Civil Code); 
- Other issues: formation, internal 
management, external 
relationships 
Sweden Lex societatis governs the 
formation of the company, 
formation of the company, the 
articles of association, shares, 
share register, share certificates, 
the shareholders’ meeting, the 
company’s management (board of 
directors, managing director, 
etc.), audit, general and special 
examination, share capital 
increases including issuances of 
new shares and other equity-
securities, profit dividends and 
other value transfers, capital 
reductions, financial assistance, 
mergers and demergers, 
voluntary and involuntary 
liquidation/dissolution, the 
company’s name, and board 




Existence or dissolution of a 
corporation, its capacity to enter 
into transactions, and all matters 
concerning its constitution, Dicey, 
Rules 174 and 175 (e.g. 
incorporation, dissolution, 
amalgamation, division, 
appointment of directors, 
directors’ duties, piercing the 
corporate veil, derivative actions 
brought by shareholders, power of 
a company to create a floating 
charge or to borrow money for 
speculative purposes 
(Haugesund), authority of the 
company’s general agent) 
If a foreign lex societatis gives rights to 
employees to participate in the 
corporate structure, for example by way 
of representation on corporate organs, 
these rights will be recognised in the UK 
 




Applicability of provisions 
addressing ‘group issues’ 
to foreign-incorporated 
parent? 
Applicability of provisions 
addressing ‘group issues’ 
to foreign-incorporated 
subsidiary? 
Austria Yes Generally governed by 
parent’s lex societatis, but 
veil piercing applies on the 
basis of the subsidiary’s lex 
societatis 
See left 
Belgium No Belgium ignores groups of 
companies, unless it can be 
proven, on the basis of the 
factual circumstances, that 
the principal establishment of 
See left 




a foreign (resp. Belgian) 
subsidiary coincides with the 
principal establishment of its 
Belgian (resp. foreign) parent 
company299 


















The consolidated annual 
financial statement as per the 
accounting and auditing 
regulations creates a clear 
picture of the property and 
financial status and of the 
state of the income of the 
group of companies as a 
whole. 
Article 118a LPOS stipulates: 
‘Any person, who or which 
controls a public company, as 
well as any other person, who 
or which, by means of the 
influence thereof on a public 
company has procured any 
members of the management 
bodies or supervisory bodies 
of the said company or a 
managerial agent of the said 
company to act or to refrain 
from acting against the 
interest of the company, shall 
incur solidary (joint and 
several) liability for the 
detriment inflicted on the 
company’. This person could 
also be a legal person. 
Bulgarian law does not 
recognise the concept of 
piercing the corporate veil 
Croatia Yes Group law applies to a foreign 
holding company which owns 
a subsidiary incorporated in 
Croatia (because the goal of 
the law is to protect minority 
shareholders and creditors of 
subsidiaries) 
Group law does not apply to 
a Croatian holding company 
which owns a subsidiary 
incorporated under foreign 
law 








Article 148, Cap.113 provides 
for the filing of consolidated 
financial statements for the 
group, for the reports 
attached to the financial 
statements by the directors in 
relation to the status and 
affairs of the group, the 
power of the Council of 
Ministers to issue regulations 
on group accounts etc. 
There is case law 
emphasising that members 
of a group of companies 
remain independent legal 
persons with separate rights 
and liabilities. Hence, 




No General private international 
law principles apply 
General private international 





Generally not (the definition 
of parent company in s. 5(20) 
CA is interpreted as referring 
only to Danish parents) 
Some rules on subsidiaries 
include foreign subsidiaries 
Estonia No General rules of conflict of General rules of conflict of 
                                                 
299 On this analysis, see n 212. 




laws apply laws apply 
Finland No No information No information 
France No No information No information 
Germany Yes Mechanisms that concern 
exclusively the position of the 
parent, for example whether 
the general meeting of the 
parent is required to approve 
an enterprise agreement, are 
governed by the parent’s 
incorporation law. 
For mechanisms that protect 
the interests of the 
subsidiary, the registered 
office of the subsidiary, not 
the holding company, is the 
relevant connecting factor300 
Greece No he applicable law is based on 
lex societatis of each 
company 
The applicable law is based 
on lex societatis of each 
company. However, there 
are some exceptions: eg, 
Art 17 para. 2 of Law 
2190/1920 on the 
acquisition of shares of 
parent company by a 
foreign-incorporated 
subsidiary contains a special 
private international rule: in 
this case, the substantive 













If the group is considered as 
a single legal person, then the 
lex societatis of the group 
applies (‘recognised groups’ 
as defined in the left column 
are not a separate legal 
person), otherwise the 
relationship among the 
members of the group is 
classified as contractual; on 
the other hand, the 
relationship between the 
holding company and the 
subsidiaries of the group falls 
within the lex societatis 
See left 
Ireland No General rules of conflict of 
laws apply 
General rules of conflict of 
laws apply 
Italy Yes It is still debated which 
choice-of-law rule applies to 
liability actions against 
holding companies; uncertain 
whether these rules also 
apply to foreign holding 
companies if the subsidiary is 
an Italian company. No case 
law is reported. 
See left 
Latvia Yes, based 
on German 
model 
Group law does not address 
the issue of applicable law  
See left 
Lithuania No General rules of conflict of 
laws apply  
General rules of conflict of 
laws apply 
Luxembourg No (but General rules of conflict of General rules of conflict of 
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laws apply laws apply 







No case law No 
Netherlands No - Generally no; all group 
companies are treated as 
separated entities 
- Structure regime: Dutch 
company is partially 
exempted if the majority of 
the parent’s employees work 
outside the NL, Art. 2:155 CC 
- Inquiry procedure: whether 
the procedure can be started 
in a Dutch subsidiary of a 
foreign parent company 
depends on the facts and 
circumstances of the case301 
- Generally no 
- Structure regime: Dutch 
parent is exempted if it 
restricts itself to the 
management of dependent 
enterprises and the majority 
of employees of the group 
work outside the NL, Art. 
2:153(b), (c) CC 
- Inquiry procedure: an 
inquiry of a Dutch parent 
can include the assessment 
of the policy of the 
subsidiaries, including 
foreign subsidiaries, if 
considered useful by the 
inquirer302 










These provisions only apply to 
‘affiliated companies’ 
governed by Portuguese law 
(according to general PIL 
criterions) and having their 
seat in Portugal (this is 
however a substantive rule 
limiting the application of 
certain provisions) (art. 
481(2) Companies Act). 
See left 
Romania No Article 2580 (2) NCC imposes 
the application of the law of 
the parent company, 
encompassing issues 
regarding the creation and 
dissolution of the branch or 
the operation of the branch 
(including the powers of 
representation and the 
responsibility of the mother 
company for the acts of the 
branch). 
 
Article 2580 NCC applies the 
law of the state where the 
subsidiary’s headquarters 
are located regardless of the 
law applicable to the parent. 
The law of the state where 
the subsidiary is located 
typically covers general 
issues concerning the 
establishment, operation 
and dissolution of the 
subsidiary, but also the 
specific issue of the 
                                                 
301 Hoge Raad 11 April 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:905 (Slotervaartziekenhuis). Compare also Hoge Raad 
29 March 2013, JOR 2013/166 (Chinese Workers) (allowing the inquiry procedure in the case of the 
shareholder of a Hong Kong parent controlling a Dutch operating company) and Hoge Raad 8 April 
2011, NJ 2011, 338, JOR 2011/178 (TESN) (denying the right in the case of a primary beneficiary of a 
trust in the parent company controlling a Dutch private company). 
302 Hoge Raad 13 May 2005, NJ 2005, 298, JOR 2005/147 (note J. Jitta), LJN AT2829. 




relationship between the 
parent company and other 
(minority) shareholders of 
the subsidiary. 
Slovakia No Each company in a corporate 
group treated as a separate 
entity governed by its lex 
societatis. The only exception 
is the regulation of the 
subordinated claims in the 
insolvency proceedings s. 95 
of the Act on Bankruptcy. 
Each company in a 
corporate group treated as a 
separate entity governed by 
its lex societatis. The only 
exception is the regulation 
of the subordinated claims 
in the insolvency 
proceedings s. 95 of the Act 
on Bankruptcy. 
Slovenia Yes No, the Slovene courts 
address liability of the 
controlling company as part 
of company law and 
consequently use the seat of 
the company as the 
connecting factor, as 
governed by Article 17 
ZMZPP. Likewise, piercing of 
the corporate veil is governed 
by the lex societatis pursuant 
to Art. 17 ZMZPP 
See left 
Spain No Unclear, some authors argue 
that each company of the 
group is governed by its lex 
societatis, while other are of 
the opinion that the law 
applicable to the dependant 
company should be decisive 
and that this law should also 
govern the liability of the 
parent for the debts of the 
subsidiary 
See left 
Sweden No  There might be some scope 
for liability on the part of 
directors of a foreign parent 
company of a Swedish 
undercapitalised subsidiary 
pursuant to principles 
developed in case law 
regarding the piercing of the 
corporate veil in certain 





No Where piercing the veil 
applies, a foreign parent of a 
UK subsidiary can be held 





1. Member States agree on a core area of company law issues that are considered 
to fall within the scope of the lex societatis. This core area comprises typically the 
formation and dissolution of the company, the corporate name, legal capacity, 




capital structure, rights and obligations of members, and internal management 
matters. The latter include the composition and competences of the corporate 
organs, duties of the directors, potential liability of the members for the debts of 
the company, rules on distributions, and conditions for bringing a derivative 
action.303 The list shows that, while the focus of the lex societatis is on internal 
affairs of the company, it is not possible to draw a clear dividing line between 
internal and external matters.304 The position of the company’s creditors is a 
function of several concepts that are governed by the lex societatis, as 
traditionally understood, notably capital requirements of the incorporation law, 
restrictions on distributions to the shareholders, and strategies to pierce the 
corporate veil, as well as legal mechanisms that fall within the domain of contract 
law in the case of voluntary creditors, tort law in the case of involuntary creditors 
(see section 4.5), and insolvency law (see section 4.4). 
2. We do not identify any substantial differences in how the scope of the lex 
societatis is defined between incorporation theory states and real seat states (or 
states that have only recently, under the impression of the case law of the Court 
of Justice, begun to move towards relying on the registered seat as the main 
connecting factor). At the margin, some Member States seem to advocate a 
broader definition of the scope of the lex societatis than others (with Cyprus, 
Denmark, and Finland, for example, at one end of the spectrum, given that the 
lex societatis is held to cover potentially all issues regulated in these countries’ 
substantive company laws,305 and countries that provide for an enumeration of 
specifically defined issues in their private international laws, such as the Czech 
Republic or Estonia, at the other end). However, since case law addressing 
boundary issues is relatively rare, it is difficult to assess whether these 
differences in formulation and regulatory technique are of practical significance. It 
should also be noted that many boundary questions are determined by legal 
terms that are contained in European legislation, notably the Insolvency 
Regulation and the Rome I and II Regulations, and that these terms accordingly 
have to be interpreted autonomously. 
3. The following paragraphs give an overview of a number of boundary issues that 
are either not explicitly mentioned as falling within the scope of the lex societatis 
in the Member States, or where we have identified a certain degree of legal 
uncertainty as regards their classification for purposes of private international law: 
matters regarding the enforcement of breaches of company law, corporate group 
law, financial reporting requirements, and the liability of directors and members 
of the company directly to third parties. We will deal with them in turn. 
4. The enforcement of breaches of company law, either by the company itself or by 
(minority) shareholders who act on behalf of the company to enforce breaches of 
duties owed to the company (derivative actions) or who challenge actions taken 
by other corporate organs, notably the general meeting, is a matter of procedural 
law. Nevertheless, in those Member States where the issue has been addressed 
(notably, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Malta and the United Kingdom), 
courts and commentators usually agree that questions of enforcement, insofar as 
they do not concern general issues of procedure, but the standing of those who 
seek to enforce claims or allocate the litigation risk between the company and the 
                                                 
303 See also the exception in Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6, art 1(2)(f). 
304 The distinction between internal and external matters has been a concern of private international 
company law for a long time. For a summary of the different approaches see S Rammeloo, Corpora-
tions in Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 2001), 20-23. 
305 Cyprus country report, Section 4.1; Danish country report, Section 4.1; Finnish country report, 
Section 4.1. 




shareholder, have a bearing on the position of the shareholder and affect the 
value of the shareholding at least indirectly.306 For this reason, it is argued in the 
above Member States that these questions fall within the ambit of substantive 
company law and are governed, consequently, by the lex societatis. 
5. In most Member States, clear conflict of laws rules concerning corporate groups 
do not exist. This is the case, unsurprisingly, in states that do not have a codified 
group law, but it also holds for states that have adopted such a law (Austria, 
Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Portugal and Slovenia). However, there 
is relatively widespread agreement that group companies are, in principle, to be 
treated as separated legal persons in private international law, which, accordingly, 
are governed by their own lex societatis. In addition, legal mechanisms designed 
to protect minority shareholders and creditors of the controlled undertaking (i.e. 
typically the subsidiary) tend to be governed by the lex societatis of the 
subsidiary. 
6. According to the clear majority of Member States, the lex societatis also governs 
financial reporting requirements. In some Member States, it has been suggested 
that this already follows from the fact that the EU accounting directives have 
largely harmonised the relevant rules and the imposition of further requirements 
by the host Member State would therefore go beyond what is necessary to 
protect creditors and other interested parties.307 However, some authors argue 
that those parts of accounting law that are not harmonised, for example in 
Germany the principles of proper accounting pursuant to the Commercial Code,308 
are to be classified as public law, given that they protect public interests.309 If this 
view were accepted, the consequence would be that certain branch 
establishments of foreign, including EU-incorporated, companies in Germany were 
bound by German accounting principles, which raises concerns with regard to 
Directive 89/666 (so-called Eleventh Company Law Directive).310 
7. Finally, the classification of legal mechanisms designed to hold directors and 
members of the company liable for the company’s debts is controversial in the 
Member States. The liability of the directors straddles questions of company law, 
insolvency law and tort law. It raises complex questions of regulatory design and 
classification that will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.2 below. The 
liability of members for the debts of the company (piercing the corporate veil) is 
classified as company law in the majority of Member States ((Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Croatia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania and the UK). 
However, there is a certain degree of legal uncertainty, and in some Member 
States (Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Spain) it is suggested that a 
classification as tort law is in some circumstances more appropriate. This question 
will also be discussed in more detail below (Section 4.5.2). 
                                                 
306 This has been addressed most directly in the English cases Konamaneni v Rolls Royce Industrial 
Power (India) Ltd [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1269, 1284; Base Metal Trading Ltd v Shamurin [2005] 1 W.L.R. 
1157, 1175. 
307 For example, H Eidenmüller, Ausländische Kapitalgesellschaften im deutschen Recht (Munich: Beck 
2004), § 5, paras 110-111. 
308 HGB, s. 238 (Grundsätze ordnungsmäßiger Buchführung). 
309 For example, H Merkt in A Baumbach and KJ Hopt (eds), Handelsgesetzbuch (Munich: Beck, 36th 
edn 2014), § 238, para 9. 
310 One argument is that for companies with their real seat in Germany ‘the law of the Member State 
by which the company is governed’ within the meaning of art 3 Directive 89/666/EEC, ie the Member 
State according to whose laws the accounting documents have to be drawn up, is Germany, see P 
Kindler, in Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (Munich: CH Beck, 6th edn, 2015), ‘Internationales Han-
dels- und Gesellschaftsrecht’, paras 273-279 (arguing that the question of the applicable law has been 
left open by the accounting directives and the right of establishment case law). For further references 
see also H Altmeppen and A Ego, in Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (Munich: CH Beck, 3rd 
edn, 2012), ‘Europäische Niederlassungsfreiheit’, paras 490-491. 




4.2 Incorporation and formalities in particular 
It is uncontroversial that the process of incorporation of companies as such, 
notably the filing and disclosure requirements as well as minimum requirements 
as to the company’s capital structure and governance architecture, are governed 
by the lex societatis. However, Member States may provide that before the 
company has been registered, but after the memorandum or articles of 
association have been drawn up (and notarised, if applicable), the company may 
already come into being as a legal entity (sometimes called ‘pre-corporation’) 
capable of entering into transactions, acquiring rights and incurring liabilities. It 
therefore depends on the Member States’ substantive company law to what 
extent rules of corporate law already apply at this stage, or the relationship 
between the promoters, the company under formation, and third parties are 
predominantly contractual in nature. For the same reason, the treatment of pre-
incorporation obligations entered into with a view to establishing the company, 
while partly harmonised,311 differs between the Member States. These differences 
may be reflected in a different understanding of when these questions are part of 
the lex societatis (see Table 4.3, column (2)). 
Two other problems arise commonly when companies are incorporated under one 
legal system, but the company’s founders, shareholders or managers are located 
in another Member State. Some of the formalities for incorporation may be 
fulfilled abroad, and it may be problematic whether the state of incorporation 
accepts the foreign act as satisfying the domestic requirements. Column (3) of 
Table 4.3 reports whether Member States allow notarial or other formalities to be 
fulfilled by forms accepted in other jurisdictions. In addition, host Member States 
may object to the use of a company’s name even if the company has been validly 
incorporated with that name in another Member State because of concerns that 
the name is misleading in domestic business dealings. Thus, as an exception to 
the general connecting factor that determines the lex societatis, Member States 
may refer to the law at the place of business in order to determine whether the 
use of the company’s name is permissible (see column (4)). 
4.2.1 Overview of national laws 
Table 4.2. Formation 
                                                 
311 Art. 8 Directive 2009/101/EC of 16 September 2009 on coordination of safeguards which, for the 
protection of the interests of members and third parties, are required by Member States of companies 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48 of the Treaty, with a view to making such 
safeguards equivalent, OJ L 258/11 (formerly First Company Law Directive). 
Country Pre-corporation and 
pre-incorporation 
contracts 
Formalities Company name 
Austria Pre-incorporation 
company has limited 
legal capacity; 
members and acting 




- The formal validity 
of a legal act is 
determined pursuant 
to the law applicable 
to the legal 
relationship forming 
the subject matter of 
the legal act or 
alternatively the law 
of the country where 
the act is performed 
(s 8 PIL Act) 
- The formal 
Generally follows lex 
societatis, subject to 
ordre public 
exception and ‘fair 
trading’ legislation 




requirements can be 
satisfied outside the 
country of the 
applicable law if the 
act as performed 
pursuant to the 
foreign law is 
substitutable for that 
under the applicable 
law 
Belgium Until the memorandum 
of association has been 
deposited, the company 
has no legal 
personality. A Belgian 
pre-incorporated 
company cannot enter 
into contracts or be a 
party to legal 
proceedings. However, 
Belgian law provides 
that a party can act in 
the name and on behalf 
of the company to be 
incorporated, and this 
party is then generally 
personally liable for 
his/her commitments, 
Art. 60 BCC 
For companies 
limited by shares, the 
memorandum of 
establishment must 
be notarised. Only a 
notary with an office 
in Belgium can 
provide this 
notarisation, Art. 66 
BCC 
The firm or company 
name is governed by 
the lex societatis, 





companies can file a 
lawsuit if another 
company uses a 
name that is identical 
or so similar that it 
leads to confusion, 
Art. 65 BCC 
It follows from Art. 
111 PIL Code that if a 
foreign (resp. 
Belgian) company 
makes use of a 
similar name as a 
Belgian (resp. 
foreign) company, 
the Belgian company 
cannot claim 
protection according 
to Belgian law 
Bulgaria Under article 69 CA, 
acts of the founders 
carried out in the name 
of a company prior to 
its registration shall 
give rise to rights and 
obligations for the 
persons that made 
them. 
The lex societatis also 
governs liabilities for 
debts incurred before a 
company is registered 
in the public register. 
If a foreign jurisdiction 
provides that a legal 
person takes the form 
of a de facto 
partnership or a 
company ‘in the 
process of formation’ 
before registration 
proceedings are 
completed, it is 
recognised in Bulgaria 
Formalities follow the 
lex societatis. 
Formal requirements 
can be satisfied 
outside the country 
of the applicable law 
if the act as 
performed pursuant 
to foreign law is 
substitutable for that 
under the applicable 
law. 
The lex societatis 
does not cover the 
protection of 
business’ names, 
which is governed by 
the law applicable to 
tort actions. 




                                                 
312 See also the decision in Cyprus Supply Company, where it was decided that the name ‘“Cyprus 
Supply Company” is a general name and that names generally giving the impression that the compa-
ny has higher turnover than what actually has, are misleading and as such undesirable’. 
and rules of that foreign 
jurisdiction apply. 
Croatia As under German law, 
Croatian company law 
provides that a pre-
incorporation company 




is lacking its own legal 
personality, founders 
and company managers 
are jointly and severally 
liable with all of their 
personal assets for all 
obligations undertaken 
in the name of the 
company until the 
company is fully 
incorporated.  
Private international 
law: lex societatis 
(unless activities are 
not carried out in the 
name of the company). 
Notarial formalities 
can be undertaken in 
another jurisdiction 
under condition of 
reciprocity (Art. 
11(1) Public Notaries 
Act). The reciprocity 
requirement is not 
applicable to EU 
registered companies 
or companies 




notarised in another 
country (e.g. 
statement of the 
founders that they 





by Croatian company 
law. 
- 
Cyprus Article 15A Law of 
Companies provides 
that ‘[a]ny contract 
signed before the 
incorporation of the 
company by persons 
who signed the articles 
of association is 
temporary and not 
binding on the 
Company until the date 
of the incorporation. 
After that date, the 
contract becomes 
binding on the 
company.’  
In the event that the 
company is not 
incorporated, Art. 
15A(2) provides that 
the contract is binding 
only upon the persons 
who signed it. A 
company cannot hold 
immovable property 








(such as HE2 and 
HE3 forms). Articles 
of Association and 
Memorandum of 
Association are not 
standardised since 
they are prepared by 
the lawyer according 
to objectives of the 
company) with the 
Companies Register. 
In addition, a 
document titled 
declaration of 
compliance must be 
provided to the 
Registrar of 
Companies and this 
document constitutes 
evidence of 
compliance with the 
legal requirements. 
Article 18, Law of 
Companies states 
that no company can 
be registered with an 
‘undesirable’ name. 
Case law clarifies that 
an undesirable name 
is a name that is the 
same as or ‘too’ 
similar (suggesting a 
striking or 
overbearing 
similarity) to the 




354E(2) states that 
their name must not 
be confusingly similar 
to the name of 
another company in 
Cyprus. 
 
Czech Acting on behalf of the A Czech company Part of the lex 




Republic company between its 
‘formation’ 
(memorandum of 
association) and its 
‘incorporation’ 
(registration): (a) 
persons acting on 
behalf of the company 
are jointly and severally 
obliged; (b) after the 
incorporation, the 
company can assume 
the effects and liability 
of these actions (s. 127 
Civil Code). 
Private international 
law: lex societatis 
cannot be formed by 
a notarial deed 




Czech provisions on 
names are overriding 
mandatory provisions 
and apply also to 
foreign companies. 
Denmark If the memorandum of 
association is signed 
prior to registration, the 
company will be treated 
as a company under 
formation, which lacks 
legal personality, but is 
treated as a business 
association which, with 
some limitations, can 
acquire rights or 
undertake obligations  
(s. 41(1) CA) 
Anyone who undertakes 
obligations on behalf of 
the limited liability 
company before 
registration is jointly 
and severally liable for 
the obligations (s. 
41(3) CA) 
Private international 
law treatment: unclear, 
but the traditional 
understanding is that 
liability towards third 




be fulfilled by forms 
accepted in other 
jurisdictions 
Issues related to the 
name of the company 
are governed by the 
lex societatis, but if 
the use of a company 
name in Denmark 
constitutes an 
infringement of a 
third party’s IP 
rights, Danish law 
may apply 
See also Table 3.2 for 
the name of branches 
Estonia Substantive law: no 
‘pre-company’. 
Private international 
law: uncertain whether 
this issue is to be 
characterised according 
to the lex fori or the lex 
causae; although under 
Estonian law there 
would be no legal 
person yet, some 
Estonian judges may 
apply the lex causae. 
Certification by a 
notary may be 
substituted by 
certification of the 
signatures on the 
petition by an official 
of a foreign state 
who has the right to 
attest the identity of 
the undersigned, or 
an ‘apostille’. 
Branch of a foreign 
company shall consist 
of the words ‘Eesti 
filiaal’ [Estonian 
branch] 
Finland A company becomes a 
legal person when it is 
registered in the trade 
- - 




                                                 
313 The alternative connecting factors have been held by the courts to apply to acts of the founders, 
corporate organs, and shareholders, such as the drawing up of the memorandum of incorporation, 
amendments of the articles, conclusion of enterprise agreements, or transfer of shares in a limited 
company, see BayObLG NJW 1978, 500; OLG Düsseldorf, NZG 2011, 388; OLG Frankfurt, WM 1981, 
946; OLG München, BB 1998, 119. 
register.   
Contractual liabilities 
arising between the 
founding of the 
company and its 
registration will pass on 
to the company upon 
registration. 
Private international 
law: no statutory 
provision, no case law 
France Substantive law: non-
registered company are 
not treated as legal 
entities.  
Private international 
law: unclear (no 
statutory provision, no 
case law). 
- No specific rule 
Germany Substantive law: an 
unregulated pre-
incorporation company 
comes (with legal 
capacity) into existence 
after conclusion of the 
memorandum of 
association, but before 
full incorporation; in 
addition to the pre-
incorporation company, 
members and 
managers are liable for 
obligations entered into 
on behalf of the 
company 
Private international 
law: if the pre-
incorporation company 
is to be registered in 
Germany, the above 
rules apply (lex 
societatis); if a 
company is validly 
incorporated under 
another legal system, 
liability cannot be 
- The formal validity 
of a legal act is 
determined pursuant 
to the law applicable 
to the legal 
relationship forming 
the subject matter of 
the legal act or 
alternatively the law 
of the country where 
the act is performed 
(Art. 11(1) 
EGBGB)313 
- The formal 
requirements can be 
satisfied outside the 
country of the 
applicable law if the 
act as performed 
pursuant to the 
foreign law is 
substitutable for that 
under the applicable 
law 
Governed by the lex 
societatis, but some 
courts have held that 
the branch of a 
foreign company can 
only be registered in 
Germany if the 
company’s name (if 
this name is also 
used for the branch) 
complies with the 
rules on permissible 
names in the German 
Commercial (s. 18 
HGB); these rules are 
considered to be 
imperative 
requirements in the 
general interest and 
hence justified under 
Gebhard 




                                                 
314 According to Art 2 para. 1(a) of Law 2190/1920, the articles of association shall contain provisions 
concerning the name of the company. According to Art 5 of Law 2190/1920: (1) a company limited by 
shares is named after the type of business it engages in; (2) the company name many include, be-
sides the above, the name and surname of the founder or other individual, or the name of a commer-
cial company; (3) the company name must in any case include the words company limited by shares 
(…); (6) for the company’s international transactions, the company name may be presented in a for-
eign language in accurate translation or in the Latin alphabet. Art. 2 of Law 3190/1955 specifies the 
composition of the name of companies with limited liability: (1) The name of a company with limited 
liability is composed either of the name of one or more of its partners, or is defined by the scope of its 
business activities; (2) the words company with limited liability must be contained in the company 
name. 
315 See Fővárosi Ítélőtábla (Court of Appeal of Budapest) 5.Pf.21.267/2006/12: an agreement made 
between a Delaware company before its registration and another person did not exist, because Dela-
ware law (lex societatis) did not accept ‘pre-corporations’. 
imposed on directors 
who act in Germany on 
behalf of the foreign 
company. 
Greece Private international 
law:  lex societatis. 
See, also, Art 7d of Law 
2190/1920 regulating 
liability for acts during 
the incorporation stage: 
persons who have acted 
in the name of the 
company under 
formation are liable for 
these acts jointly and 
severally. However, 
only the company is 
liable for the acts which 
were made expressly in 
its name during the 
formation stage, 
provided the company, 
within three months 
from acquiring legal 
personality, has 
undertaken the 
obligations arising from 
these acts.   
Notarial or other 
formalities cannot be 
fulfilled by forms 
accepted in another 
jurisdiction. 
Several provisions on 
company names do 
not apply to foreign 
companies.314 
Hungary Substantive law: 
between the conclusion 
of the articles of 
association and its 
genuine registration the 
company operates as a 
pre-corporation (S. 
3:101(1) Civil Code). 
Private international 
law: applicable law is 
the law of the state 
where the company 





incorporating a new 
entity are governed 
by the lex societatis. 
- The shareholders’ 
signatures can be 
legalised abroad (e.g. 
by a foreign public 
notary or other 
authority) and a 
Hungarian attorney 
may countersign.  
- Legalisations made 
in jurisdiction that 
have signed the 
Hague Convention 
1961 require an 
‘apostille’ to be used 
Company names are 
governed by the lex 
societatis, while 
Hungarian law 
governs names of 
Hungarian branches 
of foreign companies.  




in Hungary; Hungary 
however has also 
signed bilateral 
treaties with other 
jurisdictions 






Ireland Substantive law: ‘any 
contract or other 
transaction purporting 
to be entered into by a 
company prior to its 
formation, or by any 
person on behalf of the 
company prior to its 
formation, may be 
ratified by the company 
after its formation.’ (s. 
45(1) 2014 Act). 
Pribvate international 
law: unclear (no special 
conflict of laws rules). 
Any document 
delivered to the 
Registrar must be in 
Irish or English, but a 
translation of the 
document may be 
delivered in any 
official language of 







follow the applicable 
company law. 
Italy Substantive law: 
directors are liable for 
debts incurred before 
registration, together 
with either the sole 
shareholder, or those 
shareholders who have 
authorised or decided 
on the transaction. 
After its registration, a 
company is only liable if 
it has explicitly 
approved a specific 
transaction. 
Private international 
law: lex societatis; if a 
foreign jurisdiction 
accepts that a legal 
entity exists as a de 
facto partnership or as 
a company ‘in the 
process of formation’ 
before registration 
proceedings are 
completed, this entity is 
recognised in Italy and 
rules of that foreign 
jurisdiction apply. 
Italian notaries can 
accept foreign 
documents, provided 
that these documents 
have been either 
‘legalised’ in an 
Italian embassy or 
consular office, or 
are drafted in 
‘apostille form’, if the 
country under whose 
law the document is 
formed has signed 
the Hague 
Convention 1961. 
- The lex societatis 
governs any issues 
arising in connection 
with the choice of a 
company’s name 
(e.g. whether the 
shareholders’ names 
should be included or 
not). 





business name from 
the scope of the lex 
societatis, in which 
case these issues are 
normally governed by 
the law applicable to 
tort actions. 





registration issues or 




that it is comparable 
to the applicable 
national procedure; 
but Latvian 
Company names are 
governed by the lex 
societatis. Detailed 
rules on the necessity 
for distinctiveness, 
particular restrictions 
on involving certain 




founders and a third 
person are classified 




by a notary public in 
any EEA country and 
in Swiss 
Confederation are 
recognised to be 
valid in Latvia even 
without an ‘apostille’ 
or ‘legalisation’. For 
notarised documents 
from outside the EEA 
an apostille or 
legalisation is 
required. 
elements in a firm 
name etc. are 
provided in Articles 
26-33 of the 
Commercial Law. 
For the branch of a 
foreign company both 
a new name and the 
name of a foreign 
merchant may be 
used; in the latter 
case mandatory local 
rules apply (eg, 
regarding 
distinctiveness) 






only by Lithuanian 
trained notary; but 
certification of 
authenticity by a 
foreign notary, court 





Name of company 
must not be 
misleading 
irrespective of the 
applicable lex 
societatis 
Luxembourg Substantive law: 
companies receive legal 
personality as soon as 
the notarial deed is 
signed. 
Private international 
law: no judiciary 
decision on conflict of 
law issues. 
No case law A company’s name 
must be different 
from any other 
entity’s name 
Malta A company only comes 
into existence once the 
incorporation 
documents have been 
duly registered and a 
certificate of 
registration has been 
issued; before this 
time, liability is treated 
as contractual/non-
contractual 
No notarial or similar 
formalities 
No requirements 
concerning the name 
of a foreign 
company; this is a 
matter for the lex 
societatis 
Netherlands Substantive law: no 
entity before 
registration (but parties 
acting in the name of 
the not yet fully 
established company 
are personally liable, 
Arts. 2:93, 203 CC). 
Private international 
law: lex contractus 
(pre-incorporation 
agreements to establish 
a company are 
governed by Rome I) 
Unclear whether 
fulfilling formalities in 
front of a foreign 
notary public would 
satisfy the Dutch 
requirements for 
notarisation 
The name is part of 
the lex societatis. 
Company names, 
including those of 
foreign companies, 
cannot be registered 
if a previously 
registered entity has 
an identical or closely 
similar name. 
Difficulties related to 
the registration of the 
name of a foreign 
company are not 
common. 




Poland Substantive law: a ‘pre-
corporation’ exists upon 
conclusion of the 
articles of association 
before registration 
(Commercial Act); the 
pre-corporation itself, 
persons acting on its 
behalf and all 
shareholders (up to 
their contribution) are 
jointly and severally 
liable for any 
obligations entered into 
on behalf of the 
company (both 
contractual and tort 
liability).  
Private international 
law: lex societatis (real 
seat or envisaged 
seat); but if only a 
preliminary agreement 
concerning the 
establishment of a 
company exists and no 
organisational unit has 
been formed: lex 
contractus 
Notarial deed. 
It is debated (and 
still uncertain) 
whether such a 
notarial deed has to 
be drawn up by a 
Polish notary or can 
be drawn up by an 
equivalent foreign 
notary. 
The business name 
falls within the lex 
societatis. The lex 
societatis however 
does not cover the 
protection of a 
business name as 
well claims for 
exclusivity and unfair 
competition rules.  
Portugal Substantive law: 
between the signing of 
the articles of 
association and its 
registration, companies 
have no legal 
personality (but 
founders may be held 
liable). 
Private international 
law: lex societatis 
The articles of 
association can be 
drawn up abroad, 
provided the legal 
form required by Art. 
7 CSC is respected 
(Art. 7(1): ‘[T]he 
signatures of the 
parties thereto must 
be verified by a 
witness present at 
the signing’ and only 
in some limited 
circumstances shall 
the intervention of a 




are governed by 






by the Registo 
Nacional de Pessoas 
Coletivas). 
Branches of foreign 
companies: no need 
for a certificate of 
admissibility (unless 
the branch name is 
different from the 
name of the 
company); but the 
word ‘Sucursal’ has 
to be added to the 
name of the foreign 
company 
Romania Substantive law: Art. 
205(3) states that a 
company may contract 
with other parties from 
the moment the proper 
registration documents 
have been drafted (yet 
it is still not registered) 
but only if the actions 
Documents may be 
issued under the law 
of a different 
jurisdiction, provided 
that they fulfil certain 
requirements of 
admissibility in front 
of Romanian 
authorities (usually 
The Romanian Trade 
Registry can refuse 
the registration of a 
name if it considers 
this warranted or if 
the name is currently 
used by another 
company 




or acts concluded are 
necessary for the 
registration of the 
company 
The founders and 
directors are liable to 
the creditors if they 






Slovakia As a general rule, the 
pre-incorporation 
company has limited 
legal capacity; 
members and acting 
persons are personally 
liable pending 
successful incorporation 
and approval by the 
highest body of the 
company – s. 64 of the 
Commercial Code. 
Substantive law: the 
legal entity does not 
come into existence 
with full legal capacity 
before registration 
Private international 
law: lex societatis (a 
legal entity that is not 
yet registered but that 
is treated for some 
purposes as a legal 
entity under its home 
state law the Slovak 
legal system will grant 
this entity the same 
legal capacity as the 
law under which this 
company is being 
created, societas 
nasciturus) 
A company limited by 
shares cannot be 
formed by a notarial 
deed drawn up by a 
foreign notary. 
The company name is 
governed by the lex 
societatis s. 8 of the 
Commercial Code and 
following. The 
Commercial Register 
shall refuse the entry 
of the company name 




Slovenia Substantive law: prior 
to registration, the 
relationships between 
company members 
shall be subject to 
partnership law. Where 
the company members 
acquire any rights by 
acting on behalf of the 
company prior to its 
legal registration, they 
shall transfer such 
rights to the company 
following its legal 
registration. 
Private international 
law: lex contractus 
Companies Act does 
not clarify whether 
notarial acts can be 
drafted by foreign 
notaries. No case law 
in the context of 
company law. 
Judiciary decisions on 
property issues: 
foreign notaries can 
also verify 
signatures. Appellate 
Court in Koper: 
discrimination 
against notaries of 
other EU Member 
States would violate 
the freedom to 
provide services. 
 
Rules on corporate 
name: Slovenian law.  
The Companies Act 
explicitly prohibits 
the inclusion of the 
names or symbols of 
foreign countries or 
international 
organisations. 




Spain Pre-contractual period 
(before the conclusion 
of the company 
contract) is governed 
by the lex contractus.  
In general: the lex 
societatis applies 
Under Spanish law: 
public document 
formed in front of a 
notary; documents 
formed by foreign 
notaries are also 
accepted, provided 
that these documents 
are considered public 
documents, they are 
translated into 
Spanish, and the 
commercial register 
controls their 
‘legality’ (Arts. 5, 18 
Regulation on 
Commercial Register) 
Questions related to 
a company’s 
‘commercial name’ 
are governed by the 
lex loci protectionis 
(Article 10 (4) Civil 
Code). 
Sweden Substantive law: there 
is no Swedish concept 
equivalent to a so-
called pre-corporation. 
However, according to 
Chapter 2 of the 
Companies Act, if 
representatives of the 
company under 
formation enter into a 
contract or otherwise 
perform legal acts on 
behalf of the to-be 
company before 
registration, they are 
jointly and severally 
liable for such acts. 
Upon registration, the 
company becomes 
contractually bound by 
such acts provided that 
they are agreed upon 
by all founders or 
clearly stated in the 
memorandum. 
Private international 
law: lex societatis 
Documents 
equivalent to those 
foreseen under 
Swedish rules are not 
accepted. 
The name of the 
company is regulated 
by the lex societatis. 
However, when the 
use of a company 
name constitutes an 
infringement of a 
third party’s 
intellectual property 
rights, it is not 




Substantive law:  a 
company comes into 
existence upon, and not 
before, the completion 
of its registration; a 
contract by or on behalf 
of a company before 
registration has effect 
as one made with the 
person purporting to 
act for the company or 
as agent for it, and he 
is personally liable on 
the contract accordingly 
(s. 51 CA) 
Private international 
In the UK, 
preparations for 
registration are 
usually carried out by 
local lawyers, and no 









incorporation to the 
lex societatis, and 
Regulated in ss. 
1044-1059 CA 2006 
and the Overseas 
Companies 
Regulations 2009 (SI 
2009/1801) 
Incorporation in the 
EEA: certain 
particulars need to be 
delivered to the UK 
registrar, including 
the company’s name; 
all names are 
acceptable, unless 
this infringes the UK 
rules on permitted 






1. The first issue to be addressed is how liabilities arising before a company is 
registered in a commercial register, or contracts signed on behalf of a company 
before registration, are treated. From a substantive law point of view, Directive 
2009/101 (so-called First Company Law Directive) provides that, if action has 
been carried out in the name of a company before its registration, ‘the persons 
who acted shall, without limit, be jointly and severally liable therefor’316 unless 
the company assumes the obligations arising from such action. Despite minimum 
harmonisation in this matter, some Member States maintain that a separate legal 
entity exists even before the company’s formal incorporation, either in the form 
of a de facto partnership or as a company in the process of formation (Austria, 
Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, and Poland).  
2. As far as the classification of pre-incorporation actions and related liability claims 
is concerned, courts will generally apply domestic substantive company law to 
actions carried out in the name of a company that seeks to incorporate as a 
domestic company. For instance, a German court would apply domestic rules on 
Vorgesellschaften to companies that seek to be register as German companies. 
The classification of actions carried out on behalf of companies that seek to 
incorporate under the law of a foreign jurisdiction is less clear. Most jurisdictions 
treat these matters as part of the lex societatis (Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, probably Portugal, Slovakia, and Sweden) and, 
therefore, apply the law of the country in which the company seeks registration. 
As a consequence, if a ‘pre-incorporation entity’ exists pursuant to the jurisdiction 
in which a company seeks registration, domestic courts should recognise its 
existence and determine the responsibility of persons acting on behalf of the pre-
incorporation entity according to that jurisdiction. It should be noted that the 
treatment under private international law does not seem to correspond to the 
respective substantive law solutions. On the one hand, Croatia, Germany, 
                                                 
316 Directive 2009/101/EC, Art. 8. 
law: s. 51 CA applies 
both where the 
company is intended to 
be formed by 
registration in the UK 
and also where it was 
intended to be 
incorporated outside 
the UK 
However, in view of the 
possibility of a contrary 
agreement admitted by 
s. 51, it seems probable 
that s. 51 is not of 
universal application, 
but operates as part of 
the lex contractus, and 
thus is limited to cases 
where the pre-
incorporation contract 
is governed, usually 
pursuant to Rome I, by 
the law of a part of the 
UK 
this includes any 




the EEA: the 
restrictions which 
apply to companies 
incorporated in the 
UK apply (prohibition 
of offensive or 
misleading names) 




Hungary and Poland acknowledge that a legal entity exists before registration, 
and hence these jurisdictions characterise liabilities arising before incorporation 
as part of the lex societatis. On the other hand, in spite of the fact that 
companies only come into existence as legal entities upon registration in Belgium, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia 
and Sweden, actions undertaken on their behalf before incorporation are 
characterised as company law. 
If the country in which the company seeks registration considers that a legal 
entity exists before that moment, these issues are governed by its rules 
concerning companies or partnerships. In other Member States, however, these 
issues are characterised as contract law, and hence they are governed by the lex 
contractus (Slovenia, Spain and the UK). 
3. The second question is whether formalities may be fulfilled abroad and according 
to the law of another jurisdiction when a new company seeks to incorporate 
under the law of a jurisdiction that requires specific formalities, such as 
notarisation. This situation is likely to occur when the founding shareholders seek 
to make use of their freedom of establishment by availing themselves of a legal 
system different from that of the Member State where they are domiciled. In this 
regard, Member States seem to be divided on the question whether notarisation 
requirements or other formalities can be satisfied abroad. Several Member States 
accept certain documents certified by a foreign notary public or by a public body 
(Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Romania); some of these countries have signed the 
Hague Convention of 1961 on the ‘apostille’ form that replaces the official 
‘legalisation’ of foreign acts (Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Romania).317 Other Member 
States, however, do not accept formalities fulfilled abroad (Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, and Greece). In yet other countries, the legal situation is 
unclear (Luxembourg, Slovenia and Poland). Finally, common law countries do 
not require notarisation of documents for the incorporation of a new company 
(Cyprus, Ireland and the UK) and the problem accordingly does not arise in these 
Member States. 
4. The last issue to be discussed in this context is the law applicable to rules on a 
company’s name. Several jurisdictions distinguish between rules on the choice of 
a company’s name and rules on business names and unfair competition, which 
are part of tort law and governed by the lex loci delicti (Bulgaria, Italy, Poland 
and Spain). The majority of Member States, on the other hand, treat the choice 
of a company’s name as part of the lex societatis (Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and the UK). However, in 
spite of a classification as company law, most of these jurisdictions impose 
certain requirements regarding the use of corporate names on foreign companies 
operating within their territory to ensure that the name under which the company 
trades is generally permissible and does not give rise to a misleading impression 
because it resembles the name of an existing domestic company. The limitations 
on the use of corporate names are either derived from the domestic ordre public 
(Austria), mandatory overriding provisions (Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). 
                                                 
317 Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents (Apos-
tille Convention) of 5 October 1961. 




4.3 The board of directors in particular 
This section analyses where precisely the line between ‘internal management 
matters’ and external affairs of the company is drawn. Typically, ‘internal 
management matters’ comprise the composition and rights of a company’s 
organs, duties of the directors, potential liability of the members for debts of the 
company, rules on distributions, and rights of the members to bring a derivative 
action for directors’ liability. These issues are commonly seen as an integral part 
of the lex societatis (see Table 4.3, column (2)). However, Member States may 
decide to supplement the rules of a foreign lex societatis where interests of third 
parties or wider societal interests are at play, and the situation can, accordingly, 
be regarded as going beyond the purely internal affairs of the company. This may 
be the case where (1) the company’s legal representatives act beyond their 
powers, which gives rise to legal consequences that may be characterised 
conceptually as either company or contract law (column (3)); (2) the directors of 
companies incorporated in another Member State engage in conduct that satisfies 
certain liability rules of the host state’s company law (column (4)); or (3) the 
host state considers the representation of stakeholder groups on the board of 
directors or board diversity according to predefined criteria as essential for the 
achievement of certain social goals (column (5)). Examples of the latter type of 
regulatory intervention are employee co-determination rules and gender quotas. 
 
  




4.3.1 Overview of national laws 
Table 4.3. Board of directors 
Country Definition of internal 
management matters 
Ultra vires and acting without 
authority 
Liability of directors of foreign 
companies 
Board composition, in particular co-
determination and gender quotas 
Austria Composition of the board of 
directors, appointment and 
removal of directors, the role 
and competences of the 
board(s) and other corporate 
organs, as well as the authority 
of directors to act on behalf of 
the company 
Unclear, but according to some 
commentators protection of third 
parties that rely on the validity of 
acts of corporate organs, based on s 
49 PIL Act 
Liability for culpa in contrahendo One third employee representation 
on the supervisory board; 
prevailing view that employee 
participation is governed solely by 
the lex societatis. 
Belgium Composition, powers and 
functioning of the corporate 
organs, Art. 111, 5° PIL Code 
- Powers of the corporate organs are 
part of the lex societatis 
- If agents do not act in the name 
and on behalf of the company, the 
consequences are determined by 
agency law conflict rules 
- If the organ would have had 
competence to act according to the 
law of the country where the 
representation took place and the 
third party did not know, and should 
not have known of the lack of 
competence, the company cannot 
rely on the organ’s incompetence318 
Persons who are responsible for the 
governance of the branch of a 
foreign company are liable to third 
parties in the same way as board 
members of a Belgian company, 
Art. 59 BCC319 
- No employee participation, but 
Belgian law on the employees’ 
council is applicable regardless of 
the ‘nationality’ of the company. 
Branches of companies that employ 
on average more than 100 
employees, must establish an 
employees’ council. 
- Belgian gender rules regarding the 
composition of the board of the 
directors of stock exchange listed 
companies (at least one third of 
board members must be of the 
underrepresented gender320) are 
only applicable to companies 
governed by Belgian law 
Bulgaria According to article 58, point 4 
of the PILC, ‘the composition, 
competence and functioning of 
the bodies’ fall within the lex 
societatis. Consequently, rules 
related to the formation, 
number of members and 
majority requirements 
If the company is a public company, 
any transaction concluded in 
violation of rules regarding prior 
authorisation of major transactions 
affecting its assets and/or its 
indebtedness by the general meeting 
of the shareholders or by the 
managing body respectively, shall be 
Directors of foreign companies are 
subject to criminal liability, see 
Table 7. 
Under Bulgarian company law, 
employees do not enjoy any special 
rights to appoint members of the 
supervisory board or of the board of 
directors. Pursuant to article 220(3) 
CA, where a company has more 
than 50 employees, they shall be 
represented in the general meeting 
                                                 
318 Art. 111, § 2 PIL Code. 
319 See also Table 3.2. 
320 Art. 518bis, § 1 BCC. 




regarding a company’s 
management board, 
respectively board of directors 
are included in the lex 
societatis, as well as 
requirements in order to be 
elected as directors. 
null and void (article 114(11) LPOS). by one person with a consultative 
vote. No special conflict rules. 
 
Croatia Internal management relates 
to issues concerning the 
company’s internal structure, 
appointment and removal of 
directors, rights and duties of 
shareholders, validity of the 
company’s internal acts and 
decisions with external 
consequences, competences of 
the company’s organs 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned 
At least one employee 
representative on the board; 
employee participation rights are 
part of the lex societatis. 
Cyprus Internal management matters 
of a company can be said to be 
those regulated by Part IV of 
Cap.113 (‘Management and 
Administration’), e.g. register 
of members, restrictions on 
commencement of business, 
annual return, meetings of 
members, financial statements, 
inspection, distribution of 
dividends, profits and assets, 
directors’ duties, arrangements 
and reconstructions, mergers 
and divisions 
Art. 33A, Cap.113: the company is 
bound towards third parties, even if 
the contract is ultra vires the objects 
of the company, unless the company 
can prove that the third party knew 
or ought to have known that the act 
or transaction was ultra vires 
- For a director of an overseas 
company to be held liable under 
Cyprus law, there has to be a 
connection with Cyprus, e.g. 
because the overseas company 
sought to establish a branch in 
Cyprus triggering the application of 
Arts. 347-354, which impose 
certain obligations on the overseas 
company and provide that directors 
can be held liable under Cyprus 
corporate law (Art. 353). 
Directors of an overseas company 
can also be held liable for: 
- inaccurate statements in a 
prospectus (Art. 360) 
- the debts of the company in the 
case of fraudulent trading (Art. 
202ZJ)321 
No employee participation at board 
level; no special conflict rules. 
Czech 
Republic 
Composition and powers of the 
board of directors, instructions 
by the general meeting to the 
board of directors, obligations 
Lex societatis. No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned 
No specific requirements regarding 
co-determination or gender quotas, 
no special conflict rules. 
                                                 
321 By virtue of Art. 202ZJ(7), a company for the purposes of this provision is any entity that can be wound up in accordance with Cap.113. Since, in accordance with Article 
362, an overseas company that carries on or has carried on business in Cyprus can be wound up in accordance with Cap.113, Art. 202ZJ applies to overseas companies. 




and rights, appointment and 
removal of directors, duties 
and liability of directors. 
Denmark - No case law 
- The general understanding is 
that ‘internal management 
matters’ comprise composition 
and rights of a company’s 
organs, including the general 
meeting, duties of the 
directors, potential liability of 
the members of the company 
management, rules on 
distributions, and rights of the 
members to bring a derivative 
action for directors’ liability 
Authority of directors to act on behalf 
of the company: lex societatis, 
provided that the director acts in the 
capacity as director; if a director 
enters into a transaction in another 
capacity, e.g. as employee, the 
transaction falls outside the scope of 
the lex societatis 
 
Acting without authority: lex 
societatis (for the substantive rules 
see s. 136 CA) 
Liability of the directors exist to the 
company, shareholders, and third 
parties, s. 361(1) CA 
 
Liability to the company or 
shareholders for breach of duty: lex 
societatis, not applicable to 
directors of foreign companies 
 
Liability to third parties, e.g. 
creditors: the prevailing opinion in 
the literature argues that the lex 
loci delicti should apply, but unclear 
(no authoritative case law) 
Rules on employee co-
determination are an integrated 
part of the rules on board 
composition (s. 140 CA322) and 
hence governed by the lex 
societatis. In particular: in limited 
liability companies which have 
employed an average of at least 35 
employees for the preceding three 
years employees are entitled to 
elect representatives in the 
company’s board of directors (or 
supervisory board), corresponding 
to half of other members (CA 
section 140(1)). 
 
Gender quotas: also considered a 
matter for the company’s internal 
governance structure and thus to 
be determined according to the lex 
societatis 
Estonia See general definition in Table 
4.1 above 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned 
No employee participation at board 
level, no special conflict rules 
Finland No definition Capacity/authority are governed by 
the lex societatis 
No liability under Finnish law No employee participation at board 
level, no special conflict rules 
France Composition and rights of a 
company’s organs,323 duties of 
the directors, potential liability 
of the members for debts of 
the company, rules on 
distributions, and rights of the 
members to bring a derivative 
action for directors’ liability 
Acting without authority: part of lex 
societatis324 
No liability under French company 
law (see also Table 4.6: liability of 
directors is characterised as 
company law, even if it is towards 
third parties, hence the lex 
societatis applies) 
 
Criminal offence of abus de biens 
sociaux applied to directors of 
foreign incorporated companies 
In companies with at least 5,000 
employees and certain listed 
companies, one or two directors are 
elected by the employees; 
governed by the lex societatis, no 
overriding provisions regarding co-
determination or gender quotas 
                                                 
322 In limited liability companies that have employed an average of at least 35 employees for the preceding three years, the employees are entitled to elect representatives 
to the company’s board of director’s (or supervisory board), corresponding to half the number of the other management members. 
323 Civ., 17 October 1972, Soc. Royal Dutch, Rev. soc. 1974, p. 127. 
324 Cass. com., 21 December 1987, Revue des sociétés. 1988, p. 398 ; 9 April1991, Revue des sociétés 1991, p. 746; 9 March 1993, Revue des sociétés  1993, p. 584. 




with their real seat or most of their 
activity in France325 
Germany Composition of the board of 
directors, appointment and 
removal of directors, the role 
and competences of the 
board(s) and other corporate 
organs, as well as the authority 
of directors to act on behalf of 
the company 
See Table 4.1 (protection of third 
parties that rely on the validity of 
acts of corporate organs under Art. 
12 EGBGB) 
Directors of foreign companies 
were held liable where they acted 
on behalf of the company without 
making sufficiently clear that a 
legal person with limited liability 
should be contracting party 
(notably by failing to use the 
addition ‘ltd.’ after the company 
name); German law was found to 
be applicable because liability was 
not based on the position of the 
director as a corporate organ, but 
the creation of the false legal 
appearance that a person with 
unlimited liability would be party to 
the contract (connecting factor: the 
place where the false legal 
appearance was created and had 
an effect on third parties)326 
It is now generally accepted that 
employee co-determination is part 
of the lex societatis, but some 
commentators propose to 
determine the applicable law not on 
the basis of the registered office, 
but the real seat, qualify the 
German co-determination regime as 
overriding mandatory provisions, or 
invoke the German ordre public. 
The two most important 
‘codetermination’ statutes provide: 
- Companies with more than 2000 
employees: employees appoint half 
of the members of the supervisory 
board; the chairman, who has a 
second vote in case of a tie, is 
elected by the shareholder 
representatives (MitbG 1976); 
- Companies with more than 500 
(and less than 2000) employees: 
employees appoint 1/3 of the 
members of the supervisory board 
(Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz 2004). 
Greece Internal management matters 
comprise the lawful and 
minimum content of the 
articles of association as well 
as their amendment, the 
position of shareholders and 
ownership issues over the 
shares, the composition and 
rights of the company’s 
organs, decision-making 
process of organs, quorum, 
who has the right to be a 
Lex societatis applies to a situation 
where directors contract beyond their 
powers to act on behalf of the 
company. 
Directors of companies 
incorporated in another Member 
State but having their real seat in 
Greece are considered to be 
managers of a de facto general 
partnership. Foreign companies 
registered abroad but having their 
real seat in Greece are null and are 
treated as de facto general 
partnerships. These managers will 
be treated under the new law of 
partnerships (Law 4072/2012).  
No employee participation at board 
level, no special confluct rules 
                                                 
325 Cass. crim., 31 January 2007, Nadhmi Auchi, Patrick Chamarre, André Guelfi, Jean Hamon et autres; 10 March 2010, F-D, n°09-82.453, Rev. Soc. 2007.369, comment 
B. Bouloc ; 25 June 2014, n° 13-84445, Revue des sociétés 2015, p. 50, note M. Menjucq. 
326 BGH NJW 2007, 1529 (Einfamilienhaus); OLG Rostock, GmbHR 2010, 1349. Liability in these cases is based on an analogy to Civil Code, s. 179, a provision of agency 
law that provides for the liability of an agent who acts without authority, BGH NJW 1996, 2645. 




member of the organs, 
meetings, nullity of decisions 
taken by the organs, duties of 
directors, potential liability of 
directors. 
Moreover, shareholders (who could 
also be directors) of companies 
incorporated in another Member 
State but having their real seat in 
Greece are considered to be 
partners (and also managers) of a 
de facto general partnership – with 
personal liability. 
Hungary Status and powers of the board 
of directors  
Duties and liabilities of 
directors towards the company 
Direct liability of the directors 
towards third parties is lex 
societatis if the claim is 
expressly dealt with (also) by a 
specific provision of Hungarian 
company law (directors may 
simultaneously be liable under 
company law and tort law) 
- The lex societatis probably 
also governs the liability of 
directors towards creditors in 
case of liquidation, when 
directors did not consider the 
creditors’ interests in the 
vicinity of insolvency (s. 3:118 
Civil Code). 
Lex societatis, provided that it is a 
settled case law that when the 
managing director, by breaching the 
articles of association, makes an 
agreement on behalf of the company 
without the previous approval of the 
meeting, the agreement is still valid 
between the company and the good 
faith third party, because the lack of 
the meeting’s approval is only an 
internal matter of the company, 
which may well imply the liability of 
the manager towards the company, 
but it has no effect on the agreement 
made by him/her. 
No liability pursuant to Hungarian 
company law. 
One third of members of 
supervisory board must be 
employee representatives, provided 
that the company has more than 
200 employees; no special conflict 
rules. 
Ireland No precise definition under 
conflict of laws rules. 
 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned. 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned. 
No employee participation at board 
level, no special conflict rules. 
Italy Formation, powers and 
functioning rules of companies’ 
bodies’ and rules on attribution 
(Art. 25 PIL Act). 
 
Lack of authority: Lex societatis. See above groups of companies. The following rules apply only to 
Italian companies listed on a EU 
regulated market:  
- Election of minority directors 
- ‘Independency’ requirements 
- Gender quotas (Article 147-ter 
Italian Consolidated Finance Act 
1998) 
- ‘No frustration rule’ when facing a 
takeover attempt (Article 104 
Italian Consolidated Finance Act 
1998). 




Latvia Internal matters comprise 
issues where a third party is 
not involved, eg, composition 
of a company`s organs, duties 
of directors, liability of a 
director towards a company or 
its shareholders, rules on 
distributions etc; but not 
further agreements with 
directors 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned 
No employee participation at board 
level, no special conflict rules. 
Lithuania Composition and the rights of a 
company’s organs, the duties 
of the directors, the potential 
liability of the members for 
debts of the company, rules on 
distri-butions, and rights of the 
members to bring a derivative 
action for directors’ liability. 
Annulment or invalidity of a 
transaction entered into by the 
representative of a foreign company 
in excess of their competence (ultra 
vires) cannot be invoked if Lithuanian 
law does not provide for any 
restrictions on that person’s or 
organ’s powers of representation, 
unless ‘the other party knew or, 
taking into account its position and 
the relationship with the other party, 
should have known of such 
restrictions 
If a foreign company operates its 
business in Lithuania, civil liability 
of persons acting on behalf and in 
the interest of such companies  
governed by Lithuanian law.  The 
literature suggests that this rule 
should also apply to cases where 
representatives act on behalf of the 
company in Lithuania only 
episodically.  
No employee participation at board 
level, no special conflict rules. 
Luxembourg Distinction between ‘internal 
management matters’ and 
external affairs of the company 
is similar to the one in the UK 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned 
Possibly courts would hold directors 
of foreign companies liable for 
abuse of corporate assets following 
French case law, but no decisions 
One-third employee representation 
required for PLCs having at least 
1,000 employees, classified as 
labour law. 
Malta Internal affairs include the 
method of appointment, 
formation and rights and 
obligations of the board of 
directors; generally similar to 
UK law 
Lex societatis insofar as the company 
may validate an ultra vires act; if the 
company does not validate the act, 
the company itself would not appear 
to be a relevant factor and 
obligations would be governed by the 
law of contract or non-contractual 
obligations 
No liability pursuant to Maltese 
company law 
- Employee participation has only 
been used in companies established 
by the state; no mandatory rules 
concerning gender-balance. 
- Lex societatis applies. 
Netherlands Defined as the ‘arrangements, 
structure, and organisation of 
the company’;327 covers all 
corporate organs, i.e. general 
meeting of shareholders, board 
of directors and supervisory 
Each director has the authority to 
represent the company, Art. Arts. 
2:130, 240 CC 
Statutory limitations on the organ’s 
powers are governed by the lex 
societatis 
Four cases: 
i) If a foreign company that is 
subject to corporate tax in the NL 
becomes insolvent, Dutch rules on 
liability of directors (Arts. 2:138, 
149 CC) apply, Art. 10:121 CC 
No employee participation at board 
level; works council (companies 
with more than 50 employees 
only): Conflict rules applicable to 
companies do not apply; Dutch law 
is always applicable to a works 
                                                 
327 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 137, nr. 3, p. 69. 






removal, quorum, calling of, 
validity of decisions, duties, 
competences, etc.) 
If the limitation is unknown in the 
country where the company has been 
represented and the third party could 
not be expected to be aware of it, 
the company cannot rely on the 
limitation, Art. 10:12 CC 
The liability of agents acting without 
authority is determined by agency 
law conflict rules (which will most 
likely lead to the application of the 
lex societatis); the validity of the 
legal act is part of the lex 
societatis328 
ii) Companies subject to the Act on 
foreign law business corporations: 
directors are liable to third parties 
if the financial accounts or reports 
are misleading; ‘de facto’ directors 
are qualified as directors if they 
perform ‘acts of administration’, 
(Arts. 2:249, 260, 261 CC) 
iii) The director’s behaviour is 
careless to third parties (liability for 
a tortuous act; governed by Rome 
II) 
iv) If there is identification of the 
director with the company329 
2) Not subject to Dutch law: 
liability of the directors of a foreign 
company that acts as director of a 
Dutch company330  
council located in the NL  
Poland Composition and powers of the 
board of directors, instructions 
by the general meeting to the 
board, obligations and rights, 
appointment and removal of 
directors, duties and liability of 
directors (article 17(3)(9) PIL 
Act). 
Lack of authority: Lex societatis 
(article 17(3)(9) PIL Act). 
‘Highly unrealistic’. No case law. No employee participation at board 
level, no special conflict rules 
Portugal Composition and powers of the 
board of directors, instructions 
by the general meeting to the 
board of directors (and in 
general powers of companies’ 
bodies), obligations and rights, 
appointment and removal of 
directors, duties and liability of 
directors (art. 33(2) Civil 
code). 
Lack of authority: Lex societatis (art. 
33(2) Civil code). 
Protection of third parties that rely 
on the validity of acts of corporate 
organs: a party contracting with a 
foreign company in Portugal may rely 
on Portuguese substantive law in 
claiming that the corporate organ of 
a foreign company acted with 
authority, as long as that party was 
ignorant (in good faith) of the lack of 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned 
No employee participation at board 
level, no special conflict rules 
                                                 
328 Hoge Raad 25 juni 2010, NJ 2010/370; JOR 2010/226 (e-Traction). 
329 For an overview of cases accepting and rejecting identification, see P. Vlas, Rechtspersonen, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2009, nr. 324. 
330 According to Art. 2:11 CC, each director of the legal entity that acts as director of a legal entity is individually liable. The Hoge Raad held that the directors of a Dutch 
company are subject to Dutch law, but not the directors of the foreign legal entity that acts as director, Hoge Raad 18 maart 2011, NJ 2011, 132; JOR 2011/144 (note G. 
van Solinge); Ondernemingsrecht 2011/71 (note B. Assink),  LJN BP1408 (D Group/Schreurs q.q.). 




authority of the corporate organ 
according to the foreign company’s 
personal law (Art. 28 Civil Code). 
Romania Internal management matters 
refer to the structure of the 
board (one-tier or two-tier), 
the composition of the board of 
directors, appointment and 
removal of directors, the role 
and competences of the 
board(s) and other corporate 
organs, as well as the authority 
of directors to act on behalf of 
the company. 
If directors would enter a transaction 
beyond their given powers, the 
creditors would see their contract 
protected through the provisions of 
art. 55 LS by which the company is 
bound by any bargaining contracted 
by a director beyond his powers 
provided that the third party did not 
know of said limitation. 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned 
No employee participation at board 
level, no special conflict rules 
Slovakia Composition of the board of 
directors, appointment and 
removal of directors, the role 
and competences of the 
board(s) and other corporate 
organs, as well as the authority 
of directors to act on behalf of 
the company- Internal 
management matters: of the 
mechanism of how the 
company decides internally 
about the management 
- Also covered by the lex 
societatis: breach of directors’ 
duties 
Lex Societatis – s. 13 subsection 3 
and 4 of the Commercial Code.  
Persons who are responsible for the 
governance of the branch of a 
foreign company can be removed 
by court decision under s. 13a of 
the Commercial Code. 
One third of supervisory board 
members in companies with more 
than 50 employees must be 
employee representatives; no 
special conflict rules. 
Slovenia No definition Substantive company law rules 
stipulate that in the performance of 
their tasks, executive directors shall 
comply with the guidelines and the 
restrictions imposed by the general 
meeting, the board of directors, the 
articles of association and the rules 
of procedure of executive directors. 
Slovene company law does not 
contain any special rules on liability 
of directors of companies 
incorporated in another Member 
State. 
At least one-third employee 
representation required in Slovene 
companies having not less than 50 
employees; no special conflict rules. 
Spain Structure and corporate organs 
of the company, the 
composition of the board of 
directors as well as their 
appointment and removal, and 
the liability of directors for 
- Organic representation of directors:  
lex societatis.  
- Voluntary representation: national 
law of the country where the 
company uses the power of 
representation (Article 10 (11) of the 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned 
No employee participation at board 
level, no special conflict rules 




breaches of their duties, 
regardless of their contractual 
or tortious character 
Civil Code).  
- Capacity of the company: lex 
societatis  
 
Sweden The lex societatis determines 
the structure and composition 
of the board, appointment and 
removal of directors, the role 
and competences of the board 
and other corporate organs 
etc. 
Chapter 8 of the Companies Act 
contains provisions regulating the 
implications of the board acting 
beyond its power to represent the 
company. 
The consequences of other persons 
acting on behalf of the company are 
not regulated by the Companies Act 
but by general principles of contract 
law. 
Directors of companies 
incorporated in another Member 
State cannot be held liable under 
the Companies Act or any 
equivalent company law rules or 
principles.  
Directors of a non-Swedish 
company, just as directors of 
Swedish companies, may of course 
be subject to criminal sanctions 
(and tortious liability in connection 
with criminal acts) for crimes 
committed in Sweden and 
administrative sanctions on 
individuals under rules 
implementing various EU 
Directives. 
According to Chapter 8 of the 
Companies Act, a minimum of half 
of the board members of a Swedish 
limited company must reside within 
the EU/EEA. An EU/EEA residency 
requirement also applies to the 
managing director, and at least one 
of the persons authorised to sign 
for the company must be an 
EU/EEA resident. Rules regarding 
the composition of the board, 
including rules on employee 
representation or gender quotas, 
would in Sweden be determined by 
the lex societatis.  
United 
Kingdom 
- Composition and powers of 
the company organs, duties of 
directors arising under 
company law 
- Other duties under contract 
or tort law are governed by 
Rome I + II 
No doctrine of ultra vires (s. 39 CA 
2006) 
Lack of authority (s. 40): applicable 
to companies incorporated in the UK 
(follows from s. 1 CA 2006), i.e. they 
operate as part of the lex societatis 
and apply notwithstanding a foreign 
lex contractus; it is likely that where 
the company is incorporated abroad, 
such issues will be subjected to the 
lex societatis 
No special conflict of laws rules 
mentioned 
Governed by the lex societatis, no 
overriding provisions regarding co-
determination or gender quotas, no 
employee representation according 
to substantive law 





1. While not all Member States provide for a definition of ‘internal management matters’, 
the basic contours of such matters, and their treatment as part of the lex societatis, is 
largely consistent across the EU (some Member States define the term rather broadly,331 
but this seems to reflect interpretations from the academic literature, rather than 
definitions introduced by the legislator or the courts). As a common denominator, 
internal management matters comprise the composition and powers of the corporate 
organs, directors’ duties and liability, and the relationship between the general meeting 
and the board(s). Member States also largely agree that the rights of members to bring 
a derivative action are part of the lex societatis (see, in particular, Denmark, France, and 
the UK). 
2. It is also generally accepted that the representation of employees on the board of 
directors or requirements to introduce gender quotas are governed by the lex societatis 
(see Austria, Croatia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK), even 
though such rules pursue somewhat broader societal goals than the investor-focused 
body of core company law. In some countries, commentators indeed suggest that these 
matters should be left to the country where the company’s main operations or real seat 
are located in order to achieve a close alignment between the applicable law and the 
social preferences of the society (as exemplified by the policy choices of the local 
legislator) that is most clearly impacted by the company’s operations.332 However, there 
does not seem to be any instance where such suggestions have been litigated 
successfully, and it is doubtful that overriding requirements of employee participation 
could be justified under the Gebhard conditions developed by the Court of Justice. 
3. The most controversial of the issues discussed here is the extension of the reach of 
certain liability provisions of the forum’s company law to directors of foreign companies 
that operate within the territory of the forum. In this regard, we observe substantial 
differences between the Member States. These differences can be conceptualised as 
follows.  
4. In some Member States, the issue does not seem to have been discussed widely, and 
the general approach is not to subject directors of foreign companies to domestic liability 
provisions stemming from company law.333 
5. A second group of countries focuses on the activities of branches of foreign companies 
and holds branch managers responsible under domestic rules on directors’ duties and 
liability for mistakes made in the course of operating the branch (Belgium, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Lithuania, and the Netherlands334). It is not entirely clear how the application 
of these provisions to foreign companies is justified in private international law terms, 
but most convincingly they can be seen as outreach statutes or overriding mandatory 
provisions.  
                                                 
331 For example, the Cyprus report qualifies reconstructions, mergers and divisions as internal management 
matters. In Denmark and France, rules on distributions are included in the list of internal management matters, 
although they should probably be seen as a part of the company’s capital maintenance regime, and hence capi-
tal structure. 
332 See, e.g., German country report, Section 4.3. 
333 Directors are, of course, subject to criminal liability, since such laws will generally apply to criminal offences 
committed within the territory of the forum. In addition, liability may be imposed based on provisions that fol-
low other connecting factors, such as tort law. These will be analysed in Section 4.5 below. Here, we are pri-
marily interested in liability according to what will typically be considered company law mechanisms. 
334 In the Netherlands, liability of directors of foreign companies for certain acts derives from the Act on foreign 
law business operations. These parts of the act are not applicable to EU-incorporated companies, see Dutch 
country report, Section 3.2. 




6. Third, a number of Member States report that directors of foreign companies can be held 
liable under domestic (company) law in specific situations irrespective of their 
involvement in branch operations. This class of situations can be termed liability by 
virtue of classification, because the respective liability provisions are typically invoked 
not because they are seen as overriding mandatory requirements, but because they are 
classified as falling outside the scope of the lex societatis, notwithstanding their 
regulation in the Member State’s substantive company law. However, there is significant 
legal uncertainty and inconsistency in the EU when directors may be found liable 
pursuant to the forum’s law in spite of a foreign lex societatis. We have identified the 
following cases where liability has been discussed: (1) fraudulent trading (Cyprus) and 
comparable mechanisms imposing liability in case the director caused or contributed to 
the company’s insolvency (the Netherlands); (2) liability to third parties (not the 
company or shareholders) for breach of directors’ duties (among others, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, the Netherlands); and (3) creation of the false legal appearance that 
a person with unlimited liability (e.g., a partnership or natural person) would be party to 
the contract between the company and a third part (Germany, and, similarly, in Austria).  
7. We would expect the first case to be classified as insolvency law if the legal mechanism 
can be seen as an action deriving directly from insolvency proceedings and being closely 
connected to them.335 In this case, the national liability provisions can be applied to 
companies with their centre of main interest (COMI) in the forum state.336 However, the 
two Member States discussed here (Cyprus and the Netherlands) do not rely on the 
COMI as connecting factor, but apply their national liability provisions when the company 
‘carries on business’ within the state’s territory (Cyprus) or is subject to corporate tax 
(Netherlands). These connecting factors are related, but will generally be wider than the 
COMI. 
8. Member States do not agree how the second case, liability to third parties for breach of 
directors’ duties, should be classified. In Denmark, some views in the literature suggest 
a classification as tort law, hence leading to a bisection of the liability regime if the 
company is incorporated abroad and the director commits acts in Denmark that give rise 
to liability under Danish law. In a number of other states, for example Bulgaria and the 
Netherlands, directors may be sued, in appropriate circumstances, both for breach of 
directors’ duties337 and under tort law.338 It is then unclear whether the situation should 
be characterised as company law or tort law, since the director commits a tortious act in 
the capacity as a director.339 In general, the classification seems to be to some extent a 
function of the idiosyncrasies of the national law on directors’ duties and liability. 
Compare the above legal systems, for example, with France, where directors’ duties are 
owed to the company, shareholders, and third parties. 340  As a consequence of this 
formulation of the substantive law, liability is always seen as part of the lex societatis, 
notwithstanding the type of claimant. The demarcation between the lex societatis and 
the lex loci delicti will be explored further in section 4.5 below. 
9. The treatment of the third case, creation of a false legal appearance, is relatively clear. 
Liability in such a case is generally considered to derive from quasi-contract and not 
company law, since it is not based on the position of the director as a corporate organ or 
                                                 
335 This criterion has been established by the CJEU in the context of interpreting Art. 4(2) Insolvency Regula-
tion, see Section 4.4 below. 
336 Insolvency Regulation, Arts. 3(1), 4(1). 
337 Dutch Civil Code, Art. 2:9. 
338 Dutch Civil Code, Art. 6:162. An example for an act giving rise to liability under tort law is the decision of 
the Hoge Raad 6 October 1989, NJ 1990/286NJ 1990/286 (Beklamel). In this case, a company had incurred 
additional obligations at a time when the director knew, or reasonably should have known that the company 
would not be able to meet the obligations and the company’s assets would not be sufficient to satisfy all claims 
of creditors. 
339 Dutch country report, Section 4.3. 
340 For example French Commercial Code, Art. L225-251 (public companies). 




the violation of company law duties, but on quasi-contractual duties that apply more 
generally. Courts have held that the relevant connecting factor is the place where the 
false legal appearance was created and had an effect on third parties.341 However, it 
should be noted that if liability according to these principles were used as a method to 
require disclosures that go beyond Directive 89/666 (so-called Eleventh Company Law 
Directive), holding directors of foreign companies liable would be in conflict with EU law, 
irrespective of the applicable connecting factors.342 
10. Finally, an outlier is Greece, where it has been reported that directors of foreign 
companies could be found personally liable if the company’s real seat is located in 
Greece. 343 Directors of companies incorporated in another Member State but having 
their real seat in Greece are considered to be managers of a de facto general partnership. 
Foreign companies registered abroad but having their real seat in Greece are null and 
are treated as de facto general partnerships. Moreover, shareholders (who could also be 
directors) of companies incorporated in another Member State but having their real seat 
in Greece are considered to be partners (and also managers) of a de facto general 
partnership with personal liability This approach is likely a function of the real seat 
theory, which is still formally applied in Greece.344 If, as discussed in the Greek literature, 
the real seat theory were to be modified or entirely disregarded in cases involving EU-
incorporated companies, a logical consequence would be a corresponding limitation of 
the scope of application of the liability rules. As the law stands, it is difficult to justify the 
blanket extension of liability provisions to directors of foreign companies with their real 
seat in Greece under Gebhard. 
4.4 Distinction between the lex societatis and the lex concursus (the law 
applicable to insolvency proceedings) 
The general delimitation of private international company and insolvency law is fairly 
clear. The Insolvency Regulation provides that the lex concursus shall determine the 
conditions for the opening of insolvency proceedings, their conduct and closure, and 
further lists a number of questions falling within the scope of international insolvency 
law.345  These questions are mostly concerned with the operation and effects of the 
insolvency proceedings themselves, so that the problem of an overlap with company law 
mechanisms usually does not arise. However, it has for some time been controversial in 
some Member States how to classify legal mechanisms intended to protect creditors 
before the company is actually insolvent, in particular regarding acts in the vicinity of 
insolvency that jeopardise the creditors’ interests or aggravate the company’s insolvency. 
Such mechanisms can be found both in the companies acts and the insolvency codes of 
the Member States, and it has been questioned whether their classification for purposes 
of private international law should follow their substantive (internal) legal regulation. 
From the perspective of the EU Insolvency Regulation, the question commonly turns on 
the interpretation of the term ‘actions which derive directly from [insolvency] 
proceedings and which are closely connected to them’.346 The Court of Justice has held 
that the courts that have international jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3(1) to open 
insolvency proceedings also have jurisdiction to hear such closely linked actions. 347 
Likewise, the Court has clarified that the scope of Article 3(1) of the Insolvency 
                                                 
341 See the references in n 326 above. 
342 This point seems to have been ignored by the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), which argued that 
imposing liability on the acting director was permissible because the liability rules ‘did not fall within the scope 
of the lex societatis and, hence, did not concern the right of establishment’, see BGH NJW 2007, 1529 (Ein-
familienhaus), para 10 (own translation). 
343 Greek country report, Section 4.3. 
344 See Table 3.1 above. 
345 Insolvency Regulation, art. 4(2). 
346 Case C-339/07 Christopher Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV [2009] ECR I-767, para 21. 
347 Ibid., now codified in Regulation (EU) 2015/848, art. 6(1). 




Regulation and the bankruptcy exception of the Judgments Regulation348 are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive.349 Given that the legislator intended the Judgments Regulation 
to have a broad scope of application, encompassing all civil and commercial matters 
except certain well-defined issues, 350  it follows that the scope of the Insolvency 
Regulation is to be interpreted narrowly.351 This much is generally not disputed in the EU, 
since it is universally acknowledged that Articles 3 and 4 of the Insolvency Regulation 
have to be interpreted autonomously. Some commentators have argued that the case 
law of the Court of Justice did not have a bearing on the international scope of 
substantive insolvency law, since the Court had, until 2015, only addressed jurisdictional 
questions and the protection of creditors demanded a wide interpretation of Article 4 
Insolvency Regulation (now Article 7 Regulation (EU) 2015/848).352 This question has 
probably become moot after Kornhaas, decided in December 2015.353 Kornhaas dealt 
with a reference from the German Federal Court of Justice regarding the classification of 
the liability of managers of a private limited company for payments made after the 
company becomes cash flow insolvent or over-indebted.354 The Court referred to its prior 
holding in H,355 a case concerning the same provision of German law, where it had held 
that a national court that has international jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings 
pursuant to Art. 3 Insolvency Regulation has jurisdiction to rule on such an action. The 
Court of Justice concluded from this holding that the German provision had to be 
qualified as insolvency law not only for purposes of international jurisdiction, but that it 
was also ‘covered by the law applicable to insolvency proceedings and their effects, 
within the meaning of Article 4(1)’ of the Insolvency Regulation.356 
Examples for ambivalent and often controversially debated cases are the shift of 
directors’ duties to creditors in the vicinity of insolvency;357 the duty to recapitalise the 
company; liability of directors for failure to protect the assets of the company when the 
company nears insolvency or after cash-flow insolvency or over-indebtedness, such as 
wrongful trading, 358  failure to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings, 359  and 
action en responsabilité pour insufissance d’actif (liability for insufficiency of assets);360 
liability for causing the company’s insolvency;361 re-characterisation of shareholder loans 
given, or not called in, when the company nears insolvency;362 and avoidance actions.363 
                                                 
348 Now Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, art. 1(2)(b). 
349 They ‘must be interpreted in such a way as to avoid any overlap between the rules of law that those texts 
lay down and any legal vacuum’, Case C-157/13 Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v ‘Kintra’ UAB, nyr, para 
21. 
350 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, recital 10. 
351 Case C-292/08 German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v Alice van der Schee [2009] ECR I-8421, 
para 25. 
352 Kindler, n 310 above, at para 664. 
353 Case C-594/14 Simona Kornhaas v Thomas Dithmar, nyr. 
354 Now s. 64, sentence 1 Limited Liability Companies Act (GmbHG). The reference was made by BGH, decision 
of 2 Dec. 2014, II ZR 119/14. 
355 Case C295/13 H v H.K., nyr. 
356 Kornhaas, para 17. The Court further explained that ‘Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1346/2000 provides, in 
particular, that the lex fori concursus determines the ‘conditions for the opening’ of the insolvency proceedings. 
In order to ensure the effectiveness of that provision, it must be interpreted as meaning that, first, the precon-
ditions for the opening of insolvency proceedings, second, the rules which designate the persons who are 
obliged to request the opening of those proceedings and, third, the consequences of an infringement of that 
obligation fall within its scope.’ Ibid. para 19. 
357 For example, this is the case in the UK, see West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250. For a 
discussion see, e.g., PL Davies, ‘Directors’ Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in 
the Vicinity of Insolvency’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review 301. 
358 UK: Section 214 Insolvency Act 1986; Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2006] BCC 57, para 42. 
359 Germany: LG Kiel [District Court Kiel, Germany], NZG 2006, 672 (classifying the duty to file and ensuing 
liability pursuant to the German Civil Code, s 823(2), and the Stock Corporation Act, s 93(2), as insolvency law, 
and applying the provisions to an English limited company with COMI in Germany). 
360 Art L.651-2 of the French Commercial Code. See Gourdain v Nadler (Case 133/78) [1979] ECR 733. 
361 Case C-295/13 H v H.K., nyr. The Court held that courts of the Member State where insolvency proceedings 
have been opened have jurisdiction to hear actions based on s. 92(2) German Stock Corporation Act and s. 64 
German Limited Liability Companies Act (liability of directors who make payments that must lead to the insol-




Table 4.5 assesses how national courts interpret ‘actions deriving directly from 
insolvency proceedings’ and other relevant European concepts of insolvency law, and 
summarises how national courts treat the above ambivalent cases. 
4.4.1 Overview of national laws 
Table 4.4. Lex societatis and lex concursus 
Country Interpretation of European 
concepts ‘actions deriving 
directly from insolvency 
proceedings’ 
Ambivalent cases 
Austria Austrian courts follow the 
interpretation by the ECJ 
Duty to file for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings and liability for failure to file 
Liability of directors who make payments to 
creditors (or impair the assets of the 
company in other ways) at a time when the 
company is cash-flow insolvent or over-
indebted, but before insolvency proceedings 
have been opened,  
- Re-characterisation of shareholder loans as 
equity  
- Liability for causing the company’s 
insolvency (Existenzvernichtung)  
Belgium Not relevant since no 
demarcation problems exist in 
Belgium (see right) 
 
- COMI and principal establishment are 
generally interpreted in the same way, 
therefore Belgian courts will apply insolvency 
and company law concurrently, hence no 
demarcation issues and no case law 
- Scholars have argued that liability of the 
board for serious mistakes which resulted in 
the insolvency of the company should be 
considered as part of the lex concursus 
instead of the lex societatis 
- Liability of directors for not calling a GM in 
case of considerable loss of capital is part of 
                                                                                                                                                        
vency of the company and that would not have been made by a prudent businessman) if these actions are 
brought by the liquidator. It should be noted that this judgment concerns only the interpretation of Article 3(1) 
EU Insolvency Regulation, not the applicable law (but see also our discussion above, text to notes 353-356). In 
addition, the Court of Justice acknowledged that the obligations at issue were owed to the company and that 
the claim could also be enforced outside the context of insolvency proceedings. Where the claim is brought by 
the liquidator, it ‘clearly derogates from the common rules of civil and commercial law, specifically because of 
the insolvency of the debtor company’, and is therefore an action deriving directly from insolvency proceedings 
(ibid. para 23). Compare this case with Case C-147/12, ÖFAB v Frank Koot, nyr. ÖFAB dealt with a Swedish 
law providing ‘that the members of the board of directors may be liable for the debts of the company where 
they fail to complete certain formalities to monitor the company’s financial situation which no longer has suffi-
cient funds’ (ibid. para 8). The Court held that personal liability of the directors where they had allowed the 
company to continue to trade at a time when it should have been put into liquidation did not constitute a close-
ly connected action, because the action was not ‘the exclusive prerogative of the liquidator to be exercised in 
the interests of the general body of creditors’ (para 25). Rather, it could be (and was in this case) pursued by 
the company’s creditors outside insolvency proceedings. It was, therefore, classified as tort law, ibid. para 42. 
362 BGH [German Federal Court of Justice], judgment of 21 July 2011, IX ZR 185/10 (holding that the re-
characterisation of shareholder loans as equity in the vicinity of insolvency should be classified as insolvency 
law, even though the doctrine originated in capital maintenance law (analogy to German Limited Liability Com-
panies Act, ss 30, 31, version in force until 31 October 2008, now codified in the German Insolvency Code, ss 
39, 135)). 
363 Case C-339/07 Christopher Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV [2009] ECR I-767 (holding that avoidance 
actions that could only be brought by ‘the liquidator … in the event of insolvency with the sole purpose of pro-
tecting the interests of the general body of creditors’ fell within the international jurisdiction of the courts of the 
country where the insolvency proceedings were opened). However, the Insolvency Regulation stipulates that 
the lex concursus does not govern the material preconditions for avoidance insofar as the act that is challenged 
is subject to the law of another Member State and cannot be set aside pursuant to the law of that state, Arts. 
4(2)(m), 13 (now Regulation (EU) 2015/848, arts 7(2)(m), 16). 




substantive company law and will probably be 
characterised accordingly for purposes of PIL 
- Liability for not filing for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings is part of substantive 
insolvency law and will probably be 
characterised accordingly for purposes of PIL 
Bulgaria No case law, but it is 
suggested that ‘closely 
connected actions’ include 
avoidance and ‘claw-back’ 
actions 
‘Failure to file for the opening of bankruptcy 
proceedings’ (Art. 627 CA): contained in the 
Companies Act, but relevant connecting factor 
is the COMI. 
Croatia No case law 
 
- Director’s duty to file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings is regulated by both 
company law and insolvency law (Arts. 
251(2), 431.c Companies Act and Art. 110 
Insolvency Act). Since the idea behind such 
rules is the protection of creditors, it is more 
likely that this duty will be considered as part 
of insolvency law for the purposes of 
determining the applicable law. 
- Rules on loans substituting capital are only 
provided by company law and as such it is 
questionable whether they form a part of the 
lex societatis or insolvency law. This is 
because such rules can be characterised as 
both capital maintenance rules and insolvency 
rules aimed at protecting the company’s 
creditors. 
Cyprus Courts can wind up an 
overseas company if it 
conducts or has conducted 
business in Cyprus (Art. 362, 
Cap. 113). This provision does 
not seem to be in line with the 
concept of COMI in the EIR 
See left  
Czech 
Republic 
Czech insolvency law applies 
to: liability for damage caused 
by the insolvency petition 
being filed too late or not at 
all; debtors’ liability to 
creditors for a breach of 
obligations during the 
‘moratorium’ period; damages 
against the insolvency 
petitioner; liability for 
breaches of the due care 
obligation in disposing of the 
estate; invalidity of legal acts 
Certain provisions of the Business Corporation 
Act related to directors’ duties and liabilities, 
to be applied after the company enters into 
an insolvency proceeding:  
- Claw back of considerations received in the 
2 years before the decision on insolvency; 
- Disqualification; 
- Wrongful trading (liability of directors if they 
should have known of imminent insolvency) 
Denmark - EIR does not apply 
- General rule: the lex 
concursus determines the 
conditions for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings, their 
conduct and closure (i.e. 
issues concerned with the 
operation and effects of the 
insolvency proceedings 
themselves) 
1) Lex concursus: 
- Competence of creditors to file for opening 
of insolvency proceedings 
- Avoidance actions 
2) Lex societatis: 
- Competence to file for opening of insolvency 
proceedings on behalf of the company 
- Liability of directors for acts in the vicinity of 
insolvency, e.g. aggravating the insolvency364 
                                                 
364 UfR1989.812H (Danish Supreme Court). 




Estonia No case law No case law 
Finland No case law No case law 
France French courts follow the 
interpretation by the Court of 
Justice 
 
1) Lex concursus: 
- action en responsabilité pour insuffisance 
d’actif (liability for insufficiency of assets)365 
- action en interdiction de gérer (prohibition 
of managing a company)366 
2) Ambivalent case law on the interpretation 
of Art. 2(4)(h) EIR (lodging of claims): in one 
decision, the Cour de Cassation held that the 
lex concursus determines whether the 
delegation given to a company officer to 
lodge a claim on behalf of the company is 
valid;367 in a second decision the court added 
that the determination of the capacity of the 
company’s organ to delegate to an officer the 
power to lodge a claim is ruled by the lex 
societatis368 
Germany German courts follow the 
interpretation by the Court of 
Justice 
1) Lex concursus: 
- Duty to file for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings and liability for failure to file (s. 
15a InsO)369 (but some commentators 
suggest a characterisation as company law) 
- Liability of directors who make payments to 
creditors (or impair the assets of the 
company in other ways) at a time when the 
company is cash-flow insolvent or over-
indebted, but before insolvency proceedings 
have been opened, or if they make payments 
to shareholders that must lead to the 
insolvency of the company (ss. 92(2) AktG, 
64 GmbHG)370 
- Re-characterisation of shareholder loans as 
equity (since 2008 ss. 39(1), no. 5, 135 
InsO)371 
- Avoidance actions (s. 129 InsO)372 
(2) Ambivalent cases 
- Liability for causing the company’s 
insolvency (Existenzvernichtung)373  
Greece No case law; matters 
governed by internal Greek 
insolvency law are seen as 
belonging to the lex concursus 
No rule similar to wrongful trading in English 
company law or to ‘action en comblement du 
passif’ in French law; however Art. 98 of the 
Greek Bankruptcy Code introduces civil 
liability of managers of corporations. This rule 
                                                 
365 T. com. Nanterre, 3ème ch., 24 October 2013, n° 2011F04794, Revue des procédures collectives 1/2014, 
comm. 12, obs. M. Menjucq (opening of secondary proceedings sufficient to apply the lex fori). 
366 Cass. com. 22 January 2013, n° 11-17.968, Rev. Proc. coll., 2/2013, n° 30,  obs. Th. Mastrullo; Dalloz 2013, 
p. 755, note R. Dammann et A. Rapp (COMI used as connecting factor). 
367 Cass. Com., 15 December 2009, n° 08-14949. 
368 Cass. Com., 22 June 2010, n° 09-65481. 
369 LG Kiel, NZG 2006, 672 (overturning the opinion of the district court, which characterised the duty to file 
and liability for failure to file as company law, see AG Bad Segeberg, NZG 2005, 762); Explanatory memoran-
dum accompanying the proposal for a Law for the Modernisation of the German Limited Liability Company Law 
and the Prevention of Misuse (MoMiG), Bundestags-Drucksache 16/6140, p. 55. 
370 Kammergericht Berlin, NZG 2010, 71. 
371 BGHZ 190, 364; AG Hamburg, NZI 2009, 131. 
372 The Insolvency Code contains an explicit conflict of laws provision in s. 339 InsO. See also Case C-339/07 
Christopher Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV [2009] ECR I-767, dealing with international jurisdiction for 
avoidance actions under German law.  
373 Prior to Überseering, and hence prior to the abolishment of the real seat theory in Germany, characterised 
as company law, see BGHZ 78, 318, 334. Now the characterisation is controversial in the literature; the courts 
have not yet decided the question. 




is part of the lex concursus. 
Hungary The lex societatis generally 
applies to insolvency issues, 
unless special legal norms 
(e.g. the Insolvency 
Regulation) refer to another 
law. The distinction between 
lex societatis and the lex 
concursus has not yet been an 
issue in Hungary. 
- Liability of majority shareholders and 
directors for ‘wrongful trading’: those actions 
derive directly from the insolvency 
proceedings, because they require that 
insolvency proceedings have been opened 
- But in practice no case where these rules 
were applied to foreign companies with COMI 
in Hungary 
Ireland No case law It is argued that provisions such as: 
fraudulent and reckless trading; unfair 
preference; duty to contribute for misapplied 
company money or property; misfeasance or 
other breaches of duty or trust in relation to 
the company, which fall within Part 11 
(Winding Up) of the 2014 Act, are part of the 
lex concursus 
Italy Italian law governs any 
actions deriving from 
insolvency proceedings 
opened in Italy, including 
avoidance and ‘claw-back’ 
actions. 
- Directors’ duties and liability in the vicinity 
of insolvency: lex societatis 
- Veil piercing and liability of shareholders: 
lex societatis 
- Subordination of shareholder loans and 
avoidance: probably lex societatis (no case 
law so far) 
Latvia Insolvency Law refers to the 
‘permanent economic activity’ 
in Latvia as the decisive 
connecting factor for the lex 
concursus 
Liability towards the company for failure to 
file for the opening of insolvency proceedings 
stems from company law; classification 
unclear 
Lithuania No relevant case law or legal 
literature that would discuss 
this issue 
No case law 
Luxembourg No case law No case law, no discussion in the literature 
Malta Case law is rare Case law is rare, legal uncertainty persists 
how the lex societatis and lex concursus 
should be delimited 
Netherlands Dutch courts follow the 
interpretation by the Court of 
Justice374 
Liability of the directors for having caused or 
contributed to the insolvency of the company, 
Art. 10:121 CC: Dutch law applies if the 
company is subject to corporate tax and has 
been declared bankrupt in the NL;375 thus, 
not identical with COMI, but considered to be 
part of the lex concursus 
Poland Discussed in the literature, 
but no publicly available case 
law 
1) Duty to file for bankruptcy within 2 weeks 
from actual insolvency (Art. 21 Bankruptcy 
Act): liability for non-compliance is of 
uncertain characterisation 
2) Directors of limited liability companies are 
jointly and severally liable vis-à-vis unpaid 
creditors if they do not prove (i) that an 
application for bankruptcy was filed or that 
arrangement proceedings with creditors were 
commenced within an appropriate time; (ii) 
that it is not due to their fault that the 
                                                 
374 Hof Amsterdam 3 November 2009, JOR 2010/244 (Groet/Conrads q.q.); Rb. Dordrecht 3 February 2010, 
JOR 2010/90 (Mr. Gilhuis q.q./X). 
375 Rechtbank Breda 25 March 2009, RON 2009, 44, LJN BH 9042; Rechtbank Dordrecht 3 February 2010, JOR 
2010/90, LJN BL2214. 




petition for bankruptcy was not filed or that 
arrangement proceedings with creditors were 
not commenced; (iii) or that the creditor did 
not suffer any damage despite the fact that 
the petition for bankruptcy was not filed or 
that the arrangement proceedings with 
creditors were not commenced (article 299 
Commercial Companies Code): uncertain 
private international law characterisation 
Portugal No case law Directors’ duty to file for insolvency is 
characterised as insolvency law 
Romania No case law Liability of administrators for insolvency-
related issues: the literature suggests that 
they should be classified as insolvency law; 
therefore, Arts. 169-173 Insolvency Law no. 
85/20014 apply only if lex concursus is 
Romanian law 
Slovakia Limited case law suggests that 
Slovak courts would follow the 
interpretation by the Court of 
Justice 
- Duty to file for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings and liability for failure to file 
Liability of directors,  
- Re-classification of shareholder loans as 
equity, s. 67d of the Commercial Code 
- Shift of duties from shareholders to 
creditors not regulated. 
- In the case that the company’s COMI is 
located in the Slovak Republic but the 
company is incorporated abroad and 
insolvency proceedings are opened in the 
Slovak Republic, the Slovak Act on 
Bankruptcy is applicable, but presumably not 
the provisions of the Commercial Code on 
companies in crisis, as these are considered 
to be separate concepts. 
Slovenia - Both the courts and legal 
scholarship argue for a broad 
interpretation: any action filed 
during insolvency proceedings 
and having an effect on the 
bankruptcy estate are 
qualified as ‘closely connected 
actions’ 
- For example, actions that 
can be filed outside of 
insolvency proceedings and 
that are not a direct result of 
these proceedings, such as an 
action to enforce a lien/title, 
or an action for recovery of 
claims resulting from 
operations before bankruptcy, 
are considered to be 
‘connected with the insolvency 
proceedings’ 
Failure to file for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings: As this is a question that falls 
within the ambit of insolvency law, the 
applicable law is the law of the country where 
the company has its COMI. However, 
company law provisions may also be of 
relevance to determining the directors’ 
liability, and these provisions will be governed 
by the lex societatis. 
Spain Limited number of decisions; 
legal situation unclear 
Lex concursus governs the liability of 
directors for the debts of the company where 
they have caused or aggravated the 
company’s insolvency or failed to file for the 
opening of insolvency proceedings pursuant 
to Arts. 164(1), 172 and 172bis Spanish 
Insolvency Act of 2003. 
Sweden Case law is rare - No domestic case law by upper courts 




addressing any particular problems in this 
regard 
- Directors’ liability for not taking action in the 
case when less than half of the registered 
share capital is left is considered to fall within 
the ambit of company law, not insolvency law 
United 
Kingdom 
- General rule: whether the 
claim made in the proceedings 
is based on insolvency law, or 
is based on ordinary law 
- Brussels I is interpreted 
following the relevant 
decisions of the Court of 
Justice (German Graphics 
etc.) 
 
1) Disqualification of directors of insolvent 
companies under UK law, even if the 
company is incorporated abroad, where 
insolvency proceedings have been opened in 
the UK376 
2) lex concursus: 
- Wrongful trading377 
- Insolvency Regulation applied where the 
claim is not based on insolvency law, but 
arises from the activities of the liquidator, 
e.g. claims in contract or tort made by a 
creditor against a liquidator based on 
statements made by the liquidator in 
negotiations between the liquidator and the 
creditor concerning the admission and priority 
of the creditor's underlying claim (but the 
decision addressed judicial jurisdiction, rather 
than the reach of the lex concursus)378 
3) Brussels I: 
- Action brought by a creditor against the 
insolvent debtor to determine the amount 
owing under their contract379 
- Actions to recover property belonging to the 
debtor or enforce a debt owing to the 
debtor380 
- An insolvent company brought an action 
against its former directors and professional 
advisors for conspiracy to defraud and 
breaches of fiduciary duty, since the claims 
were based on ordinary law and the foreign 
insolvency proceedings were purely 
collateral381 
4.4.2 Discussion 
1. In most Member States, there is little or no case law explicitly addressing the question of 
how ‘closely connected actions’ should be interpreted. Where case law exists, our 
findings indicate that national courts generally follow the interpretation of the Court of 
Justice382 faithfully. In larger Member States, notably France and Germany, case law 
illustrates that national courts are familiar with the relevant issues and prepared to make 
references to the Court of Justice if the legal situation is uncertain. However, the 
compatibility of national law with EU law seems to be in doubt in Cyprus. According to 
the relevant legislation, an overseas company that ‘carries on business’ in Cyprus can be 
                                                 
376 Re Seagull Manufacturing (No 2) [1994] Ch 91. 
377 Re Howard Holdings [1998] BCC 549 (Chadwick J); Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2005] EWHC 872 (Ch) 
(Lloyd LJ) at para 42. 
378 Polymer Vision v Van Dooren [2011] EWHC 2951 (Comm). 
379 UBS v Omni Holding [2000] 1 WLR 916; Gibraltar Residential Properties Ltd v Gibralcon 2004 SA [2010] 
EWHC 2595 (TCC). 
380 Re Leyland DAF Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 106 (CA); Re Hayward [1997] Ch 45 (Rattee J); QRS v Frandsen [1999] 
3 All ER 289 (CA); Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2005] EWHC 872 (Lloyd LJ); Byers v Yacht Bull Corp 
[2010] EWHC 133 (Ch). 
381 Grupo Torras v Al-Sabah [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 374. 
382 See the references in notes 224, 228, 230-248 above. 




wound up under Cypriot law.383 It has been argued that this connecting factor goes 
beyond the concept of COMI in the Insolvency Regulation and should either be amended 
to exclude EU-incorporated companies or be interpreted narrowly by the courts. This has 
not yet been addressed in reported case law and the issue remains unsettled. A similar 
problem may exist in Latvia, where the relevant connecting factor of the lex concursus is 
defined as ‘permanent economic activity’ in the country. 
2. In spite of several preliminary reference rulings by the Court of Justice (which, however, 
deal—with one exception—with questions of jurisdiction and not the applicable law384), 
the demarcation between the lex societatis and the lex concursus remains uncertain in 
many Member States. Questions that have been discussed concern in particular the 
liability of directors for management mistakes or other actions that cause or aggravate 
the insolvency of the company, their liability for failure to file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings, and the re-characterisation of shareholder loans as equity 
capital. We examine these issues in the following paragraphs. 
3. The duty to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings if the company is insolvent 
(and ensuing liability if directors fail to do so, as well as comparable institutions such as 
wrongful trading) is laid down in the national company legislation in some Member 
States (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany until 2008, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands), 
and in insolvency law in others (Belgium, France, Germany since 2008, Greece, Ireland, 
Romania, the UK). In spite of these differences in the Member States’ internal laws, the 
duty to file and liability for failure to file are classified as insolvency law for purposes of 
private international law in the majority of Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, and the UK). 
However, the legal situation is by no means consistent across the EU. In several Member 
States, the classification is controversial or uncertain (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
Spain), and in some it has been suggested in the literature, or decided by the courts,385 
that liability of the directors should be governed by the lex societatis (Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Italy). 
4. This is not simply a problem of the correct (autonomous) interpretation of the criteria 
laid down by European law to distinguish between the lex concursus and other legal 
areas, in particular the term ‘closely connected actions’. Rather, the diverging views in 
the Member States seem to be a function of the inherent limitations of the European 
legal concepts, which are not sufficiently responsive to differences in the Member States’ 
substantive laws. The operation of the Czech ‘wrongful trading’ mechanism illustrates 
this point. Pursuant to Czech law, a member or former member of the company’s 
governing body is personally liable for the debts of the company if the member knew, or 
should have known, that the company was facing an imminent threat of bankruptcy and, 
in breach of the duty of care, failed to take all necessary steps to prevent the 
bankruptcy.386 Given that not only the insolvency administrator, but also the company’s 
creditors have standing to bring a lawsuit, and liability is determined outside of 
insolvency proceedings, it is convincing to conclude that the conditions for actions 
deriving directly from insolvency proceedings are not, or at least not always, satisfied. 
The Court of Justice has held that an action is ‘closely connected’ if it concerns ‘the 
exclusive prerogative of the liquidator’387 and was ‘actually brought in the context of 
                                                 
383 Section 362 Cyprus Companies Law, Cap. 113, which provides: ‘Where a company incorporated outside the 
Republic or which has been carrying on business in the Republic, ceases to carry on business in the Republic, it 
may be wound up by the Court under the provisions of this Law, notwithstanding that it has been dissolved or 
otherwise ceases to exist as a company under or by virtue of the Laws of the country under which it was incor-
porated.’ 
384 Case C-594/14 Kornhaas, n 353 above. 
385 Denmark, see n 364 above. 
386 Section 68 Czech Business Corporation Act. See the discussion in the Czech country report, Section 4.4. 
387 Case C-147/12, ÖFAB v Frank Koot, nyr, para 25. See also n 361 above. 




insolvency proceedings’.388 Thus, depending on the precise formulation of the Member 
States’ internal laws, functionally equivalent mechanisms may fall either within or 
outside the scope of the Insolvency Regulation. 
5. The legal situation is equally unclear with regard to the re-characterisation of 
shareholder loans as equity capital in the vicinity of insolvency. In the Member States 
where this problem has been regulated or discussed, we find a classification both as 
company law (Italy, Poland) and insolvency law (Germany since 2008), and in some 
Member States the classification is ambivalent (Austria, Croatia). 
4.5 Distinction between the lex societatis and the international scope of non-
contractual obligations  
The law applicable to non-contractual obligations has been unified in the EU by the Rome 
II Regulation. 389  Company law may overlap in particular with two types of non-
contractual obligations: tort law and culpa in contrahendo.390 The connecting factor in 
tort law is the place where the damage occurs, thus leading to the application of the lex 
damni,391 unless the parties involved in the tort have their habitual residence in the 
same country or the tort is ‘manifestly more closely connected’ with another country.392 
Culpa in contrahendo is defined as ‘a non-contractual obligation arising out of dealings 
prior to the conclusion of a contract’ and is governed by the law that applies, or would 
have applied, to the contract.393 Alternatively, if that law cannot be determined, the 
connecting factors of tort law apply.394 
The Rome II Regulation contains a provision to distinguish matters falling within the 
scope of the Regulation from issues to be governed by private international company law, 
in particular matters of internal organisation and liability of officers and members.395 
While the Rome II Regulation therefore confirms that certain questions of core company 
law, such as liability for breach of directors’ duties, are governed by the lex societatis,396 
this is less clear where the legal mechanism is not directly connected to the company’s 
internal governance structure or the position of the defendant as director or member. An 
example for the latter case is liability pursuant to principles of piercing the corporate 
veil.397 
The situation is complicated by the use of broadly phrased, open-ended tort-law 
provisions in many Member States that are susceptible to being utilised in a variety of 
situations closely related to processes within corporations and affecting corporate 
stakeholders.398 Of great practical relevance is, for example, the reliance on tort law to 
impose liability on directors for incorrect corporate disclosures.399 In other situations, 
however, the dissemination of incorrect information to investors and shareholders may 
                                                 
388 Case C295/13 H v H.K., nyr, paras 20, 25. 
389 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) 
[2007] OJ L199/40. 
390 Rome II Regulation, art 12. 
391 Rome II Regulation, art 4(1). 
392 Art 4(2), (3). 
393 Art 12(1). 
394 Art 12(2). 
395 Art 1(2)(d). 
396 See, for example, GP Calliess, Rome Regulations: Commentary on the European Rules on the Conflict of 
Laws (Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer, 2011), Article 1 Rome II, para 51. 
397 Ibid, para 52 (arguing that piercing the corporate veil should be classified as ‘a general problem of (tort) 
law’ and should, therefore, be covered by Rome II). 
398 Such open-ended tort law provisions are particularly common in legal systems belonging to the French legal 
tradition, see Arts. 1382, 1383 of the French Civil Code. 
399 For an example from France, see Cass. com., 22 November 2005 (Sté Eurodirect marketing c/ Pfeiffer), RTD 
com. 2006, p. 445. 




be held to constitute a breach of pre-contractual duties (culpa in contrahendo)400 or of 
directors’ duties under company law.401 Tort law has also been used to hold directors 
liable for acts that harm creditors.402 Further issues falling within the scope of typical 
corporate activities, but that may not be characterised as company law for purposes of 
private international law, include aspects of takeover law (going beyond Art. 4(2)(e) of 
the Takeover Directive, which points to the law of the Member State of the ‘registered 
office’) and the position of the statutory auditor. 
Table 4.5 assess how company law and non-contractual obligations are distinguished for 
purposes of private international law, listing the ambivalent cases that have been 
discussed or litigated in the Member States. 
4.5.1 Overview of national laws 
Table 4.5. Lex societatis and non-contractual obligations 
Country Tort Quasi-contract Other cases 
Austria Capacity governed by 
lex societatis 
If the tortious act 
constitutes a breach of 
company law: governed 
by the lex societatis 
Liability for culpa in 
contrahendo based on 
lex loci delicti 
Incorrect disclosures to 
the capital markets: 
according to some 
commentators tort law 
Belgium If the tortious act 
constitutes a breach of 
company law or the 
articles of association or 
it is related to the 
bankruptcy of the 
company, it is governed 
by the lex societatis or 
the lex concursus. 
Example: the board of 
directors of a foreign 
company enters into a 
contractual relationship 
in Belgium, of which it 
is aware or cannot 
reasonably be 
considered not to be 
aware that the 
company will never be 
able to perform 
- - 
Bulgaria Certain liabilities may 
be classified as tort law 
with the consequence 
that the conflict rule for 
tort actions applies. 
Directors may be liable 
in tort for any losses 
caused by negligent 
- No special conflict-of-
laws rule applicable to 
the liability of directors 
under securities 
regulation for mistakes 
in the prospectuses and 
other disclosures to the 
market 
                                                 
400 For example in Germany: BGHZ 71, 284; 72, 382 (dealing with incorrect statements by directors and other 
others to induce investors to invest in a mutual fund or another investment vehicle). More generally see J 
Cartwright and M Hesselink (eds), Precontractual Liability In European Private Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) [conclusions available on SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1309150]. 
401 UK: Peskin v Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC 372. 
402 For example, liability pursuant to German Civil Code, s 823(2), was held to be triggered where the director 
violated various duties of a criminal and insolvency law nature, including, the failure to file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings, see Z 126, 181. 




decisions that directly 
damaged third parties, 
including individual 
shareholders 
Croatia Directors and 
shareholders of a 
foreign company can be 
held liable for tortious 
acts that occur in 
Croatia 
Piercing the corporate 
veil, although non-
contractual in nature, is 
determined pursuant to 
the lex societatis 
- Prospectus liability rules 
apply if the public 
offering is undertaken in 
Croatia or the securities 
are admitted to trading 
on a regulated market 
in Croatia. 
The Croatian regulator 
is generally competent 
to supervise a takeover 
of a foreign offeree 
company if the offeree’s 
shares are admitted to 
trading only on a 
regulated market in 
Croatia 
Cyprus Article 43 (liability for 
incorrect statements in 
the prospectus) and 
Article 169F (duties of 
directors in the case of 
a significant loss of 
capital of a public 
company) provide for 
the imposition of 
liability to pay 
compensation to 
aggrieved parties for 
any damage suffered as 
a result of the breach 
and in this respect, they 
concern tort law. 
However, given that 




relevant provisions), it 
is unlikely that it will be 
classified as tort law.  
 In relation to the duties 
of trust, care and 
diligence that directors 
owe to the company, 
these are not provided 
for in Cap.113 but have 
their roots in English 
common law; they are 
widely accepted to be 




Anyone who is able to 
influence the company 
in any way (except 
members of the board 
of directors) shall be 
liable towards the 
creditors of the 
company for the 
payment of the debts, 
which cannot be 
partially or fully paid to 
them as a result of his 
or her influence; 
classified as a civil 
wrong (tort law) 
Reflective loss: where a 
shareholder or director 
-  




causes a loss to the 
company and at the 
same time to another 
member of the 
corporation in the value 
of his participation, the 
characterisation is 
uncertain 
Denmark No clear demarcation; it 
is most likely that the 
act of a director, 
manager or shareholder 
will be caught by the 
lex societatis if it 
concerns the exercise of 
corporate powers or the 
preservation of the 
company’s capital as 
these issues are 
regulated in the CA 
No discussion in 
Denmark on the 
demarcation between 
company law and culpa 
in contrahendo for 
purposes of private 
international law 
- 
Estonia In problematic cases, 
judges would probably 
apply the lex fori 
approach (ie apply the 
Estonian distinction 
between tort and 
company law, being 
regulated in different 
parts of law) 
No information in private 
international law about 
classification of culpa in 
contrahendo 
No separate conflict of 
laws norm under 
securities regulation for 
mistakes in disclosures 
Finland No case law - - 
France Liability of directors to 
third parties is 
characterised as 
company law, not tort 
law403 
- - 
Germany Lex loci delicti governs 
the capacity of the 
company to commit 
tortious acts 
Lex loci delicti 
according to the 
prevailing view 
generally not engaged if 
the act concerns the 
exercise of corporate 
powers or jeopardises 
the preservation of the 
company’s capital (but 
some commentators 
argue that liability for 
failure to file for the 
opening of insolvency 
proceedings and for 
causing the insolvency 
of the company is tort 
law) 
Directors of foreign 
companies are liable 
where they act on behalf 
of the company without 
making sufficiently clear 
that a legal person with 
limited liability should be 
contracting party 
(liability for creating the 
false legal appearance 
that a person with 
unlimited liability would 
be party to the contract, 
see Table 4.4) 
Claims of post-duty 
creditors that have 
suffered a loss because 
of violation of the duty 
to file: according to 
some commentators to 
be characterised as 
quasi-contract; no case 
Incorrect disclosures to 
the capital markets: 
according to some 
commentators tort law; 
others propose an 
autonomous 
classification that relies 
on the market place 
where the securities are 
traded and that has 
been affected by the 
disclosure as relevant 
connecting factor 
Interpretation of ‘seat’ 
in the Takeover 
Directive (Art. 4(2)(e)) 
for purposes of 
determining the law 
applicable to internal 
matters of the target: 
registered office (as in 
the English version) 
                                                 
403 Cass. civ. 1ère, 1st July 1997 (Africatour), Bulletin Joly des sociétés 1997, p. 1062, note M. Menjucq (the 
only decision of the French Cour de cassation on these matters; holding that Senegalese law applied to the 
liability of directors of a Sengalese company to third parties). 




law according to the 
prevailing view in the 
literature; no case law 
Greece Shareholders are able 
to bring a direct claim 
against directors under 
tort law in certain cases 
even if the claim is for 
breach of directors’ 
duties or provisions of 
the companies act; in 
this case, the claim 
would be dealt with 
under the lex delicti and 
not the lex societatis. 
The lex societatis 
applies to piercing the 
corporate veil 
- - 
Hungary Liability issues that are 
not specifically dealt 
with by the Hungarian 
legislator from a 
company law 
perspective are 
classified as tort law; 
but no case law dealing 
with the issue 
- - 
Ireland Civil liability for 
misstatements in the 
prospectus or practcies 
amounting to market 
abuse is governed by 
the lex societatis 
insofar as the obligation 
is laid down in Irish 
company law; if it is 
laid down in securities 
regulation the liability 
will be classified as tort 
law 
General principles of 
contract law will apply to 
the formation and 
performance of contracts 
between shareholders or 
between the company 
and third parties 
Irish Courts tend to find 
in the pre-contract stage 
that a duty to negotiate 
a contract is 
unenforceable 
Takeover Directive was 
implemented into Irish 




Regulations 2006; this 
implementation does 
not specify how 
company and securities 
law are to be 
distinguished 
Italy Directors are liable in 
tort for any losses 
caused by negligent 
decisions that directly 
damage third parties 
and individual 
shareholders (art. 2395 
Civil Code) 
- - 
Latvia Acts committed by 
directors or 
shareholders and 
harming creditors are 
classified as tort law in 
Latvia; thus the lex loci 
damni applies in these 
cases 
- No case law regarding 
the classification of 
misstatements to the 
market or breaches of 
other capital market 
laws 
Lithuania In problematic cases, 
judges would probably 
apply the lex fori 
approach (ie apply the 
Lithuanian internal law  
establishes duties for the 
parties in pre-
contractual relations to 
No separate conflict of 
laws rules for breaches 
of securities regulation 
or mistakes in 





between tort and 
company law accoridng 
to the regulation of the 
question in the internal 
law) 
act in accordance with 
good faith, but it is not 
clear how these duties 
should be classified 
disclosures to the 
market, no case law 
Not clear how ‘seat’ in 
the Takeover Directive 
is to be interpreted 
Luxembourg No case law, no 
discussion in the 
literature 
No case law, no 
discussion in the 
literature 
- 
Malta Very little guidance in 
the case law; where the 
claim appears to fall 
within the general 
scope of company law 
as defined by Maltese 
law, Maltese courts are 
likely to apply the lex 
societatis 
No consideration of the 
classification of culpa in 
contrahendo in the case 
law 
No consideration of the 
classification of 
prospectus liability and 
other breaches of 
securities regulation in 
the case law 
Netherlands Directors of foreign 
companies can be held 
liable for tortious acts 
under Dutch law (see 
Table 4.4) 
But unclear whether a 
situation where 
directors commit a 
tortious act in their 
capacity as director and 
are sued both for 
breach of directors’ 
duties (Art. 2:9 CC) and 
deceit/wrongful act 
should be characterised 
as tort or company 
law404 
Contract law: see the 
reference of the Hoge 
Raad mentioned before, 
dealing with the 
distinction between 
company and contract 
law for purposes of 
jurisdiction (but not 
applicable law)405 
 
Unclear which conflict 
rules apply if 
misrepresentations in 
the annual accounts and 
reports cause damage 
to third parties (see 
also Table 4.1) 
Poland No case law; scholars 
suggest that the Rome 
II Regulation applies to 
any liability resulting 
from an act or omission 
of the company that 
constitutes a breach of 
Culpa in contrahendo: 
no case law and limited 
scholarly authority (who 
characterise it as non-
contractual obligation) 
- 
                                                 
404  Reference by the Hoge Raad to the CJEU, Case C-47/14 Holterman Ferho Exploitatie BV V Spies von 
Büllesheim, nyr. The Court was asked to interpret both Art. 5(1)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001, stipulating that 
a person may be sued ‘in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the obli-
gation in question’, and Art. 5(3), allowing persons to be sued ‘in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, 
in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur’. As regards the first question, the 
Court held that ‘the action brought by the company against its former manager on the basis of the alleged 
breach of his obligation to perform his duties properly under company law may legitimately be considered to 
come within the concept of “matters relating to contract” for the purposes of Article 5(1) of Regulation No 
44/2001’ (Case C-47/14, para. 54). As far as the second question was concerned, the Court pointed out that 
Art. 5(1)(a) and (3) were mutually exhaustive in liability actions: ‘It is settled case-law that Article 5(3) of 
Regulation No 44/2001 applies to all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and do not con-
cern “matters relating to a contract” within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the regulation’ (ibid., para. 68). Giv-
en that the Court interpreted ‘matters relating to a contract’ as comprising not only the employment or service 
contract concluded between the director and the company, but generally the legal relationship between them 
(ibid., para. 69), liability claims based on breach of duty were held not to fall within the scope of Art. 5(3) Reg-
ulation No 44/2001: Where ‘a company sues its former manager on the basis of allegedly wrongful conduct, 
Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that that action is a matter relating to 
tort or delict where the conduct complained of may not be considered to be a breach of the manager’s obliga-
tions under company law’ (ibid., para. 79—emphasis added). 
405 Above note 404. 




the common tort law 
provisions applicable to 
all persons and entities 
(e.g. rules on unfair 
competition), while the 
lex societatis governs 
liability in connection 
with any tortious acts 
or omissions that 
constitute a breach of 
company law  
Shareholders’ liability 
for the company’s 
obligations (veil 
piercing) falls within the 
scope of the lex 
societatis (Art. 17(3) 
PIL Act) 
Portugal The various provisions 
of the Portuguese CSC 
establishing liability of 
directors/managers to 
the company itself (Art. 
72), the company’s 
creditors (Art. 78), 
individual shareholders, 
or even third parties 
(Art. 79) all fall within 
the scope of the lex 
societatis. 
- Liability of shareholders 
for exercising undue 
influence over the 
company’s organs (Art. 
83(4) CSC): probably 
lex societatis, but some 
authors suggest a 
classification as tort law 
Art. 84 CSC (liability of 
sole owner for the debts 
of the company in 
bankruptcy) and other 
cases of veil piercing: 
probably lex societatis 
Romania Tort law: liability of 
directors who violate 
their duties in regard to 
the statement they 
must fill out verifying 
the legal requirements 
of their appointment 
(Art. 36 (2) let. f LSC) 
(because in this case 
the director does not 
act in the capacity of a 
corporate body) 
Liability of the company 
and its bodies to third 
parties: Art. 2581 lit. f 
NCC states that such 
liability is governed by 
the law applicable to 
the legal person 
(includes piercing the 
veil) 
- In general the law at 
the place of the 
regulated market (lex 
mercatus) will apply to 
breaches of securities 
regulation 
Slovakia Lex societatis if the 
director breaches duties 
that are stipulated in 
the Commercial Code  
Breach of duties 
prescribed under other 
laws: lex concursus or 
lex loci delict 
Scholars discuss whether 
culpa in contrahendo 
shall be classified as a 
contractual or non-
contractual liability, no 
case law 
- 




Slovenia The companies act 
provides for liability of 
directors both to the 
company for breach of 
duty and to 
shareholders for a loss 
other than that suffered 
as a result of the 
damage caused to the 
company; both are 
classified as lex 
societatis 
No available case law 
dealing with culpa in 
contrahendo in relation 
to certain corporate law 
issues 
- 
Spain Veil piercing: law of the 
country where the 
company is active 
Directors’ liability 
towards third parties: 
tort law 
When a foreign company 
acts as if it was a 
‘national’ company: legal 
consequences classified 
as non-contractual and 
thus governed by the 
law of the market where 
the company is active 
The law of the country 
where the company’s 
securities are traded 
(lex mercatus) applies 
in relation to issues 
such as the prospectus 
and transparency 
regime or market abuse 
and takeover bid rules 
Sweden Demarcation between 
company law and tort 
law for purposes of 
private international law 
has not been clarified in 
Swedish law; no case 
law by upper courts 
addressing this issue 
- There are no special 
rules in Sweden 
applicable in the context 
of takeovers (going 
beyond Article 4(2)(e) 
of the Takeovers 
Directive, which refers 
to the law of the 




False statements in 
prospectuses: 
characterised as tort 
law, hence Rome II 
applies 
Auditor liability: 
excluded from Rome II 
(Art. 1(2)(d)), but 
governed by Rome I in 
the case of a contractual 
claim of the company 
against its auditors 
Claim in tort against the 
auditor: usually 
governed by the law 
applicable to the 
contract to carry out the 
auditing (law with the 
closest connection 
pursuant to s. 12 of the 
Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1995 in 
the case of a claim by 
the company or a 
member, or Art. 4(3) 
Rome II in the case of 
some other claimant)406 
Takeovers: chapter 1 of 
Part 28 CA 2006, 
dealing with the 
Takeover Panel, 
extends to foreign 
companies with 
securities admitted to 
trading in the UK (s. 
943(6)); chapters 2 and 
3 on impediments to 
takeovers and squeeze-
out and sell-out are 
limited to cases where 
the offeree company is 
incorporated in the UK 
(s. 991(1)); (hence, 
corresponding to Art. 4 
Takeover Directive) 
                                                 
406 Johnson v Coventry Churchill International [1992] 3 All ER 14. 





1. The boundary region between the lex societatis and the lex loci delicti is probably the 
least well established area of delimitation. In most Member States, very little information 
is available on the criteria that may be employed to determine whether an act that is 
related to the operations of the company, but that goes beyond the internal relationships 
of the corporate organs among each other, falls within the scope of the lex societatis or 
the lex loci delicti. The problem is further complicated by the fact that – as opposed to 
the demarcation of the lex societatis and lex concursus – little guidance in the form of 
case law by the Court of Justice is available, and the internal law of the Member States 
that is of relevance in this context straddles various legal areas, ranging from company 
law to tort, quasi-contract, and securities regulation. It is therefore not surprising that 
the Member States where these issues are discussed in any detail do not agree on a 
common approach to determining the demarcation between company law and non-
contractual obligations. 
2. The question becomes relevant in particular in the following cases: (1) liability of 
directors for a tortious act that constitutes simultaneously a breach of directors’ duties or 
other provisions of corporate law, in particular if the act causes a loss directly to 
shareholders, creditors, or other third parties; (2) liability of shareholders for the debts 
of the company (piercing the corporate veil); and (3) liability of either shareholders or 
directors for breach of capital markets laws, for example misstatements in an offering 
prospectus or breaches of market abuse law. 
3. In order to distinguish between acts committed by a director that lead to liability under 
company law and acts that are governed by tort law, different suggestions have been 
advanced in the Member States. Probably the majority of Member States consider an act 
to be part of the lex societatis (although case law seems to be rare) if it constitutes a 
breach of directors’ duties, company law or the articles of association (Austria, Belgium, 
and Poland), or more generally when it concerns matters regulated in the companies 
legislation, as opposed to other areas of substantive law (Estonia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Portugal, Slovakia, as well as probably Cyprus and Slovenia). This approach, therefore, 
is based on a demarcation for purposes of private international law that follows the 
division that the legislator has drawn in the Member State’s internal law, which 
necessarily varies from state to state. In other countries, it is proposed that the lex 
societatis governs a situation if the act concerns the exercise of corporate power, the 
preservation of the company’s assets, or acting in a corporate capacity (Denmark, 
Germany, and Romania). A third approach distinguishes between decisions that directly 
damage third parties (including the shareholders and creditors), in which case the lex 
loci delicti applies, and decisions that cause a loss to the company and only indirectly a 
(reflective) loss to shareholders or other parties, in which case the lex societatis applies 
(Bulgaria, Italy, Spain). Finally, in some Member States the legal situation is simply 
unclear (Czech Republic, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands,407 and Sweden).408 
4. Piercing the corporate veil is classified as company law in the majority of Member States 
(Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania and the 
UK). However, this view is not universal in the EU. For example, in the Czech Republic, 
the liability of persons who use their influence over the company in a way that results in 
damage to the company’s creditors,409 a legal mechanism comparable to common law 
veil piercing, is seen as falling within the scope of the lex loci delicti. 410  In the 
Netherlands, if the controlling shareholder influences the management of the subsidiary, 
                                                 
407 See already the discussion notes 337-339 above. 
408 It should be emphasised, however, that the legal situation does not seem to be well in any of the Member 
States that have been analysed. 
409 Czech Business Corporations Act, s. 71(3). 
410 Czech country report, Section 4.5. 




it is required to take the interests of the creditors of the controlled company into account. 
Where the shareholder knows or should have known that the third party acted upon the 
behaviour of the controlling shareholder, veil piercing is based on the rules of tort law.411 
In Spain, piercing the corporate veil is governed by the law of the country where the 
company is active, thus potentially leading to a wide international application of the 
Spanish liability provisions.412 
5. Finally, liability for breach of capital markets laws is generally considered not to be part 
of the lex societatis, although we can again observe considerable uncertainty in some 
Member States (see, for example, Cyprus). The majority of Member States classify 
liability for breach of securities regulation as tort law, while others emphasise that the 
classification depends on the character of the respective liability provision as part of 
internal company law or securities regulation (Ireland), and some commentators propose 
an autonomous classification that relies on the market place where the securities are 
traded and that has been affected by the disclosure as the relevant connecting factor.413  
6. In a decision dealing with international jurisdiction pursuant to the Brussels Regulation, 
Kolassa v Barclays Bank,414 the Court of Justice has made some important observations 
that are of relevance to the present context. The Court held that prospectus liability 
claims, as well as damages claims for ‘breaches of other legal information obligations 
towards investors’415 concern ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’.416 While the 
connecting factor for jurisdiction (‘place where the harmful event occurred’ 417 ) is 
different from the connecting factor to determine the applicable law pursuant to the 
Rome II Regulation (‘the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country 
in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred’, i.e. leading to an application of 
the lex loci damni418), a determination of the applicable law that is informed by the 
interpretation of the Court would be in line with the majority opinion in the Member 
States, as discussed above. 
7. Other issues related to non-contractual obligations receive even less attention in the 
Member States. The concept of culpa in contrahendo or breach of quasi-contractual 
duties is known most Member States, but it has been used in the context of company 
law only in a few countries, usually to hold persons liable that create the false impression 
that foreign company is trading as a domestic undertaking or that a person without 
limited liability shall be party to the contract (Germany, Spain). In these countries, it has 
been proposed that the responsibility of the person creating the false impression should 
be governed by the law at the place where the impression was created and had an effect 
on third parties.419 
                                                 
411 See for an analysis K Vandekerckhove, Piercing the Corporate Veil (Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007) 33-
38. 
412 Spanish country report, Section 4.5. 
413 H Eidenmüller, Ausländische Kapitalgesellschaften im deutschen Recht (Munich: Beck 2004), § 4, para 36; S 
Grundmann, ‘Deutsches Anlegerschutzrecht in internationalen Sachverhalten’ (1990) 54 RabelsZ 283-322; KJ 
Hopt, Die Verantwortlichkeit der Banken bei Emissionen (Munich: Beck 1991), para 238. 
414 Case C-375/13, nyr. 
415 Ibid. para 44. 
416 Brussels Regulation, Art. 5(3) (now Art. 7(2) Brussels Regulation Recast). 
417 The Court of Justice interprets the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ as covering ‘both the place 
where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, so that the defendant may be sued, at 
the option of the applicant, in the courts for either of those places’, Case C-360/12 Coty Germany v First Note 
Perfumes, nyr, para 46. In the case of the dissemination of incorrect information to the market, the harmful 
event takes place not necessarily where the investors who has suffered a loss is domiciled, but where ‘the deci-
sions regarding the arrangements for the investments … and the contents of the relevant prospectuses were 
taken … or [where the incorrect] prospectuses were originally drafted and distributed’, Kolassa, n 414 above, 
para 53. 
418 Rome II Regulation, Art. 4(1). 
419 See already our discussion in Section 4.3.2, para 9. 




4.6 Re-classification of company law 
‘Re-classification’ of company law refers to the reformulation or restructuring of a legal 
mechanism of substantive company law so as to bring it within the ambit of a different 
connecting factor, which will typically result in the application of the lex fori, without 
changing the functional character of the mechanism. We distinguish between express 
legislative re-classification and re-classification for purposes of private international law 
only. Under ‘express legislative re-classification’ we understand cases where a policy-
maker replaces an existing legal instrument with another, functionally identical or similar 
instrument, the old instrument having been classified as company law for purposes of 
private international law and the new instrument not being so classified, or vice versa. 
For purposes of this study, it is particularly relevant to explore whether such re-
classification has taken place after, and hence potentially as a reaction to, the decisions 
of the Court of Justice in the cases Centros and Überseering. 
The second type, re-classification for purposes of private international law, refers to the 
different classification of the legal mechanism without changing the structure of the rule 
or its location in the Member State’s internal law. Thus, here the different operation of 
the mechanism is a function of changes in its interpretation, possibly by making use of 
the well-accepted principle in private international law that classification does not need 
to follow the categories of the substantive (internal) law.420 Again, we are primarily 
interested in re-classifications that have occurred as a reaction to the right of 
establishment jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and that seek to provide for the 
continued application of parts of the lex fori to foreign-incorporated companies. 
In this context, it is useful to analyse not only how boundaries between the lex societatis 
and other legal areas have shifted, but more generally to what extent the use of 
functional substitutes alters the rules to which companies are effectively subject, 
irrespective of the determination of the lex societatis. Functional substitutes are 
mechanisms that may be drafted as part of company law in one legal system and in 
another as part of, say, insolvency law or tort law, but that perform the same function in 
protecting the relevant interests.421 It is important to understand the substitutability of 
legal mechanisms in harmonising aspects of private international law, since the 
harmonised connecting factor(s) will only be effective if they do not lead to dissociation 
of functionally complementary institutions.422 
 
                                                 
420 See text to notes 283-285 above. 
421 For example, the problem of ensuring that directors (and shareholders) do not engage in inefficient risk-
taking in the vicinity of insolvency may be addressed through company law instruments, such as the require-
ment to recapitalise or liquidate the company if the company’s assets fall below a certain threshold (and ensu-
ing liability if the directors do not comply with this duty), or through requiring the directors to act in the inter-
est of creditors, rather than shareholders, in the vicinity of insolvency. Alternatively, the same objective may 
be achieved by relying on insolvency law strategies, such as wrongful trading or the duty to file for the opening 
of insolvency proceedings. See Gerner-Beuerle, Paech, and Schuster, n 286 above, pp. 235-237, 240-242. 
422 On this problem, see text to notes 285-287 above. 




4.6.1 Overview of national laws 
Table 4.6. Re-classification 
Country Express legislative re-classification after Centros Re-classification for private international law 
purposes after Centros 
Functional substitutes 
Austria No reclassification No reclassification - 
Belgium - Reclassification not necessary because of 
continued application of the real seat theory 
- The Belgian Centre for Company Law advocates 
the abolishment of the real seat theory and 
suggests that (i) the liability of the board for 
serious mistake which resulted in insolvency and 
(ii) the liability of the founders for the insufficient 
financing of the company should be transferred to 
insolvency legislation in order to be applicable in 
the insolvency of foreign companies operating in 
Belgium 
See left - 
Bulgaria No reclassification No reclassification - 
Croatia No reclassification No reclassification - 
Cyprus No reclassification It may be assumed that those provisions falling 
under Part V, Cap.113 titled ‘Winding Up’ will be 




No reclassification No reclassification - 
Denmark No reclassification No reclassification - 
Estonia No reclassification No, but distinction between company and 
insolvency law according to EU law requirements 
mentioned 
- 
Finland No reclassification No reclassification - 
France No reclassification No reclassification - 
Germany - Duty to file for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings and rules on equity-replacing 
shareholder loans moved from the Stock 
The literature suggests in different cases a 
characterisation as tort or insolvency law to apply 
German creditor protection rules to foreign 
The mechanisms in 
the left column are 
functionally 




Corporation Act and the Limited Liability 
Companies Act to the Insolvency Code in 2008423 
- In addition, provisions imposing personal liability 
on directors who make payments in the vicinity of 
insolvency in the companies acts were changed to 
‘make it easier to classify [the rules] as insolvency 
law and apply [them] pursuant to Articles 3(1), 
4(1) and (2), sentence 1 of the EU Insolvency 
Regulation’424 
companies, see Tables 4.5, 4.6 substitutes of e.g. the 
French action en 
responsabilité pour 
insufissance d’actif or 
English wrongful 
trading 
Greece No reclassification No reclassification - 
Hungary See Table 2 above: some legal changes after 
Cartesio, but no reclassification for present 
purposes 
No reclassification - 
Ireland No reclassification No reclassification - 
Italy No reclassification No reclassification Directors’ criminal 
liability for actions 
undertaken in the 





Latvia No reclassification No reclassification - 
Lithuania No – but report mentions that requirement to have 
at least one Lithuanian representative was dropped 
for EU/EEA companies in 2009  
No reclassification - 
Luxembourg No reclassification No reclassification - 
Malta No reclassification No reclassification - 
Netherlands - International application of the Act on foreign 
business corporations limited after Inspire Art (see 
Table 3.2) 
- A draft law of 2014 proposes to move the rules 
No reclassification - 
                                                 
423 See Bundestags-Drucksache 16/6140, p. 55, for the motivation of the legislator (pointing out that it was important to extend the relevant provisions to ‘foreign compa-
nies that have their real seat and operations in Germany’ in order to avoid ‘regulatory gaps’). 
424 Bundestags-Drucksache 16/6140, p. 47 (also pointing out the wide international scope of the rules was necessary to compensate for ‘partly low formation requirements 
of foreign companies that are not subject to the strict insolvency law of their home state jurisdiction if they operate in Germany’). 




on liability of directors for the insolvency of the 
company from Book 2 CC (company law) to 
insolvency law 
Poland No express reclassification after Centros (there are 
however certain questions integral to company law 
that are treated in other areas of law – typically 
insolvency law rules – but these rules have not 
been changed after Centros) 
No express reclassification after Centros. Directors’ duties to file 
for insolvency and 
liability for not having 
filed timely: 
insolvency law.  
Portugal No reclassification No reclassification - 
Romania No reclassification No reclassification Directors’ duties and 
issues related to the 
representation of the 
company are informed 
by general principles 
of civil and contract 
law regarding the 
mandate (Arts. 2013-




Slovakia No reclassification No reclassification - 
Slovenia No reclassification No reclassification - 
Spain No reclassification No reclassification - 
Sweden No reclassification No reclassification - 
United 
Kingdom 
No reclassification No reclassification, courts follow the case law of 
the Court of Justice and are likely to adopt similar 
approaches, for example to the definition of 
claims deriving from insolvency proceedings, 
where the Insolvency Regulation does not apply 
- 





1. Re-classification of legal strategies that were initially classified as company law in 
response to the case law of the Court of Justice could only be observed in one country: 
Germany.425 A prime example of express legislative re-classification in this jurisdiction is 
the liability for failure to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings, which used to be 
regulated in the German companies legislation and was moved to the Insolvency Code in 
2008. 426  The legislator was explicit in acknowledging that the changes served the 
purpose of ensuring that the lex fori continued to apply to companies whose centre of 
main interest was located in Germany. 427  Similarly, German law characterised 
shareholder loans under certain conditions as equity capital, with the consequence that 
repayment of the loan was subject to the restrictions of capital maintenance law.428 The 
law now provides for an insolvency solution: all loans advanced by a shareholder to the 
company, not just equity replacement loans, are subordinated to the claims of other 
creditors.429 
2. Given that such express legislative re-classification (or indeed implicit re-classification for 
purposes of private international law) does not seem to have occurred in any other 
jurisdiction, it can be concluded that the Centros-line of case law of the Court of Justice 
did not trigger any widespread ‘flight’ from the lex societatis to other areas of conflict of 
laws. Even in Germany, the legislator’s re-classification activities concern individual legal 
strategies that had already been at the boundary of the lex societatis and the lex 
concursus. There was no comprehensive attempt to bring areas of company law within 
the domain of insolvency law in order to take advantage of the real-seat-like connecting 
factor under the Insolvency Regulation. Furthermore, the legal reforms in Germany are 
consistent with generally accepted principles informing the determination of the lex 
concursus and the delimitation of the two legal areas. Therefore, express legislative or 
implicit re-classification does not seem to give rise to major concerns. 
 
                                                 
425 A draft law is under consideration in the Netherlands that would move the rules of liability of directors for 
the insolvency of the company, which are currently in Book 2 Dutch Civil Code (company law) to insolvency law, 
see Dutch country report, Section 4.6. However, it is still unclear whether the proposal will eventually result in 
new legislation. In addition, arguably, the law would simply clarify the legal situation and provide for a solution 
in line with that in the majority of other Member States, see Section 4.4.2 above. 
426 The duty to file is now laid down in s 15a of the Insolvency Code, inserted by Gesetz zur Modernisierung des 
GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen of 23 October 2008 (MoMiG), BGBl. I, p. 2026. Liability 
arises under s 15a in conjunction with the Civil Code, s 823(2), see Z 126, 181. 
427 Bundestags-Drucksache 16/6140, p. 55. 
428 Leading case was Z 90, 381 (BuM). 
429 Insolvency Code, s 39(1) No 5, as amended by MoMiG (n 426 above). 




5. Mechanisms to protect public interests (ordre public) 
Member States pursue different strategies to protect the ‘public interest’ – areas 
of great importance the national economy (for example, the interests of creditors, 
minority shareholders, consumers, employees, or the integrity of commerce and 
trade) – against the activities of foreign companies on their territory. They may 
invoke the concept of ordre public,430 which is recognised both at the European 
level 431  and the national level 432  as a mechanism that allows countries to 
disregard the otherwise applicable lex causae, either partially or completely, 
because the effect of the operation of such foreign law in the concrete case433 
cannot be reconciled with fundamental principles of domestic law, notably human 
rights or ‘some prevalent conception of good morals’.434 This is the traditional 
(negative) function of the ordre public, which is commonly more relevant in 
morally sensitive areas such as family law, rather than in commercial law.  
More broadly understood, and more pertinent to the problems analysed here, 
ordre public is sometimes used in a positive way to justify the application of a 
domestic rule that is ascribed a certain public interest function.435 In this case, it 
is less evident that fundamental principles of the forum are engaged and are in 
need of protection against the effects of foreign law. Rather, the application of the 
domestic rule is a function of a policy decision by the forum to recognise an 
exception to the normal operation of the relevant rules of the conflict of laws 
when a case falls within the scope of the respective provision. Such rules are 
typically referred to as ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ 436  (French: ‘Lois 
d’application immédiate’ or ‘lois de police’; German: ‘Eingriffsnormen’). They can 
be distinguished from internal mandatory norms that cannot be derogated from 
by contract in that they incorporate an implicit or express rule of private 
international law determining the international reach of the substantive content of 
the provision.437 Importantly, given that they seek to achieve specific, clearly 
defined policy objectives, they are often construed less restrictively than the 
general (negative) ordre public. 438 
The disapplication of foreign law on ordre public grounds creates obvious 
problems for legal certainty. 439  Table 5 provides an overview of the use by 
Member States of the concept of ordre public, both in its negative and positive 
function, to disapply a foreign lex societatis under certain circumstances. Where 
this is the case, two related questions arise.  
                                                 
430 Typically referred to as public policy in English legal terminology.  
431 See, e.g., Art 26 Insolvency Regulation; Art 21 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations (Rome I); Art 26 Regulation No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations (Rome II). 
432 See, e.g., for Germany: Art 6 Introductory Act to the Civil Code. 
433 In exceptional cases, the law as such may be held to be contrary to fundamental principles of the 
forum, see, for example, Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] A.C. 249. 
434 Kuwait Airways Corpn v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19, para 17 (quoting Loucks v 
Standard Oil Co of New York (1918) 120 NE 198, 202). 
435 The positive function of the ordre public is notably accepted by jurisdictions in the French and 
German legal tradition, see e.g. Art 6 French Civil Code, but less so by common law jurisdictions. 
436 See, for example, Art 9 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obliga-
tions (Rome I). 
437 This distinction is also reflected in the formulation of unified conflicts rules at the European level, 
see the Rome I Regulation, recital 37. 
438 In a way, the Treaty provides an alternative to Member States acting unilaterally by invoking ordre 
public – namely harmonisation; see Art 50(2)(g) TFEU; see also W Schön, ‘The Mobility of Companies 
in Europe and the Organizational Freedom of Company Founders’ (2006) 3 European Company and 
Financial Law Review 122, 128.  
439 See e.g. A Mills, ‘The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law’ (2008) 4 Journal of 
Private International Law 201. 




First, it is necessary to determine which type of connection with the territory of 
the lex fori triggers the application of national rules or the disapplication of 
foreign rules on ordre public grounds. Second, the application of the host state’s 
law to foreign companies potentially constitutes a restriction of the right of 
establishment, which accordingly needs to be justified. If the state relies on the 
negative ordre public, the reasons given for invoking it will often be congruent 
with the grounds for justification under Article 52 TFEU, although this may differ 
depending on how extensively Member States interpret ordre public. Justification 
is generally more problematic when ordre public is invoked in its positive function. 
Provided that the relevant provisions of the host state apply to all companies 
operating in that state’s territory, the extension of the lex fori to foreign 
companies can in principle be justified by imperative requirements in the public 
interest outside the scope of Article 52 TFEU. However, the test, which follows the 
criteria set out by the Court of Justice in its Gebhard decision, is relatively 
demanding.440 For example, if a Member State was to advance considerations of 
creditor protection, the state had to overcome a high argumentative threshold. 
Generally, the Court’s response that potential creditors were ‘put on sufficient 
notice’441 would leave little scope for Member States to restrict the activities of 
foreign companies.  
This section also explores whether such arguments have been advanced in the 
Member States to justify overriding mandatory provisions of the forum’s company 
law (or another legal area) and whether they are considered to withstand scrutiny 
under the Treaty. 
 
 
                                                 
440 Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard contro Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano 
[1995] ECR I-4165, according to which national measures restricting EU freedoms must ‘fulfill four 
conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative 
requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objec-
tive which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it’ (para 37). 
441 See, for example, Inspire Art, para 135. 




5.1 Overview of national laws 
Table 5. Ordre public 
Country Definition of the negative ordre public Examples in company law Positive ordre public 
Austria s 6 of the Austrian PIL Act: a ‘provision of 
foreign law shall not be applied where its 
application would lead to a result which is 
incompatible with the fundamental 
principles of the Austrian legal order. 
Where necessary, the relevant provision of 
Austrian law shall be applied’ 
According to Austrian case law, 
disapplication of foreign law on ordre 
public grounds would only occur in 
exceptional circumstances. No specific 
case law regarding company law. 
- Some commentators argue that Austrian 
employee participation rules should be 
regarded as overriding mandatory 
provisions (Eingriffsnormen), but the 
prevailing view is to apply the lex societatis 
even for companies having their real seat 
in Austria (i.e. companies incorporated in 
an EU/EEA Member State 
- Some commentators also suggest that 
rules on capital maintenance and re-
characterisation of shareholder loans are to 
be viewed as overriding mandatory 
provisions 
Belgium Principles that are essential for the moral, 
political, and economic order of Belgium442 
Public order must be strictly interpreted; 
consequently, it is unlikely that the ordre 
public will be applied in company law, 
given the far-reaching liberalisation of 
company law nowadays443 
- Some rules regulating the trade register 
or specific activities such as insurance are 
qualified as lois d’application immédiat 
(voorrangsregels) 
- General regulation in Art. 20 PIL Code 
Bulgaria According to article 45 PILC a provision of 
a foreign law shall not apply if the 
consequences of such application are 
manifestly incompatible with Bulgarian 
public policy.  
This shall be assessed by way of taking 
into account the extent of connection of 
the relationship with the Bulgarian legal 
order and the significance of the 
consequences of the application of the 
foreign law. 
 
Ordre public has not been invoked in 
practice in the area of company law. 
- In the realm of company law, Bulgarian 
overriding mandatory provisions are quite 
rare. Competition law, takeover and IPO 
regulation apply also to foreign companies, 
and legal scholars consider these rules as 
‘overriding mandatory provisions’.  
- Application of a third country’s positive 
ordre public: Pursuant to article 46(2) PILC 
the court may have regard to the 
mandatory rules of another state with 
which the relationship has a close 
connection if the said rules, according to 
                                                 
442 Cass. 18 June 2007, Arr.Cass. 2007, 1359, Tijdschrift@ipr.be 2007/2, 33. 
443 For an old case holding that the prohibition of the establishment of one-member limited liability companies was part of the ordre public, see Cass. 5 January 1911, Pas. 
1911, I, 68. 




the law of the state that created them, 
must be applied notwithstanding what law 
has been determined as applicable by a 
conflict-of-laws rule of the Code. 
Croatia According to the Private International Law 
Act, foreign law shall not be applied if 
doing so would violate ‘the basic principles 
of the social organisation laid down by the 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia’ 
(Art. 4). 
Croatian courts have not yet refused to 
apply foreign company law on the basis of 
a violation of public policy under Article 4 
- 
Cyprus No explicit statutory rule. According to case 
law: ‘The doctrine of “public policy” should 
be applied only in clear cases, in which the 
harm to the public is substantially 
incontestable and does not depend upon 
the idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial 
minds’.444 
The doctrine has not been applied in 
relation to companies or in the context of 
private international law for companies. 
The legislative restrictions upon the 
acquiring of immovable property in Cyprus 
by foreigners would be considered as an 
internationally mandatory rule. 
Czech 
Republic 
Provisions of a foreign law, which are to be 
applied pursuant to the provisions of the 
Private International Law Act, shall not be 
applied if the effects of such application are 
manifestly incompatible with the public 
policy (ordre public) (Section 4 PIL Act).  
No case law related to company law 
issues. 
Overriding mandatory provisions of Czech 
law always apply, before the determination 
of the applicable law (Section 3 PIL Act). 
No applications so far to foreign 
companies. 
Denmark Not codified; literature: if the application of 
the lex causae would lead to a result which 
is obviously incompatible with the 
fundamental principles of Danish law 
- No application of ordre public, but of the 
related ’doctrine of circumvention’ (fraude 
à la loi) in several company law cases, 
notably Centros445 
- Based on the Centros decision of the 
Court of Justice, the literature argues that 
the application of the ‘doctrine of 
circumvention’ must be interpreted so as 
to respect EU law 
No discussion of the possible positive 
function of ordre public in the literature nor 
any examples in case law. 
Estonia ‘Foreign law shall not apply if the result of 
such application would be in obvious 
conflict with the essential principles of 
One case mentioned (on splitting up of 
companies) 
Estonian Law is applied if the result of the 
application of foreign law ‘would be in 
obvious conflict with the essential 
                                                 
444 Glamor Development Ltd v Christodoulos Christodoulou [1984] 1 CLR 444. 
445 UfR2000.1079H. 




Estonian law (public order). In such an 
event Estonian law applies.’ 
principles of Estonian law (public order)’. 
Finland The concept of ordre public is recognised in 
principle, but no application / no case law 
in relation to companies. 
No case law No case law 
France No legal definition; ordre public is 
understood as an exceptional mechanism 
allowing the exclusion of a foreign law that 
contains provisions considered as 
unacceptable by French courts 
The (negative) ordre public has never 
been used in practice in order not to apply 
parts of the lex causae governing 
companies incorporated in other Member 
States and pursuing business within the 
territory of France; the Gebbard criteria 
have not been discussed in the academic 
literature or by the courts in the context of 
company law 
Particularly some laws in the social area 
are qualified as lois d’application 
immédiate (also called lois de police) and 
applied by French courts to companies 
incorporated in other countries 
French rules about worker representation 
applied to foreign companies with an 
establishment (not necessarily the real 
seat) with the minimum number of workers 
pursuant to the French overriding 
provisions446 
Director of a Swiss company who was 
working usually in France was required to 
be affiliated with the French social security 
system; connecting factor was not the real 
seat of the Swiss company but the place 
where the director usually exercised his 
job447 
Courts make no difference between EU and 
non-EU companies 
Germany Art. 6 EGBGB: a ‘provision of the law of 
another country shall not be applied where 
its application would lead to a result which 
is manifestly incompatible with the 
fundamental principles of German law’ 
No case law; the predominant view in the 
literature suggests a restricted use of the 
ordre public: there have to be imperative 
reasons of the public interest given that 
the application of the lex fori restricts a 
company’s freedom of establishment 
Company name: German courts take the 
view that the ordre public requires that the 
name of the company indicates its legal 
form, that there is no confusion with the 
name of other companies and no deception 
of the public448 
Some scholars argue that the rules on 
employee co-determination are overriding 
                                                 
446 Cons. Etat, 23 June 1973, Syndicat général du personnel de la Compagnie des Wagons-lits, Rev. crit. DIP 1974, p. 344, concl. N. Questiaux. See also, Ph. Francescakis, 
‘Lois d’application immédiate et droit du travail’, Rev. crit. DIP 1974, p. 273. Cass. soc., 19 March 1986, Rev. crit. DIP 1987, p. 554 ; 3 March 1988, JDI 1989, p. 78, note 
M.-A. Moreau-Bourlès ; Rev. crit. DIP 1989, p. 63, note G. Lyon-Caen. 
447 Cass. soc., 18 March 1999, CPAM Haute-Savoie et autre c/ SA Unic Mann et autres, Bull. Joly Sociétés 1999, p. 1205, note M. Menjucq. 
448 BayObLG NJW 1986, 3029; OLG München NZG 2007, 824; OLG Frankfurt, FGPrax 2088, 165. 




mandatory provisions (Eingriffsnormen); 
no case law 
- Some scholars also suggest that rules on 
legal capital, veil piercing and the business 
address are overriding mandatory 
provisions 
Greece Provisions of foreign law do not apply if its 
application conflicts with good morals (boni 
mores) and public order (ordre public). 
No case law regarding company law rules. Provision on negative ordre public may 
result in a positive dimension of the ordre 
public, as far as Greek law would be used 
to fill gaps resulting from the disapplication 
of foreign law. 
Hungary The application of foreign law shall be set 
aside when it would be incompatible with 
Hungarian ordre public (Nmjt s 7(1)). 
However, ordre public is not a well-defined 
term in Hungarian law and courts use 
heterogeneous criteria. 
No application in company law matters. The concept of ‘overriding mandatory 
provisions’ is not used by courts regarding 
company law matters (but is accepted in 
theory). 
Ireland Ireland’s approach to ordre public is based 
on English law (but see subsequent 
column); see also UK, below 
 
No explicit case law. The Irish Constitution 
could matter, as companies can have 
constitutional rights in Ireland, and enjoy, 
amongst other rights, protections for 
private property; in principle, then, 
application of the lex societatis could 
violate the constitutional rights of 
companies in a manner that violated Irish 
public policy, thus causing its exclusion. 
No, public policy is not given a positive 
function to apply particular domestic rules 
rather than excluding foreign rules. 
Italy Italian courts must not apply foreign rules 
if their effects infringe a general principle 
of ‘public order’. In this case, domestic 
courts should apply either (a) rules of a 
different jurisdictions, selected by other 
connecting factors that Italian private 
international law may provide for the same 
matter or (b) Italian law. (Article 16 Italian 
Private International Law Act). 
No reported case law.  Italian private international law ‘respects’ 
the unity of the law of the country of 
incorporation and the application of 
overriding mandatory provisions is rare. 
Examples are:  
- duty to register in the Italian register for 
foreign companies having their 
administrative seat or its main object in 
Italy 
- disclosure requirements for secondary 
seats of foreign companies 
- takeover and IPO regulation 




Latvia The law of a foreign state is not applicable 
in Latvia if it is in conflict with the public 
order or moral ideals of Latvia, or 
mandatory or prohibitive norms of Latvian 
law. 
Requirements as to the trading names of 
companies. 
Application of a domestic rule that is 
ascribed a certain public interest function 
(‘overriding mandatory provision’) 
Applied in a case concerning the 
intersection between company law and 
labour law rules.449  
Lithuania ‘provisions of foreign law shall not be 
applied where their application would be 
inconsistent with the public order 
established by the Constitution of the 
Republic of Lithuania and other laws. In 
such instances, the civil laws of the 
Republic of Lithuania shall apply’ 
No case law available Yes, for mandatory rules considering the 
‘nature of these provisions, their purpose 
and the consequences of application or 
non-application thereof’; eg, applied in the 
area of employment law 
Luxembourg Borrowed from French law (see above) No case law applying the ordre public to 
company law matters 
The Luxembourg court of appeal has held 
that a statute of 18 May 1979 on employee 
representation450 was a ‘loi de police’ 
within the meaning of Art. 7 Rome 
Convention.451 However, the case was not 
concerned with the issue of whether the 
relevant company should have established 
employee representatives, but determining 
the law governing the employment 
contract. The court suggested in obiter that 
it would apply the 1979 Statute to 
branches located in Luxembourg. 
Malta No statutory rules, but the concept of ordre 
public is generally recognised. 
No case law concerning the invocation of 
the concept of ordre public in company 
law matters. 
No case law. 
Netherlands Ordre public in company law: Art. 2:20 CC 
(‘Where the activities of a legal person are 
contrary to public order, the District Court 
shall prohibit and dissolve that legal person 
upon the request of the Public Prosecution 
On the basis of the ordre public of Art. 
2:20, foreign companies can be prohibited 
to operate in the NL and assets located in 
the NL liquidated (Arts. 10:122, 123 CC) 
- Considered not to be in conflict with Art. 
Generally not used to apply a domestic rule 
that is ascribed a certain public interest 
function 
Main exceptions: Act on foreign law 
business corporations; rules on employees’ 
                                                 
449 See the CJEU decision in the relevant case, C-232/09 Dita Danosa v LKB Līzings SIA [2010] ECR I-11405. 
450 Loi du 18 mai 1979 portant réforme des délégations du personnel. 
451 Court of appeal of Luxembourg, 13 January 2010 (Koelzsch), Pasicrise Luxembourgeoise 35, p. 63. The case eventually resulted in a judgment of the European Court of 
Justice (Case C-29/10). 




Service’), but no clear definition of ordre 
public. 
24(2) Brussels I-bis councils located in the NL 
Poland General ‘negative’ ordre public clause: ‘A 
foreign law shall not be applied, if its 
application would lead to results that are 
incompatible with the fundamental 
principles of the legal system of the 
Republic of Poland’ (article 7 PIL Act).  
No case law on company law matters. Overriding mandatory provisions are 
generally applicable ‘if it clearly results 
from their content or purpose that they 
should be applied to a given legal 
relationship irrespective of the law 
otherwise applicable’ (art. 8(1) PIL Act); 
overriding mandatory provisions of third 
states could also be applied if there is a 
‘close connection’ (art. 8(2) PIL Act). There 
is no case law and this topic is still 
debated. Examples suggested in the 
literature: directors’ disqualification and 
notification duties of a dominant company 
towards the subsidiary 
Portugal General ‘negative’ ordre public clause: 
foreign law is not applicable whenever such 
application constitutes an offence to the 
fundamental principles of public policy of 
the Portuguese State (article 22 Civil 
Code). 
 
Applicable rule: in the first place should be 
found within the legal system deemed 
applicable according to choice of law rules, 
if not feasible Portuguese law applies (art. 
22(2) Civil Code). 
No case law in the field of company law. ‘Norms of immediate application’ (i.e.: 
overriding mandatory provisions). No case 
law in the field of company law. 
Romania Ordre public can lead to the disapplication 
of the foreign law normally designated, 
when this would manifestly contravene to 
fundamental norms and values of the 
forum legal order and would generate 
results incompatible with the fundamental 
principles of Romanian law or regarding the 
protection of human rights. 
This might be the case when the 
proprietary rights of the shareholders of a 
foreign company with assets in Romania 
have been severely affected by unjust or 
discriminatory foreign nationalisations or 
expropriations. 
No case law. 
Slovakia Principles of the social and state 
establishment of the Slovak Republic and 
Despite its broad formulation, academics 
claim that ordre public should be 
No case law. 




its legal system. These principles will 
mainly stem from the Constitution of the 
Slovak Republic. 
interpreted and applied narrowly; no clear 
application in company law 
Slovenia Ordre public does not include all mandatory 
provisions of domestic law, but only those 
imperative legal norms and moral rules, 
the violation of which would jeopardise the 
legal and moral integrity of the Slovene 
legal order. 
As the Supreme Court held, it should be 
used only as a last resort, when its non-
application would lead to unsustainable 
consequences for the domestic legal 
system. 
No existing court decision has used the 
(negative) ordre public.  
No. 
Spain Yes, codified in Art. 12(3) of the Civil code. 
 
No application in the area of company law 
so far. 
This is debated in the literature in relation 
to co-determination rules; no case law. 
Sweden The application of a foreign provision would 
be manifestly incompatible with the very 
foundations of the Swedish legal system. 
In practice, it is very rarely invoked by the 
Swedish courts and there are no reported 
cases relevant to the field of company 
law. 
Theoretical question; no reported cases 




The application of a foreign substantive 
rule of the lex causae is excluded if it 
departs so radically from the concepts of 
fundamental justice accepted in the forum 
country that its application would be 
intolerably offensive to the judicial 
conscience there452 
 
In company law: no requirement that the 
company should be carrying on business 
within the UK 
 
Amalgamation between two companies 
incorporated in the same country, with the 
law of the country of incorporation 
providing that the amalgamated company 
should succeed to all of the assets, but 
only to some of the liabilities, of the 
companies amalgamated (considered as 
equivalent to a fraudulent transfer)453 
- Requirement of the lex societatis that a 
company or its directors perform acts in 
another country which would infringe the 
criminal law of that country454 
UK courts are able to derogate from the lex 
causae in order to assert an overriding 
interest in the application of their own 
substantive rules; but there is no existing 
No case law in which the UK courts have 
actually derogated in this way from a 
foreign lex societatis 
 
                                                 
452 Cheni v Cheni [1965] P 85; Dicey, n 202, above, Rule 2. 
453 Adams v National Bank of Greece [1961] AC 255. 
454 Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 (CA); Regazzoni v Sethia [1958] AC 301; Royal Boskalis v Mountain [1999] QB 674 (CA); Ralli v Naviera [1920] 2 KB 287; but not 
dealing with corporate matters governed by the lex societatis. 





1. As is evident from Table 5 above, the laws of all Member States allow for, at least in 
principle, an ordre public-based disapplication of foreign law provisions where its 
application would entail consequences that cannot be reconciled with fundamental moral 
conceptions or policy choices of the lex fori. The prerequisites for dis-applying foreign 
law on ordre public-grounds are not always determined by statute, and where they are, 
the statutory definitions exhibit some variation across different Member States. The 
basic contours of the concept are, however, well established and largely comparable 
across the EU. 
2. The results also indicate that Member States are generally very reluctant to invoke the 
negative ordre public in the field of company law. Case law is, with a few exceptions, 
non-existent, and commentators argue that it is unlikely that courts will rely on ordre 
public in the future to disapply rules of a foreign lex societatis. A notable exception to 
this pattern is Denmark, where a related concept, the ‘doctrine of circumvention’, has 
been used in a number of company law cases, including Centros. The doctrine of 
circumvention is considered to be less demanding than ordre public and hence can be 
appealed to more readily. 455  However, after the decision of the Court of Justice in 
Centros, it has been acknowledged in Denmark that the doctrine needs to be applied 
restrictively so as to be consistent with the requirements of EU law, in particular the 
Gebhard conditions.456 Some case law can also be found in the UK, where courts have 
used the ordre public, for example, to prohibit arrangements permitted pursuant to the 
law of incorporation that were considered to be equivalent to a fraudulent transfer.457 
3. The positive function of ordre public is more relevant for purposes of this study. Here, 
we can observe significant differences in the Member States, and a common 
understanding of what type of rules may be considered as overriding mandatory 
provisions, or what type of situation may warrant intervention on the part of the forum 
state, is not evident. Suggested applications of the positive ordre public range from 
employee co-determination and capital maintenance rules (according to views expressed 
in the Austrian, German and Spanish academic literature) to rules on company names 
(Germany), 458  directors’ disqualification (Poland), labour law (Lithuania, Latvia), and 
laws regulating the social security system (France).459 In areas that can be considered 
part of ‘core’ company law, 460  little case law exists. This may in part also be a 
consequence of the problems in enforcing mandatory overriding provisions in areas that 
concern the internal organisation of a company, such as for instance in relation to board 
structure and composition. 
6. Reincorporations 
Companies incorporated under the law of a given Member State may seek to subject 
themselves to another Member State’s law without having to go through the process of 
liquidation in their original jurisdiction. This process is typically referred to as 
‘reincorporation’. This transaction, if allowed, normally requires companies to transfer 
their ‘registered office’ (or ‘statutory seat’ in jurisdictions that simply refer to the 
company’s seat as indicated in the articles of association) and to be registered in the 
new country as a company governed by the law of this jurisdiction. As we shall see 
below, however, national rules are extremely diverse and reincorporation requirements 
vary widely across Member States. Furthermore, most Member States have traditionally 
                                                 
455 Danish country report, Section 5.1. 
456 For references see ibid. 
457 See n 453 above. 
458 See n 448 above. 
459 See n 447 above. 
460 See also the discussion in Chapter V., Section 6. below. 




restricted, prohibited or rendered excessively difficult such transactions. In part, the 
difficulties can be explained in political terms, as Member States’ legislators often regard 
company law as a device for protecting a wide range of corporate constituencies rather 
than merely addressing the shareholder-director relationship. The new applicable 
company law may be less protective for creditors, for other stakeholders or for minority 
shareholders than the law of the country of origin – or, at least, the country of origin 
may consider this to be the case. Consequently, a reincorporation might be harmful for 
such ‘weak constituencies’, unless other legal mechanisms are in place for protecting 
them.461 Moreover, whenever the legal rules protecting such constituencies differ, this 
may create the possibility for companies to exploit such differences opportunistically, 
even where the absolute level of protection is similar in the Member States concerned. 
In the European Union, however, alternatives to reincorporations exist for companies 
that want to change the law applicable to them. First, most companies incorporated in 
an EU Member State can make use of cross-border mergers in order to achieve effects 
equivalent to a reincorporation. Such de facto reincorporations are typically implemented 
by incorporating a new ‘shell’ company (normally a subsidiary) in another Member State 
and then merging the holding company ‘into’ the newly formed foreign company. Cross-
border mergers of this type can now be implemented under a common procedural 
framework,462 which lead to a significant simplification of these transactions. However, 
cross-border mergers may still be burdensome and costly, depending on the legislation 
of Member States’ involved and due to the absence of a ‘fast-track- procedure’,463 mostly 
so when the only aim of a cross-border merger is relocating a company’s registered 
office, without implementing a real integration between different companies. 464  The 
second option for an undertaking to achieve a change of applicable company law without 
liquidation is by using the vehicle of a European Company (‘SE’).465 In this regard, it is 
worth recalling that the SE Regulation only provides a general regulatory umbrella, and 
that SEs are mainly governed by the legal framework for public companies in the 
Member State where their registered office is situated. 466  SEs can relocate their 
registered offices from one Member State to another, which also triggers a change in the 
applicable national rules.467  SEs, however, are required to maintain their head office in 
the same Member State as that of registered office.468 Additionally, SEs can only be 
incorporated by pre-existing public companies under specific circumstances, which are 
detailed in the SE Regulation and whose common denominator is the existence of a 
‘cross-border’ connection.469 
                                                 
461 See FM Mucciarelli, ‘The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of Reincorporations in the U.S. and the 
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The main question of cross-border reincorporations by way of relocation of registered 
office throughout the EU, therefore, remains unresolved. In particular, what was, and 
partially still is, unclear is whether the freedom of establishment requires Member States 
to allow domestic companies to reincorporate abroad (in the EU) and foreign companies 
incorporated in another Member State to incorporate as domestic companies without the 
need to liquidate. In recent years the Court of Justice has gradually clarified its case law 
in order to favour mobility, although the present situation is still partially ambiguous. 
The original position of the Court of Justice, at least according to a widespread view, 
allowed Member States to pose limits in the way to relocations abroad of a company’s 
central management and to ‘outbound reincorporations’. In the decision Daily Mail470 the 
European Court of Justice addressed the limits placed by a Member State (the UK) to the 
relocation abroad of a domestic company’s administrative seat and tax domicile. The ECJ 
held that such restriction was not a violation of the freedom of establishment. The Court 
based its opinion on a general assumption regarding the relation between a company 
and its state of incorporation, which seem to stretch far beyond tax law. In particular, it 
was maintained that ‘unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the law and, in 
the present state of Community law, creatures of national law. They exist only by virtue 
of the varying national legislation which determines their incorporation and 
functioning’.471 As a consequence, the ECJ concluded that the freedom of establishment 
‘cannot be interpreted as conferring on companies incorporated under the law of a 
Member State a right to transfer their central management and control and their central 
administration to another Member State while retaining their status as companies 
incorporated under the legislation of the first Member State.’472 According to widespread 
opinion, in light of Daily Mail, Member States could place any limitations in the way of 
any ‘moving out’ of a domestic company. Daily Mail, however, also revealed several 
ambiguities. This decision, indeed, only addressed restrictions placed by a Member State 
against an outbound relocation of a company’s tax residence, while it was not related to 
outbound reincorporations (which are, as we shall see hereunder, impossible from the 
standpoint of English law). In the same decision, additionally, the ECJ also added that 
the freedom of establishment ‘also prohibits the Member State of origin from hindering 
the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company 
incorporated under its legislation’.473 The ECJ confirmed this statement in other decisions, 
maintaining that the freedom of establishment ‘prohibits the Member State of origin from 
hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a 
company incorporated under its legislation.’474 
The Court of Justice partially clarified these issues in the more recent decisions rendered 
in the cases Cartesio 475  and VALE. The former decision was related to a Hungarian 
company that aimed at transferring its ‘seat’ to Italy, while keeping the Hungarian lex 
societatis. In Cartesio, the Court concluded that ‘a MS has the power to define […] the 
connecting factor required’ for being incorporated under its law, and thus is capable of 
enjoying the right of establishment, and the criteria for continuing to maintain that 
status. That included the power ‘not to permit a company governed by its law to retain 
that status if it intends to reorganise itself in another MS by […] moving its seat’ there, 
‘thereby breaking the connecting factor required under the national law of the MS of 
incorporation’.476 This statement, therefore, is in clear continuity with Daily Mail, which 
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maintained that companies are ‘creatures of national law’ and that Member States retain 
the power to impede cross-border transfer of own companies’ headquarters or of any 
other material factors. Importantly, however, the Court also explains477 that this Member 
State power does not include a power to impede a ‘conversion’ into a company governed 
by the law of a new Member State. Rather, there is a right under the freedom of 
establishment, as against the Member State of origin, to reincorporate a company 
abroad: ‘far from implying that national legislation on the incorporation and winding-up 
of companies enjoys any form of immunity from the rules on freedom of establishment, 
cannot, in particular, justify the Member State of incorporation, by requiring the winding-
up or liquidation of the company, in preventing that company from converting itself into 
a company governed by the law of the other Member State, to the extent that it is 
permitted under that law to do so’.478 Outbound reincorporations, therefore, fall within 
the scope of the freedom of establishment and any restriction must be assessed under 
the Gebhard test. Against this backdrop, liquidating any companies that transfer abroad 
their registered office with the aim of reincorporating abroad is, according to the Court of 
Justice, neither a necessary nor a proportionate reaction. The statement was not 
necessary for deciding the case at hand and it might be questioned whether it is entirely 
binding or a mere obiter dictum. Furthermore, the ECJ also declared that a prohibition of 
outbound reincorporations is a violation of the freedom of establishment, unless it serves 
overriding requirements in the public interest. The Cartesio ruling, therefore, does not 
seem to provide for conclusive answers to the question of whether Member States must 
allow domestic companies to reincorporate abroad (or, at least, it may be debated 
whether this part of the Cartesio ruling is directly binding or not). In this regard, it is 
necessary to stress that a Polish court has recently submitted a request to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling which aims at clarifying whether Polish law, which makes 
outbound reincorporations without liquidation impossible in practice (as will be 
summarised hereunder), is compatible with freedom of establishment.479  
Finally, in the decision rendered in the VALE case (in which an Italian private limited 
company sought to reincorporate under Hungarian law, but the Hungarian register 
refused to register the company as the ‘universal successor’ of the Italian company)480, 
the Court of Justice argued that national law ‘cannot escape all review in the light of 
articles 49 and 54’.481 The Court of Justice maintained that any national legislation ‘which 
enables national companies to convert, but does not allow companies governed by the 
law of another Member State to do so, falls within the scope of’ the freedom of 
establishment482, with the consequence that Member States must provide ‘the same 
possibility’ for conversion to foreign EU companies as they provide to those governed by 
national law. 483  Any restrictions to inbound reincorporations must be justified by 
overriding reasons in the public interest and should be proportionate to the goals that 
the Member State aims at achieving (‘Gebhard test’). In this regard, the Court of Justice 
also argued that if a Member State prohibits reincorporations in any circumstance, such 
operations would be prevented ‘from being carried out even if the interests mentioned 
[…] are not threatened’. Consequently, a complete ban of reincorporations goes beyond 
what is necessary to protect those interests.484 Member States thus must comply with 
the principles of ‘Equivalence and Effectiveness’, and the recording of the status of 
predecessor in law could not be denied to VALE Costruzioni if it was granted in domestic 
conversions.485 The decision VALE, therefore, clarified486 that restrictions to cross-border 
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reincorporations need to be justified against the Gebhard test and that a complete 
prohibition is neither a necessary nor a proportionate reaction, since minorities, creditors 
and employees might well be protected by applying rules on domestic conversions. 
Nevertheless, a number of powerful obstacles still exist, and outbound reincorporations 
by way of transfer of registered office seem to be rarely used in practice (although data 
in this regard are sparse and unclear), unless both the country of origin and the country 
of arrival provide for clear regulations of these transactions and agree upon the 
prerequisites. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the most appropriate and 
desirable solution is introducing a harmonisation directive (originally envisaged as the 
14th company law directive) that allows and regulates cross-border reincorporations 
throughout the European Union. The first detailed proposal for a directive, which was 
eventually not approved, was presented in 1997.487 The 1997 proposal did not alter 
Member States’ choice as to the primary connecting factors, be it the ‘incorporation 
theory’ or the ‘real seat theory’.488 Consequently, companies that sought to reincorporate 
out of a real seat country should have also relocated the connecting factor abroad, and 
companies that sought to reincorporate into a real seat country should have relocated 
the connecting factor onto their territory. According to the 1997 proposal, additionally, a 
project of reincorporation was to be published in the commercial register of the country 
of origin489 and shareholders should approve this proposal with qualified majority.490   
In 2002 a panel of corporate law specialists, entrusted by the EU Commission with the 
task of developing reform proposals for European company law (the ‘high level group’), 
recommended liberalising reincorporations, as a way to increment both efficient 
allocation of resources and the quality of domestic laws.491  Along this line, the Action 
Plan issued in 2003 by the Commission, aimed at modernising company law, maintained 
that the 14th directive was a priority for the EU. 492  This aim was confirmed by a 
consultation launched in 2004, the large majority of whose respondents supported the 
idea that ‘the transfer of registered office should not entail the company being wound up 
in the home Member State’.493  
A fully-fledged policy analysis conducted a few years later, however, revealed a much 
more complex scenario. This impact assessment, indeed, concluded that a harmonisation 
by way of regulation would be too rigid a mechanism and would not be proportionate to 
the planned goals. Therefore, according to this analysis the only options left on the table 
were either a harmonisation through directives, or leaving the present situation 
unaltered. In this regard, the assessment also argued that harmonisation by way of 
directive could be too onerous and not proportionate ‘considering that the practical effect 
of the existing legislation on cross-border mobility (i.e. the cross-border merger directive) 
is not yet known and that the Community approach to the issue of the transfer of the 
registered office might be clarified by the Court of Justice in the near future’, with the 
consequence that ‘it might be advisable to wait until the impacts of those developments 
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can be fully assessed and the need and scope for the EU action better defined.’ 494 
Therefore, the project of harmonising Member States’ regimes on cross-border transfers 
of registered office was eventually put on hold.  
A need for clarifying rules on cross-border reincorporations, however, still exists in 
business practice. Various resolutions and reports of the European Parliament, indeed, 
have requested the European Commission to present a new proposal for a directive on 
the cross border transfer of companies’ registered offices. 495  Furthermore, a public 
consultation launched in 2012 on the future of European company law confirmed the 
interests of the respondents in a legislative initiative aimed at clarifying that European 
companies can transfer their registered office throughout the EU and reincorporate into 
another Member State without liquidating in the country of origin, and at regulating 
these cross-border reincorporations. 496  The 2012 Action Plan on company law and 
corporate governance 497 acknowledged that the issue of cross-border reincorporations is 
relevant, but that ‘any future initiative in this matter needs to be underpinned by robust 
economic data and a thorough assessment of a practical and genuine need for and use 
made of European rules on transfer of seat.’ Following this acknowledgement, in 2013 
the European Commission launched a new public consultation on the transfer of 
companies’ seat, which confirmed that in most Member States the rules on cross-border 
transfers of statutory seat (or registered office) are still unclear and that the Court of 
Justice’s decisions rendered in the case Cartesio and VALE are not sufficient for clarifying 
all regulatory issues.498  
In light of the efforts undertaken by the European Commission and by the European 
Parliament, aimed at understanding whether harmonisation is appropriate, the 
comparative analysis of this study assesses how Member States deal with the issues 
related to outbound and inbound reincorporations. In this regard, it is worth 
remembering that, in order to ‘reincorporate’ from one jurisdiction to another, a 
company should follow both private international law and substantive rules of the State 
of origin and the State of arrival, provided that these countries allow this transaction. In 
particular, the ‘emigrating’ company must comply with the rules and requirements on 
formation and registration of new companies imposed by the State of arrival, and should 
be eventually cancelled from the company register of the ‘State of origin’. In this regard 
it is useful to distinguish the standpoint of the ‘State of origin’ (‘outbound 
reincorporations’) from the standpoint of ‘State of arrival’ (‘inbound reincorporations’). 
Finally, for countries that follow the ‘real seat theory’ (in one of its versions) the question 
arises as to whether a foreign company by transferring the connecting factor onto the 
domestic territory should reincorporate according to domestic company law. 
6.1 Outbound reincorporations 
From the viewpoint of the State of incorporation (hereinafter also the ‘State of origin’) of 
a company that seeks to reincorporate under the law of another country, the most 
important issue is whether domestic private international law rules allow companies to 
change the applicable company law (the lex societatis) without previously liquidating. If 
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this general question has a positive answer, we should inquire what substantive rules 
and which procedure a company should follow in order to reincorporate under the law of 
another country. Normally, as we shall see, reincorporations require a decision of the 
shareholders to transfer abroad the company’s registered office or statutory seat. These 
concepts (statutory seats and registered office) are normally used interchangeably in 
this report, but we should be aware that they might refer to different concepts in 
different jurisdictions. In particular, the concept of ‘registered office’ derives from English 
law and refers to the place registered in the official company register; by contrast, the 
wording ‘statutory seat’ refers to a place mentioned in the articles of association, which 
almost invariably also coincides with the registration. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude, 
however curious such hypothesis might seem, that companies could be allowed to 
transfer their ‘statutory seat’ (by amending the corresponding clause in the articles of 
association) without transferring their registration in the State where the new statutory 
seat is situated. That a company might amend the clause of its articles of association 
indicating its ‘statutory seat’ without triggering a transfer of registration is a possibility 
that legal scholars have considered; 499  additionally, as we shall see hereunder, the 
comparative analysis reveals that there are cases where this dissociation is possible.  
From a policy viewpoint, the issue of whether and under which conditions a jurisdiction 
shall allow voluntary outbound reincorporations is quite complex. In several Member 
States, indeed, company law rules, besides the agency problem arising between 
shareholders and directors and the ‘horizontal’ relation among shareholders, also 
address the relation between companies and their creditors and, in some jurisdictions, 
their employees. A widespread strategy for protecting creditors is based upon rules on 
capital formation and capital maintenance, and upon minimum capital requirements in 
public companies, but the intensity of creditor protection varies from Member States to 
Member States. Additionally, in several jurisdictions the level of creditor protection is 
higher in public companies than in private companies.500 Furthermore, certain Member 
States include in the lex societatis rules on debentures and on the powers of debenture 
holders. Eventually, in some Member States employees have the right to appoint a 
certain number of directors or of members of the supervisory board (‘codetermination’). 
In these circumstances, a reincorporation under the law of another jurisdiction would 
harm creditors or employees if the new jurisdiction is less protective than the country of 
origin (e.g.: when the law of country of arrival does not provide for codetermination 
mechanisms or when capital maintenance rules are weaker than those of the country of 
origin), unless the country of origin also considers these rules as overriding mandatory 
provisions to be applied to pseudo-foreign companies. The impact of reincorporations on 
creditors and other stakeholders also depends on the scope of company law in the 
country of origin. If rules protecting creditors and other stakeholders are included in the 
scope of company law, reincorporations might harm these stakeholders, if the country of 
arrival is not as ‘protective’ as the country of origin. By contrast, if the country of origin 
protects creditors and other stakeholders through non-‘company law’ rules, such as 
insolvency law or tort law, a reincorporation is likely to be less harmful for pre-existing 
stakeholders, who can continue relying upon the application of insolvency or tort law of 
the country of origin.501 Regarding creditor protection, things are further complicated by 
the significant differences between the regulation of private and public companies that 
exist in several countries. Rules on creditor protection of public companies are partially 
harmonised at EU level, while virtually no such harmonisation has taken place in relation 
to private companies. Furthermore, in recent years a trend has emerged throughout the 
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European Union to reduce or abolish minimum capital requirements and probably 
creditor protection mechanisms based on company law rules more generally, at least as 
far as private limited companies are concerned. Consequently, in some Member States 
significant differences have emerged in the level of protection afforded to creditors of 
private and public companies, respectively. The effects of a reincorporation may thus 
depend not only on the countries, but also on the national company types involved. 
Moreover, the powers and protections of minority shareholders vary from Member State 
to Member State. Where the law of the ‘country of arrival’ is less protective of minority 
shareholders than the ‘country of origin’, a cross-border reincorporation could therefore 
also harm this group of stakeholders. These are the main reasons why in several 
Member States reincorporations are restricted or not allowed by national law. In 
particular, a complete ban of reincorporations (in particular of outbound reincorporations) 
would be an effective (albeit drastic) strategy for protecting the acquired interests and 
expectations of pre-existing creditors or other stakeholders relying on application of the 
company law rules of the country of incorporation, and yet, such legislation is unlikely to 
be compatible with the Treaty, at least in relation to outbound reincorporations. 
Additionally, as we shall see hereunder, even when reincorporations are allowed, the 
State of incorporation may provide for specific legal mechanisms for protecting minority 
shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders, such as: (a) supermajority requirements 
for the approval of these decisions; (b) further safeguards aimed at protecting dissenting 
minority shareholders, such as the right to withdraw from the company; (c) special 
safeguards aimed at protecting creditors, such as the right to object to the 
reincorporation or to request a guarantee.  
It is therefore important to also assess the procedural and technical aspects of 
reincorporations in the State of origin. Such technicalities and procedures have 
significant practical and theoretical implications. Companies cannot exist without being 
registered in an official commercial or company register and without being incorporated 
under the law of a specific jurisdiction. Companies, in other words, cannot exist ‘outside’ 
or independently of a jurisdiction of incorporation and, consequently, reincorporations 
require continuity of registrations across jurisdictions. Once a company – in accordance 
with the private international law rules of both jurisdictions involved – starts being 
governed by the law of the new jurisdiction, its articles of association will already need to 
have complied with the provisions of the new jurisdiction of incorporation. 502 
Furthermore, it is the State of origin that governs the point in time when the domestic 
commercial register strikes off that company. In this context the question arises as to 
whether the ‘emigrating company’ should be cancelled only after it has been registered 
in the companies register of the destination country as a domestically incorporated 
company. Indeed, if a company was cancelled from the company register of the State of 
origin before being registered in the State of arrival, there would be a period of time 
during which that company would not be registered anywhere, and thus not exist. It 
goes without saying that this possibility would raise the risk of opportunistic decisions, as 
we shall see hereunder. All these issues, as we shall see in the comparative analysis, are 
still uncertain in most Member States of the EU. 
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6.1.1 Overview of national laws 
Table 6.1. Voluntary outbound reincorporations 
Country Are voluntary outbound 
reincorporations allowed? 
 
Company law requirements for 
outbound reincorporations 
Procedure to implement such 
decisions 
Comparison with cross-border 
mergers 
Austria No explicit statutory route 
to outbound 
reincorporations, but after 
Cartesio and VALE it is 
generally acknowledged 
that reincorporations are 
permitted within the EU.  
Unclear, but some scholars argue 
that the rules regarding cross-
border mergers and the 
reincorporation of SEs should be 
applied by analogy. 
Unclear, but according to some 
scholars the rules regarding the 
reincorporation of SEs can be 
applied by analogy. 
Unclear whether re-
incorporations, which are not 
provided for explicitly in statute, 
follow the same rules as cross-
border mergers, particularly in 
relation to the preservation of 
employee participation. 
Belgium Yes (art. 112 PIL Code). 
A reincorporation requires 
a transfer of both the 
statutory seat and the real 
seat. 
The possibility to reincorporate 
abroad without interruption of 
the legal personality is 
acknowledged in Art. 112 PIL 
Code. 
- The PIL Code does not provide 
for a specific procedure. 
- Practitioners suggest that the 
company must call a GM; the 
conversion must be approved 
and the articles of association 
amended with a 75% majority of 
voting shares and at least half of 
the share capital being present 
Companies have to comply with 
the formalities of establishment 
in the country of immigration, 
after which the company can be 
delisted from the corporate 
register. 
Considerable legal uncertainty of 
cross-border conversions as 
opposed to mergers because of 
the lack of an established legal 
framework 
Bulgaria Unclear. 
Relocation of the seat in 
another state is effective 
only if it has been carried 
out in accordance with the 
law of the affected states 
(Article 59 PILC). This is a 
general substantive rule 
that governs both inbound 
and outbound relocations 
No substantive provisions. 
The effects of a relocation 
decision are still unclear and not 
explicitly regulated.  
Bulgarian law, in particular, does 
not clarify whether the company 
law of the country of the new 
statutory seat becomes, or may 
become, applicable, and whether 
the company should be canceled 
- Cross-border mergers are 
regulated in detail, following the 
relevant EU legislative 
provisions. 




Country Are voluntary outbound 
reincorporations allowed? 
 
Company law requirements for 
outbound reincorporations 
Procedure to implement such 
decisions 
Comparison with cross-border 
mergers 
of statutory seats. 
In practice an outbound 
reincorporation cannot be 
implemented due to lack 
of administrative and 
technical provisions.  
from the Bulgarian register. 
Even in the field of tax law, the 
Corporate Income Tax Act 
(‘CITA’) does not provide for the 
tax treatment of outbound 
and/or inbound re-incorporation 
and transfer of seat of other 
types of entities, different from 
Societas Europaea and European 
Cooperative Society. 
Croatia No (a transfer of 
registered office leads to 
liquidation; only 
exception: SE) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Cyprus Yes. 
Article 354A provides that 
Sections 354B to 354I 
shall apply to all overseas 
companies, incorporated 
or registered pursuant to 
the laws of an approved 
country or jurisdiction, 
according to the laws of 
which these companies 
can still exist as legal 
entities under the legal 
regime of another 
approved country or 
jurisdiction. 
Some of the requirements listed 
in Article 354L are: 
- shareholders’ special resolution 
according to the memorandum 
and articles of association.  
- a declaration which confirms 
the solvency of the company. 
- the absence of proceedings for 
the liquidation of the company. 
- the fact that the company has 
submitted all the fees and has 
completed all the proceedings 
relating to the company’s 
business. 
An application has to be 
presented before the Registrar 
so as to give his consent; 
This application shall be 
accompanied by a statement 
signed by at least two directors 
of the company duly authorised 
and it must include the name of 
the company that wishes to be 
registered in the approved 
country or jurisdiction, the place 
of the proposed registration of 
the company and the name and 
address of the competent 
authority in the approved 
country or jurisdiction and the 
suggested date of registration. 
Shareholders’ special resolution 
of the company according to the 
memorandum and articles of 
association of the company, a 
declaration which confirms the 
In contrast with the rules on re-
incorporation procedure which is 
taken care of solely by the 
Companies Registrar, the legality 
of cross-border mergers is 
scrutinised by the District Court 
of the district where the 
registered office of the merging 
Cyprus companies is situated, 




Country Are voluntary outbound 
reincorporations allowed? 
 
Company law requirements for 
outbound reincorporations 
Procedure to implement such 
decisions 
Comparison with cross-border 
mergers 
solvency of the company, the 
absence of proceedings for the 
liquidation of the company, the 
fact that the company has 
submitted all the fees and has 
completed all the proceedings 
relating to the company’s 
business. 
Creditors can object to the 
reincorporation, indicating 
sufficient reason.  
The Court may approve the 
reincorporation with an order, or 
on the basis of sufficient 
guarantees or can prohibit it.  
The Registrar shall consent to 
the continuation of the company 
under the legal regime of 
another country or jurisdiction. 
Czech 
Republic 
Yes (S. 139 to 143 Civil 
Code, applicable to any 
jurisdiction, and S. 384f to 
384p Transformations Act, 
applicable only regarding 
EU Member States). 
Czech companies can also 
transfer they statutory 
seat into another Member 
State without changing 
applicable company law 
provided the law of the 
Member State to which 
the seat is to be moved 
allows so. These 
companies are also 
cancelled from the Czech 
Reincorporation into another 
Member State: procedure 
detailed in the Transformation 
Act (which corresponds to Article 
8 SE Regulation).  
Company law steps: (i) the 
proposal should be published in 
the Commercial Gazette, (ii) 
decision of the general meeting 
to approve the transformation 
(supermajority of 3/4 three 
fourths of the attending 
shareholders), (iii) a notary 
certificate of the cross-border 
transformation. 
Creditor protection: creditors can 
demand that the company puts 
Procedural steps: (i) application 
for the registration of the seat 
transfer in the foreign 
commercial register, (ii) foreign 
authority’s decision on the 
registration of the transfer in the 
foreign commercial register, (iii) 
a notary issues a certificate for 
the registration of the seat 
transfer in the commercial 
register, (iv) filing for 
cancellation from the Czech 
register, (v) a court’s decision of 
cancellation. 
Same rules (Section 59 – 59zb 
Transformations Act) and Section 
61 et seq. Transformations Act. 




Country Are voluntary outbound 
reincorporations allowed? 
 
Company law requirements for 
outbound reincorporations 
Procedure to implement such 
decisions 
Comparison with cross-border 
mergers 
register, provided that the 
country of arrival accepts 
this outcome. 
up security for its unpaid debts. 
The company shall provide the 
notary with documents proving 
that all known debts have been 
satisfied or secured or that 
creditors have not exercised 
their rights to ask for a security. 
No agreement with creditors: a 
court shall determine type and 
amount of a security that the 
company should provide. 
Denmark Yes.  
Allowed since 2012 for 
reincorporations within 
the EU/EEA (Ch. 16a CA) 
General conditions: (a) the 
receiving country allows the 
transfer; (b) legislative 
protection of the Danish 
company’s employees’ co-
determination in the receiving 
state. 
Procedure: 
(a) Transfer plan and a written 
statement that provides 
explanations and reasons for the 
plan for the transfer drafted by 
the BoD; 
(b) statement of evaluation 
experts that creditors are 
sufficiently protected after the 
transfer (unless shareholder 
unanimously decide not obtain 
this statement); 
(c) general meeting resolution 
(no earlier than four weeks after 




The transfer plan must be filed 
with the DBA no later than four 
weeks after it is signed by the 
central governing body.  
If creditors have a right to file 
their claims, this must be stated 
in the Agency’s notification.  
Within 4 weeks after the 
resolution of seat transfer the 
company should apply for 
registration; DBA ensures that all 
actions and formalities that are 
necessary to implement the 
transfer have been taken or met 
and issues a certificate if 
statutory conditions are satisfied 
(general meeting decision, 
creditor protection, dissenting 
shareholder appraisal)  
When the DBA receives 
confirmation from the Member 
State to which the seat has been 
transferred that the transfer of 
the seat has been registered in 
their register, the company can 
The law follows the rules on 
cross-border mergers closely 




Country Are voluntary outbound 
reincorporations allowed? 
 
Company law requirements for 
outbound reincorporations 
Procedure to implement such 
decisions 
Comparison with cross-border 
mergers 
(a) if the valuation experts 
conclude that the creditors will 
not be sufficiently protected after 
the transfer, or if no declaration 
has been made by a valuation 
expert on the creditors' position, 
creditors whose claims arose 
prior to the DBA’s publication of 
the transfer may file their claims 
up to four weeks after the date 
of the publication.  
(b) no claims for which adequate 




dissenting shareholders may 
demand redemption of their 
shares. 
be cancelled. 
Estonia Unclear. No specific rule. 
No case law. 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Finland Unclear, no rule n.a. n.a. n.a. 
France Yes.  1) ‘Sociétés en commandite 
simple’ and ‘sociétés à 
responsabilité limitée’: 
unanimous vote to decide a 
change of ‘nationality’ (article L. 
222-9 and L. 223-30 Commercial 
Code). Both EU and extra EU.   
2) Sociétés anonymes:  
a) The Extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting can decide 
a change of nationality with a 
majority of two third of the 
shareholders present or 
No regulation of the procedure to 
implement a reincorporation.  
-  




Country Are voluntary outbound 
reincorporations allowed? 
 
Company law requirements for 
outbound reincorporations 
Procedure to implement such 
decisions 
Comparison with cross-border 
mergers 
represented, provided that a 
special treaty exists between 
France and the country where 
the seat is transferred to 
preserve the legal personality of 
the company.  
b) As there is no special treaty, 
the requirements of article L. 
225-97 are never satisfied and 
the transfer of the seat of a 
‘société anonyme’ can be 
decided only with a unanimous 
vote of the shareholders. 
Germany Traditionally not possible 
and no legal procedure, 
but after VALE it is 
acknowledged that 
reincorporations need to 
be permitted within the 
EU 
Unclear. 
Probably, application of the 
German rules on national 
conversions by way of analogy 
(Transformation Act – 
Umwandlungsgesetz) 
Unclear.  
Probably application of either the 
Transformation Act or the SE 
Regulation by way of analogy. 
Greater legal certainty for cross-
border mergers. 
Greece Yes Companies limited by shares 
(real seat theory):  
- quorum 2/3 of capital at first 
call, 1/2 and 1/3 at subsequent 
calls; qualified majority 2/3 of 
votes cast.  
- minority shareholders: 
withdrawal right (act 
2190/1920). 
Companies with limited 
liability(real seat theory) and 
private companies (incorporation 
theory):  
- unanimous decision (act 
3190/1955 and act 4072/12). 
For private companies: 
- Directors’ report explaining 
consequences to members, 
creditors and employees.  
- Directors’ report and a financial 
report registered in the General 
Commercial Registry for at least 
2 months before the decision.  
- The General Commercial 
Registry can reject the 
application for seat transfer on 
grounds of public interest. 
Specific statute (No 3777/2009) 
on cross-border mergers of 
limited liability companies. This 
statute follows the pattern of 
domestic mergers procedure and 
provisions for protecting 
creditors and shareholders. 
There is no case law or any other 
opinion stating that this 
procedure for cross-border 
mergers could apply by way of 
analogy to reincorporations.  
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reincorporations allowed? 
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outbound reincorporations 
Procedure to implement such 
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n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ireland No 
 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Italy Uncertain, but companies 
can relocate their 
statutory seat abroad.  
No explicit regulation of 
outbound 
reincorporations. 
In practice, certain 
corporate registrars (eg 
Milan) allow 
reincorporations and have 
regulated this proceeding. 
Case-law is uncertain 
(decision of the Supreme 
Court in the negative).  
In order to transfer abroad a 
company’s statutory seat: 
- the decision should be 
approved by the general meeting 
(quorum and qualified majority) 
- dissenting shareholders can 
withdraw from the company. 
 
 
Not regulated at all. Gap-filling 
role of the commercial register. 
- Some local offices of the 
commercial register (eg Milan) 
require the company be 
registered in the country of 
arrival before it can be cancelled 
from the Italian register. 
- Other local offices cancel the 
company after the general 
meeting decides to transfer the 
seat abroad (see: Court of 
Justice decision Interedil) 
Cross-border mergers are 
analytically regulated (company 
law requirements, shareholders 
and creditors’ protection, 
registration and cancellation 
procedure), while 
reincorporations are still not 
regulated. 
Latvia No specific rule.  Indirect 
reincorporation possible 
by establishing a new 
company abroad and 
merging with it. 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lithuania No. Any attempt of 
reincorporating abroad 
would trigger liquidation.  
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Luxembourg Yes.  Unanimity (art. 167-1(1) and 
art. 199 companies act) 
Not regulated (risk that the 
company is cancelled before its 
registration in the new 
jurisdiction) 
Cross-border mergers are 
regulated, while reincorporations 
are still not regulated. 
Malta Yes (Continuation of 
companies regulation 
2002) 
Reincorporations allowed only to 
‘approved countries’ (EU, OECD 
countries, Jersey, Guernsey, 
Gibraltar, British Virgin Islands, 
Bahamas, Bermuda, Isle of Man, 
- The company is cancelled after 
the Maltese register receives a 
copy of the instrument of 
continuation, issued by the 
relevant authority of the country 
- 




Country Are voluntary outbound 
reincorporations allowed? 
 
Company law requirements for 
outbound reincorporations 
Procedure to implement such 
decisions 
Comparison with cross-border 
mergers 
Cayman Islands and Mauritius.) 
No provision for protecting 
minorities.  
of arrival. 
- Creditor protection: creditors 
can object to the reincorporation, 
with the consequence that the 
Register must not allow the 
reincorporation. 
- Plc general meeting decision: 
quorum 51% of the capital; 
majority 75% nominal value of 
the shares represented.  
- Ltd shareholders’ decision: 
majority 51% in the nominal 
value of the shares conferring 
voting right.  
 
Netherlands No legal regulation, but 
some cross-border 
conversions occur in 
practice based on the ECJ 
case law, and a draft bill 
of 2014 provides for a 
legal framework  
Procedure followed by 
practitioners: see draft bill 
hereunder, with respect to the 
protection of creditors, the 
approval by a supermajority of 
the shareholders and the 
intervention of the notary. 
Draft bill: The board of directors 
proposes the cross-border 
conversion; creditors have two 
months to oppose the proposal 
and require security for their 
claims; shareholders must 
approve the cross-border 
conversion with a two thirds 
majority; the conversion does 
not affect the existence of the 
company, all rights, duties and 
obligations remain unaffected; 
sell-out right of opposing 
minority shareholders; to protect 
Draft bill: deed of notary; when 
the conversion is completed is 
determined by the receiving 
country 
Since cross-border conversions 
are not (yet) regulated, 
companies generally make use of 
the cross-border merger regime 
to avoid legal uncertainty. 




Country Are voluntary outbound 
reincorporations allowed? 
 
Company law requirements for 
outbound reincorporations 
Procedure to implement such 
decisions 
Comparison with cross-border 
mergers 
the employees, the draft bill 
prohibits the cross-border 
conversion of a Dutch company 
with a ‘structuurregime’ unless 
an agreement has been reached 
about a scheme of 
codetermination as provided in 
the Act on the SE. 
Poland Unclear, but most legal 
scholars maintain that 
outbound reincorporations 
are not allowed. There is, 
however, no case law. It 
is debated whether this 
provision applies to 
outbound transfers of 
statutory seat towards 
EEA countries (after 
Cartesio and Vale). 
Statutory law is 
controversial: on the one 
hand, art. 19(1) PIL Act 
maintains that transfers of 
seat within the EEA area 
does not result in loss of 
legal personality; on the 
other hand, a 
shareholders’ resolution 
on relocation of the 
statutory seat is akin to a 
liquidation decision (art. 
270(2) and 459(2) 
Commercial Company 
Act). This issue will 
probably be resolved by 
the Court of Justice in 
It is still uncertain whether 
reincorporations are allowed, due 
to complete lack of any rule 
governing substantive and 
procedural steps (and uncertain 
PIL law). If we accept that 
outbound reincorporations to 
EEA countries are allowed, the 
rules on domestic conversions 
apply accordingly. The essential 
company law steps are: (i) plan 
of transformation (ii) 
shareholders’ decision with 
supermajority (3/4 of votes cast 
representing ½ of the paid up 
capital). 
 
It is still uncertain whether 
reincorporations are allowed, due 
to complete lack of any rule 
governing substantive and 
procedural steps (and uncertain 
PIL law). If we accept that 
outbound reincorporations to 
EEA countries are allowed, the 
procedural steps are: (i) 
registration in the foreign 
register (application per 
analogiam of rules on certificate 
of completion as for cross-border 
mergers); (ii) after the 
registration abroad: cancellation 
from the Polish register.  
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outbound reincorporations 
Procedure to implement such 
decisions 
Comparison with cross-border 
mergers 
deciding on the 
application for a 
preliminary ruling in the 
case C-106/16, Polbud v 
Wykonawstwo sp. z.o.o. 
Portugal Yes: ‘[t]he transfer of the 
registered office of the 
collective person to a 
place subject to a 
different legal system 
shall not extinguish its 
legal personality, if the 
laws of both offices agree 
to that.’ (article 33(3) 
Civil Code). 
Consider that Portuguese 
companies can also 
transfer their real seat 
into another Member 
State while keeping the 
original applicable law, if 
the country of arrival 
accepts this outcome. 
Company law matters for 
outbound reincorporations are 
regulated by the Companies Act 
(art. 3(2) to 3(5) Companies 
Act): (a) shareholders’ approval 
by a qualified majority of 75% of 
the share capital; (b) right of 
shareholders who have not voted 
in favour of the decision of 




Romania No statutory rule. The 
most likely answer, based 
upon trade register 
practice, is a negative 
one. In 2014, a decision 
of the Brasov Court of 
Appeal (and the trade 
register) rejected a 
request of a Romanian 
company to reincorporate 
in the UK on the basis of 
two arguments: (a) 
Cartesio does not clarify 
Decisions to relocate a 
company’s statutory seat outside 
Romania should be decided by 
the general meeting with 
qualified majorities for SA or 
unanimity for Ltd. (art. 113 CL). 
- - 




Country Are voluntary outbound 
reincorporations allowed? 
 
Company law requirements for 
outbound reincorporations 
Procedure to implement such 
decisions 
Comparison with cross-border 
mergers 
the reincorporation 
proceeding and no specific 
rules have been 
implemented in Romania; 
(b) the company has not 
provided evidence of 
having completed all 
formalities in the UK.  
 
Slovakia Relocation of the 
registered office of a 
Slovak company abroad is 
conditional upon existence 
of the regulation of such 
relocation in EU Law or in 
an international treaty. 
In absence of the relative 
legislation, outbound re-
incorporation is influenced 
by the case law of 
Cartesio and VALE.  
Relocation of only ‘real 
seat’: the company is still 
considered to be a Slovak 
legal entity. 
Change of the legal form shall be 
applied per analogiam. 
The deletion of the company 
from the Commercial Register is 
considered the ‘death’ of the 
company, as stipulated in 
Section 68 Subsection 1 of the 
Commercial Code. 
Hence, ensuring a sound 
chronological order of firstly 
registering the company in the 
host state and only then deleting 
the company from the home 
state’s Commercial Register will 
be beneficial to the protection of 
the continuity of the company, 
prevention of time travelling of 
the company and the protection 
of creditors. The above-
mentioned view has been 
confirmed by the (scarce) case 
law of the Slovak courts. 
The Commercial Code of the 
Slovak Republic stipulates 
(paragraph 69 part 2) that only 
companies with identical legal 
form can take part in a merger.  
 
The question arises of how this 
‘similarity of company legal form’ 
is to be assessed, as the 
Commercial Code does not clarify 
this issue. In this regard, it is 
widely accepted that the 
assessment should be conducted 
on a case-by-case basis.  
Slovenia No explicit statutory rule 
(with the exception of 
provisions on the SE).  
However, legal scholars 
maintain that such 
operations are allowed as 
a consequence of Cartesio 
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Procedure to implement such 
decisions 
Comparison with cross-border 
mergers 
and VALE and that rules 
applicable to the SE 
should be applied by 
analogy.  
Spain Yes (articles 92 – 103 
Structural Modifications 
Act ‘SMA’ n. 3/2009). 
- The company should not be 
under a liquidation or insolvency 
proceeding (art. 93(2) SMA) 
- Transfer project (drafted by 
directors) in a public document 
should be published in in the 
official Journal of the Commercial 
Register; 
- Approval of general meeting of 
shareholders with supermajority 
(private companies: 2/3 of 
capital; public companies:  ½ of 
voting shares if 50% or more of 
voting capital attended the 
meeting, 2/3 of voting shares if 
only between 25% and 50% of 
shares with voting capital 
attended the meeting). 
- Withdrawal right of 
shareholders who didn’t vote in 
favour of the decision; 
- The Commercial Register issues 
a certificate attesting that all 
formalities have been duly 
fulfilled. 
- The reincorporation is 
considered as fulfilled and 
effective when the company is 
registered at the Registry of its 
new seat.  
- The foreign register should 
issue certificate of registration 
and deliver it to the Spanish 
commercial Registry. 
- The company can only be 
cancelled after such certificate is 




Swedish rules regarding 
the transfer of a 
company’s seat into or out 
of Sweden and the impact 
of the ECJ rulings has yet 
to be tried by any courts. 
- - - 
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No503 - - Similar results to a cross-border 
reincorporation can be achieved 
by a cross-border merger, or a 
sale of the business to a 
company incorporated for that 
purpose abroad 
 
                                                 
503 Dicey, n 202, above, at para. 30-003; and Re Irrigation Company of France Ltd (1871) LR 6 Ch App 176. 





1. Member States follow different strategies regarding ‘outbound reincorporations’, ranging 
from complete prohibition to explicit and detailed regulations of these transactions. To 
understand Member States’ regimes, however, we should consider the ‘law in action’, not 
just the ‘law on the books’. If we look at Member States’ regimes as they are in reality, 
we can see that, despite the most recent development of the case-law of the Court of 
Justice in the decisions Cartesio and VALE, several jurisdictions still prohibit or make 
impossible outbound reincorporations. These countries are: Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom. As a matter of fact, companies 
incorporated in these countries cannot relocate their statutory seat or registered office 
abroad and reincorporate under the law of a different Member State without prior 
liquidation. In most jurisdictions, the impact of Cartesio and VALE has been scarcely 
debated or acknowledged, and only in Poland legal scholars seem to have debated this 
issue. Regarding Poland, it is worth stressing that statutory rules are not univocal: on 
the one hand, art. 19(1) PIL Act maintains that transfers of seat within the EEA area do 
not result in loss of legal personality; on the other hand, a shareholders’ resolution on 
relocation of the statutory seat is treated akin to a liquidation decision (art. 270(2) and 
459(2) Commercial Company Act). This issue will probably be resolved by the Court of 
Justice in deciding on the application for a preliminary ruling in the pending case C-
106/16, Polbud v Wykonawstwo sp. z.o.o, which is related to a Polish company seeking 
to reincorporate in another Member State. It is interesting to note that, despite the 
decision in Cartesio being related to a Hungarian company seeking to relocate its 
headquarters to Italy, Hungarian companies still cannot, as a practical matter, 
reincorporate abroad, with little discussion of the direct applicability of the Court of 
Justice’s interpretation of the Treaty in Cartesio. Finally, in 2014 a decision of the 
Romanian Court of Appeal of Brasov rejected a request for reincorporation to the UK on 
the basis of two arguments: (a) that case law of the Court of Justice (Cartesio in 
particular) does not provide any clear guideline regarding the proceeding for 
implementing reincorporations, and no specific rules have been issued in Romania; (b) 
the specific company that sought to reincorporate in the UK did not provide evidence 
that all formalities were actually fulfilled in the country of arrival.  
2. Five Member States, namely Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal, 
statutorily allow domestic companies to ‘reincorporate’ abroad, despite domestic 
legislation not fully regulating the procedural details of this transaction. Most of these 
countries follow the ‘real seat theory’, with the sole exception of France, which is to be 
classified as a mixed system. In order to reincorporate abroad, companies incorporated 
in jurisdictions following the real seat theory (Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Greece regarding public companies) should transfer both their administrative seat and 
their statutory seat. However, despite statutory rules of these jurisdictions explicitly 
allow domestic companies to change lex societatis without the need to liquidate, the 
procedure to implement outbound reincorporations is not regulated; therefore, the risk 
arises that companies are cancelled from the register of the jurisdiction of origin before 
their registration in the commercial register of the new jurisdiction. France, Greece, 
Luxembourg and Portugal regulate the internal decisional procedure and the mechanism 
for protecting shareholders, while no special creditor protection mechanisms is foreseen. 
According to the Portuguese Companies Act, the general meeting of shareholders should 
approve a transfer of ‘real seat’ abroad with a quite high majority (75% of the share 
capital); additionally, dissenting or absent shareholders can withdraw from the company 
(but there is no provision for protecting creditors). French and Luxembourgish 
companies, by contrast, can change ‘nationality’ (that is to say reincorporate in another 
jurisdiction) only by unanimous decision, which makes these transactions almost 
impossible at least for widely held companies. It is worth mentioning, however, that in 
Luxembourg a reform project is under discussion, and is likely to be approved soon, 




according to which a reincorporation will only require 2/3 of the votes cast. Greek 
companies limited by shares can reincorporate abroad by deciding with qualified 
majorities; additionally, a right to withdrawal from the company protects their 
shareholders. Greek private companies (which follow the ‘incorporation theory’) can also 
reincorporate abroad by unanimous decision.  
3. Another group of States, by contrast, allow and clearly regulate reincorporations through 
detailed company law and procedural rules. These countries are: Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Malta, and Spain. In all these countries, reincorporations require a 
decision of the shareholders to transfer abroad the registered office or the statutory seat. 
Most of these regimes provide for mechanisms aimed at protecting creditors and 
explicitly govern the procedure for implementing outbound reincorporations and for 
cancelling a domestic company from the local register avoiding that the company is 
cancelled before it is registered in the new jurisdiction (See the detailed procedure in 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Malta and Spain). Interestingly, the Cyprus regime 
also requires that the directors of ‘emigrating companies’ issue a ‘solvency statement’ in 
which they also declare that ‘they are not aware of any circumstances that could 
negatively influence the solvency of the company within a period of three years.’  
4. Several Member States do not explicitly mention and regulate reincorporations (Austria, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherland, Slovenia and Sweden). 
Among these countries, Austria, Germany and the Netherlands seem to have a partially 
distinct position. In these countries, outbound reincorporations by way of transfer abroad 
of a company’s statutory seat were traditionally prohibited. Nevertheless, Austrian, 
German and Dutch literature accepts that, in light of Cartesio and VALE, outbound 
reincorporations must be allowed as a matter of EU law, although its technicalities are 
still uncertain (in Germany, additionally, it is debated whether this transaction requires a 
transfer of both statutory and real seat into the Member State of arrival). This 
construction, however, has never been tested by any judicial decisions on outbound 
reincorporations. It is worth mentioning that in the Netherlands, although companies 
seem to prefer entering into cross-border mergers, reincorporations abroad are not 
infrequent and practitioners have developed a standardised procedure based upon the 
application, by way of analogy, of rules on cross-border mergers and internal 
conversions; furthermore, a draft bill is being discussed by the Dutch Parliament and is 
likely to be approved soon. 
It is interesting to compare Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, on the one hand, 
with the position of Italy on outbound reincorporations, on the other hand. On paper, 
Italian legislation seems to favour outbound reincorporations more that Austria, 
Germany and the Netherlands, since domestically incorporated companies are explicitly 
allowed to transfer abroad their ‘statutory seat’ (sede legale) by way of a decision of 
their general meetings amending the articles of association. Nevertheless, no statutory 
rule explicitly clarifies the private international law consequences of this decision of 
transferring abroad a company’s statutory seat. Although legal scholars seem to consider 
reincorporations allowed, this issue is still debated, with the consequence that regulatory 
gaps are filled by commercial registers, notaries and courts, which creates the risk of 
inconsistent interpretations across the country. Legal scholars have debated the impact 
of Cartesio and VALE, arguing that, as a consequence of these decisions, 
reincorporations should be made feasible, but judicial decisions are still uncertain and 
contradictory.  
In other jurisdictions (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Slovenia and Sweden), it is not 
clear whether domestically incorporated companies can transfer their statutory seat 
abroad and, as a consequence, if they can reincorporate abroad. It is worth mentioning 
the position of Estonia, where reincorporations are not regulated at all and it still unclear 
whether this transaction is feasible; the national report, however, indicates that, as a 




matter of fact, Estonian companies might be cancelled from the local register when they 
relocate their registered office abroad. In Slovenia, despite the absence of any statutory 
rule in this respect, most academic scholars maintain that such transactions should be 
made possible as a consequence of the Cartesio and VALE rulings. 
5. The question of whether private international law allows outbound reincorporation does 
not reflect the division between ‘real seat theory’ and ‘incorporation theory’. Indeed, 
most real seat countries prohibit reincorporations (see the traditional position of Austrian 
and German case law until the decisions Cartesio and VALE), while other real seat 
jurisdictions allow these transactions (Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal). By contrast, 
certain ‘incorporation theory’ countries, such as Ireland and the UK, clearly prohibit 
outbound reincorporations. Curiously, Cyprus and Malta, despite being based upon the 
UK model, allow and regulate reincorporations. In general, therefore, the possibility of 
reincorporating abroad is independent from the general private international law strategy 
that a certain jurisdiction adopts. The only difference is related to the prerequisites for 
reincorporating abroad, since real seat theory countries also require that domestic 
companies transfer both their statutory seat and their real seat into the new country of 
incorporation, while incorporation theory countries do not foresee such a requirement. 
6. The main question is whether complete prohibitions of outbound reincorporations are 
compatible with the EU freedom of establishment, as interpreted by the Court of Justice 
in the cases Cartesio and VALE. The answer to this general question largely depends on 
whether the statement in the decision Cartesio, according to which Member States 
cannot hinder domestic companies to reincorporate abroad, has binding force or is a 
mere ‘obiter dictum’. Under a comparative and merely descriptive standpoint, our 
findings seem to indicate that scholars and courts of Member States that still prohibit 
outbound reincorporations do not see Cartesio as a major problem (this is the case in 
Ireland, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) or maintain that such 
issue can only be answered by a legislative reform (see the UK report). By contrast, as 
we have seen above, in two countries (Austria and Germany) that traditionally prohibited 
outbound reincorporations, legal scholars suggest that even without an explicit 
legislative reform such transactions should be made feasible in order to comply with the 
freedom of establishment as interpreted in the ECJ decision Cartesio. It is however still 
unclear how these transactions are to be implemented, and whether the commercial 
registers would actually cancel ‘emigrating’ companies and under which conditions. 
7. From our findings emerge that the most significant problem is related to the proceeding 
for implementing a cross-border reincorporation (if allowed). In several Member States, 
indeed, this proceeding is not regulated at all, or is not sufficiently and neatly regulated. 
In particular, the question arises as to the moment when the local register should cancel 
the company and whether the local register should wait until the company is re-
registered in the company register of the State of arrival as a local company. In several 
Member States this issue is not regulated, with the consequence that companies, after 
an official decision to transfer their statutory seat abroad, might be cancelled from the 
register of the country of origin without being registered yet in any other commercial 
register. The ECJ decision rendered in the case Interedil is a telling example of this 
problem.504 In that case, an Italian company decided to transfer its statutory seat to 
London; the local register cancelled the company without checking whether the company 
was registered in the English register as a domestic company. Interedil, however, was 
only registered in the English Companies House as an ‘overseas’ company having a 
‘place of business’ in England. Indeed, as we shall see hereunder, the English company 
register does not accept inbound reincorporations. As a consequence, Interedil was not 
registered anywhere as a domestic company: it was a UK company for the Italian 
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register and an Italian company from the standpoint of the English register. Some 
Member States, by contrast, decided to explicitly allow reincorporations and to precisely 
regulate these transactions (see: Cyprus, Czech Republic and Spain). In these countries, 
the proceedings and substantial requirements for reincorporating abroad are often 
similar to those foreseen in cross-border mergers. In particular, companies can be 
cancelled from the domestic register only after they have been registered under a 
foreign commercial register.  
8. It is necessary to address the question of whether companies incorporated under the law 
of Member States can decide to transfer abroad their ‘statutory seat’ without changing 
applicable company law. This question seems contradictory, for the ‘statutory seat’ is 
normally the place where companies are also registered and coincides with the state of 
incorporation. Nevertheless, the comparative analysis has revealed that, as a matter of 
fact, companies incorporated in two member States (Czech Republic and Italy) can 
transfer abroad their statutory seat while keeping the original lex societatis. In particular, 
the Czech private international law regime505 allows domestic companies to transfer their 
statutory seat abroad without triggering a change of company law; these companies, 
curiously, are cancelled from the Czech company register, despite them keeping the 
Czech lex societatis, with the consequence that such a transfer is only feasible if the 
country of arrival accepts that a domestically registered company is governed by a 
foreign law. In Italy, by contrast, the possibility of relocating the ‘statutory seat’ without 
changing applicable law is not mentioned anywhere in any legislative document or in 
judicial decisions; the comparative analysis has also revealed that local offices of the 
commercial register normally fill the gaps and loopholes of Italian law on the effects of 
any relocation abroad of a company’s statutory seat. In particular, the local office of the 
commercial register of Milan (which is quite relevant for Italian business) accepts that 
local companies relocate their statutory seat to another EU Member State and that these 
companies, at the same time, can keep the Italian lex societatis; these companies, 
therefore, continue to be registered in the Milan office of the register, which ‘fictively’ 
considers the original ‘statutory seat’ as the actual seat for registration purposes. In 
practice, the transfer abroad of the statutory seat has no impact on the registration and 
the applicable law, it just has internal purposes, since the ‘statutory seat’ is the place 
where pre-meeting documents should be filed and is supposed to be also the place 
where general meetings will be held.  
6.2 Voluntary inbound reincorporations  
Cross-border reincorporations should also be analysed from the viewpoint of the country 
whose law the company seeks to adopt (the ‘State of arrival’). The legal and policy 
issues that arise from that Member State’s perspective often mirror those addressed by 
the ‘State of origin’ in outbound reincorporation. Thus, most Member States that allow 
outbound reincorporations also allow the inbound conversion of foreign companies into 
domestic ones. Few exceptions do however exist. 
The preliminary question is whether private international law and/or substantive rules of 
the ‘State of arrival’ allow foreign companies to convert into domestic companies, 
without liquidating in the State of origin and by keeping continuity of their legal 
personality.  
One approach is, of course, simply prohibiting ‘inbound reincorporations’. In this case, 
when a foreign company decides to transfer its statutory seat or registered office into 
the domestic territory and to re-register in the domestic company register as a local 
company type, this decision would – at most – be regarded as the decision to register a 
new company, which is neither the ‘same legal person’ as the original company, nor its 
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legal successor. Therefore, from the standpoint of the state of arrival, all debts and 
credits, and all contracts – including employment contracts – of the former company are 
not transferred to the newly registered company. Furthermore, shareholders would need 
to make contributions to the company capital, according to domestic substantive rules 
and proceedings. Alternatively, Member States that do not accept ‘inbound 
reincorporations’ might just register a domestic branch or establishment of a foreign 
company, despite its intention for re-registering under the new law.  In both cases, if the 
‘emigrating company was cancelled from the register of the original State of 
incorporation, despite the ‘State of arrival’ did not accepts ‘inbound reincorporations’, 
that company would ‘disappear’ from any company registers in the EU without being 
officially liquidated, as we have already mentioned by analyzing ‘outbound 
reincorporations’.  
From an EU law standpoint, however, it is highly questionable whether a complete 
prohibition of ‘inbound reincorporation’ is in line with the freedom of establishment as 
interpreted by the Court of Justice in the cases Cartesio and VALE.  
Member States could obviously decide to allow ‘inbound reincorporations’. Since the 
state of origin is the jurisdiction in which the company is incorporated at the moment 
when the decision is taken, it is also normally competent to set company law 
requirements and proceedings (such as majorities for approving this decision). 
Nevertheless, we cannot exclude that the State of arrival also seeks to regulate 
substantive law issues. What the ‘State of arrival’ is certainly competent to regulate is 
the registration proceeding. In other words, the question arises of which procedural 
steps ‘immigrating companies’ should follow for registering in the company register as a 
continuation of an already existing company instead of a newly founded one.  
6.2.1 Overview of national laws regarding voluntary inbound reincorporations 
Table 6.2. Voluntary inbound reincorporations 









Procedure to register the 
foreign company in the 
company register 
Austria No explicit rule, but 
case law confirms 
that (after Cartesio 




Case law requires full 
compliance with Austrian 
company law rules, 
relocation of the real 
seat to Austria, and full 
compliance with foreign 
(home state) law. 
Company has to provide 
evidence for 
permissibility of 
transaction under foreign 
law as well as full 
compliance with Austrian 
law. 




Belgium Yes (art. 112 PIL 
Code) 
The possibility to 
reincorporate abroad 
without interruption of 
the legal personality is 
acknowledged in Art. 
112 PIL Code, but the 
PIL Code does not 
provide for a specific 
procedure 
Practitioners suggest a 
procedure similar to 
outbound reincorporation 
(see Table 6.1); the 
company should be 
registered after all 
formalities in the country 
of origin have been 
complied with. 
See left. 
Bulgaria No (lack of any 




register will not 
record in the 
registered status of 
the company that it 
is a successor of the 
foreign company. 
Impossible to make 
effective use of the 
EU rights to re-
incorporate by way 
of an inbound 
transfer of seat. 
  
Croatia No n.a. n.a. 
Cyprus Yes (for EEA and 
non-EEA companies).  
Statutory condition: 




transaction.  (Art. 
354B) 
Some of the 
accompanying 
documents under Article 
354C) are:  
- a copy of a revised 
memorandum of the 
company that satisfies 
the requirements for the 
incorporation of the 
company according to 
Cap.113 (these are 
mainly formalities that 
would not hinder 
corporate mobility) 
- the resolution which 
authorises the company 
to be registered in 
Cyprus, 
- a list of the directors of 
the overseas company 
and of the secretary of 
the company. 
 
The Registrar shall file 
the related documents 
temporarily and certify 
that the company is 
temporarily registered as 
continuing in Cyprus. 
According to Article 
354G, the temporarily 
registered company 
must submit evidence of 
its removal from the 
company register of the 
country of its initial 
incorporation within 6 
months from the 
issuance of the 
temporary certificate and 
in this case, the (final) 
certificate of 
continuation will be 
issued. 






Yes (S. 138, 142 and 
143 Civil Code, 
applicable to any 
jurisdiction, and S. 





Primarily company law 
rules of the country of 
origin. Furthermore, 
some provisions of 
Transformations Act.                                                                                                         
 
Competence of the 
notary who issues the 
certificate for 
registration in the 
commercial register 
(Sections 59z and 384d 
Transformations Act): 
the notary attests the 
compliance with the 
requirements for 
registration in the Czech 
register and that he or 
she has seen the 
instrument issued by the 
competent authority of 
the country of origin. 
Denmark Allowed since 2012 
for reincorporations 
within the EU/EEA 
(Ch. 16a CA) 
The law follows the rules 
on cross-border mergers 
closely; s 318a(2) makes 
the reservation that a 
transfer of seat can only 
be decided if the country 
of origin allows the 
transfer 
The competent authority 
in the Member State of 
origin should issue a 
statement that that all 
conditions are satisfied 
and that the foreign 
registration authority 
accepts to register the 
transfer of the seat to 
Denmark.  
The DBA registers the 
transfer of the seat after 
having received the 
certificate and notifies 
the competent authority 
in the former home state 
as soon as possible that 
the transfer has been 
registered.  
Registration cannot take 
place before the 
company complies with 
the Danish Companies 
Act.  
The reincorporation 
comes into force on the 
day of the registration by 
the DBA. 
Estonia No n.a. n.a. 
Finland No n.a. n.a. 
France Unclear. Lack of any 
statutory rule.  
Certain French 
registrars accept the 
registration of EU-
companies that seek 
to reincorporate 
under French law, in 
order to comply with 
the decisions 
Cartesio and VALE of 
the Court of Justice. 
n.a. n.a. 




Germany Traditionally not 
possible and no legal 
procedure, but after 
VALE it is 
acknowledged that 
reincorporations 
need to be permitted 
within the EU. 
Analogy to the German 
rules on transformation 
of the legal form 
(Transformation Act – 
Umwandlungsgesetz);506 
unclear whether the 
isolated inbound transfer 
of the statutory seat, 
without transfer of the 
real seat, needs to be 
accepted 
Unclear, probably 
analogy to the 
Transformation Act 
Greece Unclear. Lack of 






The articles of 
association should be 
amended in compliance 
with Greek company law. 
Establishment of the 
connecting factors of 
Greek private 
international law (real 
seat) onto the Greek 
territory. 
Registration rules and 
formalities of Greek 
company law. 
Hungary Yes, under specific 
conditions set by the 
Hungarian Supreme 
Court (in the VALE 
case).  
No other case of 
inbound 
reincorporations 
other than VALE. 
  
The former company 
should be cancelled from 
the original register 
At least one member of 
the predecessor 
company has to become 
a member in the re-
incorporated company, 
and at least a part of the 
assets of the genuine 
company has to become 
a part of the assets of 
the new company.507 
 
Ireland No n.a. n.a. 
Italy Unclear. The 
question depends on 




Law in action seems 
to be in favour of 
inbound 
reincorporations. 
The incoming company 
should respect Italian 
substantial and 
procedural rules. 
The incoming company 
should file for 
registration, provided 
that it respects Italian 
substantial rules. 




merger with existing 
company. 
n.a. n.a. 
Lithuania No n.a. n.a. 
Luxembourg Yes The incoming company 
should hold a general 
meeting in Luxembourg. 
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only to ‘approved 
counties’ (EU, OECD 
countries, Jersey, 
Guernsey, Gibraltar, 
British Virgin Islands, 
Bahamas, Bermuda, Isle 
of Man, Cayman Islands 
and Mauritius.) 
Documents to be filed 
with the register: 
- resolution or equivalent 
document authorising 
the company to be 
continued in Malta; 
- a copy of the revised 
constitutive documents 
of the foreign company 
- certificate of good 
standing or equivalent 
document to the 
satisfaction of the 
Registrar of Companies 
- a declaration signed by 
at least two directors of 
the company providing 
certain essential 
information 
- list of the directors and 
company secretary of 
the foreign company 
- any other documents 
required by the registrar 
to prove that the request 
is permitted under the 
law of the foreign 
jurisdiction and that 
stakeholders in the 
company have not 
objected to the 
reincorporation. 
Upon finalisation of these 
formalities: provisional 
certificate of registration 
is issued to the 
company; within six 
months from its issuance 
the company is to 
provide the registrar with 
documentary evidence 
that it has ceased to be 
registered in the foreign 
jurisdiction, whereupon 
the registrar shall issue a 
certificate of 
continuation. 
Netherlands No legal regulation, 
but a draft bill of 
2014 provides for a 
legal framework 
See Table 6.1 Notary deed required, 
the company comes into 
existence on the day 
following the date of the 
deed 
Poland Allowed according 
to most of legal 
scholars (but no 
explicit provision 
and case law) 
No procedure for inbound-
re-incorporations. 
Suggested by the legal 
doctrine: company law 
rules of the country of 
origin. The company 
should fulfil Polish legal 
requirements for the 
selected type of company.  
Polish law governs 
application to the 
registry court. The day 
of registration is the day 
of successful 
reincorporation under 
Polish law.  









33(3) Civil Code 




can also transfer 





Requirements: transfer of 






should verify that the 
company adapted its 
articles of association to 
Portuguese Law before 
such reincorporation.  




foreign register that the 
company has been 
reincorporated/registere
d in Portugal as a 
Portuguese Company. 
Romania Unclear. On paper, 
inbound 
reincorporations 
should not be 
allowed. However, 
in practice it 
happens that the 
trade register 





scholars, this issue 





should be feasible 
base this solution 
on the VALE 
decision.   
 - Formalities in the 
country of origin;  
- Fulfilling formalities 
before the Trade 
Registry in order to 
incorporate as a 
Romanian company; 
- Application filed with 
the Trade Register 
- Approval of the 
reincorporation and 
publication in the 
Register. 




Slovakia Yes (conditional 
upon EU law and 





follow the Cartesio 
and VALE rulings. 
Therefore, if the 
Slovak Republic is 
in the position of a 
host state it cannot 
reject an inbound 
re-incorporation as 
these kinds of 
transformations 
are allowed for 
national 
companies.  
A foreign company should:  
- comply with Slovak law; 
- convert into a type of 
Slovak company; 
- fulfil the requirements 
for the creation of this 
company form 
The company limited by 
shares established under 
the legal system of one of 
the Member States will 
convert into the company 
limited by shares 
regulated by the Slovak 
law in the process of 
conversion.  
The problem of ‘similarity 
of the company legal form’ 
will arise in this situation. 
However, the company is 
free to opt for any 
stipulated legal form of 
company as it is allowed 
for the domestic 
companies.   
 
Incorporation of a 
company limited by 
shares: incorporation 
documents in the form of 












should be allowed, 
as a consequence 
of the Cartesio and 
VALE rulings, and 
that rules on 
conversion should 





Spain Yes: art. 94 SMA. 1) Non EEA companies and 
any company (including 
EEA companies) when the 
country of origin allows 
domestic companies to 
keep the legal personality 
after a transfer of 
company’s seat: report 
from independent expert 
stating that the net value 
of assets is at least equal 
to the minimum capital 
requirements 
2) EEA companies: 
transfer of statutory seat, 
registration in the 
company register under 
Spanish law. Foreign 
companies are not 
explicitly obliged to cancel 
and the Spanish register 
does not inquire. 
- Registration into the 
Spanish register as a 
Spanish company. 





No Swedish rules 
regarding the 
transfer of a 
company’s seat 
into or out of 
Sweden and the 
impact of the ECJ 
rulings has yet to 





No508 n.a. n.a. 
 
6.2.2 Discussion 
1. Our findings indicate that (as a matter of positive law or ‘law in action’) several Member 
States have not adopted legislation and a reincorporation of foreign companies as 
domestic companies of these jurisdictions is either impossible or extremely difficult 
without prior liquidation. These countries, additionally, do not distinguish EEA from non-
EEA companies (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and the UK). This 
policy option normally mirrors the ban of ‘outbound reincorporations’ in the same 
country and is either based upon general private international law criteria (Ireland and 
the UK) or upon lack of regulation (Bulgaria). Such regimes are likely to be in breach of 
the freedom of establishment, as interpreted in the decision VALE, regarding foreign 
companies incorporated in the EU or the EEA. Nevertheless, in a comparative work we 
should simply acknowledge that in these countries the ‘law in action’ is that foreign 
companies cannot reincorporate into these Member States as a domestic type of 
company.  
2. Other countries, by contrast have explicitly allowed and regulated ‘inbound 
reincorporations’ in the same legislative instrument that regulates ‘outbound 
reincorporations’ (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Malta, Portugal and Spain). 
‘Inbound reincorporations’ are feasible only if the country of origin allows domestic 
companies to reincorporate abroad and if the ‘immigrating’ company has respected 
substantive and private international law provisions of that country. In theory, therefore, 
commercial registers should register the company only if it has complied with 
substantive and private international rules of both the country of origin and the country 
of arrival. In some jurisdictions, a notary statement (Czech Republic), a statement of the 
competent authority (Denmark) or a specific declaration of the immigrating companies 
(Cyprus) must be attached to the filing with the local register attesting that the 
relocation complies with the law of the country of origin.509 Under Spanish legislation, in 
order to protect creditors of the incoming company, an independent expert should state 
that the net value of assets is at least equal to the Spanish minimum capital 
requirements (this provision is applicable to both EEA and non EEA countries). Another 
issue that needs to be addressed in proceedings for inbound reincorporations is the 
cancellation from the commercial register of the country of origin. As we have seen 
above regarding outbound reincorporations, according to both the SE Regulation and the 
Cross-Border Merger Regulation the ‘emigrating’ company can be canceled from the 
original register only after its registration in the country of arrival. In this timespan, 
therefore, that company is registered in two registers at the same time. Under the 
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viewpoint of the state of arrival, the question arises as to whether a domestic authority 
should send a statement of registration to the commercial register of the country of 
departure and whether it should check that the company is being actually canceled from 
the register of the original country. Cypriot, Maltese and Danish regimes deal with these 
issues. In Cyprus and Malta, an ‘immigrating company’ is registered only temporarily, 
and is required to submit evidence of its removal from the companies register of origin 
within 6 months; only after this submission can the (final) certificate of continuation be 
issued. In Denmark, the local register (DBA) should send a statement, attesting that the 
company was registered as a Danish company. 
3. In several other Member States where this operation is still not regulated, legal scholars 
and/or judicial decisions maintains that inbound reincorporations should be allowed 
(Austria, Italy, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland and Slovenia). 
In some cases, this opinion is merely based upon judicial decisions of the Court of 
Justice in the cases Cartesio and VALE. In these countries, however, it is uncertain which 
proceeding is to be followed for incorporating a foreign company into the domestic 
company register (see: Austria, Italy, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg). For 
instance, in Germany this issue was only decided by one judicial decision, which 
maintained that rules on national conversions should be applied by way of analogy. In 
France, despite the lack of statutory regulation of inbound reincorporations, there is 
anecdotal evidence that certain registrars accept the registration of companies from 
other Member States that seek to reincorporate under French law, in order to comply 
with the decisions Cartesio and VALE of the Court of Justice. In Hungary, where 
‘outbound reincorporations’ are still in practice impossible (see above), inbound 
reincorporations are considered feasible by applying the ratio decidendi of the VALE 
decision (which was related to a company that sought to reincorporate in Hungary). 
Similarly, in Poland legal scholars hold that inbound reincorporations should be made 
possible after the VALE decision, whereas, as we have seen above, legal scholars are 
divided regarding outbound reincorporations, which are likely not to be feasible. It is 
interesting to note, therefore, that both in Hungary and Poland the VALE decision is held 
directly applicable, whereas the position in relation to the statement in Cartesio, 
according to which outbound reincorporations must also be allowed, is much less clear. 
In Slovenia, finally, where there is no case law, legal scholars maintain that inbound 
reincorporations should be allowed as a consequence of Cartesio and VALE. 
4. Finally, in other Member States inbound reincorporations are not regulated and it is still 
uncertain whether a foreign company could convert into a type of company of one of 
these jurisdictions without prior liquidation (Finland, Romania, Sweden). Romanian 
legislation, in particular, does not mention inbound reincorporations, and a court of 
appeal decision from 2008 held that these transactions were not allowed; however, as a 
matter of fact the feasibility of this operation is a much more controversial issue and 
several legal scholars argue that EU and EEA companies should be placed in a position of 
reincorporating under Romanian law without liquidating, as a consequence of the VALE 
decision, but this issue is still debated. 
6.3 Involuntary change of law 
When a foreign company transfers its central administration, its place of business, a 
relevant premise or its activity into the territory of another Member State, that state 
may require the company to convert into a domestic company (and thus re-register with 
the domestic companies register). The host state may also simply determine the status 
of the company merely according to its own company law provisions, which is the 
natural consequence of a company having established a relevant connecting factor in 
that state. These reactions, of course, will be triggered only where the ‘State of arrival’ 
applies a private international law criterion based upon the physical presence of assets, 
premises or activities to establish the lex societatis (i.e. applies a version of the ‘real 




seat theory’). These countries might react in different ways to a foreign company that 
transfers some physical elements, amounting to a relevant ‘connecting factors’ for 
private international law purposes, to their territory.  
A first possible reaction is requiring this company to reincorporate as a domestic type of 
company, by filing for registration and complying with domestic company law rules. In 
this case, the foreign company formally ‘converts’ itself into a domestic one, and 
maintains its nature as ‘corporation’, with the consequence that its shareholders 
continue enjoying limited liability. It goes without saying that this is only possible if the 
jurisdiction of origin accepts outbound reincorporations.  
The second possible reaction to inbound transfers of physical elements (the ‘real seat’) 
into the domestic territory is treating incoming companies as being governed by 
domestic law. The application of domestic law, however, will regularly lead to no longer 
regarding the incoming company as an autonomous legal entity, since companies only 
come into existence once registered in the way prescribed by the applicable law. In some 
jurisdictions, courts thus treat such foreign companies as de facto partnerships, which 
can come into existence without a requirement of prior registration. Obviously, such 
reaction presupposes that substantive law of the country of arrival provides for the ‘de 
facto’ formation of non-incorporated entities, which are ‘partnerships’ in English legal 
conceptualisation or personal and non-personified companies in other legal systems 
(such as in France, Germany, Italy of Spain, for instance).510 The conversion of the 
original registered company into a domestic partnership implies that, under the 
standpoint of the country of arrival, members of that company are likely to be liable for 
the company’s debts, regardless of whether that partnership is still registered in the 
country of origin as own company with limited liability. In practice, in these cases two 
companies would exist: the original incorporated company, which is still registered and 
existing in the country of incorporation, and the de facto partnership in the country in 
the new real seat. This outcome would reveal a blatant disagreement between the two 
countries, and yet this is a quite logical and straightforward application of merely 
national private international law criteria.  
The country of arrival could also adopt a third strategy, namely considering the incoming 
company simply a non-existing entity. This is a straightforward application of the real 
seat theory: since the company has its ‘real seat’ on the domestic territory, domestic 
company law applies, and since that company did not comply with domestic rules on 
companies’ registration, it cannot be considered as an existing entity.  
It goes without saying that these outcomes (reincorporations, conversion into a de facto 
partnerships or non-existence) are not in line with the freedom of establishment, as 
interpreted by ECJ in particular in the case Überseering and Inspire Art.  Nevertheless, 
we shall see that some Member State still apply similar solutions to ‘inbound’ mobility of 
a foreign company’s real seat, with the consequence that the whole debate and all 
solutions, even those in compliance with EU law, are to be assessed against the 
backdrop of these alternative solutions. 
By contrast, countries that follow a pure ‘incorporation theory’ do not require foreign 
companies to reincorporate under domestic law when they transfer onto the domestic 
territory a physical premise, even if no factual connection is maintained with the state of 
incorporation. However, certain incorporation theory countries apply domestic rules to 
foreign companies having their ‘real seat’ or other physical elements on the domestic 
territory, as we shall see in the next pages. Such provisions are likely to constitute 
restrictions of the freedom of establishment, and given their general nature are unlikely 
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to fulfil the strict requirements for justification as applied by the Court of Justice. As a 
consequence, these rules may not be applicable to EU or EEA companies, although their 
existence in national law can give rise to significant legal uncertainty. 
6.3.1 Overview of national laws 
Table 6.3. Involuntary change of law / duty to re-incorporate 
Country Would a foreign company that transfers some physical elements onto the 
territory have to reincorporate under your law, or would it be called into 
question?  
Austria EU/EEA Companies: since Überseering, the lex societatis of companies from 
other EU Member States is unaffected by a relocation of the real seat 
(provided the Member State of incorporation does not require the 
maintenance of the headquarter in that jurisdiction’s territory) 
Companies from non-EU/EEA countries would be treated as civil law 
partnerships (‘GbR’); while essentially maintaining their legal capacity, 
shareholders lose limited liability 
Belgium No distinction between EU/EEA companies and non-EU/EEA companies. 
If a company transfers its principal establishment to Belgium, it loses its 
status as a company of the country where it was established and will be 
subject to Belgian law 
If Belgian courts notice that a foreign company has transferred its seat to 
Belgium without simultaneously transferring its statutory seat, there is a risk 
that the company would be considered as a Belgian partnership with 
(VOF/SNC) or without legal personality (Maatschap/la société de droit 
commun) 
Transfer of the principal establishment from Belgium to another country: the 
Belgian company may either continue to be subject to Belgian law (in case of 
renvoi), or convert into a type of a company of the country of immigration (if 
the latter country allows the conversion of the company), or lose its legal 
personality (if the country of immigration does not allow the conversion). 
Bulgaria No (incorporation theory country). 
Croatia No (incorporation theory country). 
Cyprus No (incorporation theory country). 
Czech 
Republic 
No (incorporation theory country). 
Denmark The transfer of the real seat into Denmark will not lead to a change in the 
applicable law (both for EU and non-EU companies) 
Estonia No distinction between EU/EEA companies and non-EU/EEA companies. 
Companies managed or having their main activities in Estonia are governed 
by Estonian law (see Table 3.1, above), hence these companies are required 
to ‘reincorporate’ and their existence would be otherwise called into question.  
Finland No (incorporation theory country) 
France No.  
In principle the transfer to France of a company’s seat might lead to the 
application of French law, but not to a duty to reincorporate. In particular: 
when the real seat diverges from the statutory seat, third parties can invoke 
the application of the law of the country where the real seat is situated (no 
case law however).  
Germany EU/EEA companies: since Überseering these companies are treated as validly 
incorporated under foreign law even if they move their headquarters to 
Germany; their German business is then registered as a branch of this 
foreign company 
Companies from non-EU/EEA countries: foreign companies are treated as 
partnerships or sole traders.511 
                                                 
511 BGHZ 178, 192 (Trabrennbahn). 




Greece Yes (real seat theory) regarding public companies.  
Foreign companies moving their ‘real seat’ onto the Greek territory without 
reincorporating as Greek companies: these companies are often regarded as 
de facto Greek partnership.  
Greek case law has not had the chance to examine the compatibility of these 
approaches with the Court of Justice case law.   
Hungary No (incorporation theory country) 
Ireland No (incorporation theory country) 
Italy EU/EEA companies: no application of Italian rules (incorporation theory 
country) 
Non-EU/EEA companies that have their principal place of business of central 
administration in Italy: application of Italian rules.  
Latvia Yes. Transfer of the ‘real seat’ into the territory of Latvia would lead to the 
application of the Latvian domestic company law. 
It remains an open question whether the right to decide on ‘legal capacity’ 
comprises the right to decide on the ‘legal form and status’ of the company 
concerned. 
Lithuania In general, Lithuania follows the incorporation theory, hence there should be 
no duty to reincorporate (art. 1.19(1) civil code). 
However, Lithuanian rules on civil capacity apply to foreign companies having 
a ‘subdivision’ on the Lithuanian territory (art. 1.19(3) civil code).  
The criterion of the country of incorporation applies to determine rules on 
legal nature, foundation, reorganisation and liquidation of a legal entity (art. 
1.20 civil code). 
Luxembourg Uncertain. 
Non-EU companies are likely treated as de facto partnerships or an SNC. 
Case law only for non-EU insolvent companies. 
Malta No (incorporation theory) 
Netherlands No duty to reincorporate as the NL applies the incorporation theory, but the 
question arises of whether the company should be considered as a ‘pseudo’-
foreign company subject to the requirements of the Act on foreign business 
corporations 
Poland EU/EEA companies: no change of applicable law, as it is firmly established 
that real seat-based PIL rules do not apply to such companies.  
Non-EU/EEA companies: the answer depends on the choice of law criterion 
that will prevail, since statutory rules are unclear and need interpretation, 
and no case law exists:  
(a) incorporation theory: no involuntary change of law 
(b) real seat theory: mandatory change of applicable company law when 
a company transfers its ‘real seat’ onto the Polish territory.  
Portugal No (despite its general classification as ‘real seat country’) 
Romania No 
Slovakia No (incorporation theory country) 
Slovenia No (incorporation theory country) 
Spain EU/EEA companies: no involuntary change.  
Non-EU/EEA companies: mandatory reincorporation in Spain; failure to do so 
leads to the company being considered a Spanish partnership (art. 9 
Companies Act). 
Sweden No (incorporation theory country) 
United 
Kingdom 
No (incorporation theory country) 
 





1. Table 6.3 shows that several Member States apply domestic company law rules to 
foreign companies when they establish a relevant link with that Member State’s territory 
(usually their central administration or main management office). This is the case for 
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Latvia and Spain. This approach is 
incompatible with EU law if the foreign company is registered in an EU or EEA jurisdiction, 
and indeed several national reports clearly indicate that this approach does not apply to 
such companies. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, some Member States still do not 
explicitly distinguish between companies incorporated in a EU/EEA and companies from 
other companies in their domestic law. This is the case in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, 
Greece and Latvia. However, in most of these countries case law has not yet explicitly 
addressed this issue. As a consequence of case law of the Court of Justice, it is to be 
assumed that, if explicitly requested, courts from these countries would recognise the 
continued application of the foreign lex societatis to EU companies. In other countries 
that traditionally follow, or followed, the ‘real seat theory’ it is clear that the duty to 
reincorporate does not apply to foreign EU or EEA companies. In Austria, Germany and 
Spain, for instance, EU companies can transfer their real seat onto the domestic territory 
without triggering any duties to reincorporate as a consequence of case law of the Court 
of Justice. By contrast, foreign non-EU companies transferring their ‘real seat’ onto the 
domestic territory are treated as domestic partnerships (in Spain, the ‘immigrating’ 
company can however decide to reincorporate as a Spanish company). In Poland, the 
position in relation to third-country (non-EU/EEA) companies is somewhat uncertain, and 
there may be a requirement for such companies to reincorporate under Polish law, if 
they transfer a physical element to Poland. 
2. In all countries that apply the domestic lex societatis to foreign companies having a 
relevant physical element on the domestic territory, the question arises as to the 
consequences of non-compliance with this duty. As we have seen above, two alternative 
reactions are possible: considering the incoming company as not existing or considering 
this company as an unincorporated business association or de facto partnership. The 
traditional position of German and Austrian case law was that immigrating companies 
were not incorporated according to the ‘right’ law (i.e. domestic rules), hence being non-
existent as legal entities. This rigid position has however changed following the 
Überseering decision, and now foreign companies incorporated in a third country are also 
treated as de facto partnerships when they relocate their real seat onto the German or 
Austrian territory. Similar solutions are followed by Belgium and Spain, but these 
countries accept that the ‘incoming company’ may reincorporate as a domestic company. 
In other countries, by contrast, incoming companies risk being not recognised as legal 
entities, unless they reincorporate as a domestic entity; this may be the case in Estonia 
and Latvia and Greece; the position of these countries, however, is still partially unclear. 
In Greece, such foreign companies are characterised as domestic partnerships (de facto 
general partnerships).  
3. Other Member States follow mixed solutions, by not requiring foreign companies to 
reincorporate as domestic entities when they transfer physical elements onto the 
domestic territory, while only applying selected domestic company law rules to those 
companies. This is the case in France, Italy and probably Lithuania. Regarding France, 
when a foreign company transfers its ‘real seat’ onto the French territory, third parties 
can invoke the application of French law, but case law is scarce or non-existent. On 
paper, however, this rule applies to both EEA and non-EEA companies. The Italian 
solution is applying Italian law to foreign companies having their main business head 
office on the domestic territory. It is however unclear what portion of Italian law is to be 
applied to foreign companies; furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that these rules do 
not apply to EU companies. The Lithuanian position is also peculiar: in general, Lithuania 
follows the incorporation theory, but Lithuanian rules on ‘civil capacity’ apply to foreign 




companies having a ‘subdivision’ on the Lithuanian territory; the concept of ‘subdivision’ 
is interpreted in a quite broad way, and includes any foreign companies carrying out 
their business or other main activity in Lithuania, or having their head office in Lithuania.  
4. All other Member States do not require foreign companies to reincorporate as a domestic 
entity when they relocate their real seat onto the domestic territory. In most cases this 
is a straightforward consequence of the incorporation theory. It is worth mentioning the 
position of Portugal, which is on paper a ‘real seat country’. Nevertheless, in practice 
courts and the commercial register do not require foreign companies transferring their 
administrative seat, or any other physical presence, onto their territory to reincorporate 
under Portuguese law.  
7. Other areas of law 
The internal affairs of companies are also influenced by criminal and tax law rules, whose 
international scope is often not limited to domestically incorporated companies. 
a) Criminal law 
In several Member States, company directors face criminal charges for actions or 
decisions taken in their capacity as directors. Such criminal offences vary from state to 
state, according to domestic policy goals and values. What is relevant for a comparative 
analysis of private international company law issues is that certain criminal offences 
might be functional substitutes for director duties and liability aimed at protecting a 
company’s assets, and might even represent the backbone of directors’ liability in 
insolvency proceedings. Regarding these criminal liabilities, the question arises as to 
whether they only apply to directors and other corporate officers of domestic companies, 
or they also address directors and officers of foreign companies that are active on, or are 
somehow connected with, the domestic territory. As we shall see when the results of the 
comparative analysis are discussed, in most jurisdictions the general international scope 
of criminal liability is based on the place where the criminal act was perpetrated or the 
place where damage was incurred. By applying this logic, the consequence would be that 
these criminal sanctions also apply to directors of foreign companies, when these 
companies are ‘active’ on the domestic territory or when the damaged persons are 
resident on the domestic territory (‘effects test’). However, when criminal liability is 
triggered by the violation of directors’ duties, some jurisdictions might limit its 
application to domestic companies only, regardless of the place where the criminal act 
was perpetrated or its effects were produced. It goes without saying that the scope of a 
criminal sanction also depends on the interests that a legal system aims at protecting. 
When the goal is to reinforce directors’ duties vis-à-vis the company or its creditors, it 
seems consistent that the scope is limited to domestic companies only. By contrast, 
when the goal of a criminal statute is to protect investors or general interests, including 
those of potential creditors and other stakeholders, such statutes should also apply to 
foreign companies when the criminal act is perpetrated on the domestic territory or 
when it produces effects on the domestic territory and on local stakeholders.  
b) Tax law 
Regarding tax law, it is necessary to stress that the concept of a company’s ‘tax 
residence’ varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and is usually constructed autonomously 
from criterions for establishing the applicable company law, so that most jurisdictions 
refer to a qualified relation with a state’s territory and its economic life, such as a 
company’s central administration or the management of its day-by-day business. It is 
also worth stressing, however, that some countries (see hereunder) always consider 
domestically incorporated companies being resident on the domestic territory for tax 
purposes. Member States, furthermore, often consider any ‘relocation’ of the tax 




residence of domestically incorporated companies as a liquidation for tax purposes and 
tax all unrealised profits (‘exit tax’). 512  Exit taxes may be politically understandable 
strategies from the viewpoint of the State of origin, but they limit corporate mobility 
throughout the EU and may infringe the EU freedom of establishment, as highlighted by 
the Court of Justice in National Grid Indus. 
7.1 Overview of national laws 
Table 7: Relevance of other areas of law 
                                                 
512 See eg AP Dourado, ‘Tax Mobility in the European Union: Present and Future Trends’, in A.P. Dourado (ed.) 
Movement of Persons and Tax Mobility in the EU: Changing Winds (Amsterdam 2013) at 3-25, and P Pistone 
‘EC Law and Tax Residence of Companies’ in G Maisto (ed.) Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC 
Law (Amsterdam 2009) at 183. 
Country Criminal sanctions for breach of 
company law 
Tax rules that potentially impede 
‘corporate mobility’ 
Austria Austrian criminal law generally 
applicable if the relevant act is 
committed in Austria, subject 
however to the substantive 
requirements of the lex societatis 
where violation of a company law 
duty forms part of the offence 
Austrian tax rules have broadly been 
brought in line with National Grid Indus, 
i.e. no immediate taxation of unrealised 
profits upon migration to a EU Member 
State. 
Belgium Unclear  Exit taxation of capital gains applies if 
assets are transferred abroad. 
Compatibility with National Grid Indus 
questionable since no provision is made 
for delaying payment of the exit tax. 
Bulgaria Directors face criminal liabilities if 
within 30 days following suspension 
of payments they have failed to 
request the court to initiate 
insolvency proceedings (article 
227b(2) of the Penal Code (‘PC’)).  
Directors who have committed or 
have authorised the commission of 
the acts specified in para 1 of article 
227e PC, namely a trader, who: 
1) has not conducted his business 
with the care of a good trader or has 
entered into risky transactions that 
are not within the scope of his/her 
usual business, 
2) has incurred personal, family or 
other expenses apparently untypical 
of and not related to the scope of 
business and incongruous with 
his/her property status, 
3) has failed to set up, or has set up 
an incorrect annual accounting 
statement and a balance sheet 
though under the obligation to do so, 
and as a consequence has been 
forced into insolvency and this has 
caused damages to his/her creditors,  
shall be punished for imprudent 
bankruptcy by imprisonment for up 
to two years, whereas the court may 
additionally rule deprivation of rights 
under Article 37(1), sub-paragraphs 
No exit taxation 




6 and 7 (article 227e(3) PC).  
Under certain circumstances these 
provisions may apply to directors of 
foreign companies also. 
Croatia General principle: territoriality 
(Croatian law only applies to offenses 
committed on the domestic territory). 
Criminal offenses provided in the 
Croatian companies act and related 
to directors’ duties: these offenses 
only apply to Croatian companies 
(provided that they are committed on 
the Croatian territory).  
Specific criminal offenses apply to 
foreign companies also (eg: when 
directors do not register a branch in 
Croatia). 
Criminal offenses provided in the 
Criminal Code: if committed on the 
Croatian territory these offenses also 
apply to foreign companies. 
Non-resident companies should pay taxes 
in Croatia when they establish a ‘business 
unit’ in Croatia. 
Cyprus There are several provisions in 
Cap.113 that impose criminal liability 
against directors because of a breach 
of duties imposed by Cap.113. There 
are also additional laws that establish 
criminal liability against the company 
and its directors, for instance, the 
criminal offense of false and 
misleading statements in Article 41 of 
the Cyprus Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Law (2009) and the 
offense of false and misleading 
statements in supplying information 
for legal purposes in Article 189 of 
Securities and Cyprus Stock 
Exchange Law (1993). 
The relevant issues are not governed 
by the lex societatis but by the law of 
the place where the offense has been 
committed. 
Tax residence is in Cyprus when 
‘management and control’ are exercised 
in Cyprus. 
No exit taxation. 
Czech 
Republic 
Criminal offenses of companies’ 
directors or members of other bodies  
(chapter 5 of the Criminal Code) eg:  
breach of the duty to administer 
another’s property, harm done to a 
creditor, preference transfers, 
intentional bankruptcy, breach of 
duties in bankruptcy and insolvency 
proceedings.  
Territoriality principle: Czech criminal 
offenses apply to crimes committed 
on the territory of the Czech Republic 
(i.e. a director acts in the Czech 
Republic or acts abroad but the 
consequence of such crime was about 
to occur in the Czech Republic).  
Personality principle: Czech criminal 
offenses apply to acts committed 
abroad by a citizen of the Czech 
Republic. 
If a company is being transformed under 
the Transformations Act, when the extent 
to which its tax liability passes to its legal 
successor is not sufficiently evident, the 
tax administrator shall determine the 
legal succession regarding tax liabilities. 
No exit taxation. 




                                                 
513 BGH, NStZ 2010, 632 (holding that the criminal offence of a breach of trust, s. 266 Criminal Code, can be 
based on the breach of duties under UK company law). 
514 AG Stuttgart wistra 2008, 226. 
Denmark Breaches of the CA can lead to 
criminal sanctions (Ch. 23 CA); 
however, these provisions seem to be 
tied to duties established in the CA 
and cannot be applied to foreign 
companies 
Directors of non-Danish companies 
may be subject to criminal sanctions, 
as well as directors of Danish 
companies, for crimes committed in 
Denmark. 
 
Exit taxes apply to hidden reserves of 
assets that cease to be subject to Danish 
corporation tax 
The Corporation Tax Act was amended in 
2014 as a reaction to National Grid Indus; 
payment of exit taxes may now be 
deferred for up to seven years if the 
company’s tax residence is transferred to 
an EU/EEA Member State 
Estonia Criminal sanctions, also applicable to 
directors of foreign companies. 
No rules that would impede ‘corporate 
mobility’; Estonia is said to have a very 
simple and rather liberal tax regime 
Finland No information No information 
France The criminal offense ‘abus de biens 
sociaux’ (abuse of the company’s 
assets) (Articles L. 241-3 and 242-6 
of the Commercial Code) applies to 
directors of foreign companies (EU 
and non EU companies), provided 
that the company has activities in the 
France territory (Cass. crim., 25 June 
2014, n° 13-84445). 
 
1) A company transfers its statutory seat 
or its real seat from France to a non-EU 
country: it should pay taxes on hidden 
reserves of the assets that cease to be 
subject to French corporation tax.  
2) Relocation within the EU: any transfer 
that reduces the assets of the company 
leads to taxation, but the payment may 
be deferred for up to five years on an 
interest-free basis. 
3) Inbound reincorporation: assets are 
taxed (except EU companies). 
Germany German criminal law applicable if the 
relevant act is committed in 
Germany513 
Criminal sanctions for bankruptcy 
offences applied to English limited 
companies based in Germany514 
If a company transfers the statutory seat 
or the headquarters out of the EU/EEA, it 
is obliged to pay taxes on the hidden 
reserves of assets which cease to be 
subject to German corporation tax; 
payment of the taxes may be deferred for 
up to five years on an interest-free basis 
Criticised by some commentators for not 
being in line with National Grid Indus 
Greece Territorial principle: Greek criminal 
offenses apply to crimes committed 
on Greek territory. 
Personality principle: Greek criminal 
offenses apply to acts committed 
Crimes committed by foreigners 
abroad: Greek criminal law on felony 
or misdemeanour applies, if the act is 
directed against Greek citizens and is 
punishable under the laws of the 
country where it was committed (…). 
Greek criminal law applies to criminal 
offenses committed in Greece or 
abroad by directors or other persons 
involved in foreign companies. 
No exit taxation. 
Hungary The Criminal Code applies for criminal 
offenses committed (i) in Hungary, 
(ii) abroad by Hungarian citizens, or 
(iii) abroad by foreign citizens to the 
When a Hungarian company transfers it 
central management abroad: for tax 
purposes this is a transfer of tax 
residence and is considered as a 




detriment of Hungarian natural or 
legal persons (e.g. companies). 
liquidation (art. 16(7) Act on corporate 
taxation 1996). This rule has not been 
change after National Grid Indus. 
If the Hungarian company keeps a branch 
in Hungary after the relocation of its 
administrative centre, the branch should 
be re-registered as a new undertaking. If 
the Hungarian company keeps a branch 
in Hungary after the relocation of its 
administrative centre, the branch should 
be re-registered as a new undertaking. 
Ireland Directors' criminal liabilities mainly 
apply to directors of Irish companies, 
regardless of their residence, while 
directors of foreign companies face a 
limited exposure to criminal liability 
in specific cases.  
Exit tax in Ireland since 1997; but 
following National Grid Indus provision in 
Finance (No.2) Act 2013 allowing for the 
deferral of an exit tax charge arising on 
the migration of the tax residence by a 
company from Ireland to another EU/EEA 
member state 
Italy Criminal offences included in the 
Italian Civil Code and in the 
Consolidated Financial Act apply to 
only Italian companies.  
Other criminal offences are included 
in the Insolvency Act: these offences 
apply only when an insolvency 
proceeding is open under Italian 
insolvency law (i.e.: also to foreign 
companies whose COMI or whose 
‘principal seat’ is in Italy). 
 
Exit tax (art. 166 Consolidated Fiscal Act, 
amended in 2014 after National Grid). 
Any transfer abroad of an Italian 
company’s fiscal residence is considered a 
‘taxable transaction’ of all company’s 
assets (including goodwill). This corporate 
income tax is levied on unrealised gains, 
calculated as the difference between the 
book value of transferred assets and the 
market value. After the 2012 reform, if 
an Italian company transfers its fiscal 
residence to another Member State of the 
EU or of the EEA (provided that the State 
of arrival has agreed with Italy to provide 
fiscal assistance, similarly to EU Directive 
2010/24) payment of the exit tax can be 
deferred or can be paid in several 
instalments.  
Latvia A foreign company can be penalised 
for actions committed in Latvia with 
regard to the violation of work safety 
or illegal employment. 
Report outlines various criteria for tax 
residence; tax law is a potential limitation 
for seat transfers 
Lithuania Lithuanian prosecutors and courts 
would most likely follow the general 
territoriality principle of criminal law.  
No rules that would impede ‘corporate 
mobility’; Lithuania said to have a very 
simple and rather liberal tax regime. 
Luxembourg Abuse of corporate assets (abus de 
biens sociaux) (article 171-1 of the 
1915 Companies Act): applicable to 
foreign companies having their real 
seat in Luxembourg.  
In practice, this was only applied to 
non-EU companies.  
A reincorporation is considered a 
dissolution for tax purposes. 
Malta Courts may order investigations of 
the affairs of a foreign company 
when it appears that: (i) the 
company’s affairs are being 
conducted with a view to defrauding 
creditors or in a manner that could be 
unfairly prejudicial to members; (ii) 
that proposed or actual acts or 
omissions of the company are 
unfairly prejudicial or that the 
Where shareholders of companies are not 
resident in Malta, they are entitled to 
claim refunds on tax paid in respect of 
profits made by the company from 
‘foreign income’.    
Relevant connecting factors for corporate 
taxation are not only the residence and 
domicile of the company, but also the 
residence of shareholders and the place 
in which profitable activity occurs.  




company was formed for a fraudulent 
or unlawful purpose; (iii) that 
persons involved in the establishment 
or management of the company have 
been party to fraudulent or 
prejudicial activity related to the 
company; or (iv) that members have 
not been provided with all the 
information that they might 
reasonably expect of the company. 
Netherlands Dutch criminal law is applicable when 
a person commits a criminal offense 
in the Netherlands, as well as when a 
person commits a criminal offense 
against a Dutch citizen. 
Exit taxation of capital gains applies 
The law was changed after National Grid 
Indus; payment of the exit tax can now 
be delayed if the company provides 
sufficient security; since a number of 
administrative requirements apply, as 
well as a guarantee and an interest 
charge, it can be debated whether the 
new rules are in compliance with the 
Treaty 
Poland No specific rules on the application of 
Polish criminal rules to directors of 
foreign companies active in Poland.  
Therefore, general rules on the scope 
of criminal law apply: (1) its 
application is based on the principle 
of territoriality; (2) criminal law is 
also applicable to Polish citizens who 
committed a criminal offense abroad; 
(3) Polish criminal provisions are 
applicable to foreigners committing 
an offence under the Polish law, the 
given offence is criminalised in both 
relevant countries and the 
perpetrator is present on the territory 
of Poland (articles 109 – 111 Polish 
Criminal Code). 
 
Any entity having its seat within the 
Polish territory or any entity whose 
management board operates in Poland is 
considered a tax resident subject to the 
tax liability calculated on the basis of 
their entire income. Tax neutrality 
provisions for cross-border mergers have 
been implemented. Polish tax law does 
not entail any exit tax on unrealised 
capital gains at the moment of tax 
residency change. 
Portugal International scope of criminal 
offenses: this applies when the 
criminal act is committed in Portugal 
or to act committed by directors of 
companies having their seat in 
Portugal, even if their action has 
taken place abroad. 
Relevant criminal provisions for 
company law purposes: (a) acts 
prejudicial to creditors’ interests 
(fraudulent insolvency); (b) 
frustration of creditors (directors 
make companies’ assets disappear); 
(c) negligent insolvency; (d) wrongful 
trading in the vicinity of insolvency. 
 
 
Tax law remains at least a source of 
potential limitation for outbound transfers 
of seat of Portuguese companies.  
The Portuguese Corporation Tax Code 
was substantially changed in 2014, 
through Lei n. 2/2014, of the 16 January, 
in order to comply with Court of Justice 
decision C/38/10 [2012].  
Romania Criminal offenses aiming at avoiding 
significant damages to creditors (eg: 
untrue information in prospectuses, 
reports and communications at the 
moment of the formation of the 
company, done in bad faith). 
No exit taxation. 




Criminal offenses that ensure 
compliance with company law: only 
applicable to Romanian companies. 
Slovakia Criminal offenses of companies’ 
directors or members of other bodies 
(chapter 4 and 5 of the Criminal 
Code) e.g.: breach of the duty to 
administer another’s property, harm 
done to a creditor, intentional and 
fraudulent bankruptcy.  
Territoriality principle: Slovak 
criminal offenses apply to crimes 
committed on the territory of the 
Slovak Republic. 
Personality principle: Slovak criminal 
offenses apply to acts committed 
abroad by a citizen of the Slovak 
Republic. 
Companies registered in the Slovak 
Commercial Code and companies having 
their real seat on the Slovak Republic will 
fall under the applicability of the Act on 
Direct Taxation.   
Slovenia Criminal Provisions are in part 9 of 
the Companies Act, in the Criminal 
Code (Art. 240 governing the abuse 
of trust in business activity and Art. 
228 governing business fraud) and in 
the Liability of Legal Persons for 
Criminal Offences Act. 
No case law related to criminal 
sanctions committed by directors of 
foreign companies. 
A company shall be treated as a resident 
either if its registered office is located in 
Slovenia or if its place of effective 
management is located in Slovenia.  
Exit taxation. No compliance with 
National Grid Indus. 
Spain Criminal offenses committed on the 
Spanish territory can be brought to 
trial according to Spanish criminal 
law (‘territoriality principle’: art. 
23(1) Organic Law of Judicial 
Powers); under certain conditions, 
Spanish courts can also hear cases 
on criminal offenses committed 
outside Spain (‘personality principle’: 
art 23(2) Organic Law of Judicial 
Powers).  
Companies with residence in Spain are 
taxed according to Spanish tax rules (art. 
7(1)(a) act 27/2014).  
Companies are considered as Spanish tax 
resident when (a) incorporated in Spain 
or (b) when the effective direction is in 
Spain (art. 8(1)(a) act 27/2014). 
No exit taxation. 
Sweden Directors of a non-Swedish company 
may be subject to criminal sanctions 
for crimes committed in Sweden.  
Non-resident companies are subject to 
tax in Sweden only insofar as they derive 
income subject to Swedish source country 
taxation, which include, for example, 
business income effectively connected 
with immovable property or a permanent 
establishment in Sweden. 
Exit taxation, which was however in 
compliance with Court of Justice decision 






Offences under the Companies Act 
2006 in general only apply to 
companies incorporated in the UK 
Tax residence: companies incorporated in 
the UK and companies whose central 
management and control is exercised 
therein. 
A company which is resident in the UK by 
virtue only of central management and 
control can become non-resident for fiscal 
purposes by moving its central 
management and control abroad, with 






1. The international scope of directors’ criminal responsibility is intricately, and sometimes 
incoherently, regulated in the Member States. From the national reports, significant 
differences emerge, but also certain patterns and commonalities. In general, it is useful 
to distinguish criminal offences related to the violation of domestic directors’ duties and 
ensuring the enforcement of company law rules and standards, which are often included 
in the same statutory materials that govern domestic companies (either the domestic 
civil code or specific companies or commercial acts), from criminal offences aimed at 
protecting general interests, interests of actual or potential creditors, or the interest of 
the market at large. The latter are most likely to be applicable to foreign companies if 
the conduct is perpetrated on the domestic territory. For instance: criminal offences 
related to a company’s insolvency could apply to foreign insolvent companies having 
their COMI on the domestic territory (this is the case in Italy); criminal offences aimed at 
protecting labour also apply to foreign companies active on the domestic territory (this is 
the case in Latvia). The scope of criminal liability intended to ensure the enforcement of 
company law rules is a much more controversial field. In some Member States, these 
criminal offences apply only to directors of domestic companies (Croatia, Denmark, Italy, 
Romania and the UK). National reports of several other Member States, however, 
indicate that such criminal statutes also apply to foreign companies having some 
connection with the domestic territory, or when the crime is committed on the domestic 
territory (Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden). National reports reveal that following 
connecting factors are applied: (a) the fact that the crime is committed on the domestic 
territory (see: Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden); and (b) the fact that the company has activities or its 
‘seat’ on the domestic territory (France and Portugal). 
2. Regarding exit taxes, a comparative assessment of national reports reveals a rather 
complex scenario. Some national reports maintain that in their jurisdiction no exit 
taxation is levied (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Spain, the UK). In most Member States, however, domestic companies 
relocating their tax residence abroad are taxed as though they were wound-up. Several 
judicial decisions of the Court of Justice have addressed national tax rules that restricted 
freedom of establishment; recently, in National Grid Indus, the Court of Justice held that 
exit taxes restrict freedom of establishment and may infringe EU law if the relocation of 
the tax residence triggers an immediate taxation of all unrealised profits (whereas it may 
be in line with the company’s Treaty rights if payment of the taxes is postponed). As a 
consequence of this decision, several of the Member States providing exit taxes have 
limited the scope of these rules to relocations outside the EU or have deferred the 
payment of unrealised profits to at least five years (Austria, Denmark, France, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal). In Sweden, exit tax rules already allowed a deferral 
and are in compliance with the case law of the Court of Justice. In other countries, 
however, it is more problematic whether the national regime on exit taxes complies with 
the case law of the Court of Justice, and some commentators argue that the conditions 
imposed by the Court in National Grid Indus are not satisfied (Belgium, Germany, 
Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia). 
effect from the end of its current 
accounting period, and without incurring 
any exit charge. 





According to the Brussels I Regulation Recast, in proceedings relating to ‘the validity of 
the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies’ or to ‘the validity of the 
decisions of their organs’, the courts of the Member State where the company has its 
‘seat’ have exclusive jurisdiction.515 The Brussels I Regulation Recast, however, does not 
provide for a uniform concept of ‘seat’. On the contrary, national courts should interpret 
the word ‘seat’ in accordance with their own private international law rules.516 When this 
definition is interpreted as ‘statutory seat’ (or ‘registered office’), courts are competent 
to hear cases on the matters mentioned in article 24(2) Brussels I Regulation Recast 
only when the defendant is a domestically incorporated company, while they are not 
competent if the company is incorporated abroad. By contrast, when a Member State 
interprets the term ‘seat’ as ‘real seat’ (or a similar concept related to the location of the 
company’s centre of activities), their courts are obviously competent to hear cases when 
the defendant has its ‘real seat’ on the domestic territory, even if the company is 
incorporated in another state. Therefore, the jurisdiction criteria are likely to diverge 
across the EU and both positive and negative conflicts of jurisdictions may arise. Since 
courts should employ their own rules of private international law, the concept of ‘seat’ is 
likely to mirror the main conflict-of-laws criterion employed in a given Member State; 
consequently, we can predict that ‘real seat countries’ will interpret the term ‘seat’ as 
‘real seat’, while ‘incorporation theory’ countries would interpret it as ‘registered office’. 
At the same time, the opposite might also be true: the interpretation of the concept of 
‘seat’ for jurisdiction purposes reveals a certain attitude of a given Member State and 
might shed light on ambiguities as to its main private international law logic.  
8.1 Overview of national laws 
Table 8. Jurisdiction 
Country Interpretation of ‘seat’ requirement in 
Brussels I-Regulation Recast by national 
courts 
Main connecting factor 
Austria EU companies: registered office. 
Companies from third countries: real seat. 
EU companies: incorporation theory 
Non EU companies: real seat theory 
Belgium Either principal establishment or 
registered office. 
Real seat theory 
Bulgaria Registered office Incorporation theory 
Croatia Registered office Incorporation theory 
Cyprus Registered office Incorporation theory 
Czech 
Republic 
Registered office Incorporation theory 
Denmark Probably registered office. No case law. Incorporation theory 
Estonia Unclear. No case law nor literature 
available 
Incorporation theory 
Finland Registered office. Incorporation theory 
France Real seat. No case law.  Debated 
Germany EU companies: registered office  
Companies from third countries: real seat 
EU companies: incorporation theory 
Non EU companies: real seat theory 
Greece Real seat. Unclear. No case law. Real seat theory as a general rule. 
Incorporation theory for private 
companies. 
Hungary In case of doubt: seat is the place of Incorporation theory 
                                                 
515 Art. 24 (2), first sentence, Brussels I Regulation Recast (Art 22 (2) of the ‘old’ Brussels I Regulation). 
516 Art. 24 (2), second sentence, Brussels I Regulation Recast (Art 22 (2) of the ‘old’ Brussels I Regulation). 




management. No case law. 
Ireland Unclear. No case law. No practical 
problems or conflicts.  
Incorporation theory 
Italy The jurisdiction in which companies are 
located and undertake their business (just 
one decision: Corte di Cassazione 2005). 
Incorporation theory 
Latvia Probably registered office. No case law.  Debated 
Lithuania Probably registered office. No case law. Incorporation theory 
Luxembourg Unclear. No case law. Real seat theory. 
Malta (a) Companies incorporated in Malta, or  
(b) companies deemed to be resident by 
virtue of the situation of their central 
management or control.  
Incorporation theory 
Netherlands Registered office. 
In case of negative conflict, Dutch courts 
accept jurisdiction. 
Incorporation theory 
Poland The seat of the managing bodies. No case 
law 
Debated 
Portugal Unclear. No case law Real seat theory, but debated 
Romania Registered office Incorporation theory 
Slovakia Registered office Incorporation theory 
Slovenia Registered office Incorporation theory 
Spain Domicile determined by the law under 
which a company s constituted or 
recognised, nor by its articles of 
association or funding regulations. 
In all other cases: the place in which its 
legal representation is established or in 
which its main functions are carried out. 
Debated (predominant opinion: 
incorporation theory) 
Sweden Registered office Incorporation theory 
United 
Kingdom 
The seat of a company is defined by 
paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 to the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 
2001/3929 as being in the UK if either: 
(a) it was incorporated under the law of a 
part of the United Kingdom; or (b) its 
central management and control is 





1. Surprisingly, several national reports indicate that domestic courts have never addressed 
the concept of ‘seat’ under the Brussels I Regulation (this is the case in Denmark, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and Portugal). The most 
striking result of this overview, therefore, is that the content of the law in several 
jurisdictions is simply uncertain. In other words, should a conflict emerge regarding ‘the 
validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies’ or ‘the validity of 
the decisions of their organs’, it is unpredictable whether domestic courts of these 
countries will declare themselves as competent or not. In this regard we should 
distinguish three scenarios. The first scenario refers to companies that are incorporated 
in one of the aforementioned countries and have their real seat on its territory; in these 
circumstances, domestic courts of the country of incorporation are certainly competent, 
since that company would comply with both possible concepts of ‘seat’. The second 




scenario refers to foreign companies having their ‘real seat’ on the domestic territory; in 
this case, it is uncertain whether domestic courts of these countries will accept 
competence or not. Finally, when a domestic company has its real seat abroad, it is 
uncertain whether courts of these jurisdictions will be held competent or not, although it 
seems unlikely that a domestic court will refuse competence regarding domestically 
incorporated companies (but we have no evidence of this conclusion from the national 
reports).  
2. In other Member States, the word ‘seat’ under article 24(2) of the Brussels I Regulation 
is interpreted as ‘real seat’ or ‘administrative office’ (or a similar concept related to the 
location of the company’s centre of activities), with the consequence that domestic 
courts of these states are competent to hear cases related to companies incorporated in 
other States and having their ‘real seat’ (or s similar concept) on the domestic territory. 
This is the case in Belgium, France, Italy, Poland and Spain. In Italy, however, only one 
decision has been published on the concept of ‘seat’, which was interpreted as the place 
where companies undertake their business activities (hence, probably this result is not 
entirely reliable and the interpretation seems to be still quite uncertain).  
3. In other countries, by contrast, the concept of ‘seat’ under article 24(2) of the Brussels I 
Regulation is interpreted as a company’s registered office, with the consequence that 
domestic courts would be competent to hear cases related to domestic companies even 
though these entities have their ‘real seat’ or their central administration abroad. This is 
the case in: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Latvia, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. Interestingly, the Austrian and German 
regimes distinguish EU companies from non-EU companies: regarding the former, the 
concept of ‘seat’ is the registered office, while for the latter ‘seat’ is interpreted as the 
place of their central administration. This solution aims at avoiding negative and positive 
conflicts of jurisdiction in the EU (but its effectiveness is questionable as long as there is 
no uniformity in the interpretation of the concept of ‘seat’). 
4. In the UK, Malta and Belgium, two alternative criteria apply: a company can be sued in 
domestic courts either (a) when it is a domestically incorporated company, or (b) when 
its central management and control is exercised from the domestic territory (this is the 
case in the UK and Malta) or its principal establishment is on the domestic territory 
(Belgium). These are ‘catch-all’ criteria that expand the competence of domestic courts 
to include both domestic companies having their ‘real seat’ abroad and foreign 
companies with their ‘central management and control’ on the domestic territory. The 
risk of these criteria is that positive conflicts of jurisdiction might arise in relation to 
foreign companies whose country of incorporation follows the ‘statutory seat’ concept.  
5. In comparative terms, the most interesting question is whether the interpretation of the 
concept of ‘seat’ under article 24(2) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast actually mirrors 
the general private international law criterion for company law matters. Article 24(2) 
Brussels I Regulation Recast stipulates that this term should be interpreted according to 
the private international law criteria of each Member State; therefore, we would expect 
that there should be a perfect symmetry between the jurisdiction criterion and the main 
conflict of law connecting factor. The comparative analysis only partially confirms this 
hypothesis. In most countries that clearly follow the ‘incorporation theory’, the concept 
of ‘seat’ is actually interpreted as the registered office (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Sweden and the UK); in the UK and Malta, however, courts may also be competent to 
hear cases when the defendant has its central management or control on the domestic 
territory. The only partial exception among pure ‘incorporation theory countries’ is 
Ireland, in which courts have never properly defined the concept of ‘seat’ under article 
24(2) of the Brussels I Regulation and regard the location of a company’s ‘seat’ as a self-
evident element. Additionally, Austria and Germany, which follow the incorporation 




theory for EEA companies and the real seat theories for other companies, interpret the 
concept of ‘seat’ for jurisdictional purposes in a similar vein: as the company’s registered 
office when the company is incorporated in the EU or in the EEA, and the ‘real seat’ in 
other cases. In most of these jurisdictions, however, there is no case law and the 
interpretation draws on analysis by scholars. Italy is in a quite peculiar position: 
although it follows the ‘incorporation theory’, the concept of seat seems to be interpreted 
as ‘real seat’, but this conclusion is quite uncertain as just one decision is published on 
the matter. Particularly interesting are those countries whose national reports have 
revealed that the content of the main conflict of law criterion is contentious, debated or 
unclear: France, Poland and Spain. In these countries, legal scholars predominantly 
seem to be in favour of the ‘incorporation theory’, but it is undeniable that the features 
of the private international law mechanisms are still debated. Interestingly, in these 
three countries the concept of ‘seat’ under article 24(2) Brussels I Regulation Recast is 
interpreted with reference to fact-based criteria, such as the ‘real seat’ or the actual 
management of the company, even for companies incorporated abroad. Regarding the 
Member States that still largely follow the ‘real seat theory’ (Belgium, Greece and 
Portugal), the results are not unequivocal: while in Greece and Portugal the 
interpretation of the concept of ‘seat’ under Brussels I is uncertain and there is no case 
law on the matter, in Belgium the answer is based on a double criterion, as it can mean 
either the registered office or the principal establishment (similarly to the UK and Malta). 
Greece seems to define ‘seat’ as real seat, according to its general private international 
law approach. 
9. Critical reflections 
As discussed above, the Court of Justice, starting with the decision rendered in the case 
Centros in 1999, has continuously clarified the scope of companies’ freedom of 
establishment. Nevertheless, Member States’ private international law regimes may not 
be in line with these continuous developments of case law of the Court of Justice and, 
consequently, with the freedom of establishment. Such a tension between EU law and 
national law is not surprising, and is to be considered a normal scenario in ‘multi-layer’ 
legal systems like the European Union. In this scenario, the question arises whether 
national courts, scholars and legislators are aware of these discrepancies and aim at 
addressing them. Therefore, we have asked to national reporters to assess whether 
conflicts between domestic rules and EU law exist and whether policy makers intend to 
reform (or have already reformed) the present legal situation.  
Additionally, the proper functioning of the freedom of establishment may be impeded by 
administrative practices of notaries, commercial registers or courts, not only by 
legislation. Such obstacles to a correct application of EU law are not always visible and 
cannot be repealed by simply amending statutory rules. Furthermore, if the national 
commercial register is decentralised, different courts and local offices of the commercial 
register may follow inconsistent practices and interpretations of domestic rules, 
especially if these rules are somehow ambiguous. These inconsistencies may themselves 
represent restrictions on the freedom of establishment.  




9.1 Overview of national responses 
Table 9: Critical reflections 
Country Compatibility of the national 
framework with EU law 
Reforms, or plans for 
reforming, the legal situation. 
Do differences in 
interpretation and application 
exist among different courts 
and registrars? 
Law firms or other advisory 
firms that promote 
incorporation in another 
jurisdiction 
Austria Largely in line with EU law. 
There is broad agreement 
among commentators that the 
rules of Austrian company 
law, including capital 
maintenance rules and 
employee co-determination, 
do not apply to foreign 
companies incorporated in 
other Member States. There is 
some uncertainty and debate 
as to the application of rules 
at the boundary between 
company and insolvency law 
to foreign companies, limited 
however to areas not yet 
addressed in the relevant 
Court of Justice jurisprudence. 
No current plans Some differences are likely, 
but regular case law from the 
Austrian Supreme Court leads 
to fairly consistent practice 
overall. 
No 
Belgium Requirement to have the real 
seat of a company established 
under Belgian law in Belgium 
is seen as being in line with 
the case law 
It is controversial whether the 
real seat theory can be 
applied to companies validly 
incorporated abroad, and it is 
generally acknowledged that 
rules of Belgian substantive 
company law applied to 
foreign companies need to 
Proposal of the Belgian Centre 
for Corporate Law to amend 
the Belgian PIL Code: to adopt 
the incorporation theory and 
introduce a procedure for the 
cross border transfer of the 
seat, based on the procedure 
for the transfer of the seat of 
the SE 
Submitted to the Ministry of 
Justice in June 2015; it can be 
expected that the Minister will 
prepare a bill based upon the 
No - 




meet the Gebhard test proposals 
Bulgaria Even if Article 3(1) of the PILC 
declares the supremacy of the 
norms of international 
conventions and other 
international instruments, 
including European 
instruments over the PILC, the 
systematic negligence of 
inbound/outbound re-
incorporations impedes 
corporate mobility. However, 
this has not yet been judicially 
tested on national courts. 
- - - 
Croatia Incorporation theory country: 
no violation of EU freedom of 
establishment, at least in 
general. 
Art. 17(2) PILA provides for 
the application of company 
law of the country where a 
company’s real seat is located, 
if different from the country of 
incorporation, when the 
former considers that 
company as a domestic 
company. This situation is 
probably rare, but this could 
be a violation of EU freedom 
of establishment. 
 
A reform of private 
international law is being 
prepared. Art. 17(2) PILA is 
likely to be abolished. 
Inconsistencies could arise. - 
Cyprus Article 362 Cap 113 is highly 
problematic, see 3.2 and 4.4 






Yes (despite uncertainties on 
cross border transfer of seats, 
connected to non-EEA 
- - - 





Denmark Discussions in the literature 
focus on the Danish rules on 
branches of foreign 
companies, cross-border 
groups and tax issues; neither 
of these issues have been 
tried in court 
Interpretation of registered 
office as the place from where 
the company was actually 
managed changed by the 
Danish Commerce and 
Companies Appeals Board in 
2008; now it is sufficient that 
the company’s management 
or a (genuine) representative 
of the management can be 
contacted at the registered 
office (but not clear what 
authority such a 
representative must have) 
 
No Certain law firms and other 
advisory firms actively assist 
companies in incorporation in 
another jurisdiction, but these 
services seem to be promoted 
only on a small scale 
Estonia Presumably yes Since 1 December 2014 digital 
ID-cards are issued to non-
residents, eg for the benefit of 
foreign entrepreneurs who 
own or plan to start a 
company in Estonia (easy 
registration)  
Presumably not Some cases recently when 
Estonian companies relocated 
to Norway before opening 
insolvency procedures due to 
the more favourable 
insolvency regime there 
Finland In line with EU law. - No known differences in 
interpretation and application 
of the relevant rules. 
- 
France Third parties can choose the 
application of the law of the 
statutory seat and law of the 
real seat of a company. 
Therefore, companies 
incorporated in another 
Member State, but having its 
real seat in France territory, 
may be submitted to French 
company law: this solution 
does not comply with the 
Inspire Art decision. 
No intention of the French 
Legislator to reform the legal 
situation. 
Consistent interpretation 
throughout the country 
Yes. 





Germany There are some discussions 
about the compatibility of 
specific issues with EU law 
(e.g. rules on the name of 
companies), but apart from 
these issues it is largely 
accepted that German law, 
including central regulatory 
elements of the German 
corporate economy, such as 
strict capital maintenance 
rules and employee co-
determination, do not apply to 
companies incorporated in 
other EU states 
- Not clear whether the 
Gebhard criteria are always 
applied as strictly in the 
German jurisprudence as in 
ECJ case law. 
 
A draft law codifying the 
private international law of 
companies had been prepared 
in Germany,517 but it is 
currently not being pursued 
Differences in application of 
the law are likely since 
commercial registers are 
decentralised in Germany 
A number of advisory firms 
promote services for 
incorporation of a UK Limited 





Greece Greek law managed to adjust 
the real seat theory to the 
requirements of the findings 
of the Court of Justice. 
Lack of special provisions on 
cross-border conversions 
might be problematic after 
Cartesio and Vale. 
No No There are some quite large 
law firms in Greece offering 
consultation to those 
companies wishing to transfer 
their seat abroad or wishing to 
transfer their registered office 
to Greece. The financial crisis 
put pressure on Greek 
companies and many of them 
transferred their seat abroad 
(esp. in Bulgaria and Cyprus). 
Hungary No proceeding for inbound 
conversions.  
- - - 
                                                 
517  Referentenentwurf, ‘Gesetz zum Internationalen Privatrecht der Gesellschaften, Vereine und juristischen Personen’, available at 
http://www.gesmat.bundesgerichtshof.de/gesetzesmaterialien/16_wp/int_gesr/int_gesr-index.htm.  






Ireland Presumably yes No Presumably not A large number of 
international companies invite 
companies to set up offshore 
companies or to relocate 
existing businesses overseas 
and many websites promise a 
quick company formation in 
Panama, the British Virgin 
Islands etc. However, Irish 
law firms or other advisory 
firms generally do not actively 
promote incorporation in 
another jurisdiction. On the 
contrary, the emphasis tends 
to be on encouraging 
international companies to 
relocate to Ireland to take 
advantage of favourable tax 
treatment, an English 
speaking educated workforce, 
membership of the EU etc. 
Italy Transparency and registration 
requirements of secondary 
seats: unclear to what extent 
these rules are applicable to 
EEA companies.  
 
The lack of any regulation on 
cross-border reincorporations 
is probably at odds with ECJ 
case law (Cartesio) and 
creates the risk of abuses.  
 
No current plan Different registrars follow 
different interpretations on 
cross border reincorporations. 
At these websites exist: 
- www.italianlimited.it (which 
targets Italian undertakings 
seeking to incorporate a 
company in the UK, Malta, 
Ireland, or Cyprus)  
- 
www.italiancompanyformation
s.com (promoting the 
incorporation of Italian 
companies) 
Latvia Unclear / no major challenges 
yet 
No Limited number of cross-
border company law related 
issues 
Not aware of advisory firms; 
law firms deal with tax and 
regulatory benefits 




Lithuania Yes due to incorporation 
theory 
No Possible but little experience Some but to benefit from a 
perceived better tax 
environment, rather than to 
the reincorporation of existing 
Lithuanian companies abroad 
Luxembourg - No reform plan - No 
Malta Compliance with EU law. 
However, there are areas that 
would benefit from greater 
clarity (e.g. the border 
between the lex societatis and 
the lex concursus) 
- - - 
Netherlands Application of parts of the Act 
on foreign business 
corporations to EEA 
companies (see Table 3): 
considered not in breach with 
EU-law as these rules are 
pivotal to combating fraud 
Proposal of a bill for an 
appropriate procedure for 
outbound and inbound 
transfers of seat, 2014:  
addresses the transfer of the 
statutory seat of a Dutch 
public or private limited 
liability company to another 
EU or EEA country, as well the 
transfer of the seat of foreign 
companies to the 
Netherlands518 
- - 
Poland 1) The main connecting factor 
is still unclear; 
2) Lack of regulation on 
reincorporations. 
 
New Private International Law 
Act 2011, article 19 (1): ‘The 
transfer of the seat within the 
EEA does not result in the loss 
of legal personality.’ 
No broad interest in using 
foreign entities to do business 
in Poland. Opalski (2014) 
mentions that there are 
thousands of Polish companies 
whose board members are 
resident abroad and whose 
‘real seat’ is abroad. 
- 
Portugal Despite the wording of article 
3(1) Companies Act, in 
practice there is no 
incompatibility with EU law.  
- No No 
                                                 
518 The proposal can be found at https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/grensoverschrijdende_omzetting (no English translation available). 




Regime on ‘affiliated 
companies’ (art. 481 
Companies Act) may raise 
doubts regarding its 
compatibility with EU law.   
Slovakia Not any major inconsistency 
with EU law. 
- There are some 
inconsistencies among courts 
regarding the question of re-
incorporations. 
- 
Slovenia The potential conflicts of the 
Slovene rules with the 
requirements of EU law are 
primarily noticeable in the 
field of outwards corporate 
mobility. 
The legislator/policy maker 
currently does not intend to 
reform this legal situation. 
 
No No 
Spain Art. 9(2) Companies Act is not 
applicable to EEA companies 
(but the legislators do not aim 
at amending it). 
No No - 
Sweden No substantial conflict 
between Swedish law and the 
requirements of EU law. 
- No No 
United 
Kingdom 
The prohibition of inbound and 
outbound reincorporations is 
likely to be a violation of EU 
freedom of establishment, as 
interpreted by Court of Justice 
in the cases Cartesio and 
VALE.  
No plan to address this issue 
(which needs a legislative 
reform). 
No  Yes 
 





1. Our findings (table 9) reveal the following potential incompatibilities of Member States 
legislation with EU law: (a) some countries block the ‘arrival’ of foreign companies into 
the domestic territory, mostly because they still adhere to some form of the ‘real seat 
theory’; (b) some countries apply domestic rules to branches or activities of foreign 
companies; (c) in some countries, reincorporations are not regulated or there is 
uncertainty as to whether they are allowed and as to how they should be implemented; 
(d) in some States inbound and outbound reincorporations are not possible, which might 
be considered as a violation of the freedom of establishment (see: Bulgaria, Ireland, 
Slovenia and the UK); (e) in some Member States exit taxes may not be in compliance 
with the conditions developed by the Court of Justice in National Grid Indus and other 
case law. In the Netherlands, specific domestic rules also apply to foreign companies 
incorporated in EEA countries, but these provisions are considered in line with case law 
of the Court of Justice as they aim at combatting fraud and, therefore, are argued to 
pass the ‘Gebhard test’.   
2. Most national legislators have either intervened, or seem to have the intention to 
intervene, in order to resolve these discrepancies. It is interesting to note, however, that 
the French legislator does not have any plan of amending domestic law, although this is, 
in some respects, at odds with the Court’s decision in Inspire Art; furthermore, there is 
no plan to adopt legislation allowing inbound and outbound reincorporations into and 
from the UK. Most national reports are either silent on the question whether an 
inconsistent interpretation of domestic rules across courts or commercial registers risks 
undermining a correct application of freedom of establishment, or they maintain that the 
practices of notaries and local registers are consistent throughout the country. The only 
exceptions are Austria, Croatia, Germany and Italy, whose reports mention the 
possibility of inconsistent interpretations and applications. In this respect, it is worth 
mentioning the German and Italian reports, which argue that a reason for potentially 
diverging interpretations and practices throughout the country is the decentralised 
structure of the commercial register.  
3. Finally, the question arises whether law firms or other advisory companies actively 
promote incorporations in another jurisdiction. Legal advisors, indeed, could be possible 
drivers of ‘regulatory competition’ among Member States. Some national reports 
(Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Lithuania) indicate that such law firms or 
advisors are active in the market, helping domestic companies to ‘emigrate’ or foreign 
undertakings to incorporate companies under domestic law.519  
10. Conclusions 
The comparative analysis reveals certain common patterns across Member States, but 
also a number of relevant uncertainties and regulatory gaps in domestic legislations. 
Such uncertainties and gaps can be found across the European Union. To a certain 
extent, these problems seem to be more pronounced in the Member States that joined 
the EU recently, probably due to a lack of relevant judicial decisions; however, the 
comparative analysis also reveals that in several ‘old’ Member States, private 
international law regimes are unclear, at least in some respects, and may not entirely 
comply with the freedom of establishment.  
In addition, long-run trajectories also play a (limited) role. While Member States can no 
longer be divided along the traditional lines of ‘real seat theory’ and ‘incorporation 
theory’, this classification is still helpful in explaining some distinctive elements of 
national law. The distinction between ‘real seat’ countries and ‘incorporation theory 
                                                 
519 See also the empirical survey, Chapter III, Section 3.3. 




countries’ cannot predict how a given jurisdiction will react when facing a variety of 
situations regarding companies with an ‘international’ or ‘cross-border’ connection. 
Nevertheless, this divide may be useful to capture a jurisdiction’s attitude towards 
foreign companies: while formerly ‘incorporation theory countries’ recognise the 
existence of foreign companies without further questioning where any physical elements, 
such as the administrative seat or the real seat, are located, and generally do not apply 
any part of their domestic company law (or only isolated provisions in selective 
situations) to such companies, jurisdictions that used to follow the ‘real seat theory’ tend 
to be more readily prepared to apply certain domestic rules to foreign or pseudo-foreign 
companies. Additionally, the comparative analysis has revealed that several Member 
States continue to combine the incorporation theory with elements of the real seat 
theory, often differentiating between the intra-EU scenario and the relationship to third 
countries. What emerges is also that in several Member States, conflict of laws rules 
applicable to companies are unclear and, for intra-EU cases, the compatibility of national 
regimes with the case law of the Court of Justice on freedom of establishment is 
problematic. 
This chapter has also explored the question of how the rules of private international law 
are related to national substantive rules on companies. Since companies are ‘creatures 
of national law’, 520  each jurisdiction establishes under which conditions domestic 
companies can be incorporated. Such requirements are part of substantive company law, 
not of conflict of laws, and yet the connection between these areas is evident. Formerly 
real seat jurisdictions tend to require that domestically incorporated companies keep the 
relevant connecting factor within the domestic territory, whereas incorporation theory 
countries normally do not require the presence of any physical elements in the domestic 
territory in order to incorporate a new company. The comparative analysis, however, has 
also revealed that Member States may follow intermediate solutions, and that in some 
Member States codified rules are controversial, or even disregarded, in practice, by the 
commercial register.  
Additionally, Member States do not provide for a uniform interpretation of the 
boundaries between the lex societatis and other areas of law (lex concursus, lex 
contractus and lex delicti) for conflict of laws purposes. In some Member States, 
directors’ duties and liability in the vicinity of insolvency (such as the British ‘wrongful 
trading’ regime) are characterised as ‘insolvency law rules’ and, therefore, fall within the 
lex concursus, with the consequence that these rules also apply to foreign companies 
having their centre of main interests (COMI) in the domestic territory (according to the 
conflict of law criteria set by the Insolvency Regulation). Such solution seems to be 
coherent with the Court’s case law, according to which the Member State of a debtor’s 
COMI has jurisdiction to hear actions that ‘derive directly from the bankruptcy or 
winding-up and [are] closely connected with the [insolvency] proceedings’. 521  The 
Insolvency Regulation Recast of 2015, additionally, stipulates that ‘the Member States 
within the territory of which insolvency proceedings have been opened […] shall have 
jurisdiction for any action which derives directly from the insolvency proceedings and is 
closely linked with them’. 522  In other Member States, however, the classification of 
liability for breach of duties in the vicinity of insolvency – or other functionally equivalent 
legal strategies that aim at protecting creditors in the ‘twilight zone’ when insolvency 
approaches – is controversial and it has been suggested that such mechanisms fall 
within the scope of the lex societatis. Similarly, the liability of the shareholders for the 
company’s debts (‘veil piercing’) is classified in Member States as either an action in tort 
or an action based on company law. 
                                                 
520 Daily Mail, at 19. 
521 C-133/78, Gourdain v. Nadler [1979] R-I 733, at 4.  
522 Art. 110(1) Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
insolvency proceedings. 




Another significant problem that emerges from the national reports is that in several 
Member States conflict of laws rules applicable to companies are still uncertain and 
underdeveloped. In many Member States, several issues that are crucial for a correct 
application of freedom of establishment are simply not regulated and therefore unclear. 
For instance, in many Member States it is unclear whether domestic companies can 
reincorporate under the law of other Member States without prior liquidation, and 
whether foreign companies can reincorporate as a domestic company. This lack of clarity 
whether cross-border reincorporations are allowed often goes hand in hand with a lack of 
regulation of the procedure and technicalities (for example, when a company should be 
cancelled from the domestic register) to be followed to implement such transactions.  
Regarding cross-border reincorporations, additionally, national reports have shown that 
several Member States simply prohibit or make impossible this transaction, despite the 
fact that most recent decisions of the Court of Justice seem to hold that the freedom of 
establishment of the Treaty grants companies incorporated in a Member State a right to 
convert into company types of another Member State, at least to the extent that 
domestic companies can convert into another type of company.523 In this regard, the 
lack of uniformity among Member States also reveals that the case law of the Court of 
Justice is, at least in this respect, not sufficient to create a uniform interpretation and 
application of freedom of establishment throughout the EU.524 
Furthermore, in most countries there is very little case law interpreting the conflict of 
laws and jurisdictional rules and addressing problematic boundary issues identified in the 
reports, thus creating a significant degree of legal uncertainty for companies operating in 
more than one Member State. For instance, several reports state that no judicial decision 
has been rendered regarding the definition of ‘seat’ under the Brussels I Regulation, 
which is the jurisdictional criterion for ‘core’ company law issues. In summary, the laws 
of the Member States seem to reveal a striking lack of uniformity and legal certainty as 
to several crucial aspects. It can be assumed that both the lack of uniformity and legal 
uncertainty are obstacles to market integration and corporate mobility in the EU, limiting 
the possibility of companies to make effective use of the freedom of establishment. 
Furthermore, lack of clarity and uniformity may give rise to opportunistic behaviour on 




                                                 
523 VALE, at 41. 
524 See the results of the empirical survey, Chapter III, Section 3.2. 




V. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
The call for tender of this report indicates that the study should ‘suggest possible 
solutions to the problem, including a possible harmonisation of conflict-of-law rules at EU 
level in the area of company law’. This is supposed to cover all relevant topics of this 
area, such as the ‘connecting factor, the scope of the lex societatis and possible 
exceptions to it, overriding mandatory provisions and renvoi’, as well as the possible 
need for differentiations between ‘intra-EU cases and for cases involving companies from 
third countries’. In addition, the call for tender asks the report to take into account the 
relationship to other areas of law. This means giving consideration to existing laws of 
private international law and jurisdiction such ‘Brussels I, Insolvency, Rome I and Rome 
II Regulations’. It is also essential to discuss related topics of substantive law, in 
particular for the effectiveness of any rules concerning the change of the lex societatis. 
The subsequent text will explain the reasons in favour and against possible solutions, 
taking into account the statistical, empirical and comparative findings of this study. It 
will also provide specific recommendations to the main issues at stake. In some 
instances, those will be definitive ones, while in other instances the report will present 
options in order of preference. 
The corresponding structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 will, at a general 
level, discuss the question about a possible harmonisation of conflict of laws rules 
applicable to companies. Section 3 will turn to the scope of such harmonisation in terms 
of entities and jurisdictions covered. Sections 4 to 10 will then follow the structure of the 
comparative analysis; thus, they will analyse the residence requirement of substantive 
company law, the general private international law approach, the scope of the lex 
societatis, the mechanisms to protect public interests, reincorporations, the relevance of 
other areas of law and jurisdiction in terms of the possible content of harmonised 
provisions. Section 11 concludes. 
2. Harmonisation of conflict of laws rules applicable to companies: general 
considerations 
2.1 The need for common rules in this area of law 
The question of whether the EU should harmonise conflicts of laws rules applicable to 
companies is an element of a more general question, namely the power allocation in a 
‘multi-layer’ system. In this regard, the preliminary question is whether full 
harmonisation of the substantive rules of company law at EU level would make it less 
relevant to harmonise rules of private international law. Such harmonisation of 
substantive law would to a large extent1 remove legal uncertainty in the area, which is 
mainly a consequence of differences between national company law regimes. It may also 
be justified as a way to reduce the ‘transaction costs’ that may arise from the diversity 
of company laws.2  However, despite the emergence of European forms of company (e.g. 
                                                 
1 Harmonisation would not completely solve the issue of the law applicable to companies, since companies, as 
creatures of national law, would still need to derive their status (and existence) from one legal system, even if 
the content of the rules were identical in all respects. 
2 Transaction costs are a frequent reason cited in favour of harmonised rules. Cf, e.g., U Mattei, Comparative 
Law and Economics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997) 94, 219; K Pistor, ‘The Standardization of 
Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 97. 




SE, a proposal for SUP) and ongoing harmonisation measures,3  it is not realistic to 
expect a fully uniform company law throughout all Member States.4 
Given this persistence of diversity of company laws, conflict of laws rules will therefore 
continue to play a crucial role. This study supports the idea of common EU conflict of 
laws rules applicable to companies. This follows from the main findings of this study. 
2.1.1 Statistical data collection and empirical survey 
The analysis of the statistical data5 examined how far, in the EU, companies operate in 
some form in Member States different from the Member State in which they have been 
incorporated. It was found that, to some extent, such corporate mobility is already a 
reality. Based on data from all Member States, we identified the UK as the most popular 
target destination for private companies, but foreign incorporations also take place in 
other Member States, with Estonia, Romania and Slovakia being popular target 
destinations. However, we also established that decisions about domestic or foreign 
incorporations are not merely a result of differences in substantive company law. The 
regression analysis found that countries that have a clear-cut version of the 
‘incorporation theory’ under private international law benefit in this market for 
incorporations, as compared to countries that have retained elements of the ‘real seat 
theory’. We also identified a negative effect of differences in the conflict of laws rules 
applicable to companies. These findings have important policy implications. They show 
that the case law of the ECJ (now CJEU) has not made differences in the conflicts of laws 
rules applicable to companies obsolete.6 The significance of the variables of conflict of 
laws rules also indicate that EU harmonisation could have a positive effect in this area of 
law.  
The empirical survey7 dealt with the practical problems created by the legal uncertainty 
for companies caused by the current situation stemming from the potential for conflicts 
of laws in a context where the substantive laws of the Member States have not been 
fully harmonised. The main finding of the survey was that there are significant practical 
obstacles to corporate mobility in the EU. In particular, it is notable that many of the 
respondents of the countries that have retained an element of the ‘real seat theory’ 
report various practical obstacles. There is also a strong positive correlation between 
respondents who are sceptical about their domestic law and who support EU 
harmonisation of conflict of laws rules. Furthermore, the analysis of group differences 
shows that there is still a divide between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States as 
respondents from the latter countries are more likely to indicate lack of familiarity with 
the relevant procedures and to report practical problems in their dealings with domestic 
courts and commercial registers. 
2.1.2 Comparative analysis 
The comparative analysis8 identified core differences among Member States’ conflict of 
laws rules applicable to companies. Thus, the case law of the Court of Justice has not yet 
led to convergence between those rules. This lack of convergence also raises the risk of 
‘forum shopping’, since it can sometimes be justifiable to leave claimants the choice 
                                                 
3 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/company-law/index_en.htm  
4 It may also be possible to refer to the value of legal diversity. See, e.g., S Deakin, ‘Legal Diversity and Regu-
latory Competition: Which Model for Europe?’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 440. 
5 See Chapter II, above. 
6 See also Section 2.2, below. 
7 See Chapter III, above. 
8 See Chapter IV, above. 




between courts from different countries.9 Furthermore, in some instances, we found that 
the EU requirements following the freedom of establishment have been sufficiently 
implemented by the domestic law-makers. 
More specifically, the comparative analysis showed how in some core topics 
harmonisation of conflict of laws rules would be beneficial. The following four examples 
can illustrate this point. First, the conflict of laws rules of some Member States do not 
unambiguously refer to the state of incorporation and some also provide secondary 
connecting factors that deviate from this principle. Thus, in order to increase legal 
certainty and predictability, it is advisable to provide for harmonised rules that clarify the 
scope of primary and secondary connecting factors as far as the freedom of 
establishment is applicable. 
Second, the comparative analysis found that some host states seek to extend the 
international reach of their laws by providing for exceptional connecting factors or 
qualifying certain rules as overriding mandatory provisions. This raises questions as to 
the conformity of such connecting factors and rules with the Court of Justice’s right of 
establishment jurisprudence. In principle, the answer may be derived in each individual 
case by applying the Court’s Gebhard conditions. However, the comparative analysis 
shows that EU law is applied inconsistently in the Member States: thus, a harmonising 
instrument that provides for a clear delineation of acceptable overriding requirements is 
advisable for this legal issue.10 
Third, the delimitation of the international scope of company law from other legal areas 
was found to be problematic in several respects. Although in some areas of law, notably 
insolvency, contract and tort law, whose connecting factors are laid down in instruments 
of EU law, it is not always clear how these factors are applied. Thus, this requires either 
clarifications of the meaning of the connecting factors in the existing instruments or in a 
new instrument that regulates the conflict of law rules applicable to companies.11 In 
addition, a problem arises where legal mechanisms that perform a similar function but 
use different legal techniques are classified differently in the Member States: thus, here, 
the risk of regulatory gaps or the cumulative application of conflicting substantive laws12 
justifies EU harmonisation of the relevant connecting factors. 
Fourth, the viability of reincorporations is highly dependent on the cross-jurisdictional 
compatibility of both procedural and substantive company law rules, as well as on the 
exact operation of the private international law mechanisms concerned. The comparative 
analysis identified such incompatibilities. In addition, it showed that harmonisation needs 
to consider the effect reincorporations have on the application of legal rules aimed at 
protecting non-shareholder constituencies, including national employee participation 
practices.   
2.2 The form of common EU rules 
Although the case law of the Court of Justice has had an impact on some core questions 
of conflicts of laws as applicable to companies, it is clear that it is not feasible to leave it 
to the Court to design common EU rules in this area of law. The Court does not seek to 
create a set of common rules of private international law and, on its own, it cannot 
                                                 
9  See also M Siems, ‘Führen alle Wege aus dem Dschungel nach Rom? - Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der 
Vereinheitlichung des internationalen Privatrechts’ (2003/2004) GPR 66 at 67-68 (on the general discussion 
why it would not be justified only to provide exclusive jurisdiction). 
10 For details see Sections 5 and 7, below. 
11 For details see Section 6, below. 
12 See also C Gerner-Beuerle and EP Schuster, ‘The Costs of Separation: Conflicts in Company and Insolvency 
Law in Europe’ (2014) 14 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 287. 




provide sufficient legal certainty in this complex field (e.g., as to the precise scope of the 
lex societatis). 
Another suggestion may be to provide non-binding common standards that national law 
makers may, but do not have to, adopt. This approach could refer to some parallel 
developments, for example, the EU recommendations in the field of corporate 
governance,13 the draft for a European Model Companies Act,14 and – in the US – the 
Model Business Corporation Act of the American Bar Association and the Restatement of 
Conflict of Law of the American Law Institute.15 However, in the present case, such non-
binding standards would not be sufficient: due to their voluntariness, they can only lead 
to partial convergence. It is also one of the aims of common rules of conflict of laws 
applicable to companies to provide legal certainty for businesses as they operate across 
borders. Thus, a mere convergence that would allow national deviations in core aspects 
of this area would not be sufficient. Binding uniform rules are therefore needed.16 
The question about the choice between a directive and/or a regulation has to start with 
the relevant legal bases for harmonising questions of corporate mobility. On the one 
hand, according to Article 50 of the TFEU, harmonisation by means of directives is 
possible ‘in order to attain freedom of establishment as regards a particular activity’. On 
the other hand, according to Article 81(1),(2)(c) the EU can, for the purposes of ‘judicial 
cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications (…) adopt measures, 
particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, aimed at 
ensuring (…) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning 
conflict of laws and of jurisdiction’. 
This study suggests that for the conflicts of laws rules applicable to companies a 
regulation should be enacted, which may be called ‘Rome V’ Regulation for the 
Harmonisation of the Law Applicable to Companies. This approach is in line with the 
existing (and forthcoming) ‘Rome regulations’ on other matters of private international 
law. It also has the natural advantage that regulations create EU-wide conceptual 
uniformity since all Member States and their courts need to apply and interpret the same 
legal definitions and rules. While there are some instances where topics should be left to 
the discretion of the Member States, this does not mean that a regulation is unsuitable. 
Rather, as with other regulations,17 it is possible to explicitly provide that these issues 
can be left to the Member States, for example, in order to protect local interests (see 
also the next section). 
In addition, it is recommended that a new directive should address issues of substantive 
law, notably companies’ reincorporations. Such a combined use of a regulation and a 
directive for related topics is not unusual.18 The use of a directive (and not a regulation) 
for issues of substantive law follows not only from the aforementioned provisions of the 
TFEU, but is also due to substantive considerations: for example, such a directive would 
cover the topic of seat transfers which includes many questions of creditor and 
shareholder protection that Member States need to implement in a way that can 
accommodate the structure and substance of their domestic company laws.19 A positive 
                                                 
13 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/company-law/corporate-governance/index_en.htm 
14 http://law.au.dk/en/research/projects/european-model-company-act-emca/ 
15 See https://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL270000 and 
https://www.ali.org/publications/show/conflict-laws/ 
16 See also Siems, supra note 9, at 70 (for compliance with principle of subsidiary as common rules cannot be 
provided by the Member States); more generally also TS Ulen, ‘Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federal-
ism’ (1997/98) 6 George Mason Law Review 921, 928 (‘If the cost and benefits of an action, whether public or 
private, stray across jurisdictional lines, then the highest level of government that can fully internalize the 
costs and benefits of the action ought to take responsibility’). 
17 E.g., Council Regulation 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE) [2001] O.J. L294/1. 
18 For example, the directives/regulations on the European company (SE) and market abuse. 
19 Similar to the Cross-Border Merger Directive, though it may be justified to provide higher levels of European 
harmonisation. See further Section 8, below. 




side effect of using a directive based on the EU competence for harmonisation in order to 
attain freedom of establishment is that these rules would also apply to the three Member 
States (UK, Ireland and Denmark) that do not fully take part in EU matters of judicial 
cooperation.20 
Finally, for the relationship with EU directives and regulations that address other topics 
that have a linkage to those of this study, our recommendations are as follows: ideally, 
these instruments should be amended in order to clarify their relationship to the new 
conflict of law rules applicable to companies and the corresponding substantive 
harmonisation. For example, this could concern the Insolvency Regulation and the Cross-
Border Merger Directive, respectively.21 
In the medium/long term, it is suggested that a new regulation on conflict of law rules 
applicable to companies and all existing (and forthcoming) ‘Rome regulations’ should be 
merged into one regulation. Such a consolidated regulation (‘European Code of Private 
International Law’)22 can best clarify ambiguities about the relationship between the lex 
societatis, the lex contractus, the lex delicti etc. and may therefore foster the ‘unity of 
the legal order’.23 It can also address the common themes (ordre public, renvoi etc) that 
will also be addressed in the analysis of this chapter. 
2.3 Relevant considerations for substance of new legal instrument 
The recommendations of this chapter will take into account the statistical, empirical and 
comparative findings of this study. In addition, it is helpful to identify the main general 
considerations relevant for the substance of a future legal instrument harmonising the 
conflict of laws rules applicable to companies. 
2.3.1 The relevant interests 
A number of key dichotomies can be identified that are relevant for the normative 
analysis of the topics of this report. To start with, in private international law, a general 
distinction can be made between an approach that aims to identify in a neutral and 
certain way the closest relationship vs. the view that questions of private international 
law are about social, economic and political policy choices. For the present report this is 
relevant since, on the one hand, the general aim to have a common approach to the lex 
societatis may be based on the first position.24 On the other hand, an economic and 
political evaluation of the conflict of laws rules is frequently discussed in the present 
field, 25  where it has also been argued that the ‘the ancient Savignian private 
international law concept of ascertaining the closest relationship can no longer be used 
to regulated international company law relationships’.26  Indeed, experience from the 
                                                 
20 See also Section 3.2.2, below. 
21 For further discussion see Sections 6 and 8 below. 
22 See Siems, supra note 9 (‘Europäisches Gesetzbuch für internationales Privatrecht’); G Rühl and J von Hein, 
‘Towards a European Code on Private International Law?’ (2015) 79 RabelsZ 701; XE Kramer, ‘Current Gaps 
and Future Perspectives in European Private International Law: Towards a Code on Private International Law?’, 
Briefing Note European Parliament (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2200977; M Czepelak, 
‘Would we like to have a European Code of Private International Law?’ (2010) European Review of Private Law 
705. 
23 See, e.g., M Baldus, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung: Bedeutungen einer juristischen Formel in Rechtstheorie, 
Zivil- und Staatsrechtswissenschaft des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1995). But see 
also A Fischer-Lescano and G Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: the Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmenta-
tion of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999. 
24 In substance, it may also be suggested that a straightforward application of this approach referring to the 
most connected country may lead to extend the ‘real seat theory’ to the whole EU. See discussion in Section 5, 
below. 
25 Cf. J Borg-Barthet, The Governing Law of Companies in EU Law 30-47 (Oxford: Hart 2012). 
26 S Rammeloo, Corporations in Private International Law 315 (Oxford: OUP 2001). For the role of Savigny’s 
approach to private international law in Europe see also G Van Calster, European Private International Law 4 
(Oxford: Hart 2013). 




discussions in the EU since the case law in Centros shows that the selection of the right 
conflict-of-law criterion is regarded as something not neutral for the interests involved 
but as a matter of economic and political choice. 
As far as those rules are not neutral, the next dichotomy is between an approach that 
regards the principle of party autonomy as the main guidance vs. the view that local 
interests should play a key role. It can be argued in favour of the first view that it is in 
line with the idea of the EU as a common market.27 But questions about the applicable 
law may also consider the local interests of Member States. For instance, a clause 
permitting the adoption of overriding mandatory provisions may be formulated in an 
open-ended way to reflect the particularities of each Member State’s political, social, and 
economic structure. Another example is the protection of the creditors of companies: 
legal certainty on the applicable law only protects ‘adjusting’ creditors who are able to 
protect their interests by themselves. However, this is not the case for non-sophisticated 
or involuntary creditors (‘nonadjusting creditors’), whose protection requires a political 
mediation. Limited liability, in other words, creates negative externalities, which may be 
better governed by the territorial body comprehending the locality of those creditors.28 
The general dichotomy between efficiency vs. justice can, in the case of companies, be 
presented as the view of company law as merely solving principal-agent problems 
between directors and shareholders vs. a broader stakeholder position.29 This can also 
impact on the corresponding conflict of laws rules. For fields of law where issues of 
public policy play a key role, it is rightly said that ‘private international law is [..] closely 
interwoven with substantive law’. 30  For example, it matters how the dividing line 
between conflict of rules for companies and other areas of law is drawn. It can also be 
relevant for situations where a company relocates from one Member State to another 
one in order to evade rules of stakeholder protection in the former country, such as 
employee co-determination rules.31 
A final dichotomy is between intra-jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional efficiency.32 An 
allocation is efficient in intra-jurisdictional sense when it minimises the costs paid by the 
constituencies of a specific jurisdiction in order to maximise public utility. In other words, 
intra-jurisdictional efficiency takes into account only expenditures and utility within a 
specific jurisdiction. By contrast, inter-jurisdictional efficiency means that, among a 
number of interacting jurisdictions the aim is to minimise the cost of all constituencies in 
all jurisdictions in order to maximise their collective demand of goods. It follows that the 
question about identifying the ‘most efficient’ conflict of law rules needs to consider that 
efficiency considerations can lead to different results depending on whether they are 
based on the positions of the constituencies at the level of the Member States or the EU 
as whole. 
                                                 
27 R Michaels, ‘EU Law as Private International Law? Reconceptualising the Country-of-Origin Principle as Vest-
ed-Rights Theory’ (2006) 2 Journal of Private International Law 195. See also C Behme, ‘The Principle of Mutu-
al Recognition in the European Internal Market With Special Regard to the Cross-Border Mobility of Companies’ 
(2016) 13 European Company and Financial Law Review 31; Rammeloo, ibid, at 9 (‘recognition theories’). Re-
lated is the reference to party autonomy as discussed in Borg-Barthet, supra note 25, at 13-48, 73-103 
28 For this point see also FM Mucciarelli, ‘Optimal Allocation of Law-Making Power Over Bankruptcy Law in “Fed-
eral” and “Quasi-Federal” Legal Systems is There a Case for Harmonizing or Unifying Bankruptcy Law in the 
E.U.?’ NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-28 (2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1921374. 
29 See M Siems and D Cabrelli (eds), Comparative Company Law: A Case-Based Approach (Oxford: Hart 2013) 
(ibid 6-7 for a summary of the former position, as well as the subsequent case scenarios); M Siems, Conver-
gence in Shareholder Law 175-8 (Cambridge: CUP 2008) (for a summary of stakeholder approaches). 
30 XE Kramer, ‘European Private International Law: The Way Forward: In-depth analysis’, European Parliament 
(JURI Committee 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2502232, at p 22. 
31 See, e.g., M Gelter, ‘Tilting the Balance between Capital and Labor – The Effects of Regulatory Arbitrage in 
European Corporate Law on Employees’ (2010) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 792. 
32  RP Inman and DL Rubinfield, ‘Federalism’ in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (1999) available at 
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/9700book.pdf, at pp 661, 668. 




2.3.2 Existing laws and proposals 
It is clear that any harmonising instrument in the present field needs to consider the 
freedom of establishment of the TFEU as interpreted by Court of Justice.33 With respect 
to the regulations and directives that already harmonise aspects of conflict of laws, it 
was already mentioned that a new regulation has to take into account these existing EU 
laws in order to provide a consistent legal framework. The current secondary EU laws 
can also be relevant as far as they address general issues of private international law 
and may therefore be models for conflict of law rules in the area of company law.  
The necessary choices for harmonised conflict of laws rules can benefit from the 
comparative analysis of this study. In addition, the subsequent recommendations will 
specifically take into account the Member States that have codified, to some extent at 
least, the conflict of law rules applicable to companies namely: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. 
In addition, a number of proposals for codifications provide helpful suggestions: the 
Proposal by the European Group for Private International Law (GEDIP) from 2015, the 
proposal from the ‘Sonnenberger Group’ from 2007 and the (now somewhat dated) 
international proposals from 1968, 1965 and 1956.34 
The relevance of the rules from the Member States requires further explanations, as in 
the comparative law literature the use of information about different legal systems for 
normative purposes is controversial. For example, the mere fact that a majority of 
jurisdictions follows a particular legal model does not mean that this model is better than 
that of the minority. It has also been said that ‘the comparatist is not seeking to be 
judgmental about legal systems in the sense of whether he believes them to be ‘better’ 
or ‘worse’ than any other given system’,35 and that making policy recommendations for 
other countries may lead to the accusation that one is applying one’s own values in 
considering what is best for others.36 
However, the majority of comparatists support the idea of ‘applied comparative law’.37 
For example, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz hold ‘that the comparatist is in the best 
position to follow his comparative researches with a critical evaluation’, and add that ‘if 
he does not, no one else will do it’.38 This should not be based on a schematic approach, 
such as the most frequent model, the lowest common denominator or the politically least 
contentious one. Rather, it requires a careful analysis of the pros and cons of the 
respective legal systems. It is also important to consider how legal systems operate in 
practice and how any legal differences are interrelated with social, economic and political 
factors. 
In the present case, the following will carefully consider to what extent the solutions of 
the 28 Member States may be regarded as ‘just’ being different, or whether one or the 
other solution may be ‘better’ or ‘worse’. This will also take into account that many 
topics of conflict of laws in the area of company law are linked: for example, the 
                                                 
33 For a summary of the case law see Chapter I, above. 
34 GEDIP, ‘Regulation x on the Law Applicable to Companies and Other Bodies’, 3rd draft 2015, available at 
www.gedip-egpil.eu/reunionstravail/gedip-reunions-25.htm#1; HJ Sonnenberger (ed.), Vorschläge und Berich-
te zur Reform des europäischen und deutschen internationalen Gesellschaftsrechts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 
2007) (proposal by the German expert group on private international law); Draft Convention on the Mutual 
Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate, 1968, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/5610/1/5610.pdf; Pro-
posal by the Institute of International Law 1965, www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1965_var_02_en.pdf;  
Hague Convention concerning the recognition of the legal personality of foreign companies, associations and 
institutions, available 1956, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=36 (not ratified 
by any of its signatories). 
35 P De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World 224 (3rd edn, London: Routledge Cavendish, 2007). 
36 M Bogdan, Comparative Law 79 (Stockholm: Kluwer, 1994). 
37 See M Siems, Comparative Law 22-3 (Cambridge: CUP 2014). 
38 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law 47 (Oxford: Clarendon, 3rd edn. 1998). 




question about the relevant connecting factor may impact on the extent to which 
overriding mandatory provisions are used in a particular jurisdiction. We will also 
consider whether certain private international law solutions show complementarity with 
other elements or characteristics of the legal system: for instance, Member States 
providing for employee participation in their company laws may be more likely to restrict 
outbound reincorporations. 
3. Scope: entities and jurisdictions covered by EU instrument 
3.1 The entities covered by a possible harmonisation 
The current study is concerned with companies, but it is worth mentioning that the 
codified domestic laws, as well as the Sonnenberger and GEDIP proposals, typically 
include further entities. For example, the Belgian, Bulgarian, Estonian, Lithuanian, Polish 
and Romanian codifications of conflict of law rules applicable to companies include to all 
legal persons.39 In addition, Bulgarian and Polish laws also refer to unincorporated bodies, 
and the Italian and Czech rules apply to any entities.40 
The Sonnenberger proposal is similar to the first position referring to ‘companies, 
including cooperative societies, associations, foundations and other legal persons 
governed by civil or commercial law’, while the GEDIP proposal is potentially wider in 
referring to ‘companies and other bodies, corporate or unincorporated (…) in civil and 
commercial matters’.41  Apparently, both of those proposals are also influenced by the 
way the art. 54(2) of the TFEU phrases the scope of the freedom of establishment of 
companies as it is said to apply to ‘companies or firms constituted under civil or 
commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by 
public or private law, save for those which are non-profit-making.’ 
But researchers have also expressed scepticism about the wording of this provision: for 
example, comparing different language versions of art 54(2), there is some ambiguity in 
the inclusion or exclusion of partnerships and non-profit entities.42 In particular, it can be 
suggested that the words ‘other legal persons’ are puzzling, because in most countries 
not all partnerships are legal persons. Uniquely in Scotland even ordinary partnerships 
are regarded as legal persons; in France the same is the case for most partnerships 
except SEPs. The reverse is true in England: in general, partnerships are not legal 
persons, however, there is an exception for LLPs. Finally, the German situation is 
peculiar because partnerships are never legal persons, however, most partnerships with 
the exception of ‘silent partnerships’ have ‘legal capacity’.43 This divergence of terms and 
concepts shows that it would not be satisfactory simply to refer to ‘legal persons’ for a 
common provision of the Member States. 
As far as a possible ‘Rome V Regulation’ for the Harmonisation of the Law Applicable to 
Companies is concerned, it also needs to be noted that the basis of this regulation would 
                                                 
39 Code of Private International Law (Belgium), Art. 110; Code of Private International Law (Bulgaria), Art. 
56(1); Act on Private International Law (Estonia), § 14(1); Civil Code (Lithuania), Art. 1.19; Act on Private 
International Law (Poland), Art. 17; Civil Code (Romania), Art. 2.580. 
40 Code of Private International Law (Bulgaria), Art. 57; Act on Private International Law (Poland), Art. 21; Act 
on Private International Law (Czech Republic), § 30(1); Private International Law Reform 1995 (Italy) Art. 25. 
41 Sonnenberger proposal, art 1(2); GEDIP proposal, Art. 1(1). 
42 MM Siems, ‘Regulatory Competition in Partnership Law’ (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quar-
terly 767 at 793 (with reference to Cartesio as it dealt with a Hungarian limited partnership); S Lombardo, 
‘Some Reflections on Freedom of Establishment of Non-profit Entities in the European Union’, (2013) 14 Euro-
pean Business Organization Law Review 225. 
43 For references see Siems, ibid. 




be the EU competence for harmonisation in matters of civil cooperation, not freedom of 
establishment.44 Thus, here, a broader definition as in art 54(2) can be provided. 
This report suggests phrasing the scope of a Rome V Regulation as referring to ‘all 
business entities with separate legal capacity constituted under civil or commercial law’.  
This definition would therefore include all companies, including European forms of 
company,45 and all other legal persons constituted under civil or commercial law (such as 
cooperatives) as those always have legal capacity. In addition, it would cover other 
business entities as far as those have legal capacity. It will therefore include some 
partnerships while it would not cover ‘silent partnerships’ or other forms of profit sharing 
where it may be more appropriate to apply the lex contractus.46 The main rationale for 
this approach is that all entities that have legal capacity can, for example, enter into 
contracts, own property, sue and be sued in their own name: thus, regardless of 
whether it is a company or another type of business entity, the same issues are relevant 
as regards the subject matter of a forthcoming Rome V Regulation. 
3.2 Interlocal laws in Member States  
EU private international law rules often recognise that in some Member States (notably 
in the UK) there may be different legal systems within that Member State. For example, 
the Rome I and II Regulations contain virtually same text about ‘States with more than 
one legal system’: 
1. Where a State comprises several territorial units, each of which has its 
own rules of law in respect of contractual obligations, each territorial unit 
shall be considered as a country for the purposes of identifying the law 
applicable under this Regulation.  2. A Member State where different 
territorial units have their own rules of law in respect of contractual 
obligations [in Rome I – in Rome II: non-contractual obligations] shall not 
be required to apply this Regulation to conflicts solely between the laws of 
such units.47 
For conflict of rules applicable to companies, Article 12 of GEDIP suggests a phrase 
similar to the first sentence of Rome I and II. This is plausible, although it may also be 
noted that for company law there are hardly any interlocal differences in the Member 
States. Even in the UK, where Scots law has distinctive features in other areas of law,48 
the UK report of this study notes that ‘the differences between the internal laws of the 
three parts of the United Kingdom in respect of corporate matters are small, and rarely 
give rise to conflict problems.’49 Nevertheless, despite the near-identity of the rules, the 
existence of distinct legal systems within a Member State can have real-life 
consequences. For example, an English-registered company cannot re-register in 
Scotland and vice versa,50 even though companies registered in both jurisdictions can of 
course reincorporate in another Member State. 
                                                 
44 See Section 2.2, above 
45 Such as the SE, the SCE and a SUP (a legal form for single-member private limited liability companies put 
forward in the Commission 2014 proposal and currently being negotiated by the co-legislators). 
46 It would also not cover trusts as those are governed by a different area of law, see also Section 10, below. 
47 Rome I Regulation, Art. 22; Rome II Regulation, Art. 25. Rome III Regulation, Art. 14 provides more exten-
sive rules also dealing with the way the ‘habitual residence’ of natural persons is to be understood. 
48 For actual and potential differences see, e.g., D Carr ‘English Influences on the Historical Development of 
Fiduciary Duties in Scottish Law’ (2014) Edinburgh Law Review 29; D Cabrelli ‘Statutory Derivative Proceedings: 
The View from the Inner House’ (2010) 14 Edinburgh Law Review 116; D Cabrelli ‘Statutory Derivative Pro-
ceedings in Scotland: A Procedural Impasse?’ (2009) Edinburgh Law Review 511. 
49 See country report UK, Section 1. 
50 See e.g. Re Baby Moon (UK) Ltd (1985) 1 BCC 99298. See also G Morse (ed), Palmer’s Company Law (Sweet 
& Maxwell, looseleaf 2013) para 2.507.  




This report suggests phrasing this issue in the same way as in the Rome I and II 
Regulations. Using exactly the same wording is helpful for reasons of consistency. 
Adding the second sentence is also appropriate as the UK may indeed want to decide 
that the slight company law differences between Scotland and the other parts of the UK 
do not need to be solved in the same way as a forthcoming Rome V Regulation. 
3.3 The UK, Ireland, Denmark and the EEA countries 
According to Protocols No 21 and No 22 to the TFEU, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and 
Ireland do not participate in measures adopted pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the 
TFEU.51 Any legislative measure regarding the law applicable to companies will be based, 
at least in part, on Art 81 TFEU,52 and would thus fall within the area affected by these 
Protocols. Before assessing the desirability and viability of any harmonising legislation in 
the area of the laws applicable to companies, the implications of these Protocols must 
therefore be examined. 
The operation of Protocols No 21 and No 22 differ somewhat for Ireland and the United 
Kingdom on the one hand, and Denmark on the other: Ireland and the United Kingdom 
have the option to, effectively, ‘opt-in’ in relation to any measure pursuant to Art 81 
TFEU. Thus, both Ireland and the United Kingdom may decide to participate in the 
adoption and application of measures covered by Protocol 21 by notifying the President 
of the Council in writing, within three months after a relevant proposal for legislation has 
been presented to the Council.53 However, even if the United Kingdom and/or Ireland 
decide to participate in a legislative measure covered by Protocol 21, the Council may 
still adopt such a measure without the participation of the United Kingdom and/or 
Ireland provided it cannot otherwise be adopted.54 Denmark, on the other hand, does 
not currently55 participate in Union legislation covered by Title V of Part Three of the 
TFEU.56 Any legislative measure regarding the law applicable to companies would thus 
have no immediate effect in relation to Denmark. However, the Union and Denmark 
could, as has happened in related areas, 57  negotiate agreements extending the 
applicability of legislative measures taken in the present area to Denmark.58 
3.3.1 The UK and Ireland in particular 
As discussed in the statistical analysis of this report, 59  companies registered in and 
formed in accordance with the laws of the United Kingdom account for a large proportion 
of economic activity by companies registered in a Member State other than the Member 
State of its central administration; we also find a significant level of such activity in 
relation to Ireland. It follows, in our view, that EU legislation seeking to address 
effectively and comprehensively the conflict of laws and jurisdictional questions arising in 
relation to ‘foreign’ companies would ultimately need to apply to companies formed in 
the UK and Ireland.  
                                                 
51 See Protocol (No 21) to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 1 (United Kingdom and 
Ireland); Protocol (No 22) to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 1 (Denmark). 
52 See Section 2.2, above 
53 See Art. 3(1) of Protocol No 21. 
54 See Art. 3(2) of Protocol No 21. 
55 Denmark has the right to adopt an ‘opt-in system’ substantially similar to Protocol No 21; see Art. 8 of Pro-
tocol No 22 and Annex to Protocol No 22. Given the results of the recent referendum on this matter, it seems 
unlikely that Denmark will make use of this right in the near future. 
56 See Arts. 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22. 
57 See e.g. in relation to the Brussels Regulation Council Decision 2006/325/EC of 27 April 2006 concerning the 
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. 
58 See also Rühl and von Hein, supra note 22, at 733. 
59 See Chapter II, above. 




In this respect it is worth highlighting that, according to our understanding, EU law 
would not prevent Member States other than Denmark, the United Kingdom, and/or 
Ireland from adopting legislation that fully applies to companies registered in any or all 
of these three jurisdictions as long as any such measure does not bind or otherwise 
affect the rights or competences of the three Member States concerned. The efficacy of 
such a measure will, however, in part depend on its content, as compared to the conflict 
of laws rules applicable in Denmark, the United Kingdom, and/or Ireland.60  
The legislative measures recommended in this Report would, as described below, for the 
most part be broadly similar to the conflict of laws approach applicable in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland. As a consequence, we would not ultimately regard a participation 
in the recommended legislative measures by the United Kingdom, and Ireland as 
indispensable, although such participation would no doubt be highly desirable.  
This assessment assumes, however, that the remaining Member States would be willing 
to agree on harmonising legislation that would in some cases affect their competences in 
relation to companies from the non-participating Member States, even though no strict 
‘reciprocity’ is provided for. This is of course largely a political question, and we do not 
express an opinion on this point. 
3.3.2 Denmark and the EEA countries 
As already mentioned, a bilateral treaty between Denmark and the EU could provide 
similar rules to those proposed in this report. In addition, the Treaty provisions of the 
freedom of establishment apply in Denmark: thus, as far as the harmonisation of conflict 
of laws rules considers these provisions and the corresponding case law of the Court of 
Justice, the Danish situation would in practice be similar to the one in other Member 
States. 
The Danish situation would be virtually the same as the situation of the EEA countries 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The EEA Agreement includes provisions on the 
freedom of establishment (arts 31 to 35) which mirror those of the TFEU, and, while the 
EEA countries do not take part in matters of civil cooperation, bilateral agreements can 
provide similar rules. 
In the Rome I and II Regulations, there are only brief clarifications to the non-inclusion 
of Denmark.61 A similar statement may be made in a future Rome V Regulation on 
matters of conflict of company laws. It is beyond the scope of this report to assess 
whether, in case no political agreement can be reached, the EU procedure of ‘enhanced 
cooperation’, with the non-inclusion of more Member States, should be considered.62 
3.4 The relationship to countries outside the EU (‘third countries’) 
Any harmonisation of related matters of substantive company law (including seat 
transfers) would be based on the EU competence for harmonisation in order to attain 
freedom of establishment.63 Thus, like the current directives on matters of EU company 
law, these rules would not apply to companies from third countries. 
The situation is different for conflict of laws rules. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can in 
principle also enact instruments that address the relationship to third countries. Xandra 
Kramer provides the following summary: 
                                                 
60 I.e. depending on any opt-ins by the United Kingdom and/or Ireland, and any intergovernmental agreements 
reached with Denmark. 
61 Rome I Regulation, rec. 46; Rome II, Art. 1(4). 
62 Akin to the Rome III Regulation (currently applied in 16 Member States). 
63 See Section 2.2, above 




‘It is noteworthy that the proper functioning of the internal market is still 
mentioned in Article 81(2) TFEU, but no longer seems to be a strict 
requirement for the purpose of private international law measures, as is 
evidenced by the addition of the word “particularly”. Within the context of 
negotiations on specific existing instruments, in particular the Rome II 
Regulation, the international market requirement under Article 65 EC was 
debated in view of the “universal” territorial scope of this instrument 
(expanding to non-EU torts, parties, and laws). However, eventually it was 
not regarded an obstacle’.64 
It can be also seen that both Rome I and II state that ‘any law specified by this 
Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Member State’.65 For matters 
of conflict of company laws, GEDIP suggests a corresponding universal rule, namely that 
‘unless provided otherwise, any law specified by this Regulation shall be applied whether 
or not it is the law of a Member State’.66 
By contrast, the 1968 draft convention only included companies ‘established in 
accordance with the law of a Contracting State’ – and, in addition, gave contracting 
states the option not to apply the convention to companies that had ‘no genuine link 
with the economy’ of one of the territories of one of the contracting states.67 As far as 
the EU does not want to provide a universal rule, it could also limit its scope in the same 
way article 54(1) of the TFEU does in the context of the freedom of establishment, 
namely to ‘companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and 
having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within 
the Union’. 
The universalist position by GEDIP can be related to a ‘Savignian’ idea of private 
international law, according to which it is possible to establish which law is applicable to 
any legal issue or situation in a neutral way.68 In the literature, Eva-Maria Kieninger 
even considers the extension to third countries as a main reason for an EU codification of 
conflicts of law rules applicable to companies, arguing that the case law of the Court of 
Justice – interpreting the freedom of establishment of the Treaty – can ‘only’ address 
intra-EU cases.69 In addition, she argues that any lack of such international uniformity 
would also extend to the European level since a company incorporated in a third country 
that has its principal place of business in the EU might be categorised differently in 
different Member States.70 
Yet, accepting a company as established under the law of a non-EU country71 can have 
wide-reaching implications for the protection of shareholders, other stakeholders and 
society at large. The following solutions could be envisaged: 
(i) To exclude third countries from the scope of a future Rome V Regulation 
completely. This may be politically opportune if Member States are unwilling to 
include companies from third countries at all in the regulation. This option would 
entail a dual regime, which also exists in other norms of EU law and some 
                                                 
64 Kramer, supra note 23, at 7 (footnotes omitted). 
65 Rome I Regulation, Art. 2; Rome II Regulation, Art. 3 
66 GEDIP proposal, Art. 2. 
67 1968 draft convention, Arts. 1 and 3. 
68 See Section 2.3.1, above. 
69 E-M Kieninger, ‘The Law Applicable to Corporations in the EC’ (2009) 73 RabelsZ 607 at 618-9. 
70 Ibid at 624. 
71 The same would apply to the choice of a non-state law such as the EMCA (see supra note 14). Note that the 
choice of non-state laws is even excluded in Art. 3 of the Rome I Regulation as the applicable contract law. 




Member States,72 even though we recognise that conflict of law rules are usually 
universal (e.g., in the Rome I and Rome II Regulations, as noted above). 
(ii) To enable Member States to opt into the Regulation for the relationship to all 
third countries (which, in practice, may in the first instance be used by the 
traditional incorporation theory countries) or – at their own choice – just to 
certain third countries. This would have the advantage that, as far as Member 
States opt in, it would provide the legal certainty that a common set of private 
international law rules typically envisages. These rules could also be interpreted 
by the CJEU who – of course – if appropriate may well differentiate between the 
relationship to other Member State and third countries (as it is possible for the 
Rome I and II Regulations, for example, in terms of ordre public). However, this 
option would be contrary to the general goal of uniformity in EU private 
international law. 
(iii) The future Rome V Regulation shall also apply to companies from third countries, 
which are to be recognised as such by any Member States. However, Member 
States can opt out from the provisions of the connecting factor with regard to 
companies incorporated in all or specific third countries. With this approach, it can 
then also be determined at a later review of the regulation how far Member 
States make use of this opt-out and whether there is any need for change or 
adjustment. The political compromise of an opt-out is also a common adjustment 
in EU law in general (as well as EU company law more specifically73). However, 
again this option would be contrary to the general goal of uniformity in EU private 
international law. 
(iv) The future Rome V Regulation shall also apply to companies from third countries. 
However, Member States can make use of overriding mandatory rules and other 
mechanisms to protect the public interest in a wider set of scenarios than in 
relation to EU/EEA-incorporated companies. 
(v) Another suggestion would be to introduce an explicit process for accepting 
companies from third countries for purposes of conflict of company laws, similar 
to the equivalence decisions in other areas of EU harmonisation such as 
accounting law.74 In particular this may be a feasible solution as far as it concerns 
the company laws of other OECD countries as well as countries which whom the 
EU has agreed on free trade agreements.75  
The authors of this report agree that each of the approaches has its advantages and 
disadvantages. In our view, options (i) and (ii) may have a strategic advantage. Options 
(iii) to (v) would effectively extend EU-mandated choice of law – and possible regulatory 
arbitrage – to third countries, subject to the necessary safeguards. Whereas the Treaty 
allows for harmonisation of substantive company law rules where necessary, neither the 
Member States nor the EU will have control over third-country company law rules or 
                                                 
72 See Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings, OJ L141/19 (Insolvency Regulation Recast), recital 25 (centre of the debtor’s main interests 
needs to be located in the EU); Comparative Analysis, Chapter IV, Section 3.1 (e.g. for Germany). 
73 See, e.g., Art. 12 of the Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 April 2004 
on takeover bids. On the design of such optional arrangements, see e.g. PL Davies, E Schuster, and E van de 
Walle de Ghelcke, ‘The takeover directive as a protectionist tool?’ in: U Bernitz and WG Ringe (eds.) Company 
Law and Economic Protectionism: New Challenges to European Integration (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2010), 105. 
74 See http://ec.europa.eu/finance/accounting/third_countries/index_en.htm 
75 For the impact of free trade agreements on corporate mobility of companies from third countries, see KE 
Sørensen, ‘Free Movement of Companies under the New EU Free Trade Agreements’, (2016) European Compa-
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practices; sufficient protection through overriding mandatory rules would therefore need 
to be ensured.  
In addition, the EU can now engage with third countries through the Hague process.76 
Thus, in the medium/long term the aim may be to develop a new convention that 
provides more widely for internationally uniform conflict of laws rules applicable to 
companies.77 However, this should not speak against a Rome V Regulation as it may well 
be a ‘stepping stone’ towards such international rules. 
With respect to international conventions concluded by Member States, the virtually 
identical provisions in Rome I and II provide that those Regulations take precedence 
over such conventions as far as they concern matters governed by those Regulations.78 
If a future Rome V Regulation were to address third countries, it is recommended that it 
phrases this issue in the same way as the Rome I and II Regulations. 
4. The residence requirement of substantive company law 
4.1 Overview 
EU law as it currently stands allows Member States to use one of at least two regulatory 
techniques to ensure that companies incorporated under their laws maintain a 
(meaningful)79 connection to their territory: 
First, a Member State’s conflict of laws rules may use the ‘real seat’ of a company, 
however defined, as the main connecting factor determining the law that is applicable to 
it. This approach has effectively been declared incompatible with the Treaty when 
applied to foreign-incorporated companies.80 The Court of Justice has stated explicitly 
that ‘a Member State [is] able, in the case of a company incorporated under its law, to 
make the company’s right to retain its legal personality under the law of that State 
subject to restrictions on the transfer of the company’s actual centre of administration to 
a foreign country.’81 As will be shown below, this private international law approach 
would in principle also be available on a multilateral basis if adopted across the Union, 
although we do not believe it would be advisable to adopt this approach in a future Rome 
V Regulation.82 
Second, Member States can require companies formed under their laws to keep a 
connection to their territory through rules of substantive company law. As discussed, 
such rules are preliminary matters’ that determine whether a company is entitled to rely 
on the Treaty freedom and hence belong to the ‘reserved area’ where the Member States’ 
legislative activity is not subjected to scrutiny under the Treaty, at least where the 
Member State of incorporation uses one of the criteria of Art 54 TFEU to define the 
relevant requirement.83 From the perspective of primary EU law, these requirements for 
domestically incorporated companies fall into what we refer to as the ‘reserved area’. For 
simplicity, we will continue in this part to refer to all forms of these requirements as 
‘effective residence requirements’, although in many cases the relevant requirement is 
not strictly speaking one of ‘residence’ in the technical sense. Approximately half of the 
Member States currently combine conflict of laws rules based on the incorporation 
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77 For the previous draft convention see supra note 34.  
78 Rome I, Art. 25; Rome II, Art. 28. Similar GEPID proposal, Art. 14. 
79 i.e. going beyond a mere postal address. 
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82 See below, Section 5.1. 
83 See Cartesio and Daily Mail; see also the discussion in the Comparative Analysis, Chapter IV, Section 2.1. 
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doctrine with substantive company law rules84 which effectively enable companies that 
only have a ‘letterbox’ in the country of incorporation.85 Companies incorporated in these 
jurisdictions can thus, in principle, be used for any legal activity anywhere in the Union, 
irrespective of the location of the company’s headquarters or decision-making centre, 
provided it satisfies the minimal requirement of maintaining a postal address in the 
Member State of incorporation. The company laws of these Member States can thus be 
seen as being generally available from a choice of law perspective. 
The remaining Member States, on the other hand, currently require, or at least may 
require,86 companies formed under their company laws to establish and maintain some 
form of physical presence in that Member States. The level of activity required87 differs 
significantly across jurisdictions, and the comparative analysis highlights that some legal 
uncertainty in that respect exist in several Member States.88 
4.2 Potential drivers for national policy decisions 
Since we are only concerned here with residence requirements applied to domestic 
companies,89 the policy reasons for adopting such rules are (presumably) different from 
the typical rationales for private international law rules based on the real seat theory.90 
Where a country had traditionally applied a real seat theory-based approach to 
determining the lex societatis, however, the imposition of an effective residence 
requirement in its substantive company law would not have changed the position of 
domestic companies; 91 thus, effective real seat requirements may in some cases be 
historic92 remnants of that approach.  
Whereas real seat theory-based private international law rules seek to extend the reach 
of domestic company laws to all business entities with certain significant connections to 
a jurisdiction’s economy, the effective residence requirements at issue here merely 
prevent the use of a Member State’s company forms for wholly ‘external’ purposes, i.e. 
for business entities wholly or predominantly connected to another country’s territory.  
Several policy rationales may in theory underlie the decision to adopt effective residence 
requirements for domestically incorporated companies. A Member State may, for 
instance, be concerned about its ability to effectively enforce compliance with its internal 
company law rules in relation to entities with little or no factual connection to its territory, 
especially where the decision-makers, including shareholders and directors, operate 
outside their jurisdiction and no or few assets are located in the Member State of 
incorporation. Connected to this, a national legislator may be of the opinion that its 
domestic company forms have built up ‘reputational capital’, for instance because 
businesses adopting that legal form are perceived by the market (rightly or wrongly) as 
well-governed, more likely to comply with disclosure obligations, or generally as being 
subject to a set of rules protective of third parties contracting with it. 93  Given the 
                                                 
84 Note that the substantive company law nature of these rules is not always clear; see ibid. 
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possible difficulties in enforcing rules against pseudo-foreign companies, and taking into 
account the interplay between company law, insolvency law, and other rules,94 the use 
of national company forms for businesses with no connection to the Member State of 
incorporation may thus be regarded as a risk to the ‘brand value’ of that type of business 
entity. Finally, Member States could conclude that incurring monitoring, enforcement, 
infrastructure, and litigation costs95 in relation to companies incorporated under their 
laws, but with little or no relevance to the national economy,96 is not justified by the 
benefits such incorporations may bring to that Member State. 
In short, some Member States may well take the view that their participation in what can 
be seen as a European market for company incorporations does not on balance lie in 
their national interest. This will perhaps be particularly true for Member States that are 
for various reasons97 unlikely to obtain a large share of the incorporation ‘market’, as 
there will often be returns to scale in relation to the infrastructure-like costs associated 
with company incorporations. 
4.3 Policy options 
We see a number of policy options for addressing what we have labelled effective 
residence requirements:  
• First, effective residence requirements could be harmonised across all Member 
States. In this case, a number of options exist for the content of any 
harmonising legislation.  
• Second, given that the residence requirements at issue, where they exist, 
form part of the substantive internal company laws rather than the private 
international law rules of the Member States, the issue could simply be left 
outside the scope of a future European instrument.  
We will address the above policy choices in case of a harmonisation, as well as the 
option to leave this topic outside the scope of a harmonisation, in turn. 
A future European instrument harmonising conflict-of-law rules could harmonise effective 
residence requirements originating from substantive company law in a number of 
different ways. For instance: 
• it could require that all Member States sever any mandatory links between 
companies incorporated under their laws and their national economies. 
• it could simply codify the status quo based on the case law of the Court of 
Justice. 
• it could define a specific residence requirement, or a number of residence 
requirements, that Member States are permitted to apply to nationally 
                                                 
94 See e.g. Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster, supra note 12, at 318-319; K Schmidt, ‘Grounds for Insolvency and 
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96 Apart, of course, from creating demand for certain professional services (lawyers, accountants, etc). See e.g. 
J Armour, ‘Who should make corporate law? EC legislation versus regulatory competition’ (2005) 58 Current 
Legal Problems 369. 
97 Reasons could include a national language spoken by few foreigners, the perceived degree of efficiency and 
reliability of the national legal system, tax law, and of course the content of the internal company law. 




incorporated companies, leaving open to Member States, however, not to 
impose any residence requirements. 
• it could adopt the approach used in the SE Regulation98 and thus require all 
EU incorporated companies to maintain their headquarters99 in the territory of 
the Member State of incorporation. 
The first policy option described above would supplement our position on the private 
international law approach of a future Rome V Regulation,100  where we recommend 
harmonising the relevant rules along the lines of the incorporation doctrine. Combined 
with that private international law rule, this first option would in effect render all Member 
State company forms available for entrepreneurs anywhere across the EU. 101  It is 
unclear, however, whether such a legal framework would add real value to corporate 
mobility or the single market more generally. It seems unlikely that entrepreneurs would 
choose to organise their businesses under company law rules of a Member State that 
does not provide for such use of its entities unless and until required to do so by EU law. 
At the same time, it is not implausible that, under their own domestic company law, 
some Member States do not want to enable incorporation of companies that these 
countries regard as fictitious because they merely have a letterbox in the incorporation 
country.102  
The second option, i.e. codifying the status quo based on the case law of the Court of 
Justice in Daily Mail and Cartesio, would in effect only create a ‘safe harbour’ for Member 
States to use one of the criteria mentioned in Article 54103 (‘central administration’ and 
‘principal place of business’) – as a basis for effective residence requirements in their 
national law.104 If a possible EU instrument were to take this approach, it would only add 
value if it contained a precise definition of these terms. However, as any such definition 
would in effect be dependent on the Court’s interpretation of the identical terms in the 
Treaty, little would be added in terms of legal certainty beyond the status quo. Moreover, 
there is little evidence for legal uncertainty as to the residence requirements available 
under EU law. Rather, legal uncertainty mostly seems to relate to the interpretation of 
the relevant national law requirements, but a codification of the status quo would 
undoubtedly still leave room for Member States to define their residence requirements 
within the boundaries of the Art 54 criteria. 
The third option would give Member States a choice between different effective 
residence requirements. This choice would likely reduce the differences between the 
approaches taken in the Member States, since the criteria in the future EU instrument 
harmonising conflict-of-law rules would be interpreted autonomously by the Court of 
Justice. Apart from reducing these differences, however, such a solution would ultimately 
do little to encourage corporate mobility, and it may indeed have the opposite effect.  
Finally, the fourth solution would effectively prohibit Centros-like pseudo-foreign 
companies, and would indeed go beyond that, as businesses would not only need to 
choose the company law of a Member State in which they actually operate, but would be 
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100 See Section 5 below. 
101 Or, potentially, beyond, depending on the scope of the Regulation and on the private international law ap-
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tied to the company law of the Member State in which their headquarters are located. 
The Court of Justice has repeatedly held that choice of company law is an inherent 
feature of the freedom of establishment.105 This solution, however, would effectively 
negate choice of law in the area of company law, thus creating tensions between primary 
and secondary EU law. 106  Moreover, we do not believe that completely excluding 
horizontal regulatory competition in the area of company law would be in line with the 
single market objectives. Perhaps most importantly, however, this solution would create 
significant risks and legal uncertainty for a large number of businesses across the Union 
which are not currently organised under the company law of their headquarter 
jurisdiction. 
4.4 Recommendation 
In light of the discussion above, we suggest that a future EU instrument harmonising 
conflict-of-law rules would not seek to address the topic of effective residence 
requirements under substantive company law. We believe this question could be left to 
the Member States, subject of course to the scrutiny of the CJEU under the Treaty. We 
are of the opinion that the merits of harmonised rules in this area are questionable.  
5. General private international law approach 
5.1 Incorporation theory and real seat theory 
Most proposals to harmonise the conflict of laws rules governing companies favour a 
connecting factor that is based on some form of the incorporation theory, understood in 
a broad sense. This is the case with both the GEDIP and Sonnenberger proposals, which 
stipulate that companies shall be governed ‘by the law of the country under which [they 
have] been incorporated’ (or, as far as unincorporated entities are concerned, by the law 
under which they have been formed)107 and by ‘the law of the state in whose public 
register they are entered’,108 respectively.109 The comparative analysis also indicates that 
legislators and/or national courts in most (but not all) Member States seem to be of the 
opinion that the real seat theory is no longer an available policy choice with respect to 
EU-incorporated companies in light of the decisions of the Court of Justice in Centros, 
Überseering and Inspire Art.110 However, it should be noted that the Court of Justice has 
never explicitly invalidated the application of the real seat doctrine by a Member State in 
relation to companies formed in accordance with the law of that Member State (domestic 
companies). 
Rather, the Court has acknowledged that the home Member State – i.e. effectively the 
Member State of incorporation – enjoys regulatory autonomy over a range of questions, 
what we refer to as the ‘reserved area’,111 which fall outside the scope of the Treaty. 
While the extent of the home State’s reserved area remains ill-defined, the Court has 
stated explicitly that ‘a Member State [is] able, in the case of a company incorporated 
under its law, to make the company’s right to retain its legal personality under the law of 
that State subject to restrictions on the transfer of the company’s actual centre of 
administration to a foreign country.’112 The Court derives this result not only from prior 
                                                 
105 See e.g. Centros and Inspire Art, discussed in the Introduction to the Field of Study in Chapter I, above. 
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Journal of Corporate Law Studies 185. 
107 GEDIP proposal, Art. 3. 
108 Sonnenberger proposal, Art. 2(1). 
109 See also Art 1 of the 1968 Convention on the mutual recognition of companies and bodies corporate, EC 
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110 See also Introduction to Field of Study, Chapter I, above. 
111 ibid. 
112 Case C-208/00 Überseering [2002] ECR I-9919, para 70 (confirmed in Case C-210/06 Cartesio [2008] ECR 
I-9641, para 107). 




case law going ultimately back to Daily Mail, but also from the wording of Article 54 TFEU. 
Given that Article 54 places the registered office, central administration and principal 
place of business on an equal footing, the Court argues that ‘in the absence of a uniform 
Community law definition of the companies which may enjoy the right of establishment 
on the basis of a single connecting factor determining the national law applicable to a 
company […] a Member State has the power to define both the connecting factor 
required of a company if it is to be regarded as incorporated under the law of that 
Member State and, as such, capable of enjoying the right of establishment, and that 
required if the company is to be able subsequently to maintain that status.’ 113  As 
discussed above, 114  this line of the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence enables Member 
States to insist, in principle, that companies formed under their company laws maintain 
a physical presence, including their headquarters or real seat, in the territory of that 
Member State as a matter of substantive national law (‘effective residence 
requirement’). 115  Similarly, however, the use by a Member State of any one of the 
criteria mentioned in Art 54 TFEU as connecting factors in its conflict of laws rules also 
falls outside the scope of the Treaty, provided it is used only in relation to companies 
claiming their status under that Member State’s laws.116 
Thus, it seems to be well established that primary EU law places no restrictions on the 
type of connecting factor that a future Rome V Regulation could adopt. The effective 
invalidation of the real seat theory in relation to foreign-incorporated companies in 
Überseering117 was, of course, a consequence of its restrictive effect. However, were all 
Member States to use the real seat as the main connecting factor in relation to domestic 
companies, the application of that connecting factor towards foreign companies would no 
longer result in a restriction of the freedom of establishment, provided that the same 
criteria apply in all Member States in order to determine the location of the real seat. 
This is because, under such a rule, no company could maintain its real seat outside of 
the Member State of incorporation as a matter of the law under which it was formed. 
Corporate mobility would thus not be restricted by the host state, at least not beyond 
what applies under the law of the home state. 
However, as discussed, both the real seat theory and the incorporation theory are not 
precisely-defined doctrines, but rather umbrella terms for sets of theories that differ in 
questions of detail, 118  and the case law of the Court of Justice does not offer any 
guidance in determining the precise formulation of either doctrine. Thus, where Member 
States attach importance to the location of the real seat, significant differences exist in 
                                                 
113 Case C-210/06 Cartesio, ibid. paras 109-110. 
114 See Section 4.1; this effective residence requirement can be implemented either through a Member State’s 
private international law rules or through substantive (company) law rules. For a discussion see also e.g. G 
Eckert, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht 110 (Vienna: Manz 2010). 
115 Note that the rules at issue in both Daily Mail and Cartesio are best characterised as substantive, rather 
than conflict of laws, rules. In other words, the registered office, central administration and principal place of 
business are substantive requirements that trigger the application of freedom of establishment to an entity 
already existing under a national law. See the discussion in Section 4 above. See also Art 7 SE Regulation, 
which in our view falls within the scope of the reserved area. For a discussion (pre-Cartesio), arguing that Art. 
7 is incompatible with the Treaty see Ringe, supra note 106. 
116 See e.g. Überseering, para 70, and Cartesio, para 107, both of which primarily seem to have a conflict of 
laws rule in mind based on context. 
117 Ibid. 
118 As far as the approaches are concerned that fall under the umbrella of the incorporation theory, we have 
found, for example, that the Member States refer to the place of incorporation (UK, see Dicey, Morris and Col-
lins on the Conflict of Laws (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 15th ed. 2012), Rules 173-75), the country where the 
formation procedure was fulfilled (Italy, see Riforma del diritto internazionale privato [Reform of private inter-
national law] act No 218/1995, article 154(1)), or the registered office (Spain, art 8 Capital Companies Act). 
The real seat, on the other hand, is defined as the location of the company’s principal establishment, which 
corresponds to its centre of governance, business and activities (Belgium, art 4, § 3 PIL Code), the place of 
central decision-making, i.e. where the board of directors meets (Luxembourg, Court of appeals, 7th Chamber, 
21 October 2009, n°33908 and Cass., 9 November 2010, n° 58/10; PH Conac, Le siège social en droit luxem-
bourgeois des sociétés, Journal des tribunaux, Luxembourg, 2009, p. 2), or the place where the principal and 
effective office of administration is located (Portugal, Art. 33(1) Civil Code, Art. 3(1) Companies Act). 




how that seat is defined. Consequently, in a future Rome V regulation using the real seat 
as the main connecting factor of a ‘bilateral conflict of laws rule’ would require a precise 
definition of that term, which would then need to be interpreted autonomously by the 
Court of Justice. Moreover, as discussed above in Section 4, the Court of Justice regards 
choice of company law as an inherent feature of the freedom of establishment.119 Basing 
the main connecting factor of a future Rome V regulation on the location of the real seat 
would effectively negate that choice, potentially creating tensions between primary and 
secondary EU law.  
It is suggested that the determination of the applicable connecting factor should be 
informed by the following criteria: (1) legal certainty, i.e. the question whether the 
chosen formulation is conducive to consistent and harmonised interpretation by national 
courts without the need to reconcile differences in interpretation or clarify ambiguities by 
the Court of Justice; (2) the ease with which the connecting factor can be integrated into 
the existing body of national and European private international law; and (3) the 
expectations of the various constituencies involved and the desirability of a system of 
more or less extensive corporate mobility. 
Legal certainty militates in favour of a form of incorporation theory. As stated above, 
Member States differ in their definitions of the real seat,120 and past experience with a 
real-seat-type connecting factor used by the Insolvency Regulation (the centre of main 
interest/COMI) has given rise to a considerable amount of litigation and, accordingly, a 
high degree of legal uncertainty.121 
As far as the second point is concerned, the choice of the place of incorporation or 
registered seat as connecting factor may lead to friction in the boundary region between 
company law, insolvency law, and tort law.122 These three legal areas would then be 
subject to three different connecting factors — the place of incorporation for company 
law purposes, the centre of main interest in insolvency law, and the place where the 
damage occurs in relation to tort law123 (although in the latter case, it may be argued 
that in appropriate cases, for example when the tortious act of a director gives rise to a 
personal action in tort by the shareholder, the tort is ‘manifestly more closely 
connected’124 with the place where the company is incorporated or registered).  
As far as the third point is concerned, it is necessary to consider the fact that (almost) all 
Member States de facto currently use the place of incorporation or registered seat as the 
main or exclusive connecting factor in relation to companies from other Member 
States. 125  As discussed in the statistical part of this report, a significant number of 
companies have made use of the resulting corporate mobility (and choice of law). We 
thus believe that mandating a connecting factor other than the registered office (or any 
other version of the incorporation theory) would likely give rise to significant 
transitioning costs. In addition, as discussed above, mandating a uniform connecting 
factor inspired by the real seat theory in a future Rome V regulation would significantly 
reduce corporate mobility and the possibility for undertakings to choose the company 
law rules that best fit their needs; such a choice may thus be seen as conflicting with the 
aims of the Treaty. We therefore propose that, as a general rule, a company shall be 
governed by the law according to which it has been incorporated, and an unincorporated 
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122 Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster, supra note 12. 
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entity by the law according to which it has been formed. Given the differences in 
Member State laws, it may prove useful to include in the definition of ‘incorporated 
companies’ all companies that acquire (full) 126  legal personality upon entry in the 
commercial or companies register of the jurisdiction of formation. This may increase 
legal certainty in relation to some partnerships and related business organisations in a 
number of Member States. The solution suggested here also corresponds to the findings 
of the statistical and empirical analysis of this report.127 
While such a rule should capture most cases, it may be useful to supplement the 
provision by a ‘residual clause’ similar to the one contained in the GEDIP proposal to the 
effect that the law of the closest connection shall apply if the law cannot be determined 
pursuant to the general rule.128 The residual clause may, for example, capture cases 
where founders from more than one country draw up an instrument establishing a 
company in a common language without specifying explicitly the governing law and 
where registration of the company/partnership is not required or where such registration 
has merely a declaratory effect. Importantly, in order to ensure legal certainty, this 
clause should not be formulated as a general escape clause comparable to the one 
applicable to international torts in the Rome II Regulation129 or in the Slovenian Private 
International Law and Procedure Act.130 Rather, it should be made clear that it has a 
residual function that is only engaged if the determination of the incorporation or 
formation law fails.  
5.2 Renvoi 
Renvoi is commonly excluded in international conventions on private international law 
and in the Rome regulations harmonising conflict of laws rules in the EU.131 Both the 
GEDIP and Sonnenberger proposals also exclude renvoi.132  As discussed in the previous 
Section 5.1, we believe that the primary connecting factor for determining the law 
applicable to companies should follow the incorporation doctrine. If future EU legislation 
will follow this core suggestion, and provided that the scope of the lex societatis will be 
broad enough to cover the vast majority of company law-related issues,133 the question 
of whether or not to permit renvoi for the area of company law would have limited 
consequences for EU-incorporated companies. 
First, choosing an easily ascertainable connecting factor such as the jurisdiction of 
incorporation (and hence, in practice the, registered office) would effectively rule out 
situations in which courts in different Member States disagree on the national law to 
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127 See Chapter II, Section 5.3 and Chapter III, Section 3 above. 
128 GEDIP proposal, Art. 4. The residual clause of the GEDIP proposal of 2015 (but not that of the 2014 pro-
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in the application of the law of a third state). 
132 GEDIP proposal, Art. 13; Sonnenberger proposal, Art. 8. 
133 As we suggest in Section 6 below. 




which such this connecting factor points. Second, regulation of the scope of the lex 
societatis as suggested in this Report would encompass essentially all company law 
matters and would – at least in theory – eliminate legal uncertainty as to the matters 
covered by the law at the place of incorporation from the perspective of all Member 
States involved. 
However, questions may still arise in practice as to the exact scope of the lex societatis 
when dealing with a specific instrument of national law, even in relation to EU-
incorporated companies.  
Moreover, permitting renvoi could also create legal uncertainty where Member States’ 
laws continue to contain rules of immediate application effectively overriding the 
harmonised conflict of laws approach, and in particular where they also accept the 
application of foreign rules of immediate application within the scope of a future Rome V 
regulation. An exclusion of renvoi would therefore, in our view, be preferable, in relation 
to EU-incorporated companies or where the scope of application of the future Rome V 
regulation is limited to Member States’ private international law rules towards EU-
incorporated companies. 
If the personal scope of application of a future Rome V regulation were to also include 
companies incorporated in third countries,134 additional problems would arise in relation 
to renvoi. In particular, if such a broader scope is envisaged for the future Rome V 
regulation, such that it also binds Member States in their private international approach 
towards companies from third countries, the applicable third country law itself may, and 
in practice often will, use different connecting factors for determining the lex societatis 
generally, and/or define the scope of the lex societatis in a way incompatible with a 
future Rome V regulation. The question of the permissibility of renvoi would therefore 
obviously have important consequences in relation to such companies. Given the wide 
variety of private international law approaches in this field around the globe, no one 
solution can completely and reliably eliminate the related problems. The exclusion of 
renvoi may, however, increase legal certainty for third parties dealing with companies 
incorporated in third countries. 
We thus recommend excluding renvoi in relation to the entire scope of a future Rome V 
regulation, whether such a regulation will be limited to companies incorporated and 
formed under the laws of a Member State or extended to cover companies incorporated 
in and formed under the laws of a third country.  
5.3 Protection of third parties acting in good faith 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Member States often provide for exceptions to the general connecting factor that 
determines the applicable law in relation to both the company’s capacity and the 
authority of its organs in order to protect third parties. These exceptions typically either 
give third parties a choice between an application of the incorporation law and the law of 
the state where the company’s real seat (however defined) is located, or more generally 
override the foreign lex societatis by applying local authority and capacity rules where 
this would lead to the validity of a transaction concluded in the respective host Member 
State. The preconditions for this choice range from rules granting third parties the choice 
irrespective of whether or not they know that the company is incorporated under another 
legal system,135 to requiring good faith of the third party and limiting the application of 
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the host state law to questions of whether the company had capacity to act or whether 
the corporate organs had the requisite authority to bind the company.136 
Both the GEDIP and Sonnenberger proposals recognise the need to protect third parties 
where they rely in good faith on the application of a law other than the lex societatis. 
The GEDIP proposal stipulates that while the capacity of a company to enter into legal 
relationships with third parties and the powers of its organs shall be governed by the lex 
societatis, any restrictions or limitations regarding capacity or authority under that law 
‘cannot be invoked against third parties when the relationship was concluded between 
persons both of whom are in the same country which is not that of the governing law of 
the company, under the law of which those restrictions or limitations do not exist, unless 
those third parties were aware of them or were not aware of them as a result of their 
negligence.’ 137  Somewhat similarly, the Sonnenberger proposal provides that ‘[i]f a 
company has effected a legal transaction through a personally present body in a state 
other than that to whose law the company is subject, it may not rely on any limitations 
on its legal capacity or on its bodies’ power of representation that are not imposed on a 
comparable company under the law of the place where the transaction was effected. This 
shall not apply if the company proves that the other party was aware that the 
transaction exceeded the limits of the company’s legal capacity or its bodies’ powers of 
representation or could not have been unaware thereof in the circumstances.’138 
A broad application of the law at the place of the real seat at the election of third parties 
is difficult to reconcile with the right of establishment of companies under the Treaty if it 
is applied to EU-incorporated companies (which is unclear in some of the Member States 
using this concept). The imposition of additional requirements on companies validly 
established under the law of another Member State needs to be justified, and it is hard 
to see how the strict Gebhard-conditions could be satisfied if the location of the real seat 
within the territory of another state had the consequence that large sections of that 
state’s company law could be applied to the foreign company. Justification will certainly 
fail where third parties know that they transact with a foreign company, since they are 
then, in the words of the Court of Justice, ‘put on sufficient notice’ that they are dealing 
with a company governed by a foreign law.139 The same will most likely also be the case 
where national rules require reliance in good faith by the third party on the law at the 
real seat, at least if the host state seeks to apply its law in a blanket fashion, since the 
proportionality test requires the host state to provide evidence that the application of the 
host state’s law is necessary to protect specific interests that are not sufficiently well 
protected by the lex societatis.140 
The second type of good faith protection, provisions that prevent the company from 
invoking the lack of capacity or authority pursuant to the lex societatis if the company 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Portugal, see Comparative Analysis, Chapter IV, Section 3.2. Art. 4 of the draft Convention on the Mutual 
Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate of 29 February 1968 goes in the same direction by allowing a 
host state, under certain conditions, to apply ‘any provisions of its own legislation which it deems essential, to 
the companies or bodies corporate … having their real registered offices on its territory, even if these have 
been established in accordance with the law of another Contracting State.’ The ‘real registered office’ of a com-
pany is defined as ‘the place where its central administration is established’, Art. 5. 
136 Comparative Analysis, Chapter IV, Section 3.2. 
137 GEDIP proposal, Art. 6. A further good faith provision is contained in Art. 7, which provides that if the com-
pany does not disclose the law under which it was formed, creditors may claim liability from those who act on 
behalf of the company, the company’s members and its directors under the law of the state where the person 
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sponding provision from the GEDIP proposal in Section 6.3.2 below. 
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enters into a transaction with a third party in another country and the limitation on 
capacity or authority would not exist under that law, raises less concerns with regard to 
the Treaty. Capacity and authority are matters governed by the lex societatis,141 but it is 
commonly acknowledged that the law of the state where the company enters into legal 
relationships with third parties may be relied on, under appropriate circumstances, to 
protect third parties acting in good faith. Such a provision can be found, for example, in 
the Rome I Regulation, which applies to natural persons and has served as the model for 
the GEDIP and Sonnenberger provisions quoted above.142 
5.3.2 Policy options for a future Rome V Regulation and the impact of harmonisation 
Including a similar provision in a future Rome V Regulation could be seen as an 
extension of the Rome I Regulation to legal persons. It would also avoid arguably 
counterintuitive results such as the outcome in the recent decision of the English Court 
of Appeal in Haugesund Kommune,143 where the Court distinguished between the law 
determining capacity of the company and the law governing the consequences of acting 
without capacity. While the former was held to be a matter for the lex societatis (as in 
other Member States), the latter was considered to be governed by the putative lex 
contractus (English law in the case as the law chosen by the parties). As a consequence, 
the body corporate lacked capacity pursuant to the lex societatis, but the parties were 
not able to rely on the good faith provision also contained in the governing law of the 
body corporate in question.144 English law as the putative lex contractus, on the other 
hand, did not provide for any protection of third parties acting in good faith when 
attempting to contract with a corporation that has no capacity to conclude that 
contract.145 It is worth noting that for companies, acting ultra vires generally no longer 
affects the validity of contracts under English law, as required by Directive 2009/101 
(so-called First Company Law). 146  In comparable cases concerning companies falling 
within the scope of the First Company Law Directive, therefore, the full application147 of 
either host state or home (incorporation) state law would likely lead to the validity of the 
transaction, whereas the split application of both laws may result in its invalidity. 
However, the very fact that the effect of authority and capacity questions has been 
largely harmonised across the Union by the First Company Law Directive may well call 
into question the need for a rule mirroring Article 13 of the Rome I Regulation. In most 
circumstances, the parallel application of home and host state law would mean that 
substantially the same rules, albeit from two different sources, could apply to the same 
corporate transaction. In addition to general questions of actual and ostensible authority, 
which may be governed by a law different from the lex societatis if the company enters 
into legal relationships in another country,148 the First Company Law Directive already 
provides for a finely calibrated set of good faith provisions. These provisions implement a 
policy decision that seeks to strike an appropriate balance between protecting third 
parties in their reliance on the validity of acts carried out by the corporate organs and 
the interests of the company in not being bound by acts that exceed the company’s 
capacity or the powers of its organs. An extension of these provisions protecting third 
parties would rarely protect the third party more extensively than the straight-forward 
application of the lex societatis. 
                                                 
141 See Section 6.1.1 below. 
142 Rome I Regulation, Art. 13. 
143 Haugesund Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank, [2010] EWCA Civ 579. 
144 The decision concerned a Norwegian public body, rather than a company, but the relevant principles gener-
ally apply to all corporations. 
145 Since the case did not concern a UK company, UK Companies Act 2006, s. 39(1) which prevents capacity 
facts from affecting the validity of a transaction, did not apply. 
146 Now Directive 2009/101/EC, Art. 10. 
147 i.e. including the regulation of the consequences of a lack of capacity/authority. 
148 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law 330-331 (Edward Elgar 2nd edn 2010). 




There are in practice only two scenarios where a rule modelled on Article 13 of the Rome 
I Regulation would have an appreciable effect from the perspective of a third party. First, 
Article 10(1) of the First Company Law Directive does not protect third parties 
transacting with the company where the relevant act by the company exceeds the 
‘powers that the law confers or allows to be conferred’ on the company organ acting. In 
practice, this rule applies only to the most significant corporate transactions, such as 
mergers and issuances of shares. Since the scope of powers differs across Member 
States, and given that this question clearly falls within the lex societatis, transactions 
falling within the scope of that provision under the lex societatis, but not under the 
company law rules of the host state, could be rendered binding on the company if a 
future Rome V Regulation were to result in the parallel application of home and host 
state law in these situations.  
Second, Member States may (but do not have to) provide under the provisions of the 
First Company Law Directive149 that the company can rely vis-à-vis third parties on 
restrictions of the general power of representation that require several persons to act 
jointly in order to bind the company. Again, since Article 10(3) of that Directive leaves 
this choice to the lex societatis, a provision protecting third parties by (also) applying the 
law of the place where the transaction takes place may result in an otherwise invalid 
contract be rendered valid.150 
To the extent that the First Company Law Directive permits such variations across 
Member State law, the national rules will, of course, be policy decisions attempting to 
balance the interests of the company and its members on the one hand, and those of 
third parties on the other hand.  
5.3.3 Policy recommendations 
In our view, it may be useful for a future Rome V Regulation to distinguish based on 
both the nature of the company’s presence in the host Member State and the nature of 
the transaction. First, where a company operates in the host Member State through an 
establishment (as defined by the Court of Justice151), this may well create an expectation 
among third parties that the company operates on an equal footing with domestic 
companies in relation to its capacity and the powers of the persons acting on its 
behalf.152 The expectations of third parties may well be different if a foreign company 
has no permanent presence in the host Member State (i.e. the state where the 
transaction takes place), and only concludes a specific transaction with the third party in 
that Member State.  
Second, transactions in relation to which a Member State does not allow power to be 
conferred on company organs usually pose a particularly significant risk for the company 
and its shareholders, which may imply the need for wider-ranging protection of the 
company’s interests. Moreover, the transactions covered by this exception will also 
typically raise the expectations as to the due diligence of the third party. On the other 
hand, where the company organ violates a joint representation requirement according to 
                                                 
149 See Art. 10(3). 
150 Moreover, the First Directive also allows Member States to provide in their national laws that acts ultra vires 
the company are not binding, where the company ‘proves that the third party knew … or could not in view of 
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ment to disclose the particulars of the persons who are authorised to represent the company as members of 
the respective company organs and permanent representatives of the company for the activities of the branch, 
Art. 2(1)(e). 




a foreign lex societatis which does not exist (or is not enforceable vis-à-vis third parties) 
under the law at the place of the transaction, a third party transacting with the company 
may well be seen as deserving of protection if it acts in good faith, particularly where the 
company has a permanent presence in the jurisdiction where the transaction was 
concluded.  
In our view, a future Rome V Regulation should provide that all questions concerning the 
company’s capacity or the authority of its organs are to be resolved pursuant to the lex 
societatis. This general rule would therefore also extend to the regulation of the 
consequences of a lack of capacity or power by the company or its organs. However, the 
Regulation could provide that, where the application of the lex societatis would lead to 
the invalidity of the act, this fact cannot be invoked against third parties if (i) a company 
organ purporting to act on behalf of the company enters into a legal relationship with the 
third party in a country other than the Member State of incorporation, (ii) the company 
has an establishment [or acts through a personally present representative] in the 
country where the legal relationship is entered into, (iii) according to the law of that 
country the relevant restriction would not exist, and (iv) the third party did not know and 
should not have known of the existence of the restrictions pursuant to the lex 
societatis. 153  Moreover, the rule may be restricted to acts which do not exceed the 
powers the lex societatis confers or allows to be conferred on the acting company organ. 
The desirability of the recommended solution depends, of course, on the scope of a 
future Rome V Regulation. Were it to also include companies incorporated in third 
countries,154 the framework would need to apply differently to such companies, unless 
the underlying rules on authority are substantially equivalent to the rules of the First 
Company Law Directive. 
6. Scope of the lex societatis 
6.1 General formulation 
6.1.1 Enumeration of topics 
Most existing conflict of laws rules for companies, both in Member States that have 
codified the rules and in proposals on a harmonisation of private international law, 
provide for a non-exhaustive enumeration of topics that shall be governed by the lex 
societatis. The questions covered by the lex societatis are generally relatively 
uncontroversial, and the comparative analysis has found far-reaching consensus on 
which topics should be included in such a list. In order to facilitate comparison and the 
identification of a common denominator, the following table gives an overview of the 
topics that are explicitly mentioned as falling within the scope of the applicable law 
pursuant to different regulatory instruments that contain an enumeration of such 
matters.155 
                                                 
153 This formulation follows the GEDIP and Sonnenberger proposals in using knowledge (or negligence in not 
knowing) of the existence of the limitation on the company’s capacity or the powers of its organs as the rele-
vant point of reference in determining whether the third party acted in good faith. As far as the interpretation 
of the corresponding Article 13 of the Rome I Regulation is concerned, it is controversial whether such a formu-
lation implies that an error regarding both the governing law (i.e. the fact that the company is incorporated 
abroad) and the actual rules of the foreign lex societatis that determine capacity and authority is relevant for 
the provision, or only the latter, see U Spellenberg in Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (Munich: CH Beck, 6th 
edn, 2015), Art. 13 Rom I-VO, paras 70-81. 
154 See the discussion in Section 3.4. above. 
155 Unless otherwise noted, abbreviations refer to the Member States’ two-letter ISO code. The German rules 
(DE) are from a draft legislation from 2008 that was not adopted, Referentenentwurf, ‘Gesetz zum Internatio-
nalen Privatrecht der Gesellschaften, Vereine und juristischen Personen’, available at 
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the choice-of-law rules applicable to companies are not codified in Germany. 




Table 1: Subjects mentioned explicitly as falling in the scope of the lex 
societatis156 
Topic G157 S158 BE BG CZ EE DE IT LT NL PL PT RO ES 
1. Formation and legal 
nature/personality 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
2. Corporate Name yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes No no no 
3. Capacity of company 
and authority of organs 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
4. Capital structure yes yes no no no no yes no no no no No no no 
5. Rights and 
obligations of members 





yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
7. Duties of directors 
and liability for a 
breach of duty 
yes yes yes yes no no yes yes yes yes yes No no no 
8. Liability of 
shareholders for the 
debts of the company 
yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes no 
9. Voluntary winding 
up 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
10. Derivative action 
and other enforcement 
issues 
no no no no no no no no no no no No no no 
11. Group law no no no no no no no no no no no No no no 
12. Financial reporting, 
audits 
yes yes no no no no no no no no no No no no 
 
It should be emphasised that the above table only refers to matters that are expressly 
enumerated in the relevant legislation. A number of issues, notably a company’s capacity 
and legal nature, formation and dissolution, capital structure, internal governance 
matters, the acquisition and loss of the status as shareholder or member, as well as the 
ensuing rights and duties of shareholders, directors’ duties, and the liability of directors 
to the company for a breach of duties, concern core issues of company law. As far as can 
be seen, it is not contested that these questions should be governed by the lex societatis 
even where any explicit reference to them is omitted in the relevant codifications of the 
Member States. Two issues, the liability of directors for conduct that may cause a loss 
not only to the company, but also or exclusively to third parties, and the liability of 
shareholders for the obligations of the company (‘piercing the corporate veil’), which is 
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in the table. 
157 European Group for Private International Law, Regulation X on the Law Applicable to Companies and Other 
Bodies (3rd Draft, 2015) (‘GEDIP proposal’). 
158 HJ Sonnenberger (ed), Vorschläge und Berichte zur Reform des europäischen und deutschen internationalen 
Gesellschaftsrechts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2007) (‘Sonnenberger proposal’). 




assigned to the lex societatis in the majority of Member State codifications and also 
treated as falling under the lex societatis in some of the Member States without a 
codified private international law, 159  warrant closer consideration. In addition, it is 
necessary to examine whether it is sensible to harmonise issues commonly not 
mentioned in codifications of private international law, namely the last three points listed 
in the table (derivative actions, corporate group law, and financial reporting 
requirements), in a possible Rome V Regulation. We discuss these cases in more detail in 
Section 6.3.1 below. 
With regard to the other topics mentioned in Table 1,160 a non-exhaustive enumeration 
would reflect a wide consensus in the Member States. Therefore, we propose (at this 
point161) that a future Rome V Regulation should in any case include an enumeration of 
these matters in order to give guidance as to the future (autonomous) interpretation of 
the scope of the lex societatis. In addition, the regulation should make it clear that the 
enumeration is non-exhaustive, since it is clear that no list can anticipate all relevant 
questions of delimitation and it is consequently essential to retain flexibility to develop 
the law further. This would also be in line with the approach in other relevant legislative 
measures at the European level, for example the Insolvency Regulation.162 
6.1.2 Problematic areas 
In addition to the last three points mentioned in Table 1 (derivative actions and other 
enforcement issues, corporate group law, and financial reporting requirements), the 
classification of the following matters can be regarded as less well established across 
Member States: 
• the composition of the corporate organs as far as employee participation and 
gender diversity is concerned; 
• the liability of the directors and shareholders directly to third parties; and  
• special rules regarding certain debt instruments (especially bonds) issued by 
companies. 
Furthermore, the comparative analysis has shown that some of the matters that are 
acknowledged as falling within the scope of the lex societatis, especially the name under 
which the company trades, touch upon important policy interests of the host state. The 
relevant problems often arise only in the context of a company’s cross-border activity. 
For instance, a corporate name may not be misleading or give rise to a risk of confusion 
in the Member State of incorporation, but may well do so in the host state. Policy makers 
and commentators in a number of Member States are therefore of the opinion that 
certain regulatory requirements of the host state may effectively override the lex 
societatis in order to protect third parties transacting with the company in the host state. 
We will address these issues in turn. 
6.1.2.1 Derivative actions and other enforcement issues 
While derivative actions are not mentioned in the codified private international laws of 
the Member States, several Member States regard the right of the company’s 
shareholders to enforce claims of the company against its directors (derivative actions or 
minority shareholder lawsuits) as an integral aspect of the country’s corporate 
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162 See Art. 7(2) Regulation (EU) 2015/848 (applicable law). 




governance system. Consequently, these Member States classify the relevant rules as 
coming within the ambit of the lex societatis (this is the case, for example, in Denmark, 
France, and the United Kingdom). The challenge with this approach is, of course, to 
distinguish between general procedural requirements, which are determined by the law 
of the forum, and requirements that regulate specifically the minority shareholder 
lawsuit and are governed by the lex societatis. Where case law exists, it has been 
pointed out that even though the question whether a shareholder can bring a derivative 
action is answered by the law in procedural terms, its ‘real nature’163 is not procedural. 
Similar problems exist in relation to rules regarding, for instance, the challenging of 
general meeting resolutions, which play an equally important role in the enforcement of 
shareholder rights in several Member States. 
Derivative actions are part of substantive company law in that they ‘confer a right on 
shareholders to protect the value of their shares by giving them a right to sue and 
recover on behalf of the company.’164 This quote also suggests a way to distinguish 
between purely procedural aspect of the derivative action mechanism and aspects that 
are substantive in nature. Rules that set out, specifically for the case of shareholders 
seeking to enforce the company’s claims, whether and when a shareholder has standing 
to sue on behalf of the company (for example, by imposing minimum shareholding 
requirements, asking whether the majority shareholders could have ratified the 
challenged action,165 or requiring the court to balance the interests of the shareholders in 
bringing the lawsuit and the detrimental effects that the litigation may have on the 
company166), that limit the types of the company’s claims that may be brought by a 
shareholder, or regulate whether the shareholder bears the costs of the litigation, 
ultimately determine how likely it is that the company’s claims will be enforced and, 
consequently, affect the value of the shareholder’s holding. The same holds true for rules 
allowing individual shareholders to challenge general meeting resolutions. On the other 
hand, rules that regulate in a general manner, for example, how a claim form can be 
served, are purely procedural in nature from both a formal and a functional viewpoint.  
Finally, it should also be considered that the design of the derivative action mechanism 
and the content of directors’ duties are intrinsically connected. Given the governance 
structure of (particularly large, listed) companies, the effectiveness of directors’ duties in 
regulating behaviour is highly dependent on the interplay between both, the content of 
the duties and the ease of enforcement. While procedural and substantive rules are, of 
course, always interdependent, this is particularly true in the area of derivative 
actions.167 A regulatory solution that seeks to calibrate the risk of liability that directors 
face may therefore focus on either of the two dimensions (or, often, on both). 168 
Consequently, a choice-of-law approach that separates these two dimensions may result 
in the misalignment of liability risks. The same line of reasoning applies to the right of 
shareholders to challenge resolutions of the corporate organs, notably decisions of the 
general meeting 169  Again, the respective enforcement mechanisms are not only 
procedural in character, but they shape the position and rights of shareholders and may, 
functionally, be regarded as part of the substantive law. In relation to the procedures 
                                                 
163 See the English case Konamaneni v Rolls Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1269, 1284. 
But see also Base Metal Trading Ltd v Shamurin [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1157, 1175, where the court held that ‘[t]he 
question whether a shareholder has a right to bring a derivative action [has] to be distinguished … from the 
question whether the shareholder has satisfied any procedural rules from bringing a derivative claim, for ex-
ample by serving prior notice on the company.’ Whereas the former falls within the scope of the lex societatis, 
the latter ‘are matters of procedural law for the lex fori’. 
164 Konamaneni, ibid. 
165 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189. 
166 German Stock Corporation Act, § 148(1), sentence 2, no. 4. 
167 See e.g. RM Buxbaum, ‘Conflict-of-Interests Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Directors in Derivative 
Actions’ (1980) 68 California Law Review 1122: ‘Nowhere is the substantive law so dependent upon the availa-
bility of a person entitled to complain of its breach as in the case of litigation on behalf of a corporation.’ 
168 Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster, supra note 12. 
169 For example pursuant to §§ 241-249 German Stock Corporation Act. 




regarding the challenging of resolutions of the corporate organs it must also be borne in 
mind that the procedural rules will often reflect particularities of the national companies 
register. For instance, where a Member State permits the challenging of a general 
meeting resolution regarding the increase of the company’s capital, it will typically also 
deal with the question of whether or not the challenged resolution may be implemented 
by the company despite pending legislation. Solutions of this type will, however, only be 
effective where the procedural rules regarding the enforcement of shareholder rights 
follow the lex societatis. The analogous problem had to be addressed in the context of 
the Cross-Border Merger Directive,170 which at least implicitly follows this logic. Art 10(3) 
of that Directive permits the implementation of cross-border mergers notwithstanding 
pending litigation in one of the Member States, provided the shareholders of the (foreign) 
acquiring company effectively accept the future decision of the ‘court having jurisdiction 
over one of the acquired companies’. It is clear from the context of the Cross-Border 
Merger Directive that (sole) jurisdiction over the issues in question is assumed to be 
vested in the courts of the Member State of incorporation. However, such a quasi-
contractual solution171 would not be feasible in the present context. 
We, therefore, propose to clarify in the non-exhaustive list of matters governed by the 
lex societatis that these matters include the enforcement of the company’s claims by its 
shareholders and the right of shareholders to challenge resolutions of the corporate 
organs. 
It should be noted, however, that the general solution proposed in this Report regarding 
the primary connecting factor would render such a clause redundant, at least as far as 
challenges of general meeting resolutions are concerned.172 Under the Recast Brussels 
Regulation, the courts of the Member State in which a company has its ‘seat’ have 
exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings about the validity of the constitution, the nullity or 
the dissolution of companies, as well as the validity of the decisions of their organs 
(including the general meeting).173 Currently, the courts in each Member State may 
determine the meaning of the term ‘seat’ according to the national rules of private 
international law.174 If a future Rome V Regulation were to follow our recommendation 
that a company be governed by the law according to which it has been incorporated,175 
we would submit that the reference to ’seat’ in Art 24 (2), last sentence, of the Recast 
Brussels Regulation would necessarily have to be one to the place of incorporation for all 
Member States.176 Accordingly, the courts in the Member State under whose laws a 
company has been incorporated would have exclusive jurisdiction in relation to such 
claims, thus effectively resulting in the application of that countries procedural (and 
substantive rules). 
6.1.2.2 Corporate group law 
A separate body of law governing corporate groups can only be found in a minority of 
Member States (Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Portugal and 
Slovenia).177 The treatment of groups for purposes of private international law is not 
always clear in these states and specific conflict rules are often missing. However, there 
is relatively widespread agreement that mechanisms to protect minority shareholders 
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mergers of limited liability companies, OJ L 310, 25.11.2005, p.1. 
171 i.e. the voluntary acceptance of the foreign court’s jurisdiction. 
172 See Section 5.1. above. 
173 See Art 24(2) Recast Brussels Regulation. 
174 Ibid. 
175 See in detail Section 5.1. above. 
176 See in detail Section 10 below. 
177 See e.g. KJ Hopt, ‘Groups of Companies - A Comparative Study on the Economics, Law and Regulation of 
Corporate Groups’ in: J Gordon and W-G Ringe (eds) Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press 2015) Ch II 26. 




and creditors of the controlled undertaking (i.e. typically the subsidiary) are governed by 
the lex societatis of the subsidiary. In Member States without a codification, the legal 
mechanisms used to address problems in corporate groups are diverse and subject to 
general conflict of laws rules that may lead to a combination of applicable laws, for 
example the lex contractus with regard to control agreements between the parent and 
the subsidiary and the lex societatis of the controlled undertaking as far as the position 
and rights of the minority shareholders of the subsidiary and the liability of the parent 
for the debts of the subsidiary are concerned.178 In addition, the lex concursus will often 
be relevant to determine the rights of creditors of the subsidiary in the insolvency of the 
subsidiary. Because of this variation in legal strategies, it seems questionable whether a 
harmonisation of the conflict rules applicable to corporate groups is advisable. It may be 
helpful to emphasise in the recitals of a future Rome V Regulation that company law 
mechanisms designed to protect the position of controlled undertakings should be 
governed by the lex societatis of the controlled undertaking (rather than the controlling 
undertaking) and that other legal mechanisms follow general principles of private 
international law. However, a conflict rule governing the legal relationships of corporate 
groups in a more holistic fashion will likely not be effectual without harmonisation of the 
internal law on groups of companies.179 
6.1.2.3 Financial reporting and disclosure 
Financial reporting requirements are explicitly mentioned as falling within the scope of 
the applicable law only by the GEDIP and Sonnenberger proposals.180 However, even 
without explicit codification Member States generally agree that the lex societatis 
determines financial reporting requirements. In spite of the far-reaching substantive 
harmonisation of accounting law at the European level, the question is not irrelevant 
since EU accounting rules operate on the basis of minimum harmonisation181 and allow 
for various Member State options. In some Member States, commentators argue that 
those parts of accounting law that are not fully harmonised should be classified as public 
law, given that they protect public interests.182 Alternatively, it has been suggested that 
the reference in the Eleventh Company Law Directive to ‘the law of the Member State by 
which the company is governed’, which determines the form and content of the 
accounting documents that have to be disclosed by branches of EU-incorporated 
companies,183 leaves open the question of the applicable law, and Member States are 
free to apply the law of the state where the real seat is located to financial reporting 
requirements.184 These views are ultimately unconvincing. The concept of the governing 
law should be interpreted consistently throughout Union law, and as discussed above,185 
Member States are prevented by the Treaty, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, from 
applying the law at the place of the real seat in a blanket fashion as far as EU-
incorporated companies are concerned. In our view, this also determines the meaning of 
the reference to the ‘governing law’ in the Eleventh Company Law Directive. If a future 
Rome V Regulation provides for the incorporation law as a harmonised conflict-of-laws 
rule, this reference would likewise have to be interpreted as referring to the jurisdiction 
of incorporation.  
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Similarly, allowing a public law override by the host state would lead to problematic 
regulatory outcomes. Branch establishments of foreign, including EU-incorporated, 
companies would be bound by two sets of accounting rules, the incorporation law as well 
as the law of the place where the branch was located. The company, accordingly, would 
have to produce two sets of accounting documents, which would not be in line with the 
Eleventh Company Law Directive. 186  Therefore, we propose that a future Rome V 
Regulation should resolve these contentious questions by including financial reporting 
requirements in the non-exhaustive list of matters governed by the lex societatis.  
6.1.2.4 Employee participation in company organs and gender quotas 
The composition of the administrative organs of the company, the board of directors in 
one-tier board systems and the management board and supervisory board in two-tier 
systems, is a central aspect of company law and, accordingly, all legal systems qualify it 
as part of the lex societatis. In some Member States, commentators submit that the law 
should allow for an exception from this clear rule as far as employee participation at 
board level is concerned, since rules that establish, for example, a system of co-
determination pursue specific societal goals linked to the place where the company’s 
operations are located and, consequently, where the employees’ interests are affected. 
The exception is suggested to be implemented either by relying on the real seat instead 
of the incorporation law for the specific case of employee representation or regarding the 
employee participation regime as overriding mandatory provisions that apply 
notwithstanding a foreign lex societatis.187 Another possible option is to exclude the topic 
of employee co-determination from the scope of a future Rome v Regulation.188 
Looking at the actual legal situation in the Member States, all aspects of board 
composition, including the involvement of employees, are governed by the lex 
societatis.189 Furthermore, as far as can be seen, no court in the Member States has 
been prepared to impose the host state’s employee participation requirements on foreign, 
EU-incorporated companies. It would also be impracticable to incorporate the host 
state’s rules on co-determination into a foreign corporate governance regime, since a 
wide array of rules ranging from board structure to appointment and removal rights 
would need to be adjusted. This would inevitably lead to friction between the home and 
host state corporate governance regimes and, hence, to legal uncertainty. Moreover, the 
Cross-Border Merger Directive and the SE Regulation both operate under the implicit 
assumption that employee participation forms part of the lex societatis. Both instruments 
may, of course, effectively result in foreign employee participation rules affecting the 
board composition of ‘domestic’ companies, but this may be achieved by harmonising 
the relevant rules of the lex societatis, rather than by excluding the question from its 
scope.190 
Nevertheless, it is also worth pointing out that employee participation rules and, similarly, 
requirements concerning gender quotas, not only address the internal affairs of the 
company, but reflect wider policy goals as these rules seek to balance the interests of 
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different social actors within the society where a company operates. 191  Within the 
confines of the Treaty, Member States are of course entitled to protect such social policy 
goals also in relation to companies governed by a foreign lex societatis, for example by 
relying on overriding mandatory provisions.192 In this regard, all additional requirements 
imposed on companies incorporated in another EU Member State are subject to Gebhard 
justification. Given the strict conditions for a justification under Gebhard, however, it 
seems unlikely that the Court of Justice would find that the application of the host state’s 
board-level employee participation regime to foreign companies is compatible with the 
freedom of establishment.193  
In order to attain a reasonable level of legal certainty, we would suggest that a future 
Rome V Regulation should clarify that all internal governance matters, including board 
structure, the composition of corporate boards, and the involvement of employees, if any, 
at board level, shall fall within the scope of the lex societatis, unless specific social policy 
reasons justify, according to the Gebhard test, the classification of national rules on 
board composition as overriding mandatory provisions. However, we recognise that this 
question may be of a highly political nature and that an exclusion from the scope of the 
future instrument might offer an alternative solution. 
6.1.2.5 Liability of directors and shareholders 
In several Member States, the opinion has been expressed—and case law can be found 
to the effect—that Member States in whose territory a foreign company pursues some 
form of business activity has authority to hold directors and shareholders of the 
company liable under domestic law.194 The necessary link to the territory of the host 
state to engage such liability is defined differently in the Member States, as is the legal 
basis for regulating directors and shareholders of foreign companies. 
Liability of directors  
As far as the liability of directors is concerned, we can distinguish between legal systems 
that (i) impose domestic rules on directors’ duties and branch managers’ liabilities for 
mistakes made in the course of operating a branch; (ii) hold directors liable if they 
caused or contributed to the company’s insolvency (using different connecting factors 
ranging from ‘carrying on business’ within the territory of the host state to being subject 
to corporate taxation in the host state); (iii) hold directors liable if they caused damage 
to third parties; or (iv) hold directors liable if they created the false legal appearance 
that a person with unlimited liability (for example, a partnership or a natural person) 
would be party to the contract between the company and a third party.195 The following 
observations may be helpful in conceptualising these diverse approaches. As the 
discussion in Section 6.1.1 above has made clear, all legal systems agree that directors’ 
duties, as well as the consequences of a breach of duties, are matters that in principle 
fall within the scope of the lex societatis. As far as the liability of directors of foreign 
companies for their conduct is concerned, the default position should, accordingly, be an 
allocation of regulatory authority to the home state.  
In principle, this allocation of regulatory authority is exclusive. However, it may be 
modified pursuant to two considerations. First, it may be possible to regard the host 
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state rule as an overriding mandatory provision (lois d’application immédiate), in which 
case the rule can be applied notwithstanding a foreign lex societatis. Second, the host 
state’s liability provision may be classified as a legal rule not coming within the ambit of 
company law for purposes of private international law but of another conflict-of-laws rule 
and this conflict rule refers to the law of the host state. The first regulatory strategy 
mentioned above, holding directors of foreign companies liable for a breach of directors’ 
duties where the breach is connected to a domestic branch, is evidently a matter of 
company law and could only be maintained under the first approach (overriding 
mandatory provision). Regulatory strategies (ii)-(iv), on the other hand, concern the 
scope of the applicable law and may, in appropriate circumstances, be classified as 
falling outside the lex societatis. In either case, the ‘default rule’ outlined above remains 
unchanged.  
Accordingly, we propose that a future Rome V Regulation should stipulate that the lex 
societatis shall apply to the duties of directors, as well as the liability of directors for a 
breach of duty and generally for breaches of company law. Whether overriding 
mandatory provisions of the host state are permissible, and how the lex societatis and 
other areas of the law can be delimited constitute complex questions that will be 
discussed comprehensively in the appropriate context below.196 
Liability of shareholders 
The treatment of the liability of shareholders for the obligations of the company is 
equally problematic. We have seen that piercing the corporate veil is commonly 
mentioned in codifications of private international law as a matter falling within the 
scope of the lex societatis.197 However, this regulatory choice may give rise to incoherent 
results because often legal mechanisms that are grouped under the rubric ‘piercing the 
veil’ operate very differently and pursue different functions in the Member States. A 
particular type of veil piercing, namely holding the shareholders liable for the company’s 
debts if they abuse the corporate form, for example in order to evade a pre-existing 
obligation, concerns the nature and limits of the concepts of separate legal personality 
and limited liability. These concepts are part of the lex societatis in all Member States. It 
is therefore convincing to argue that a mechanism qualifying these concepts should also 
be classified as company law. Other types of veil piercing, however, may be functionally 
closer to insolvency law, e.g. where they apply only in the vicinity of insolvency, or to 
general tort law. In such a case, a classification as company law would dissect a body of 
rules intended to address problems that arise specifically in insolvency and in the vicinity 
of insolvency 198  and may therefore lead to inconsistent and ineffectual regulatory 
outcomes. Consequently, it would be advisable not to use a potentially overreaching 
term such as ‘liability of shareholders for the obligations of the company’ in defining the 
scope of the lex societatis. We propose not to follow the GEDIP and Sonnenberger drafts 
and the majority of private international law codifications in including the shareholders’ 
liability for obligations of the company in the enumeration of topics governed by the lex 
societatis. Instead, it seems advisable to clarify — possibly in the recitals of a future 
Rome V Regulation — that the general criteria developed for the demarcation of the lex 
societatis, lex concursus and lex loci delicti determine how different types of legal 
mechanism imposing liability on the shareholders for the debts of the company shall be 
classified for purposes of private international law. We will discuss this problem in more 
detail in Section 6.3.1.2 below. 
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6.1.2.6 Debt securities 
The law applicable to corporate bonds (i.e. non-equity securities) and to the terms and 
conditions of bonds, including the rights of bondholders and the mechanisms of 
bondholder meetings, are in practice generally determined by a choice of law clause in 
the relevant documentation. These choice-of-law clauses are accepted in most 
jurisdictions, 199  since validity, content and underlying rights of bonds are commonly 
assumed to be matters falling within the scope of the Rome I Regulation, which excludes 
negotiable instruments from its scope of application only ‘to the extent that the 
obligations under such […] negotiable instruments arise out of their negotiable 
character’.200 However, the laws in some Member States provide for additional sets of 
rules governing the rights of bondholders and bondholder meetings. In some cases, such 
rules are only applicable where the underlying bonds are made subject to that state’s 
law by virtue of contractual choice-of-law.201 In some Member States, however, such 
rules are held to be applicable on the basis of mandatory connecting factors, such as the 
domicile of the issuer or offeror in a public offering.202  
In several Member States, rules regarding corporate bonds and the position of 
bondholders are included in the national company law. 203  In these countries, the 
argument has been made that the classification for purposes of private international law 
should follow the internal legal classification and at least certain matters, notably 
concerning the authority of the bondholder meeting, should be governed by the lex 
societatis. However, case law is rare and there seems to be some legal uncertainty 
regarding these questions.  
It is worth noting in this context that the main rights and obligations arising under bonds 
issued by a company, such as those relating to the payment of interest and the 
repayment of the principal, generally fall within the scope of application of the Rome I 
Regulation.204 In particular, unless the bonds give special rights to their holders, such as 
the right to convert the bonds into shares, pre-emption rights over newly issued shares, 
or the right to participate in the company’s profits, the contractual relationships between 
the bondholder and the company underlying the bond do not fall within the company law 
exemption in Art 1(2)(f) of the Rome I Regulation.205  
The scope of the company law exemption in the Rome I Regulation does not depend on 
national classification, but has to be determined autonomously, ultimately by the Court 
of Justice. 206  In our view, the legal relationships between the company and its 
bondholders should therefore generally be regarded as being governed exclusively207 by 
the law chosen in the relevant contract. In exceptional circumstances, a Member State’s 
courts may insist on the application of additional rules based on Art. 9 of the Rome I 
Regulation (overriding mandatory provisions).  
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This possibility, however, exists irrespective of whether that Member State is the 
Member State under whose laws the company was incorporated, and it seems unlikely 
that a blanket application of any Member State’s rules regarding the relationship 
between bondholders and the issuer (and between bondholders) would meet the 
prerequisites for the application of Art 9, as such rules will not typically be ‘regarded as 
crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or 
economic organisation’.208 Moreover, the insistence on the application of rules concerning 
corporate bonds not governed by the law of the Member State of incorporation by that 
Member State may, depending on the content of these rules, also restrict the free 
movement of capital under Art 63 TFEU, and would thus likewise require justification. 
In light of this assessment, it would in our view be useful for a future Rome V Regulation 
to clarify that three different groups of questions concerning corporate bonds should be 
distinguished: First, the capacity of companies to issue bonds, which is an aspect of the 
general formulation of capacity and authority of the company and its organs and hence 
clearly a matter for the lex societatis;209 second, the regulation of the offering itself, 
which will depend on the international scope of application of the various measures of 
securities regulation that apply in this context;210 and third, the relationship between the 
issuer and the bondholders, as well as the bondholders among each other. As far as 
bonds in question do not grant special rights, such as conversion or pre-emption rights 
to its holders, and instead only require the repayment of the principal and the stipulated 
interest, the latter issue falls within the scope of the Rome I Regulation. 
We therefore recommend that a future Rome V Regulation excludes from the scope of 
the lex societatis rules relating to the legal relationship between the bondholders and the 
company, as well as between bondholders. In order to ensure legal certainty, such 
exclusion should be made explicit in the Regulation. However, in relation to non-equity 
securities which give its holders the right to (i) convert bonds into or exchange bonds for 
shares in the issuer, whether carrying voting rights or not, (ii) exercise pre-emption 
rights over such shares when issued, or (iii) participate directly in the profits of the 
company (‘hybrid securities’), rules regarding the rights of its holders relating to these 
special (equity-like) rights should in our view be subject to the lex societatis. 
6.1.2.7 Corporate names 
Finally, any attempts by the host state to override the matters addressed by a foreign 
lex societatis to protect domestic interests, for example the requirement that foreign 
companies trade under a name that does not give rise to the risk of confusion because 
the name is similar to that of a domestic company, should not lead to a limitation of the 
scope of the lex societatis. Rather, in order to protect the completeness and consistency 
of the lex societatis, it is more convincing to allow the host state to amplify the 
requirements of the lex societatis in clearly defined situations if this is necessary to 
protect domestic interests. We will discuss this point more comprehensively in the 
context of ‘ordre public’ and ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ in Section 7 below. 
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6.1.3 Formal requirements 
An issue that is not addressed coherently in the Member States is the question whether 
and under what conditions formalities required for the incorporation of a company may 
be fulfilled abroad, for example before a foreign notary public. In some Member States, 
this question has not yet been addressed, in others it is well established that documents 
certified by a foreign notary public can be substituted for domestic notarisations, at least 
if certain conditions are satisfied (for example, reciprocity, authentication by an authority 
of the state of incorporation, or comparability of the roles of the foreign and domestic 
authenticating institutions and the applicable procedure), and in a sizeable minority of 
Member States such documents are not accepted.211 The results of our empirical survey 
clearly show the perceived high degree of legal uncertainty in this regard. 212  The 
question is of considerable importance for corporate mobility, since the refusal to 
recognise authentications undertaken in the state where the company’s founders, 
shareholders or managers are located would impede their right to establish companies 
under the laws of another Member State. 
Formal requirements are generally determined pursuant to the law applicable to the legal 
relationship forming the subject matter of the respective legal act. In the present context, 
this would mean that notarial and other formalities applicable to the documents drawn 
up to establish the company are governed by the lex societatis, which is indeed the 
position in all Member States. Some countries allow for an additional connecting factor 
and provide that the legal act is also valid if it complies with the law of the country 
where the act has been performed. 213  The Sonnenberger proposal suggests an 
intermediate solution that distinguishes between acts ‘relating to the constitution of a 
company’, which are valid only if they meet the formal requirements of the lex societatis, 
and other legal acts, which ‘shall be valid in form if they meet the formal requirements 
prescribed by either the law applicable under [the general conflict rule determining the 
lex societatis] or the place where the act was concluded.’ 214  This limitation of the 
alternative connecting factor to acts that do not concern the formation of the company 
seems overly restrictive, given that the Treaty framework seeks to facilitate corporate 
mobility (and likewise a possible Rome V Regulation, were it to adopt the incorporation 
law as applicable law). It would also constitute a departure from the solution espoused 
by the Rome I Regulation, which uses alternatively the lex contractus and the law of the 
place where the contract is concluded to determine the formal validity of contracts.215 
Therefore, we suggest that a future Rome V Regulation should stipulate that formal 
requirements of both acts performed in the establishment of a company and the acts of 
corporate organs and shareholders shall be governed by the lex societatis, provided that 
the acts as such fall within the scope of the lex societatis. Furthermore, the regulation 
should provide that, alternatively, compliance with the formal requirements of the law of 
the Member State where the acts were performed shall suffice, provided that the formal 
requirements in that Member State are functionally equivalent.216  
The rationales of some Member States’ formal requirements in the area of company law, 
especially where they require involvement of a notary public, include the expectation 
that the parties involved receive some form of (national) legal advice regarding the 
relevant act. It is our recommendation that a future Rome V Regulation clarifies that, in 
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such cases, acts performed according to the laws of a Member State other than the 
Member State of incorporation shall only be regarded as equivalent where advice on the 
applicable law can also be given in the context of the compliance with formalities under 
the law of the Member State where the act was performed. However, where a party may, 
under the law of the Member State of incorporation, opt not to receive such advice, acts 
performed in another Member State shall not be subject to this requirement. 
6.2 Lex societatis and lex concursus 
In EU law, the question of whether to classify rules as falling within the lex societatis or 
the lex concursus has so far largely been shaped by the Insolvency Regulation. The 
Regulation provides that the lex concursus shall determine the conditions for the opening 
of insolvency proceedings, their conduct and closure, and further lists a number of 
questions falling within the scope of international insolvency law. 217  Most of these 
questions are concerned with the operation and effects of the insolvency proceedings 
themselves. They fall clearly outside the scope of the lex societatis and problems of 
demarcation are unlikely to arise with regard to them. Nevertheless, the exact 
boundaries of the lex concursus are difficult to draw because the Court of Justice has 
held that the courts that have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings (the courts of 
the Member State where the company’s COMI is located218) also have jurisdiction to hear 
‘actions which derive directly from [insolvency] proceedings and which are closely 
connected to them’.219  
The Court’s jurisprudence has now been codified in the Insolvency Regulation Recast, 
which mentions avoidance actions as an example of such closely connected actions.220 
However, the Regulation does not provide for any definition of closely connected actions, 
but merely summarises some of the Court of Justice case law in the recitals.221 Thus, two 
questions arise that are of importance in the present context: First, how closely 
connected actions are to be defined in general terms, and second, whether the definition 
thus derived is only relevant for the determination of the jurisdiction of the court of the 
insolvency proceedings, or whether jurisdiction and the applicable law go hand in hand 
and closely connected actions, accordingly, are always governed by the lex fori. 
In its case law, the Court of Justice made a number of important points that can guide 
the development of a general definition of closely connected actions. First, the Court has 
pointed out that the scope of Article 3(1) of the Insolvency Regulation Recast 
(international jurisdiction) and the bankruptcy exception of the Judgments Regulation222 
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are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 223  Given that the legislator intended the 
Judgments Regulation to have a broad scope of application, encompassing all civil and 
commercial matters except certain well-defined issues,224 it follows that the scope of the 
Insolvency Regulation is to be interpreted narrowly.225 Second, ‘the decisive criterion’ to 
distinguish between civil and commercial matters and actions that derive from insolvency 
law ‘is not the procedural context of which that action is part, but [its] legal basis’.226 
Thus, the Court asks ‘whether the right or the obligation which [constitutes] the basis of 
the action finds its source in the common rules of civil and commercial law or in the 
derogating rules specific to insolvency proceedings.’227 In addition, in several decisions, 
the Court stressed that the purpose of the action was the protection of the interests of 
‘the general body of creditors’228 and that the action was ‘the exclusive prerogative of 
the liquidator’,229 which was ‘brought in the context of insolvency proceedings’.230 On the 
other hand, if the action could also be brought by the liquidator, but it was actually 
‘brought outside the context of insolvency proceedings [it] may fall within the scope of … 
Regulation No 44/2001.’231 Summarising this case law, it can accordingly be said that the 
concept of ‘closely connected action’ is based on three criteria. Closely connected actions 
(i) derogate from common rules of civil and commercial law; (ii) are adopted in the 
interests of the general body of creditors; and (iii) are in fact brought by the liquidator in 
the context of insolvency proceedings, rather than by individual creditors. 
Whether these criteria can be transposed to the question of the applicable law has, so far, 
only been address by the Court in one decision, Kornhaas, which was decided in 
December 2015.232 In this case, dealing with the classification of a provision of German 
law imposing liability on managers of a private limited company for payments made after 
the company becomes cash flow insolvent or over-indebted,233 the Court held that the 
German liability provision fell within the codified scope of the applicable law as set out in 
the Insolvency Regulation. By interpreting what is now Article 7(2) Insolvency Regulation 
Recast, the Court stressed that ‘the conditions for the opening of [insolvency] 
proceedings’ within the meaning of that provision include ‘the consequences of an 
infringement of [the] obligation’ to apply for the opening of proceedings’.234 However, 
the Court’s decision is, arguably, more sweeping. The Court went beyond the codified 
scope of the lex concursus by embracing explicitly its case law concerning jurisdiction, 
especially its judgment in H v H.K.,235 which dealt with the same provision of German 
law. Given that the liability provision was to be qualified as a closely connected action, 
as decided in H, the Court held that it ‘must be regarded as being covered by the law 
applicable to insolvency proceedings and their effects’.236 Thus, it seems highly likely 
that the three criteria outlined above are intended to apply similarly to the determination 
of the scope of the lex concursus. 
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However, these criteria give rise to the problem that the classification of legal 
mechanisms at the intersection of company law and insolvency law depends on technical, 
and functionally not justified, differences in the formulation of the internal law. In 
particular, the necessary involvement of the liquidator may depend on relatively 
arbitrary idiosyncrasies of the national law. According to this criterion, some liability 
provisions, for example wrongful trading pursuant to English law237 and the French action 
en responsabilité pour insufissance d’actif (liability for insufficiency of assets)238, would 
be classified as insolvency law for purposes of private international law. The same would 
hold for the liability of company directors for the failure to file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings under German law, as far as the loss suffered by pre-duty 
creditors is concerned (creditors whose claims existed at the time when the duty to file 
arose),239 but not as regards the loss suffered by post-duty creditors, because they have 
standing to sue individually even if insolvency proceedings are opened.240 Likewise, in 
the Czech Republic, directors can be held liable for the debts of the company if they 
knew, or should have known, that the company was facing an imminent threat of 
bankruptcy and, in breach of the duty of care, failed to take all necessary steps to 
prevent the bankruptcy. Again, creditors have standing to bring a lawsuit in separate 
proceedings independent of any decision by the insolvency court.241 
An additional problem is the potential misalignment of legal mechanisms from insolvency 
law and company law. Since it is proposed to base a future Rome V Regulation on the 
incorporation theory, insolvency law and company law would use two different 
connecting factors. This may give rise to the risk of regulatory gaps or the cumulative 
application of legal mechanisms from different jurisdictions, leading to potential over-
deterrence. This problem exists, first of all, if the demarcation between the lex societatis 
and the lex concursus is not well established; this is currently the case in many, if not 
most, Member States. 242  In this case, the risk exists that the COMI Member State 
classifies a legal mechanism as company law for purposes of private international law 
and the state of incorporation as insolvency law, thus leading to a negative conflict of 
the applicable law, or vice versa, leading to a positive conflict. This situation is likely to 
continue to exist for some time as the Court of Justice slowly establishes the 
demarcation from the viewpoint of the Insolvency Regulation. However, the problem 
may persist even after well-established criteria to delimit the lex societatis and the lex 
concursus have been developed by the policy maker or the courts. Member States may 
utilise legal mechanisms of differing design and provenance to address the same social 
conflict. While conflicts that arise in insolvency and in the vicinity of insolvency will be 
governed by a combination of company law and insolvency law in most Member States, 
jurisdictions may place different emphasis on one strategy or the other. If a legal system 
that may provide for an adequate regulatory environment if applied as a whole is 
dissected as a result of the use of different connecting factors, the same negative and 
positive conflict of the applicable law may occur that was described above.243 
A straight-forward solution to this problem would be the use of the same connecting 
factor for legal areas as closely related as company law and insolvency law.244 However, 
we realise that it is unlikely that the connecting factor of the Insolvency Regulation will 
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242 These problems of legal uncertainty have also been identified in the Empirical Survey, Chapter III, Section 
3.3 above. 
243 Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster, supra note 12, 323-328. 
244 See also the discussion in Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster, ibid. 330. 




be amended in connection with the enactment of a possible future Rome V Regulation. In 
addition, the use of the incorporation law as the lex societatis and the law at the COMI 
as the lex concursus can of course be rationalised convincingly in light of the different 
interests that are typically at play in the two areas, with choice of law being generally 
less desirable in insolvency law than in company law.245 In any case, we suggest that for 
most purposes, the problem of positive and negative conflicts of the applicable law can 
be mitigated by providing in a future Rome V Regulation, for example in a subsection 
following the enumeration of the matters governed by the lex societatis, that legal 
mechanisms designed to address problems arising specifically in insolvency or in the 
vicinity of insolvency (to be defined more precisely in the recitals 246 ) shall not be 
included in the scope of the lex societatis.  
Thus, we suggest that the definition of the scope should include a ‘functional carve-out’, 
notwithstanding the enumeration of matters falling within the scope of the lex societatis, 
since the latter necessarily builds on concepts derived from internal company law and, 
consequently, is formulated to some extent in a ‘non-functional’ way. Of course, 
correctly understood, the scope of both the lex societatis and the lex concursus are to be 
determined functionally, i.e. they should be differentiated by taking account of the 
function of the legal mechanism as addressing conflicts between the relevant corporate 
actors while the company is a going concern and when it is, or is about to become, 
insolvent, respectively. In this sense, the functional carve-out is merely declaratory. 
However, relying on classification along purely functional lines may, in itself, create legal 
uncertainty, as many core company rules also serve the purpose of, for instance, 
reducing the risk of insolvency.247 An explicit carve-out combined with an enumeration of 
matters falling within the scope of the lex societatis would thus serve an important 
function, not least because the solution suggested here would also mean a partial 
deviation from the criteria the Court of Justice has developed to define closely connected 
actions, as the discussion that follows will show. 
A functional determination of the boundary region between company law and insolvency 
law would characterise all mechanisms designed to mitigate risk-shifting in the vicinity of 
insolvency as insolvency law, irrespective of the internal classification of the provision in 
the Member State’s company or insolvency law. If defined in this way, the first and 
second criteria used by the Court to determine whether an action is ‘closely connected’ 
(derogation from common rules of civil and commercial law, and protection of the 
interests of the general body of creditors) would retain their significance. However, the 
third, rather formalistic criterion (involvement of the liquidator in insolvency proceedings) 
would not be applicable. This is indeed the criterion that, as argued here, leads to results 
that depend often on idiosyncrasies of the national law and that are difficult to 
substantiate on functional grounds. 
However, even under the solution suggested here, differences in the internal laws of the 
Member States248 would not become entirely irrelevant. A legal mechanism would be 
characterised as company law for purposes of private international law if it regulated the 
structure and operation of the company as a going concern, starting with the company’s 
formation, and independently of the company’s financial position. Conversely, it would 
be characterised as insolvency law if it derogated from the common rules of civil and 
commercial law and applied only from a certain ‘trigger point’ onwards that was defined 
with reference to the company’s financial situation. The formulation of the trigger point 
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246 See the discussion in the following paragraphs. 
247 One could even argue, for instance, that minimum capital rules fall into this category. 
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would necessarily vary to some degree between the Member States, since the respective 
rules of company and insolvency law that apply in the vicinity of insolvency are not 
harmonised by either the Company Law Directives or the Insolvency Regulation.249 Save 
future legislative action by the European Institutions, these differences in determining 
when the body of rules designed to address the problem of risk-shifting in the vicinity of 
insolvency is triggered would need to be respected by the conflict rules embedded in the 
Insolvency Regulation and the Rome V Regulation. The autonomous concept of 
‘connected action’ builds on the trigger point pursuant to national law (both under the 
current test of the Court of Justice, because ‘provisions derogating from the general 
rules of civil law’250 will become operational when the trigger point is reached, and under 
the functional approach suggested here), but it does not determine the trigger point 
itself, since it is a jurisdictional and conflicts rule. On the other hand, a conflicts rule that 
delineates company law and insolvency law on the basis of the function of the 
mechanism of substantive (internal) law as addressing risk shifting from shareholders to 
creditors that occurs specifically in financial distress (since financial distress leads to 
incentive misalignments that do not exist otherwise251) allows the Court of Justice to 
ensure a certain EU-wide consistency in the classification of the relevant legal 
mechanisms. The Court of Justice will be able to review, as part of the interpretation of 
the conflicts rule suggested here, whether the mechanism of substantive law is triggered 
by a condition that falls within the range of what can plausibly be claimed to be an 
approximation of the point where such risk shifting occurs. If it is not, the mechanism 
does not come within the scope of the insolvency conflicts rule. 
If implemented, the following mechanisms, whose classification was identified as 
controversial in the Comparative Analysis, 252  would clearly be governed by the lex 
concursus: the duty to file and liability for failure to file (notwithstanding whether the 
claim is brought by the liquidator or, as in the case of liability to post-duty creditors 
pursuant to German law), wrongful trading, responsabilité pour insufissance d’actif, and 
also — in contrast to what is probably currently the prevailing opinion — the shift of 
directors’ duties that occurs in some legal systems in the vicinity of insolvency.253 
6.3 Lex societatis and non-contractual obligations 
6.3.1 Tort 
6.3.1.1 Liability of directors 
The comparative study has shown that Member States largely follow one of three 
approaches in determining the boundary between the lex societatis and the lex loci 
delicti as far as the liability of directors is concerned, 254  which may inform the 
determination of boundary conditions in a possible future Rome V Regulation.  
First, the distinction may be drawn along the lines of substantive law: liability questions 
that arise from a breach of directors’ duties, the articles of association, or more generally 
from a breach of company law, could be characterised as company law for purposes of 
private international law, and situations where liability arises from a wrongful act that is 
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different approximations of when risk shifting is likely to have occurred. For an example, wrongful trading pur-
suant to s. 214 UK Insolvency Act 1986, see PL Davies and S Worthington, Gower and Davies’ Principles of 
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not grounded in company law – and that does not consist in the breach of contract or 
trust either – could be characterised as a non-contractual obligation, and hence be made 
subject to the Rome II Regulation.255  
Second, the conflict rule could distinguish according to the type of injured party: the lex 
societatis governs any mechanism that gives rise to liability if the loss is caused to the 
company (and only so-called reflective loss to the shareholders), and the lex loci delict 
governs damages claims of third parties that suffer a direct (i.e. not only reflective256) 
loss. In this context, it would be necessary to define who is a third party for purposes of 
the conflict rule. Third parties may conceptually include both company insiders, in 
particular shareholders, since they may suffer a loss either in their capacity as 
shareholders because of a reduction in the value of their shareholding or in an individual 
capacity, 257  and company outsiders such as creditors or customers. Finally, the 
distinction may be based on the type of harmful act. If the act involves the exercise of 
corporate power, the lex societatis is engaged; otherwise, conflict rules from contract 
law, tort law, or other legal areas apply. 
In defining the boundary between the lex societatis and the lex loci delicti, any approach 
needs to be informed by, and needs to be compatible to, the interpretation of the 
relevant provisions in the Rome II Regulation and the Recast Brussels Regulation. The 
former provides that ‘[n]on-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies … 
regarding matters such as … the personal liability of officers and members as such for 
the obligations of the company or body’ shall be excluded from Rome II.258 The latter 
establishes special jurisdiction in matters relating to tort of ‘the courts for the place 
where the harmful event occurred or may occur’259 and ‘as regards a dispute arising out 
of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts for the place 
where the branch, agency or other establishment is situated’.260 
The first approach has the advantage that it is in line with the current interpretation of 
national law in the majority of Member States 261  and some proposals on the 
harmonisation of private international company law. 262  It is also the approach that 
seems to correspond most closely to those taken in the Rome I and Rome II Regulations. 
Insofar as this approach does not classify breaches of company law duties as tort law, it 
would probably also be in line with the opinion of the Court of Justice, which decided in 
Case C-47/14 Holterman Ferho Exploitatie BV v Spies von Büllesheim that liability claims 
based on a breach of directors’ duties does not fall within the special tort jurisdiction of 
the Brussels Regulation. The Court of Justice held that where ‘a company sues its former 
manager on the basis of allegedly wrongful conduct, Article 5(3) of Regulation No 
44/2001 [dealing with jurisdiction for tort claims263] must be interpreted as meaning that 
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that action is a matter relating to tort or delict where the conduct complained of may not 
be considered to be a breach of the manager’s obligations under company law’. 264 
Instead, such claims, brought by the company and based on a breach of company law 
duties are considered by the Court of Justice to fall under what is now Art 7(1) of the 
Recast Brussels Regulation.  
Furthermore, a correspondingly broad interpretation of the lex societatis would not 
impose undue disadvantages on injured parties seeking to enforce a claim. First, the 
majority of cases are likely to involve claims based on a breach of director’s duties, 
which are usually owed to the company, rather than to outsiders. In other cases, the 
special jurisdiction of the court for the place where the harmful event occurred265 would 
not be available (as such claims would not be classified as tort law). However, where the 
injured party is not located in the home jurisdiction of the company the behaviour giving 
rise to the liability action will presumably often be connected with the operations of an 
establishment of the company in the host state. The injured party would therefore be 
entitled to sue in the courts of the host state pursuant to Article 7(5) Recast Brussels 
Regulation. 
On the other hand, the first approach has the disadvantage that it may lead to the 
cumulative application of two liability regimes if the director’s conduct constitutes both a 
breach of company law and of general tort law and the place where the damage occurs 
pursuant to Article 4(1) Rome II Regulation is not in the country where the company is 
registered or incorporated (provided the lex societatis is determined according to a 
variant of the incorporation theory). In addition, the classification may depend, at least 
to some extent, on the formulation of the Member States’ internal company law and 
directors’ duties. However, it is unlikely that this second problem will create major 
inconsistencies in the classification of the relevant social conflicts between Member 
States. In most cases, it should be possible to arrive at an autonomous understanding of 
‘company law’ for purposes of private international law by defining what belongs to 
company law independently from the classifications of internal law and in 
contradistinction to neighbouring areas of private international law, especially insolvency 
law and securities regulation. In this way, for example, liability for misstatements made 
in disclosures required under capital markets or takeover law or liability for entering into 
obligations that the director knows the company will not be able to perform would be 
excluded from the scope of the lex societatis, even if the corresponding obligations were 
set out in the internal company law. Likewise, where a Member State relies on provisions 
of general tort law for the regulation of directors’ duties, the application of these rules 
would effectively be restricted to domestic companies. 
In addition, any potential inconsistency in regulatory outcomes as a function of the 
formulation of legal mechanisms of internal law could be further mitigated by an 
appropriate application of the conflict rules of tort law pursuant to the Rome II 
Regulation. The classification as lex societatis or lex loci delicti becomes irrelevant if the 
applicable law in the case of the classification as a tort is determined pursuant to Article 
4(3) Rome II Regulation instead of Article 4(1) (manifestly closer connection). While 
Article 4(3) is described as an ‘escape clause’,266 it is arguably possible to develop a 
certain presumption (similar to the second sentence of Article 4(3) Rome II) that results 
in the disapplication of the general rules of Article 4(1)-(2) in favour of the lex societatis, 
if the defendant is a director or manager of the company and the act complained of is 
‘connected’ with the management of the company (or a similar formulation). While 
invoking Article 4(3) Rome II Regulation would add an element of legal uncertainty since 
the question of a ‘connection with the management of the company’ is open-ended and 
in need of specification by the courts, the appeal to a manifestly closer connection is not 
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entirely novel in the present context and can build on existing case law in some Member 
States.267 
The second possible solution, a distinction according to the type of injured party (and 
presumably also according to the type of loss suffered268), would have the advantage 
that it presents (at least at first sight 269 ) a relatively clear criterion that allows a 
functional demarcation between the lex societatis and the lex loci delicti not dependant 
on the internal delineation of company law and tort law. It also seems to be the 
preferred solution of the European Group for Private International Law, which proposes 
that ‘the liability in tort of the members and directors of a company vis à vis third parties’ 
shall be excluded from the scope of a proposed Regulation X on the Law Applicable to 
Companies. 270  The recitals to the proposed GEDIP Regulation would clarify that the 
exclusion applied to liability ‘in particular resulting from misrepresentation or 
undercapitalization’, which would instead be governed by the Rome II Regulation.271 
Thus, a bright line rule is envisaged that includes liability to the company and the 
shareholders272 and excludes liability to third parties. Notably, this solution does not 
distinguish between direct and indirect (reflective) loss but proposes to qualify 
shareholders always as parties governed by the lex societatis and never as third 
parties.273 
However, arguably, there are good reasons not to choose a bright line rule as in the 
GEDIP proposal. First of all, it is clear that some consideration of the type of behaviour 
that gives rise to liability is unavoidable. A director who commits a tortious act in an 
entirely private capacity, i.e. who neither exercises corporate powers nor acts in any way 
within the sphere of corporate activity, will evidently not be liable pursuant to company 
law but pursuant to tort law, even if the injured party happens to be a shareholder of the 
director’s company. More ambiguously, but still relatively well established in the Member 
States, a director who misrepresents facts in disclosures to investors who purchase or 
sell the company’s shares as a consequence of the misrepresentation is also liable to the 
investors under tort law. 274  If a certain substantive assessment of the defendant’s 
behaviour is therefore inherent in the test, it is not clear why shareholders who complain 
of the violation of an individual right and suffer a loss that is not only a reflection of the 
loss incurred by the company should be treated differently from other parties injured by 
the tortious acts of directors. Shareholders and third parties are, in the above examples, 
in the same position, and presumably the policy decisions underlying the provisions of 
internal law that apply in these cases will take account of the difference in position 
between such claimants (both shareholders and non-shareholders) on the one hand and 
shareholders suffering a reflective loss on the other. If this is correct, it is accordingly 
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more convincing (provided this second solution is adopted) to delineate the lex societatis 
and the lex loci delicti not simply pursuant to the type of injured party, but by asking 
whether the claimant has suffered a loss (1) as a result of the violation of an individual 
right and (2) the loss is not only a reflection of the loss suffered by the company. 
Once this substantive assessment is injected in the test, the ostensible advantages in 
terms of legal certainty compared to the first approach are no longer apparent. In 
particular, the scope of the lex societatis would be defined pursuant to the open-ended 
terms ‘acting within the sphere of corporate activity’ (or a comparable formulation) and 
‘individual right’ (and correspondingly, ‘third party’). It should be noted that these terms 
will not depend on their understanding by national courts and policy makers. As part of 
the conflict rule of a future Rome V Regulation, they would become concepts of EU law 
and would consequently need to be interpreted autonomously. Thus, there would be no 
risk of shifting boundaries between the lex societatis and the lex loci delicti, irrespective 
of differences in understanding in the Member States’ internal laws, for example, of the 
definition of an individual right of the shareholders as opposed to a right they hold qua 
shareholder. However, it may take some time before a commonly accepted definition 
emerges, and until then legal certainty will not be guaranteed. 
More importantly, a broad formulation of directors’ duties would allow Member States to 
bring a provision designed to regulate the behaviour of company directors relatively 
easily within the reach of the host state law (where injured parties are located275), and 
the host state could accordingly impose part of its liability regime on the directors of 
foreign companies operating within its territory. For example, a formulation of directors’ 
duties as in the French Commercial Code, which provides that directors shall be liable ‘to 
the company or third parties either for infringements of the laws or regulations 
applicable to public limited companies, or for breaches of the memorandum and articles 
of association, or for management mistakes’ 276  would presumably need to be 
characterised as tort law according to the second approach, provided that the claimant is 
a third party. To what extent this classification would lead to overreaching host state law 
would depend crucially on the conditions that give rise to liability under national law. 
Pursuant to the current situation in France, liability to third parties (understood as not 
including the shareholders) requires a so-called faute séparable des fonctions (a fault 
separable from the functions of the defendant director). Faute séparable was described 
by the Cour de Cassation as ‘an intentional fault of a particular gravity that is 
incompatible with the normal exercise of the director’s corporate functions.’277 This can 
arguably be equated with a tortious act and may, therefore, justify the tort-law 
classification for purposes of private international law. However, it should be noted that 
the concept is case-law based and its contours are evolving. In more recent case law, 
the courts seem to be willing to acknowledge that an action may constitute a faute 
séparable even where the directors exercise their corporate powers, for example to 
approve financial accounts that are materially misleading.278 Thus, it is clear that this 
approach to classification leads to a potentially broad scope of application of the host 
state’s law, including in matters that fall within the core area of managerial activity, such 
as the approval of the company’s accounts.279 If a third party sues, this approach would 
lead to the risk that two or more liability regimes apply cumulatively, namely the 
incorporation state’s company law and the tort laws of all countries where the damage 
occurs.  
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This problem could again be mitigated by an appropriate interpretation of Article 4(3) 
Rome II Regulation,280 but the element of legal uncertainty that is added by relying on 
Article 4(3) is arguably more relevant here than in the context of the first approach, 
where the scope of the lex societatis is broader and the risk of heightened liability 
because of the cumulation of the lex societatis and the lex loci delicti is consequently 
comparatively low.281 
Finally, the third approach mentioned above, a distinction according to the type of 
harmful act, with an application of the lex societatis if the act consisted in the exercise of 
corporate power, will in many cases lead to similar results as the first approach. It has 
the disadvantage that the exercise of corporate power may depend on the scope of that 
power as defined in the Member States’ internal company laws. The boundaries between 
the lex societatis and the lex loci delicti may consequently shift from one Member State 
to another. In addition, as opposed to the first approach, it suffers from an inherently 
unclear criterion that will be difficult to define at the European level. Notably, if the 
criterion was interpreted as implying that the directors must have acted within the scope 
of actual powers conferred on them, it would certainly fall short of capturing all 
situations relevant for company law, for example the breach of the duty to act within 
powers.282 Legal uncertainty could also exist where a Member State attaches liability 
under tort law to inaction by the director. On the other hand, the term ‘exercise of 
corporate power’ is presumably narrower than the criteria that apply pursuant to the first 
approach (breach of directors’ duties, the articles or company law) and would therefore 
combine an ill-defined connecting factor with the risk of a cumulation of the lex societatis 
and the lex loci delicti. 
We therefore propose to add a provision—for example as part of the enumeration of 
matters falling within the scope of the lex societatis—stipulating that the lex societatis 
shall govern the liability of directors for breaches of the company’s constitution (the 
articles of association), directors’ duties and company law.283 It may also be useful to 
give examples in the recitals of situations where liability does not fall within the 
autonomous concept of ‘company law’ that is used to determine the applicable law in 
order to guide the development and interpretation of this autonomous term. Some such 
cases will be discussed below in 6.3.1.3. 
6.3.1.2 Liability of shareholders for obligations of the company 
As discussed, the liability of the shareholders for the obligations of the company 
(piercing the corporate veil) is commonly classified as part of the lex societatis.284 This is 
the case in the majority of Member States that explicitly address the problem (notably 
Croatia, Greece, and the UK), and both the GEDIP proposal and the Sonnenberger 
proposal envisage that the law applicable to companies governs the liability of members 
for obligations of the company. 285  However, conceptually it is not evident why a 
classification as company law is the most appropriate solution, and it is indeed possible 
to find differing views in some Member States and in the academic literature suggesting 
a classification as tort law or insolvency law.286 
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A characterisation based on a functional assessment of the relevant legal mechanisms, 
as favoured here in different contexts, would suggest that it is necessary to distinguish 
according to the precise operation and aim of the mechanisms. It can easily be seen that 
what is sometimes grouped under the term ‘veil piercing’ serves different functions, and 
a functional characterisation in private international law must take account of these 
differences. For example, veil piercing according to English law generally applies only in 
the limited circumstances where ‘a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability 
or subject to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose 
enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his control.’287 
This formulation shows that the principle neither derogates from ordinary company law, 
within the meaning of Nickel & Goeldner,288 nor is meant to address the specific problem 
of risk shifting in the vicinity of insolvency. Rather, its ambit is wider: to provide a legal 
response to abuses of the principles of limited liability and separate legal personality 
generally.289 Thus, the criteria here identified as being determinative of a classification as 
insolvency law, derogation from the common rules of civil and commercial law and 
responding to the problem of risk shifting from shareholders to creditors, are not 
present—at least not both of them together—if the veil piercing doctrine is formulated as 
in English law. 
In comparison, causing the company’s insolvency under German law 
(Existenzvernichtung),290 which is also commonly described as a case of veil piercing 
(Durchgriffshaftung),291 applies to the specific case of the shareholders entering into a 
transaction (or otherwise transferring assets out of the reach of the creditors) in order to 
benefit certain parties to the detriment of the creditors as a whole and in the knowledge 
that the action may lead to the company’s insolvency. 292  As a consequence, the 
shareholders are liable to the company for the loss caused by their action. Given that the 
company is the claimant, the liability claim will generally be enforced by the liquidator 
after insolvency proceedings have been opened. Thus, the situation is similar to that of 
any other legal mechanism imposing liability on directors for acting in a manner causing 
a loss to the company’s creditors at a time when the directors knew or should have 
known that their action would cause or aggravate the company’s insolvency. The 
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German doctrine should accordingly be classified similarly for purposes of private 
international law, namely as insolvency law. 
Thus, we suggest that the characterisation of legal mechanisms imposing liability on the 
shareholders or managers, either for pre-existing claims of a third party to the company 
or because a loss suffered by a third party gives rise to a claim for damages by the 
company, should follow the general criteria developed for the demarcation of the lex 
societatis, lex concursus and lex loci delict set out above. It may be useful to make these 
considerations explicit in the recitals, but it does not seem to be necessary or useful to 
include a separate provision on veil piercing in the regulation.293 
6.3.1.3 Other cases 
Two additional cases at the intersection of the lex societatis, lex concursus and lex loci 
delict should be mentioned, since they received attention in several Member States and 
were also discussed and regulated explicitly by GEDIP: liability for misrepresentation and 
undercapitalisation. 294  Liability of the directors for misrepresentations, for example 
incorrect statements in ad hoc disclosures required pursuant to the Market Abuse 
Regulation295 or public offering prospectuses, is generally classified as tort law in the 
Member States, although some uncertainty persists,296 not least because in some cases 
liability rules are contained in national company law statutes. The Court of Justice has 
also held in Harald Kolassa v Barclays Bank 297 that for purposes of interpreting the 
Brussels Regulation and determining international jurisdiction, prospectus liability claims 
as well as damages claims for ‘breaches of other legal information obligations towards 
investors’ 298  concern ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’. 299  While the 
connecting factor for jurisdiction (‘place where the harmful event occurred’ 300 ) is 
different from the connecting factor to determine the applicable law pursuant to the 
Rome II Regulation (‘the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country 
in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred’, i.e. leading to an application of 
the lex loci damni301), the underlying policy objectives of both provisions are similar, 
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namely (in the present context) to strengthen the protection of investors in all markets 
that have been targeted by the issuer of the incorrect statement.302  
It is therefore convincing to argue that liability for incorrect disclosures to public markets 
should be governed by the lex loci delicti, rather than the lex societatis. However, it is 
again important to emphasise that rules referring in a general manner to the lex loci 
delicti for any liability questions arising from misrepresentations by directors303 are likely 
not to capture the differences in function of different types of disclosure obligation. For 
example, if company law provides for an obligation of directors to disclose relevant 
information to the company’s shareholders in appropriate circumstances, such as the 
exercise of their voting rights under company law or the sale of their shares to the 
directors,304 it would be in our view appropriate to classify the consequences of a breach 
of this obligation as a matter for the lex societatis. 
The second problematic case is the liability of directors and other corporate insiders for 
operating an undercapitalised company that eventually fails, with the consequence that 
the creditors cannot realise their claims. In some Member States, creditors can bring an 
action in tort to claim damages, under certain conditions, from the corporate insiders in 
such a situation. 305  As in the case of misrepresentations, it has accordingly been 
suggested that this question should be governed by the lex loci delicti,306 while others 
argue that the consequences of forming and operating a company without sufficient 
capitalisation are a part of the general rules on capital structure and hence of the lex 
societatis. 307  The Court of Justice has not addressed the question directly, but the 
Court’s case law on the demarcation between the scope of the Insolvency Regulation and 
the Brussels Regulation, which excludes ‘bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the 
winding-up of insolvent companies … and analogous proceedings’ from its scope of 
application,308 is relevant in this context. The interpretation of the respective provision of 
the Brussels Regulation is the mirror image of that of ‘closely connected actions’ within 
the meaning of the Insolvency Regulation. The Brussels Regulation, accordingly, does 
not apply if the action is closely connected with insolvency proceedings, and it applies if 
it is not.309  
In ÖFAB v Frank Koot,310 the Court discussed the demarcation in light of a provision of 
Swedish company law that is related to the type of action of interest in the present 
context. The Swedish law imposed liability on directors for the debts of the company if 
they failed to monitor the financial situation of the company and allowed the company ‘to 
carry on business even though it was undercapitalised and was forced to go into 
liquidation.’311 The Court regarded the liability action as not being closely connected with 
insolvency proceedings, because it did ‘not concern the exclusive prerogative of the 
liquidator to be exercised in the interests of the general body of creditors’, but could be 
brought, and was in fact brought, by individual creditors.312 Consequently, the action fell 
within the scope of the Brussels Regulation and was classified by the Court as a matter 
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relating to tort.313 This did not create undue disadvantages for the defendant, since the 
relevant connecting factor, the place where the harmful event occurs, referred in this 
case to one location, the place where the board of directors monitored (or should have 
monitored) the financial situation and business of the company. 314  However, it is 
problematic to transpose the same reasoning to the context of the applicable law. As 
discussed, a functional approach to classification casts doubt on relying on the 
involvement of the liquidator to determine whether the lex concursus is engaged.315 A 
classification of liability for allowing the company to trade while being undercapitalised as 
tort law would have particularly severe consequences. Since the applicable law pursuant 
to the Rome II Regulation is the lex loci damni and not the lex loci delicti commissi 
(unless the escape clause of Article 4(3) Rome II can be invoked), the directors would 
potentially face liability pursuant to a multitude of ill-aligned legal systems. Arguably, 
where the directors continue to trade in violation of legal obligations and creditors enter 
into contracts with the company, the damage occurs in all countries from which goods 
are delivered or funds are transferred to the company.316 This seems to run counter the 
goal of the Rome II Regulation to ‘ensure a reasonable balance between the interests of 
the person claimed to be liable and the person who has sustained damage.’317 
Therefore, we suggest that liability provisions similar to the one discussed in Beklamel318 
and ÖFAB v Frank Koot should be characterised as insolvency law for purposes of private 
international law. This is in line with the criteria determining the lex societatis that we 
outlined above,319 since the violation of legal obligations relates in both cases to trading 
at a time when the company lacks sufficient funds to meet its obligations. On the other 
hand, should a legal system impose liability more generally for setting up or operating a 
company that is not adequately capitalised, a doctrine that is discussed in some 
jurisdictions320 but, to our knowledge, not embraced by the courts in any Member State, 
it is submitted that a characterisation as company law would be appropriate. However, it 
is difficult to see that the requisite causal connection between the formation or operation 
of an undercapitalised company and the loss suffered by creditors would be present 
unless the transaction between the claimant and the company was concluded at a time 
when it was clear that the company would not be able to avoid becoming insolvent. This 
is precisely the risk that mechanisms applying in the vicinity of insolvency seek to 
address, which would bring the liability provision within the ambit of the lex concursus 
according to the solution suggested here. Finally, it should be mentioned that, as before, 
it is not necessary to include a separate conflict rule dealing with these cases in a Rome 
V Regulation, since the characterisation follows the general rules set out above, but it 
may be useful to include guidance on the demarcation between the lex societatis, lex loci 
delicti, and lex concursus in these situations in the recitals. 
6.3.2 Quasi-contract 
Some Member States, for example Germany and Austria, have used the doctrine of 
creating a false legal appearance in order to hold directors of a foreign limited company 
liable where they act on behalf of the company without making sufficiently clear that a 
legal person with limited liability should be contracting party (i.e. they do not use the 
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addition ‘ltd.’ or a similar designation).321 Such a doctrine can be characterised as a 
quasi-contract. It has been held that the connecting factor in such a case is the place 
where the false legal appearance was created and had an effect on third parties.322 The 
doctrine serves to protect the expectations of third parties dealing in good faith with the 
company.  
This is somewhat comparable to the GEDIP proposal, which requires companies to 
disclose to third parties the law under which the company was formed. Failing such a 
disclosure, creditors of the company ‘may claim the liability of the persons acting on 
behalf of those companies, its members and directors under the law of the Member State 
where that person is acting, unless such creditor was aware of that information or [was] 
not aware of it as a result of his negligence.’ 323  The proposal of the Sonnenberger 
commission is broader in its application, stipulating that ‘[i]f a company purports to 
operate under a law other than that determined pursuant to [the general conflict of laws 
rule], a third party acting in good faith may invoke such law.’324 
While such good faith provisions are relatively rare in the Member States, the 
comparative analysis gives various examples of Member States seeking to apply their 
own law to foreign companies in particular circumstances or generally in order to protect 
third parties acting in good faith or relying—irrespective of their knowledge of the 
company’s situation—on the law of the host state where the company’s real seat is 
located.325 These examples indicate that there seems to be a policy need for some form 
of host state intervention, which a Rome V Regulation will need to take account of.326 A 
sensible, targeted approach would protect third parties that rely on the impression, 
which must be imputable to the company, that the company has been incorporated 
under another legal system or that it operates as a different (incorporated or 
unincorporated) form of business association. In order to ensure an application of the lex 
societatis that is as consistent and complete as possible, it is suggested that a solution 
based on an action for damages is preferable to one that substitutes the law of the host 
state for the lex societatis if a third party relies on the application of the host state law in 
good faith.327 The latter solution would also lead to difficult questions of determining the 
area of the lex societatis that was affected by the legitimate expectations of the third 
party and that, accordingly, should be supplanted. 
Conceptually the liability of persons creating a false legal appearance is comparable to 
that of an agent acting without authority.328 The relationship between the agent and 
third parties is excluded from the scope of the Rome I Regulation.329 Some guidance can 
be found in the Hague Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to Agency, 
which provides that ‘the effects of the agent’s exercise or purported exercise of his 
authority shall be governed by the internal law of the State in which the agent had his 
business establishment at the time of his relevant acts’ or, alternatively, by the law of 
the state where the agent acted if this is also the state where the principal’s or the third 
party’s business establishment or habitual residence is located.330 That same law ‘shall 
also govern the relationship between the agent and the third party arising from the fact 
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that the agent has acted in the exercise of his authority, has exceeded his authority, or 
has acted without authority.’331  
The European Commission proposal for the Rome I Regulation of 2005 drew on the 
approach laid down in the Hague Convention and stipulated that ‘the relationship 
between the agent and the third party arising from the fact that the agent has acted in 
the exercise of his powers, in excess of his powers or without power’ shall be governed 
by the law of the country where the agent has his habitual residence, unless ‘either the 
principal on whose behalf [the agent] acted or the third party has his habitual residence’ 
in the same country where the agent acted.332 Applying the rationale underlying these 
provisions to the present context, and considering that the Rome I and II Regulations 
equate the location of the branch, agency or other establishment of a company with the 
habitual residence of the company if the contract in question is concluded, or the 
damage arises, in the course of operation of the branch, agency or other 
establishment,333 a provision seeking to protect third parties acting in good faith could be 
phrased as follows:  
The liability of persons who create the legal appearance that the company is governed 
by a law different from the law of incorporation or that the company operates as a 
different type of business association shall be governed by the law of the place where 
that appearance was created, unless the third party was aware, or should have been 
aware of the true facts. However, in derogation from the first sentence, the applicable 
law shall be the law of the place where a branch, agency or any other establishment of 
the company is located if the legal appearance is created in the course of operation of 
that branch, agency or any other establishment. 
7. Mechanisms to protect public interests (ordre public and overriding 
mandatory provisions) 
7.1 Overview 
Virtually all Member States provide that parts (or, in the case of a few Member States, 
all334) of their internal company law apply to companies that are incorporated under the 
law of another jurisdiction, as long as they have some connection (however defined) with 
the territory of that Member State (which we will call, henceforth, the ‘host state’). The 
fact that the acceptance of a foreign lex societatis, even within the confines of what is 
commonly classified as company law for purposes of private international law,335 is not 
without exception in any Member State, including in states that have traditionally 
embraced a relatively pure version of the incorporation theory,336 indicates that there is 
a strong policy desire on the part of the Member States to retain at least some control 
over foreign companies operating within their territory. Any harmonising measure, 
therefore, needs to acknowledge this broad consensus and make some allowance for the 
preservation of a certain degree of regulatory authority on the part of the host state. At 
the same time, due regard has to be paid to the Treaty freedoms, especially the 
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Freedom of Establishment, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, which of course place 
limits on the host state’s ability to insist on the application of its own laws. 
However, potential harmonisation is complicated by the fact that the Member States 
differ significantly in the design of the laws that they hold to be immediately applicable, 
the extent of the required connection with their territory, and the rationale they use in 
order to justify the application of the host state’s law, notwithstanding a foreign lex 
societatis.337 
This variation in national approaches lends itself to a number of general observations, 
before we present the policy options available for a future Rome V Regulation. First, 
simplifying somewhat, it can be said that the scope of the host state law that is declared 
immediately applicable338 is inversely proportional to the intensity of connection with the 
host state’s territory that is a precondition for overriding the foreign lex societatis.339 For 
example, pursuant to some Member States’ laws, a highly targeted override of the lex 
societatis, for instance by an extension of the host state’s directors’ disqualification 
regime to foreign-incorporated companies, is triggered relatively quickly, namely 
whenever assets of any kind are located in the host state’s territory.340 Conversely, the 
application of broad areas of host state law typically requires a more durable and 
substantial connection, and the host state may only invoke its laws in case the 
undertaking is a pseudo-foreign company with its real seat and virtually all of its 
business activity in the host state. Thus, notwithstanding the question whether it is 
permissible for the host state under EU law to apply wide swathes of its company law to 
foreign companies, there is a nexus between the type of immediately applicable law and 
the required connecting factor, which may inform the interpretation of any ‘overriding 
mandatory provisions’ reservation in a future Rome V Regulation. 
Second, the application of a set of host state rules because they fall outside the scope of 
the lex societatis (defined autonomously once the conflict rules are harmonised) and are 
governed by a different connecting factor is not a question of overriding mandatory 
provisions, but of determining the demarcation between the lex societatis and other legal 
areas. This point is particularly relevant in respect of provisions imposing liability on 
directors of foreign companies. We have argued that such provisions should be either 
understood as falling within the scope of the lex societatis, in which case the host state 
is not able to apply them to directors of a foreign company, or of the lex concursus or lex 
loci delicti, in which case the applicability of the host state’s law depends on the relevant 
connecting factor.341 Given that the respective connecting factors (COMI and lex damni) 
are designed to take account of a variety of interests going beyond the constituencies 
protected by the incorporation doctrine, it seems counterproductive to allow the host 
state to exercise regulatory authority and impose liability on directors of foreign 
companies notwithstanding any of these applicable laws and thus override the policy 
decisions on which the connecting factors are based. 
Finally, the deviation from the main connecting factor (as discussed, currently some 
variant of the incorporation theory in most Member States) in favour of the real seat is, 
without harmonisation, difficult to justify in light of the Court’s right of establishment 
jurisprudence. If harmonisation was based on a uniform connecting factor corresponding 
to the incorporation theory, as has been proposed here,342 it would constitute a violation 
of the harmonising legislative measure to deviate from this connecting factor unilaterally 
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in particular situations. A different result would only be justified if the provisions of the 
host state’s internal law that displace the lex societatis could be qualified as overriding 
mandatory provisions and a future Rome V Regulation reserved the power of the host 
state to apply such provisions. ‘Overriding mandatory provisions’, if used in a future 
Rome V Regulation, would be a concept of EU law to be interpreted autonomously.343 
The Court of Justice has defined the term ‘as applying to national provisions compliance 
with which has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the political, social or 
economic order in the Member State concerned as to require compliance therewith by all 
persons present on the national territory of that Member State and all legal relationships 
within that State.’ 344  The Rome Regulations that use the concept of ‘overriding 
mandatory provisions’ also make it clear that public interest considerations can justify 
the disapplication of the applicable law only in exceptional circumstances and that the 
concept is not synonymous with mandatory national law, but must be construed more 
narrowly.345 Thus, the immediate applicability of the host state’s provisions must be 
assessed in light of the ‘nature and purpose’346 of each individual provision. Moreover, 
the existence of an ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ clause in a possible future Rome V 
Regulation would not affect the obligation of Member States to comply with their Treaty 
obligations. As the Court of Justice has held in relation to an equivalent provision in the 
Rome Convention, the overriding mandatory provisions are subject to full scrutiny under 
the Treaty freedoms.347 Given the Court’s jurisprudence, it must therefore be concluded 
that a blanket application of large sections of any host state’s company law is unlikely to 
be compatible with EU law, even if a future Rome V Regulation included a wide 
‘overriding mandatory provisions’ reservation.348 
7.2 Policy options 
As the discussion in the previous section shows, a future Rome V Regulation could take 
account of the legitimate interests of host states to retain some control over companies 
operating within their territory by either making use of a general ordre public clause or 
reserving the authority of the host state to apply its own overriding mandatory 
provisions, or both.  
It is common for measures harmonising conflict of laws rules, for example the Rome 
Regulations,349 and national systems of private international law to contain an ordre 
public clause.350 The GEDIP and Sonnenberger proposals also both provide for a general 
public policy exception.351 Typically, such exceptions stipulate that the application of any 
provision of the law that is applicable pursuant to the relevant conflict of laws rules may 
be refused by the forum ‘if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public 
policy (ordre public) of the forum.’352 However, the ordre public is of limited relevance in 
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12-17. 
349 See, for example, Rome I Regulation, Art. 21; Rome II Regulation, Art. 26; Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 
(Rome III Regulation), Art. 12; Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 (Rome IV Regulation), Art. 35. 
350 Comparative Analysis, Chapter IV, Section 5.2. 
351 GEDIP proposal, Art. 11; Sonnenberger proposal, Art. 10. See also Art 4 of the 1968 Convention on the 
mutual recognition of companies and bodies corporate, EC Bulletin Suppl. 2-1969, 7. 
352 This formulation is from the Rome Regulations, supra note 349, which has been adopted verbatim by the 
GEDIP proposal. The Sonnenberger proposal uses a very similar formulation, providing that the application of a 
provision of the lex societatis ‘may be denied if such application is manifestly incompatible with the fundamen-
tal principles of the law of the [forum]’. 




company law and has been invoked rarely in the Member States. 353  It sets a high 
threshold in the form of a conflict with fundamental principles of domestic law, which are 
commonly understood to refer to human rights or ‘some prevalent conception of good 
morals’.354 It is clear that this threshold will often not be reached, even where the host 
state has a legitimate interest in regulating certain aspects of a foreign company’s 
operations within its territory. For example, if a person is subject to a disqualification 
order, the Member State that has issued the order has a legitimate interest in ensuring 
that the underlying rationale of the order, such as the desire to protect the public against 
directors who are ‘unfit to be concerned in the management of a company’,355 is not 
circumvented by the incorporation of a company by the disqualified director in a 
jurisdiction where the order may have no effect.356 An ordre public clause would be of 
limited use in this example. 
Therefore, it is necessary to provide, in addition to the general ordre public clause, for a 
reservation of the host state’s overriding mandatory provisions. Such a reservation has 
also been proposed by GEDIP and Sonnenberger357 and could be modelled after the 
corresponding clause contained in the Rome I Regulation, which provides that ‘[n]othing 
in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of 
the law of the forum’, and which defines overriding mandatory provisions as ‘provisions 
the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public 
interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that 
they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law 
otherwise applicable’ pursuant to the regulation.358 The GEDIP proposal further stipulates 
that, in addition to the mandatory provisions of the forum, ‘[e]ffect may be given to the 
overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country in which the company has its 
central administration [or has an establishment] [is carrying on activities].’ 359  The 
alternative formulation was included in order to take account of the possibility that some 
Member States seek to apply overriding mandatory provisions that rely on a different 
connecting factor than the real seat (or central administration).360 
Two considerations should inform the transposition of these formulations to a future 
Rome V Regulation. First, as discussed above,361 given that the Member States use 
connecting factors of differing intensity to address legitimate domestic policy objectives, 
the application of the clause should not be restricted to situations in which the 
company’s real seat is located within the territory of the Member State invoking the 
overriding mandatory provisions clause. Rather, we propose that a more open-ended 
formulation should be used, not defining any rigid prerequisites for the application of 
overriding mandatory provisions, since any national rules invoked by the clause would 
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still need to fully comply with the Member State’s Treaty obligations.362 Such an open-
ended formulation would also allow a flexible application that takes the nexus between 
the intensity of the connection and the breadth of the intervention by the host state into 
consideration.363 
Second, in order to increase legal certainty, it would be useful to give examples of 
overriding mandatory provisions, either in the provision itself in the form of a non-
exhaustive enumeration or in the recitals of a future Rome V Regulation. 364  These 
examples should include provisions regulating the use of corporate names to avoid the 
creation of a misleading impression and rules on the eligibility and disqualification of 
directors.365 
8. Change of Law (Reincorporations) 
8.1 Policy issues behind cross-border reincorporations 
Although rules on the process of changing the applicable company law without 
liquidation (hereinafter: ‘reincorporations’) may not fall within the scope of the proposed 
‘Rome V’ regulation on companies’ private international law, 366  this issue is closely 
related to general private international law questions and cannot be ignored in this study.  
Companies incorporated in a Member State may seek to convert into a company type 
governed by another jurisdiction without liquidation in the original country. At the firm 
level, such a transaction may aim at attaining efficiency gains due to the application of a 
‘better’ or more suitable company law. In all Member States, reincorporations are 
accompanied by a relocation of the company’s ‘registered office’ to another Member 
State. Such a change of the applicable law brings with it a number of changes for 
shareholders, directors, and others. For instance, majority requirements, the balance of 
powers between shareholders and the board, the structure of the board, as well as rules 
limiting departures from the one-share-one-vote default may all change as a result of 
the operation. Apart from the change of the applicable company law, reincorporations 
may also have a number of additional effects. First, such transfers also lead to a change 
of the competent insolvency venue and the applicable insolvency regime, unless 
creditors provide evidence that the company’s centre of main interests (‘COMI’) is still in 
the country of origin (or otherwise has not changed).367 Furthermore, a relocation of the 
registered office may shift the competent jurisdiction in civil cases to the country of 
arrival.368  
National company law rules go beyond just regulating the relationship between 
shareholders and directors. Company law rules, indeed, also protect creditors and other 
stakeholders, for instance by way of legal capital rules and minimum capital 
requirements, directors’ duties in the vicinity of insolvency, limitations to dividend 
distributions or participation rights of employees in the company’s decision-making 
bodies (‘codetermination’). Therefore, a decision to reincorporate from one jurisdiction to 
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another may also negatively affect creditors or other stakeholders. As discussed 
above,369 this is true, first, where the company law regime of the new jurisdiction is 
generally ‘less protective’ than the original lex societatis. From that perspective, the 
impact of reincorporations on creditors and other stakeholders, in particular, will depend 
on the general designs of the two company laws in question. If, for instance, a 
jurisdiction relies exclusively or mostly on company law rules to protect creditors and 
other stakeholders, rather than addressing these issues through insolvency or tort law, a 
reincorporation to another jurisdiction using different strategies to address the same 
underlying problems could be detrimental.370 A detrimental effect does not, however, 
depend on differences in the absolute level of protection afforded to different corporate 
constituencies. The mere fact that significant differences exist between company laws 
across the Union may give rise to regulatory arbitrage, as companies seek to become 
subject to the legal regime least burdensome to them, given the specific situation they 
are in. In the absence of legal rules addressing this potential problem, reincorporations 
may pose a significant risk for stakeholders, as companies may act in opportunistic ways 
when deciding to change the law by which they – and their relationships to third parties 
– are governed. 
Additionally, since a reincorporation also entails the presumption that the company’s 
COMI is henceforth located in the new jurisdiction, creditors’ interests may be at risk 
even where their protection is based on insolvency law rules,371 unless they provide 
evidence that the company’s COMI is still in the country of origin. Therefore, although 
companies may attain efficiency gains through the application of more suitable company 
law or insolvency regimes, reincorporations may also harm creditors and other 
stakeholders when the newly applicable rules are less protective than the original 
ones.372  
8.2 Current possibilities to reincorporate in the EU 
Despite the interpretation of the Treaty given by the Court of Justice,373 as a matter of 
practice companies can only reincorporate in another jurisdiction if both the country of 
origin and the country of destination explicitly address this type of transaction in their 
national laws, whether through statute or through judicial interpretation. As we shall see 
below, several Member States do not currently accept the right of domestically 
incorporated companies to reincorporate in another Member State. In addition, even 
where both Member States concerned do allow reincorporations, compliance with the 
substantive laws of both countries374 can give rise to significant practical problems. 
Companies, however, can also effectively change the applicable company law regime, 
without liquidation, by following other strategies, in particular by converting into or 
otherwise forming a European Company (Societas Europaea, hereinafter ‘SE’)375 or by 
implementing a cross-border merger.376  
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a) European Companies  
The SE Regulation only provides a general regulatory framework for SEs, which are 
mostly governed by the regime for public companies of the Member State where their 
registered office is situated.377 In practice, therefore, SEs are national public companies 
incorporated under an EU ‘umbrella’. One advantage of the SE regime is that these 
companies can relocate their registered office from one Member State to another and, in 
this way, change the applicable national law under a clear and predefined procedure.378  
In this regard, it is worth noting that the registered office of an SE must be located in 
the same Member State where its ‘head office’ is situated.379 Therefore, the SE is not a 
vehicle for free (or ‘pure’) choice of law, for an SE must always transfer its head office 
together with its registered office from one jurisdiction to another. Nevertheless, 
changes of applicable company law are made possible for undertakings incorporated 
under the form of an SE, although, in practice, this is not an option accessible to small 
companies and start-ups, as SEs need to have a legal capital of at least €120,000. It is 
also worth emphasising that the company law rules applicable to SEs are generally less 
diverse than those applicable to private limited companies, as a number of key 
harmonisation measures in company law are (only) applicable to public companies, 
including SEs. 
b) Cross-border merger 
The Cross-Border Merger Directive380 introduced a specific procedure for implementing 
mergers between companies incorporated in different Member States. Cross-border 
mergers, therefore, can be vehicles for de facto reincorporations, since companies can 
incorporate a new entity in the desired Member State and then merge into that company. 
This transaction, in addition, is typically tax neutral, as are national mergers in most 
cases.381 However, the procedure for reincorporations using a cross-border merger can 
be relatively time-consuming and costly.382 The procedure involves, at a minimum, the 
following steps: (a) incorporating a ‘shell’ company in the new jurisdiction; (b) drawing-
up draft terms of merger and making them publicly available in accordance with the 
relevant national rules;383 (c) publishing in the national gazette of both countries (where 
required by national law) the essential elements of the transaction;384 (d) drawing-up of 
the business and relevant financial reports by the board and an independent expert;385 
(e) approval of the transaction by the shareholders meetings of both companies no 
sooner than one month after the publication of the draft terms of merger in the public 
register; 386 (e) the documents must then be filed with the judicial or administrative 
authorities in both countries;387 (f) the merger takes effect once entered into the register 
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of the destination country, and the acquired company is struck off the register of the 
jurisdiction of origin.  
8.3 Case law of the Court of Justice 
The general question arises as to whether a right to reincorporate abroad (by way of a 
relocation of the registered office) is part of the EU freedom of establishment. The 
current state of the case law of the Court of Justice (Daily Mail, Cartesio, VALE) 
regarding reincorporations and, in general, relocations of a company’s ‘seat’ across the 
EU388 can be summarised as follows: (a) companies are ‘creatures of the law, and, in the 
present stage of Community law, of national law’389; (b) Member States can apply their 
own connecting factors to domestic companies and can decide that domestically 
incorporated companies have to maintain a certain connection with the domestic 
territory (e.g. one of those mentioned in Article 54 TFEU); (c) Member States must 
provide ‘the same possibility’ of cross-border conversions for EU companies as they 
provide for internal conversions; (d) restrictions on reincorporations must pass the 
Gebhard-test (they should be necessary to protect the general interest and proportionate 
to this aim); and (e) a complete prohibition of reincorporations is neither necessary nor 
proportionate.  
The decisions of the Court of Justice, however, are not free from ambiguities. In Cartesio, 
the Court of Justice stated, albeit in an obiter dictum, that the Member State of 
incorporation cannot prevent a domestic company ‘from converting itself into a company 
governed by the law of [another] Member State, to the extent that it is permitted under 
that law to do so’. In VALE, the Court of Justice maintained that reincorporations cannot 
be prohibited if the destination Member State allows internal conversions, and therefore 
it may seem that companies can reincorporate only if, and to the extent that, domestic 
conversions are allowed (consequently, the principle of non-discrimination is paramount). 
Thus, case law of the Court of Justice indicates that Member States cannot prohibit 
cross-border reincorporations, but it provides only for limited guidance as to whether 
and to what extent restrictions of ‘outbound’ or ‘inbound’ reincorporations are compatible 
with the freedom of establishment (beyond the need to comply with the Gebhard test 
and with the principles of non-discrimination and effectiveness). Importantly, the case 
law does not clarify the operational details of such transactions. European case law, in 
other words, does not provide for a complete regulation of cross border reincorporations.  
8.4 Results of the comparative analysis 
Despite the most recent decisions of the Court of Justice, Member States still follow a 
variety of strategies with regard to cross-border reincorporations. The comparative 
analysis shows that Member States may be divided into five categories:  
(a) jurisdictions that (as a matter of positive law or ‘law in action’) have not 
adopted legislation allowing reincorporations and in which this operation is 
impossible or not allowed (Croatia, Ireland, Lithuania and the United Kingdom, 
whereas Hungary only allows inbound reincorporations and prohibits outbound 
ones; Poland and Romania do not allow outbound reincorporations while the 
situation for inbound reincorporations is more controversial); 
(b) jurisdictions that regulate reincorporations, either through a specific statutory 
procedure (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Malta and Spain) or through some 
minimal rules (Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal);  
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(c) jurisdictions in which, despite the absence of any statutory provisions, legal 
scholars and courts maintain that the decisions Cartesio and VALE are binding 
and that, as a consequence, reincorporations should be feasible (Austria, 
Germany and the Netherlands);  
(d) one jurisdiction (Italy) explicitly allows and regulates the cross-border 
relocation of the statutory seat of domestic companies, without clarifying the 
private international law effects of this decision and the procedure and 
prerequisites for cancelling domestic companies from the commercial register;  
(e) jurisdictions in which, lacking statutory provisions, the legal situation is still 
uncertain, although in some of these countries a general consensus seems to be 
emerging that such transactions should be feasible at least with regard to 
inbound reincorporations (see, with different positions: Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, 
Latvia, Slovenia and Sweden).  
We suggest that this complex situation should be analysed along the dimensions of legal 
certainty, ‘quality’ of legal procedures and protection of local interests: 
Legal certainty. Jurisdictions falling in category (b) do not raise issues of legal certainty: 
Companies incorporated under their law know that they can reincorporate abroad, and 
companies from other Member States know that they can reincorporate as a company of 
one of those countries, and what procedure is to be followed. Jurisdictions in category (a) 
partially pose an issue of legal certainty: since, as a matter of positive law, 
reincorporations are not allowed or not feasible, the conformity of the legal situation with 
the Treaty is problematic and one can expect that the current situation will change in the 
near future. Countries in categories (c), (d) and (e) often also pose questions of legal 
certainty. With regard to Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, companies only know 
that inbound and outbound reincorporations are allowed, but the details of the procedure 
for implementing these operations are still uncertain. As we have seen above (and we 
will also discuss hereunder) this situation is confirmed by the empirical survey. 
Effectively, companies incorporated in countries from categories (c) and (d) do not know 
the procedure they need to follow in order to reincorporate abroad, and companies from 
other jurisdictions do not know the procedural requirements for reincorporations into one 
of these countries.  
‘Quality’ of procedures and protection of local interests. Procedures for reincorporating 
abroad should clarify which company body has the power to decide on this transaction 
and when and under which circumstances the company should be struck off the original 
register. Most countries from category (b) provide for complete and coherent rules and 
procedures that govern these issues; several other countries, by contrast, do not clarify 
how reincorporations are to be implemented, with the consequence that commercial 
registers (and courts) must fill these legislative gaps and decide on a case-by-case basis 
how the requirements are to be fulfilled. Furthermore, as mentioned above, outbound 
reincorporations may create risks for pre-existing creditors and other stakeholders. 
Therefore, mechanisms should be in place to protect pre-existing creditors, employees 
and minority shareholders.  
8.5 Results of the empirical survey 
Our empirical survey confirms that EU Member States follow quite divergent paths with 
regard to reincorporations. Question 10 of the questionnaire addressed the hypothetical 
situation of a domestic company that wants to reincorporate in another Member State, 
with the destination country permitting such an operation. 390  Only 33.3% of all 
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respondents replied that they would recommend simply transferring the company’s 
registered office, while more than 48% of the respondents would advise to enter into a 
cross-border merger; interestingly, for more than 18% of the respondents the only 
option is to dissolve the company and incorporate a new company in the envisaged 
jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, respondents from countries explicitly allowing 
reincorporations are significantly more likely to suggest relocations of a company’s 
registered office (43% vs. 19%, with the difference being significant at the 5% level); 20% 
of the respondents from countries that, on paper, do not allow or make reincorporations 
impossible recommended this procedure nonetheless, which shows that domestic rules 
are probably uncertain and inconsistent. 
Question 11 asked about the main reason for that choice, and a vast majority of 
respondents hold that their main concern is legal certainty. Interestingly, respondents 
who would recommend relocating the company’s registered office claim that this solution 
is preferable because it is cheaper and faster than other types of transactions. 
The empirical analysis also reveals that respondents from Southern European countries 
(Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain) have a relative preference for the direct 
change of a company’s statutory seat (or registered office); indeed, some of these 
countries provide for a codified procedure for transferring the seat and reincorporating 
abroad. In this regard, it is extremely interesting to note that respondents from 
countries providing for a comprehensive statutory procedure for reincorporations 
(Cyprus, Malta and Spain) overwhelmingly recommended transferring the registered 
office in order to reincorporate abroad (92%), while this procedure is relatively less 
popular (36%) among countries that allow reincorporations but do not fully and 
comprehensively regulate this procedure (Greece and Portugal); this difference is 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
This result is confirmed at a broader EU level: respondents from countries with a 
comprehensive regulation on reincorporations (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Malta 
and Spain) are less likely to recommend merging into a newly established company (23% 
vs. 51%, significant at the 5% level) and are more likely to recommend transferring the 
registered office into the target jurisdiction than respondents from countries without a 
comprehensive regulation (57% vs. 27%, significant at the 5% level). 
The empirical results also confirm that the private international law classification of a 
country (whether it follows a pure incorporation theory or not) has no influence on the 
respondents’ preferences, which reflects the fact that the general conflict-of-laws 
approach is in effect neutral with regard to reincorporations.  
8.6 Past and present private sector and academic proposals  
The oldest proposals for harmonising private international law for companies did not 
include rules on reincorporations. Neither the proposal drafted in 1965 by the Institute of 
International Law, nor the European Draft Convention of 1968, mention the possibility to 
relocate a company’s ‘registered office’ abroad or to reincorporate under the law of 
another jurisdiction. The Hague Convention on the recognition of the legal personality of 
foreign companies, associations and institutions, drafted in 1956, only provided that 
contracting States should recognise the continuity of a company’s legal personality after 
a transfer of the statutory seat (siège statutaire), provided that such continuity is 
recognised in the two States concerned. The Hague Convention, in other words, 
respected each jurisdiction’s choice on whether domestic companies could reincorporate 
abroad and foreign companies could reincorporate as a domestic company without the 
need to liquidate, it just required third states to respect decisions of the jurisdictions 
involved.  




Most recent academic proposals seem to be more open towards reincorporations. The 
‘Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of Company Law in Europe’ of 2011 
recommended adopting a directive allowing cross-border reincorporations in the EU and 
harmonising procedures governing this operation. 391  The GEDIP proposal of 2015 
addresses this issue by suggesting that companies incorporated in a Member State ‘may 
change [their] applicable law in favour of the law of another Member State without losing 
[their] legal personality’. 392  Furthermore, according to this proposal Member States 
would need to accept both ‘outbound’ reincorporations of domestic companies into non-
EU jurisdictions and ‘inbound’ reincorporations of companies originally incorporated in a 
third state, provided that the third State accepts this operation.393 Additionally, it is 
clarified that the law of the jurisdiction of origin should regulate mechanisms for 
protecting minorities and creditors and the destination jurisdiction should regulate the 
procedure and the conditions for incorporating the company. The main tenet of the 
GEDIP proposal, therefore, is to require Member States to accept cross-border 
reincorporations and establishing the applicable law. Yet the GEDIP proposal addresses 
neither minority and creditor protection rules, nor ‘procedural’ issues (such as the 
moment when the ‘emigrating’ company can be cancelled from the register of the state 
of origin), limiting its scope only to conflict-of-laws rules.  
As mentioned previously, in the Sonnenberger report the main connecting factor is a 
company’s ‘country of registration’ (while non-registered companies are ‘subject to the 
law of the state under whose law they are organised’).394 Therefore, in the Sonnenberger 
proposal companies incorporated in an EU/EEA Member State can reincorporate abroad 
by relocating their place of registration to another jurisdiction (and non-registered 
companies can simply decide to be governed by the law of another Member State of the 
EU or EEA, provided that this change is apparent to third parties).395 The State of origin 
shall regulate requirements for cancelling companies from the domestic register, which 
should also aim at protecting ‘rights of third parties’ and dissenting shareholders. In 
particular, ‘creditors shall be publicly informed of the forthcoming change of applicable 
company law and invited to state their claims.’ Requirements for registration in the new 
jurisdiction shall be governed by the law of that state. The Sonnenberger proposal, 
therefore, does not address the moment when a company can be cancelled from the 
register of the state of origin. It clarifies, however, that the law of the country of origin 
shall apply until the ‘company has been registered in its new place of registration’.  
These projects developed by academics have accompanied the debate in the EU political 
bodies, which was sketched above. In this regard, it is interesting to remember that the 
European Parliament repeatedly requested the European Commission to present a 
proposal for a directive harmonising rules on cross border transfers of a company’s 
registered office.396 Mirroring some of the academics projects, the main concern of the 
European Parliament is that the current lack of consistency of legislation on cross-border 
transfers of company ‘seats’ undermines corporate mobility, which is seen as an 
essential element of freedom of establishment, so that the latest recommendation 
specifies general principles of reincorporations, in particular that Member States should 
adopt provisions for the protection of dissenting shareholders, including a withdrawal 
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right from the ‘emigrating’ company, and creditors should be protected by obtaining a 
security deposit. 
8.7 Specific issues to be addressed in the new directive 
(1) The specific legislative instrument 
As discussed above, 397  we recommend that cross-border reincorporations should be 
regulated at the EU level by a new directive. As we have seen, reincorporations from one 
jurisdiction to another can only be implemented when procedural and substantive rules 
are in place in both jurisdictions that make this operation possible. Member States 
should implement these rules in a way that accommodates the structure and substance 
of their domestic company laws and of their national commercial registers. Thus, the 
instrument of a directive seems to be more appropriate to harmonise rules on 
reincorporations. 
(2) Elements to be transferred in order to ‘reincorporate’ in another jurisdiction 
The question of whether companies can reincorporate abroad is often addressed under 
the label ‘transfer of registered office’ (or ‘transfer of statutory seat’). Companies are 
registered in a public register governed by the country of incorporation, whose 
jurisdiction is normally established according to the location of the company’s ‘seat’ as 
indicated in the articles of association (‘statutory seat’). England and other common law 
jurisdictions use the concept of ‘registered office’, indicating the office (which might be a 
mere letterbox) that is filed with the public register.398 These solutions are in line with 
the 1st Company Law Directive, which requires the presence of a ‘registered office’ in the 
Member State of registration399 and, consequently, we will here refer to a company’s 
‘registered office’, unless it is necessary to distinguish a concept of ‘statutory seat’; 
however, we should also be aware that these concepts may diverge in specific 
circumstances or in certain jurisdictions (as we shall see presently).  
In order to reincorporate abroad, companies need to be struck off the initial public 
register and registered in the public register of the destination Member State. Thus, 
companies should first decide to ‘relocate’ their statutory seat (or their registered office) 
to the new jurisdiction. This explains why all legislative proposals for a 14th directive and 
the resolutions of the European Parliament refer to the transfer of a company’s 
‘registered office’ or to the need to harmonise and clarify rules on the transfer of a 
company’s ‘seat’.  
Yet, a decision to amend the articles of association and to ‘relocate’ the registered office 
does not trigger per se a reincorporation abroad. In order to achieve this effect, further 
conditions are necessary: (a) the company must also show the aim to change the lex 
societatis and, consequently, must file for cancellation from the original register and for 
registration in the public register of the new country; (b) the company should have 
fulfilled all substantial and procedural requirements of both the jurisdiction of origin and 
the jurisdiction of arrival. Consequently, in a normative proposal aimed at coherently 
regulating the whole subject, it is more appropriate to address the whole operation of 
‘reincorporation’, rather than just the transfer of the registered office or statutory seat 
(which is just an element, albeit an essential one, of this transaction). 
                                                 
397 See Section 2.2 above. 
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Furthermore, Member States might require domestic companies to keep certain physical 
elements or economic links, such as their headquarters, administrative seat or another 
establishment on their own territory.400 As a consequence, a reincorporation into these 
Member States also requires compliance with these substantive (or private international 
law) requirements. In this regard, it is worth remembering that freedom of 
establishment, as interpreted in the decisions Cartesio and VALE, does not hinder 
Member States from establishing certain requirements for cross border conversions, 
provided that foreign companies are not discriminated against compared with domestic 
companies. In particular, it is worth remembering that we have previously suggested, in 
the context of a future EU instrument harmonising conflict-of-law rules, that the decision 
whether or not to impose substantive law residence requirements on companies should 
be left to the Member States.401  
A further issue is whether companies can relocate the ‘seat’ indicated in their articles of 
association without reincorporating abroad. As we have noticed in the comparative 
analysis, the law of the Czech Republic and the practice of some Italian local offices of 
the company register allow domestic companies to transfer their statutory seat without 
reincorporating abroad. At the same time, however, a number of EU legislative 
instruments are implicitly based on the assumption that registered office (or statutory 
seat) and applicable law always coincide.402 For instance, according to the Takeover 
Directive, if a listed company could transfer its statutory seat abroad without 
reincorporating in the new jurisdiction, rules on defensive measures of the new 
jurisdiction would apply, even though this company would still be governed by the 
original lex societatis. Therefore, it is advisable that a reform avoids diverging 
interpretations at the national level and any ambiguities as to the consequences of a 
decision to relocate a company’s statutory seat on the applicable law. A harmonising 
measure should also clarify that the law of the Member State in which the company was 
originally incorporated shall apply until the company is entered into the commercial 
register of the other Member State. 
(3) Decision-making body and the role of the board 
The first questions to be addressed are: (a) which corporate organ should decide on 
‘outbound reincorporations’; and (b) which are the procedures and the required majority 
for taking such a decision. In all jurisdictions that allow outbound reincorporations the 
ultimate decision is for the general meeting of the company’s members, similarly to an 
amendment of the articles of association or a merger. This is also the solution adopted 
for cross-border mergers403, the SE404 and the European Cooperative Company (Societas 
Cooperativa Europaea, ‘SCE’) 405 . Further, the question arises whether the board of 
directors should retain an exclusive power to call the meeting and to draw up the 
proposal and a report explaining the underlying reasons. In this regard, both the SE 
Regulation and the Cross-Border Merger Directive follow quite complex procedures.  
                                                 
400 See comparative analysis, Chapter IV, Section 2 above. 
401 See Section 4 above. 
402 See for instance Directive 2007/37/CE on shareholders’ rights, or Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover-bids. 
403 Cross-Border Merger Directive, Art. 9. 
404 SE Regulation, Art. 8(4). 
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Table 2: Decision making rules for cross-border merger / transfer of registered 
office in EU legislative instruments  
Legislative 
instrument 




Directors shall draw up a transfer proposal 
and file it with the domestic public register. 
Directors shall draw up a report on the 
impact of the relocation. 
No decision to transfer may be 
taken for two months after 




Each company needs to draw-up draft terms 
of merger and publish them in accordance 
with national rules. 
Each company should publish in the national 
gazette the essential elements of the 
transaction. 
The board and an independent expert should 
draw-up business and financial reports. 
The transaction should be 
approved by the general 
meeting no earlier than one 
month after the publication of 
the draft terms in the national 
gazette. 
 
Some Member States regulate in detail the role of directors and the powers of the 
general meeting in deciding on a reincorporation abroad. Here, we will use the Czech 
Republic and Spain as examples. 
Table 3: Decision making rules for transfer of registered office in selected 
Member States 
Member State Role of directors and publicity General meeting decision 
Czech Republic A proposal should be published in 
the Commercial Gazette 
Decision of the general meeting to 
approve the transformation 
(supermajority of three fourths of the 
attending shareholders); (b) notary 
certificate of the cross-border 
transformation 
Spain Transfer project (drafted by 
directors) in a public document 
should be published in the official 
journal of the Commercial 
Register. 
Approval of general meeting of 
shareholders with supermajority and 
special formalities. 
 
Following the blueprint of the Cross-Border Merger Directive, the SE Regulation and the 
SCE Regulation, we recommend that the proposal for reincorporations shall be drafted by 
the board of directors and be made public in the local register before it is approved by 
the general meeting of shareholders. Such proposal should include the proposed new 
Member State of incorporation, its legal form, the articles of association of the company 
as amended to comply with substantive rules of this Member State and the proposed 
transfer timetable, including the date from which the company will be treated as a 
company regulated by the incoming Member State for accounting purposes. By contrast, 
it seems that the duty to make the proposal public in the national gazette, which is 
prescribed by the Cross-Border Merger Directive, is far too burdensome and that 
publicity by filing the proposal with the companies register is sufficient. It also seems 
useful to specify that the board of directors needs to draw up a report explaining and 
justifying the legal and economic aspects of the reincorporation and explaining the 
implications of the reincorporation for members, creditors and employees. 




(4) Protection of dissenting shareholders 
One reason for an explicit legal instrument regulating reincorporations is the need to 
protect minority shareholders from risks related to a change of the lex societatis. In this 
regard, in both the SE Regulation and the Cross-Border Merger Directive minority 
shareholder protection is merely optional. The SCE Regulation, by contrast, provides for 
a mandatory mechanism protecting dissenting minorities, who have the right to 
withdraw from the company.  
Table 4: Shareholder protection in cross-border mergers / transfer of 
registered office in EU legislative instruments 
Legislative instrument Super-majorities Withdrawal right 
SE Regulation Optional  Optional 
Cross-Border Merger 
Directive 
Yes (based on 3d Company Law 
Directive on domestic mergers: at 
least 2/3 of the represented capital) 
Optional 
SCE Regulation Optional Yes 
 
Table 5: Shareholder protection in transfer of registered office in selected 
Member States 
Member State Super-majorities Withdrawal right 
Cyprus Special resolution of the shareholders 
according to the memorandum and 
articles of association of the 
company. 
No 
Czech Republic 3/4 of attending shareholders No 
Portugal 75% of the share capital  Yes 
Spain - Private companies: 2/3 of capital  
- Public companies:  ½ of voting 
shares if 50% or more of voting 
capital attended the meeting; 2/3 of 
voting shares if between 25% and 
50% of shares with voting capital 
attended the meeting 
Yes 
 
A comparison of the Member States with the most comprehensive legislation on 
reincorporations shows that: (a) in the Czech Republic, Portugal and Spain the decision 
should be taken by the general meeting of shareholders by supermajority; (b) these 
supermajorities range from two thirds of the attending shareholders to 75% of the share 
capital; (c) some jurisdiction grant a right to withdraw from the company to dissenting 
shareholders. 
It is a problematic question which level of harmonisation of shareholder rights is 
desirable. The risks of negative externalities of national rules do not justify a full 
harmonisation of shareholder protection mechanisms. It may be useful to distinguish 
between possible strategies for the protection of minority shareholders along two 
dimensions: (a) supermajority and quorum, and (b) withdrawal rights.  
(a) Majorities and quorum 
The very existence of a legal person separate from its members, and the corresponding 
benefit of limited liability, stem from rules rooted in a specific legal system in which 




companies are embedded. In the words of the Court of Justice, ‘companies are creatures 
of the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law’. 406 
Consequently, a decision to ‘reincorporate’ under a different jurisdiction, if allowed, 
should be decided by shareholders with at least the same quorum and majority as 
needed for amending the articles of association, or for converting the company into 
another type of domestic company. A directive on reincorporations can either leave the 
decision on the proper quorum and majority entirely to the Member States, or impose 
some minimum requirements. In this regard, in order to ensure conformity with the 
Cross-Border Merger Directive, which is the alternative mechanism for implementing a 
reincorporation throughout the EU, it might be advisable for a future harmonisation 
instrument to harmonise quorum and majority requirements for domestic mergers, 
cross-border mergers and reincorporations. At the same, if the level for quorum and 
majority requirements were set too high, reincorporations would risk becoming 
impossible in practice, which would be considered as a restriction of freedom of 
establishment in need of justification under the ‘Gebhard test’. Additionally, it seems 
advisable that a mandatory protection of classes of shares is included in the new 
directive. 
(b) Withdrawal right 
A common strategy for protecting dissenting shareholders against decisions that alter 
fundamental characters of the company is granting them a right to withdraw their 
participation. In this regard, both the Cross-Border Merger Directive and the SE 
Regulation leave with the Member States the decision of whether and under which 
conditions dissenting shareholders can withdraw their participation. The SCE Regulation, 
by contrast, makes this mechanism for protecting shareholder mandatory in all Member 
States. This solution reflects the different nature of membership in a cooperative 
company, which justifies harmonised protection throughout the EU. Regarding other 
companies, however, it is questionable whether particular reasons justify a full 
harmonisation of the Member States’ strategies for protecting minority shareholders of 
domestic companies, other than introducing super-majorities and specific quorum 
requirements.  
(5) Protection of creditors  
Protecting pre-existing creditors of the company as well as other stakeholders is one of 
the main problems related to outbound reincorporations and the main reason why 
several jurisdictions are restrictive towards reincorporations. 407  According to the SE 
Regulation, the Member State of original incorporation should provide for adequate 
protection, while the Cross-Border Merger Directive implicitly refers to the Third Directive 
on domestic mergers, according to which Member States should provide ‘adequate 
safeguards where the financial situation of the merging companies makes such 
protection necessary and where those creditors do not already have such safeguards’. 
Additionally, the SE Regulation and the SCE Regulation do not allow relocations of a 
company’s registered office abroad if proceedings for ‘winding-up, liquidation, insolvency 
or suspension of payments or other similar proceedings’ have been brought.408 
Member States that have detailed regulations on cross-border conversions in place also 
provide for adequate creditor protection mechanisms, mostly based on the right to 
object to the reincorporation. 
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Table 6: Creditor protection in transfer of registered office in selected Member 
States 
Member State Creditor protection 
Cyprus Solvency statement of directors.  
Any creditor can object to the reincorporation, indicating sufficient reasons.  
The Court may approve the reincorporation with an order, or on the basis of 
sufficient guarantees, or can prohibit it. 
Czech Republic Creditors can demand that the company puts up security for unpaid debts.  
The company shall furnish the notary with documents proving that all known 
debts have been satisfied or secured or that creditors have not exercised 
their right to ask for a security. 
Spain Pre-existing creditors can object to the reincorporation according to the 
rules on mergers (only unsecured creditors can object, the reincorporation 
cannot be implemented and is ineffective until the company has provided a 
security). 
 
The first option that could be considered by policy-makers is to provide for the same 
minimum level of harmonisation as for cross-border mergers and a transfer abroad of 
the SE’s registered office. This solution would leave the protection of creditors in the 
Member States’ hands according to their policy preferences. Member States would only 
be subject to the obligation to provide for ‘adequate protection’ of creditors. This solution 
would significantly increase the level of creditor protection throughout the European 
Union for countries that allow domestic companies to reincorporate abroad but do not 
regulate this transaction. In this regard, it might be more appropriate to grant such 
protection only to creditors whose claim arose before a reincorporation proposal was 
published in the domestic commercial register. This minimum level of harmonisation 
could be drafted, for instance, according to the model of the SE Regulation. 
In the EU, however, companies can decide not to conduct their business in the Member 
State of incorporation, in which case most of their creditors are likely to be situated in 
the jurisdiction of the place of business. The decisions taken by the Member State of 
origin as to the level of creditor protection in reincorporations, therefore, might have 
negative externalities on creditors situated in Member States where this company 
conducts its business. These creditors, indeed, are not citizen of the Member State of 
incorporation and, therefore, cannot influence its rules by exercising their political rights. 
Thus, leaving creditor protection mechanisms in the hands of Member States of 
incorporation may produce negative externalities (‘spill-over effect’), 409  which might 
justify some form of harmonisation of creditor protection rules beyond a minimal duty to 
provide ‘adequate protection’. 
To be sure, these negative externalities are ‘natural’ effects of the creation of a common 
market, whose geographical dimension (the whole EU) is obviously broader than that of 
any Member States.410. It might be however possible to consider addressing the ‘spill-
over effects’ of reincorporations, to some extent, by increasing the level of creditor 
protection mechanisms object to minimum harmonisation. For instance, a possible 
solution may be that Member States grant pre-existing unsecured creditors a right to 
object to the reincorporation and to require adequate security or payment, and that a 
court should assess whether the reincorporation is detrimental to creditors or not. 
Additionally, in order to avoid opportunistic reincorporations decided in insolvency or in 
the vicinity of insolvency, it seems desirable that a new directive prohibits companies 
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against which proceedings for liquidation, insolvency or suspension of payments had 
been brought to reincorporate abroad.411  
(6) Employee protection 
In some Member States, employees can appoint a certain number of members of the 
supervisory board or of the board of directors (‘codetermination’). 412  Therefore, 
reincorporations out of these countries risk to disenfranchise the employees if the new 
state of incorporation does not have similar mechanisms. To address this risk, the 
Directive on employee involvement accompanying the European Company (SE) Statute 
and the Cross-Border Merger Directive413 establish mandatory legal frameworks aimed at 
protecting existing employee participation arrangements. A new directive, therefore, 
should address this issue and should carefully consider whether to apply those 
mechanisms to reincorporations.  
(7) Jurisdiction 
The Brussels I Regulation Recast stipulates that companies can be sued in the Member 
State where they have either their statutory seat (which should mean ‘registered office’ 
in Cyprus, Ireland and the UK), or their head office or central place of business.414 
Therefore, a reincorporation, being always connected with a simultaneous transfer of the 
registered office, is likely to also shift international jurisdiction (unless the company 
already had its head office or central place of business in the Member State of the new 
registered office, in which case nothing changes in terms of competent courts). 415 
Furthermore, according to the Brussels I Regulation Recast, in proceedings related to 
‘the validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies’ or to ‘the 
validity of the decisions of their organs’, the courts of the Member State in which the 
company has its ‘seat’ have exclusive jurisdiction,416 and each Member State should 
interpret the concept of ‘seat’ according to their own rules of private international law.417 
Regarding these ‘core company law’ matters, therefore, a relocation abroad of a 
company’s statutory seat or registered office will also shift the international jurisdiction, 
unless neither the country of arrival nor the country of departure interpret the concept of 
‘seat’ as ‘statutory seat’ (or ‘registered office’) for jurisdictional purposes. 
It follows that creditors, whose claims came into existence before their debtor decided to 
relocate its registered office abroad, may be disadvantaged by a shift of the competent 
forum. To address this risk, the SE Regulation and the SCE Regulation provide that, if a 
company decides to relocate its registered office to another Member State, it shall be 
deemed, in respect of any cause of action arising prior to the transfer, to continue to 
have its registered office in the Member State of origin.418 It is advisable to extend this 
provision to reincorporations, as the same risk can arise in this case. However, it should 
be made clear that this general principle of ‘jurisdictional continuity’ should not apply to 
insolvency proceedings included in the scope of the Insolvency Regulation Recast. 
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(8) Reincorporation procedure 
Procedural requirements for companies wishing to reincorporate are often uncertain 
under the national laws of the Member States involved. Additionally, national legislations 
could make reincorporations prohibitively difficult in practice, even where they are 
theoretically allowed. The question therefore arises as to whether procedural rules on 
reincorporations should be harmonised and, if the answer is in the positive, how such 
harmonisation should be fashioned. In this context, it should also be considered that EU 
companies can reincorporate, in effect, by way of cross-border mergers and that 
European Companies (SE) can also relocate their registered office from one Member 
State to another; consequently, it needs to be discussed whether the procedures 
provided for in the Cross-Border Merger Directive and in the SE Regulation should be 
used as a model. The main procedural problem arising for reincorporations is the 
coordination of actions taken by the relevant companies registers, as legal personality is 
typically tied to registration. The risk exists that the company register of the country of 
origin strikes off a company before it ‘reappears’ in the destination country. This risk is 
not trivial, as the cases Interedil and VALE clearly show.419  
In this respect, the SE Regulation, the SCE Regulation and the Cross-Border Merger 
Directive all stipulate that (a) Member States should designate a court, notary or other 
authority, which shall scrutinise the legality of the transaction and issue a certificate 
attesting the completion of acts and formalities to be accomplished in the country or 
origin; (b) this certificate should be submitted to (i) the commercial register of the new 
registered office of an SE or SCE, or (ii) the court, notary or authority designated by the 
Member State of the company resulting from a cross-border merger; (c) the new 
registration, or the registration of the company resulting from a cross-border merger, 
may not be affected until this certificate has been submitted; (d) when the new 
registration has been affected, the registry shall notify the commercial register of the 
jurisdiction of origin, or of the jurisdiction where the companies entering into a cross-
border merger are registered; (e) a company can be deleted from the commercial 
register of the original country only after its name is entered in the commercial register 
of the new Member State, or the company resulting from a cross-border merger is 
registered in the Member State where its registered office is situated. Consequently, a 
simple solution for regulating reincorporations in this respect might be to replicate the 
rules provided for in these EU instruments. 
9. Relevance of other areas of law 
9.1 Criminal law 
In all Member States, specific criminal sanctions ensure the enforcement of company law 
rules, in particular the obligations of directors. The question, therefore, arises as to 
whether these offenses only apply to domestic companies or also to directors of foreign 
companies. Our comparative analysis has revealed an intricate web of national solutions 
regarding the international scope of directors’ criminal liabilities.420 For the purposes of 
this report, we only address those criminal offenses that enforce ‘company law rules’, 
with a particular attention to directors’ and other corporate officers’ duties. 
The comparative analysis has also shown that strategies in the Member States are highly 
diverse. In some Member States, criminal offenses related to the violation of directors’ 
duties only apply to directors of domestic companies (this is the case in Croatia, 
Denmark, Italy, Romania and the UK). Consequently, in these jurisdictions, directors of 
foreign companies do not face the risk of being held liable for such criminal offenses, 
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even if these companies are active in the Member State or the action is committed on 
the domestic territory, unless the company has entered into insolvency proceedings. 
National reports of several other Member States indicate that criminal offenses enforcing 
‘company law rules’, notably directors’ duties, also apply to foreign companies having 
some connection with the domestic territory (this is the case in Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain). 
National reports mention the following connecting factors that trigger the application of 
criminal law enforcing ‘company law’ rules: (a) the fact that the crime is committed on 
the domestic territory, regardless of the country of incorporation (Austria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain); (b) the fact that 
the company has activities or its real seat or administrative seat on the domestic 
territory (France and Portugal).  
In this inconsistent scenario, the risks arise either that the criminal laws of two countries 
(the country of incorporation and the country where the criminal act is committed) are 
applicable, or that no criminal offense is applicable at all. Additionally, if criminal liability 
also applies to directors or other corporate officers of foreign companies, the ultimate 
effect may be that the underlying duties indirectly apply to these companies too. In 
other words, a criminal sanction may be a functional substitute of directors’ and officers’ 
civil liability, which applies to foreign companies similarly to outreach statutes. 
In this regard, in order to make a comprehensive assessment, a further study seems to 
be needed to precisely evaluate all relevant scenarios and possible inconsistencies in the 
criminal laws of the Member States.421 This is not a topic comprised in the scope of a 
legislative instrument harmonising private international law for companies. Nevertheless, 
an approximation of the international scope of criminal sanctions that enforce national 
company law rules might be desirable. Regarding criminal sanctions triggered by the 
violation of company law rules, it seems advisable that their scope should coincide with 
the international scope of the underlying rule, with the consequence that these liabilities 
should be only applicable to directors and other officers of domestic companies. However, 
it should be clear that this narrow scope should not apply to law duties and actions 
deriving from an insolvency proceeding or ‘closely linked to it’, such as certain criminal 
offenses for the failure to file for insolvency, which should preferably follow the COMI 
criterion and also apply to foreign insolvent companies having their COMI on the 
domestic territory, following the logic of the Insolvency Regulation Recast.422  
9.2 Tax law  
Although there is no common definition of ‘tax residence’ applicable in all Member States, 
this concept is commonly understood as the place where a company’s business is 
undertaken or where revenues are generated. Therefore, a company’s ‘tax residence’ 
diverges both from its registered office and from its ‘administrative seat’ or ‘central 
management’ (although it is more likely to coincide with the latter, being somewhat 
linked to the physical presence of a company on a specific territory).423 In other words, a 
company’s tax residence is likely to be situated in a country within whose economic and 
social environment that company is embedded. Thus, it is politically understandable that 
relocations abroad of a company’s tax residence may trigger a reaction from the country 
of origin, such as the taxation of all unrealised profits similar to a winding-up situation 
(‘exit tax’). It is necessary to clarify that the prerequisite of exit taxes is normally a 
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transfer abroad of a company’s ‘tax residence’, which does not necessarily imply a 
reincorporation under the law of another jurisdiction and the transfer of the registered 
office to the territory of that state (as the ECJ decision in the case Daily Mail clearly 
shows, which was related to restrictions on the outbound relocation of a company’s tax 
residence). Such exit taxes, however, might unnecessarily restrict corporate mobility 
throughout the EU and infringe the freedom of establishment, as the Court of Justice 
highlighted in National Grid Indus.  
The comparative analysis of this report shows that several Member States do not apply 
exit taxes.424 Other jurisdictions, by contrast, tax unrealised profits of companies that 
decide to transfer their tax residence abroad. Some of these countries have not yet 
amended their rules to comply with the most recent case law. In the following table we 
summarise these results: 
Table 7: Overview of exit taxes in Member States  
Countries Exit tax 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Spain 
No exit tax 
Austria, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden 
Exit tax in compliance with the 
case law of the Court of Justice 
Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Slovenia 
Exit tax not amended after the 
Court’s decision in National Grid 
 
Tax law issues do not fall within the scope of a legislative instrument harmonising 
private international law rules for companies. Any instrument on this matter would thus 
not affect tax law. However, as far as relocation of companies is concerned, it seems 
relevant to mention tax matters, mostly because ‘exit taxes’ have a relevant impact on 
freedom of establishment. We would, therefore, recommend undertaking further 
research and analysis, as far as re-incorporations are concerned, with the aim of 
clarifying to what extent exit taxes may constitute an obstacle to the freedom of 
establishment.   
9.3 Other areas of law: private and public 
Previous sections of this normative analysis already discussed the often contentious 
scope of the lex societatis, paying particular attention to private international law rules 
of insolvency law, contract law, tort law and securities law.425 It could therefore be 
contemplated that, as in the Rome I and II Regulations, the first article of a future Rome 
V Regulation should clarify the relationship to those (and other) areas of law in its article 
1(2) stating that ‘the following shall be excluded from the scope of this Regulation …’. 
Indeed, the GEDIP proposal indicates a list of excluded matters in its proposed article 
1(2).426 
However, we are not convinced that such a generic list can provide a sufficient degree of 
legal certainty for the complex questions about the relationship between company law 
and related areas of private international law. Thus, we suggest that the exclusion of 
                                                 
424 See Comparative Analysis, Chapter IV, Section 7 above. 
425 See Section 6, above. 
426 Referring to ‘(a) Contractual and non-contractual obligations of the company itself, and the liability in tort of 
the members and directors of a company vis à vis third parties; (b) Rights in rem over shares or other partici-
pation rights; (c) Insolvency; (d) The constitution of trusts and the relationship between settlors, trustees and 
beneficiaries; and (e) Labour relationships and employees rights [other than rights of participation in the or-
gans [or other bodies] of the company].’ 




certain topics should be addressed more specifically in the individual sections of a Rome 
V Regulation that deal with these particular issues. 
Beyond other areas of private international law (and the specific issues of criminal and 
tax law; see 9.1 and 9.2. above), there can be situations where the applicable public law 
raises the question whether to focus on the ‘statutory seat’ or the ‘real seat’ of 
companies; for example, where a Member State requires a license to pursue a particular 
business and a company is registered in one Member State but has its headquarters in 
another.427 However, this situation is likely to have a straightforward solution, since the 
international scope of public law is based on a strictly territorial approach. Thus, such 
rules will cover any activity in the Member State in question, even if it is conducted in 
the form of a foreign company. There are also situations where Member States 
coordinate more closely with respect to certain cross-border aspects of public law, say in 
questions of banking and securities regulation. In these areas, the corresponding EU 
rules generally specify precisely which Member State is competent and how coordination 
between the Member States is conducted.428 
In the Rome I and II Regulations, the corresponding articles 1(1)(s.2) clarify that the 
Regulation ‘shall not apply, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters’. 
A similar proposal is made by the GEDIP proposal. For reasons of consistency, this report 
suggests that a future Rome V Regulation should phrase this issue in the same way as 
the Rome I and II Regulations. 
10. Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction issues and conflict of laws rules applicable to companies are necessarily 
closely related. The main risk arising in a situation with a cross-border element is that 
the competent venue may be situated in a Member State different from the state of 
incorporation. Since the procedural rules of the forum apply, a consequence would be 
divergence of procedural law and applicable substantive rules. This issue was already 
addressed above when we discussed to what extent rules on derivative actions and other 
enforcement mechanisms are to be classified as merely procedural rules or as 
substantive law provisions.429  In this respect, it was also highlighted that procedural and 
substantive mechanisms are interdependent and often reveal significant 
complementarities, with the consequence that it would be infeasible, if possible at all, to 
disentangle them.  
Regarding companies, the Brussels I Regulation partially harmonises jurisdiction rules for 
proceedings relating to ‘the validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of 
companies’ or to ‘the validity of the decisions of their organs’.430 For these proceedings, 
courts of the Member State of a company’s ‘seat’ are competent, but national courts 
should interpret this term in accordance with their own private international law rules.431  
Therefore, the concept of ‘seat’ is likely to reflect the main conflict-of-law criterion 
employed in a given Member State; consequently, currently ‘real seat’ countries may 
interpret the term as ‘real seat’ or ‘administrative seat’, while ‘incorporation theory’ 
countries may tend to interpret it as ‘registered office’, with the consequence that 
positive and negative conflicts of jurisdictions could arise.  
                                                 
427 Another example from public law concerns the question of human rights obligations of companies; for the 
discussion see, e.g., S Deva and D Bilchitz (eds.), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corpo-
rate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015). 
428 See, e.g., Directive 2013/36/EU on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision 
of credit institutions and investment firms (CRD IV), Arts. 13, 47, 50; Directive 2003/71/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are of-
fered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, Arts.  2(1)(m),(n), 23. 
429 See Section 6.1.2.1, above. 
430 Brussels I Regulation, Art. 24(2), first sentence (Art. 22(2) of the ‘old’ Brussels I Regulation). 
431 Brussels I Regulation, Art. 24(2), second sentence (Art. 22(2) of the ‘old’ Brussels I Regulation). 




The comparative analysis has partially confirmed this assumption. In most countries that 
follow the ‘incorporation theory’, the concept of ‘seat’ is interpreted as ‘statutory seat’ or 
‘registered office’. This is the case in Austria (for EU companies), Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany (for EU companies), Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, the UK (which 
however expands the competence of domestic courts to foreign companies whose central 
management and control is exercised from the UK). The sole exceptions among 
incorporation theory countries are Ireland, where this issue has never been explicitly 
addressed by any courts, and Italy, where just one judiciary decision is known on that 
matter, stating that a company’s seat is the place of its main business activity. In most 
other countries the concept of a company’s ‘seat’ is interpreted with reference to fact-
based criteria, such as the ‘real seat’ or the actual management of the company, even 
for companies incorporated abroad. It is, however, surprising that several national 
reports indicate that domestic courts have never explicitly addressed the concept of ‘seat’ 
under the Brussels I Regulation (this is the case in Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, and Portugal). The most striking result 
of this overview is, therefore, that the content of the law is simply uncertain in several 
jurisdictions and it is unpredictable whether courts of these countries will be held 
competent or not.  
A Rome V Regulation harmonising conflict of laws rules for companies throughout the EU 
would have an indirect impact on the interpretation of the concept of ‘seat’ pursuant to 
article 24(2) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast, which should then be interpreted as 
‘registered office’ in all Member States. Nevertheless, in order to increase legal certainty, 
it seems advisable to explicitly replace the jurisdiction criterion concerning ‘core’ 
company law matters in article 24(2) Brussels I Regulation Recast with a uniform 
criterion, such as the ‘registered office’ (or the ‘statutory seat’), the country in which a 
company is incorporated, or the country according to whose laws an unincorporated 
company was formed. This new formulation would be consistent with the general private 
international law regime for companies and would avoid both positive and negative 
conflicts of jurisdiction. Additionally, it seems advisable to expand the scope of the ‘core’ 
company law matters beyond the narrow boundaries set by article 24(2) Brussels I 
Regulation Recast, with the aim of including at least derivative actions, any other actions 
concerning the liability of directors and other company organs, and any procedure that 
domestic shareholders, directors or supervisory bodies may invoke in front of a court to 
enforce compliance with company law requirements. 
11. Conclusion 
This report suggests a possible harmonisation of conflict-of-laws rules in the area of 
company law at the EU level, in response to the significant legal variation and 
uncertainty identified in the Member States’ regimes. 
Given the persistent diversity of substantive company laws, conflict of laws rules will 
continue to play a crucial role. This study supports the idea of common EU conflict of 
laws rules applicable to companies in a future ‘Rome V Regulation’. Those rules would 
not cover substantive rules of company law, for example as far as they relate to seat 
transfers. In the medium/long term, it is suggested that a new regulation on conflict of 
laws rules applicable to companies and all existing (and forthcoming) ‘Rome regulations’ 
should be merged into one regulation. Such a consolidated regulation (‘European Code of 
Private International Law’) can best clarify ambiguities about the relationship between 
the lex societatis, the lex contractus, the lex delicti etc. and may therefore foster the 
‘unity of the legal order’. It can also provide for a consistent regulation of the common 
themes (ordre public, renvoi etc) that have been addressed in the existing Rome 
regulations and that are discussed in this report. 




It is proposed that, as a general rule, a company shall be governed by the law according 
to which it has been incorporated, and an unincorporated entity by the law according to 
which it has been formed. It is useful to include in the definition of ‘incorporated 
companies’ all companies that acquire (full) legal personality upon entry in the 
commercial or companies register of the jurisdiction of formation. This provision should 
be supplemented by a ‘residual clause’ to the effect that the law of the closest 
connection shall apply if the law cannot be determined pursuant to the general rule. 
The regulation should provide for a non-exhaustive enumeration of the matters governed 
by the applicable law in order to give guidance as to the future (autonomous) 
interpretation of the regulation. The enumeration should include the following matters: 
formation of the company and legal nature/personality; corporate name; capacity of the 
company and authority of its organs; capital structure; rights and obligations of the 
members; internal management matters (board structure, the composition of corporate 
boards, and the involvement of employees, if any); duties of directors and liability for a 
breach of duty and generally for breaches of company law; voluntary winding up; 
enforcement of the company’s claims by its shareholders; the right of shareholders to 
challenge resolutions of the corporate organs; and financial reporting requirements. 
The scope of the lex societatis should extend to the regulation of the consequences of a 
lack of capacity or power by the company or its organs. However, in order to protect 
third parties acting in good faith, the regulation should provide that, where the 
application of the lex societatis would lead to the invalidity of an act, this fact cannot be 
invoked against third parties if (i) a company organ purporting to act on behalf of the 
company enters into a legal relationship with the third party in a country other than the 
Member State of incorporation, (ii) the company has an establishment or acts through a 
personally present representative in the country where the legal relationship is entered 
into, (iii) according to the law of that country the relevant restriction would not exist, 
and (iv) the third party did not know and should not have known of the existence of the 
restrictions pursuant to the lex societatis. 
On the other hand, legal mechanisms designed to address problems arising specifically in 
insolvency or in the vicinity of insolvency shall not be included in the scope of the lex 
societatis, irrespective of the internal classification of the provision in the Member State’s 
company or insolvency law. Such mechanisms are in particular legal provisions that 
derogate from common rules of civil and commercial law to protect the interests of the 
general body of creditors and mitigate risk-shifting in the vicinity of insolvency. However, 
in contrast to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice interpreting the scope of the 
Insolvency Regulation, it would be irrelevant for the functional determination of the 
boundary region between company law and insolvency law suggested here whether the 
action in question was in fact brought by the liquidator in the context of insolvency 
proceedings. 
The recitals of the regulation may emphasise that company law mechanisms designed to 
protect the position of controlled undertakings in a corporate group should be governed 
by the lex societatis of the controlled undertaking (rather than the controlling 
undertaking) and that other legal mechanisms governing the rights and obligations of 
group companies follow general principles of private international law. In addition, the 
recitals may clarify that the general criteria developed for the demarcation of the lex 
societatis, lex concursus and lex loci delicti determine how different types of legal 
mechanism imposing liability on the shareholders for the debts of the company shall be 
classified for purposes of private international law. 
The regulation should further stipulate that formal requirements of both acts performed 
in the establishment of a company and the acts of corporate organs and shareholders 
shall be governed by the lex societatis, provided that the acts as such fall within the 




scope of the lex societatis. Alternatively, compliance with the formal requirements of the 
law of the Member State where the act was performed shall suffice, provided that the 
formal requirements in that Member State are functionally equivalent. If the rationale for 
the required involvement of a notary public includes the expectation that the parties 
involved receive some form of legal advice regarding the relevant act, the regulation 
should clarify that acts performed according to the laws of a Member State other than 
the Member State of incorporation shall only be regarded as equivalent where advice on 
the applicable law can also be given in the context of the compliance with formalities 
under the law of the Member State where the act was performed. Furthermore, Member 
States should be allowed to apply the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum or of 
a state where the company carries out relevant activities to companies incorporated in 
another jurisdiction. Such mandatory provisions may be, in particular, provisions 
regulating the use of corporate names to avoid the creation of a misleading impression 
and rules on the eligibility and disqualification of directors. 
Finally, due to persisting significant legal uncertainty as regards cross-border 
reincorporations, the report suggests that a directive should be adopted to provide for 
harmonised rules and procedures allowing companies created under the law of a Member 
State to convert into a company governed by the law of another Member State. Such 
reincorporations shall not result in the winding up of the company or in the creation of a 
new legal person. The Directive should also harmonise procedures for implementing 
cross-border reincorporations and provide minimum harmonisation of the rules on 
creditor protection, with the aim of avoiding opportunistic reincorporations at the 
expenses of creditors and other stakeholders. 
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